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Abstract  
 
Intellectual property has been a crucial issue for China in the past four decades. Internationally, 
it was central to China’s fifteen-year negotiation on its accession to the WTO and has been a 
priority in China-US bilateral relations. Domestically, changes in the regulation and use of 
intellectual property reflect a larger picture of rapid economic and social transition in China. 
Initially, China was a rule-taker in intellectual property, experiencing pressure from abroad to do 
much more on intellectual property. In response, China enacted comprehensive domestic 
intellectual property laws. From 2001, the Chinese Trademark Office was registering more 
trademarks than any other office in the world and from 2011, the State Intellectual Property Office 
of China (SIPO) became the world's largest patent office. Today the Chinese government 
promotes intellectual property protection in its national strategy of “innovation-driven 
development” and seeks to transform China into the world’s leading intellectual property power.  
This thesis focuses on whether the large-scale deployment of intellectual property by China in 
various markets means that it has become a regulatory power in intellectual property, in the sense 
of being an agenda setter and source of global influence over IP rules. The UK in the nineteenth 
century and the US in the twentieth were regulatory IP powers in this sense.   
China’s regulatory and international influence over IP rules is tracked empirically through case 
studies on geographical indications (Chapter 3), the disclosure obligation (Chapter 4), and 
intellectual property and standardization (Chapter 5), along with an examination of China’s 
international IP engagement at the bilateral level (Chapter 6) and plurilateral and multilateral 
levels (Chapter 7). This thesis also analyses the roles of sub-state actors and non-state actors in 
China’s international intellectual property engagement (Chapter 8).    
This thesis argues that China’s role in international intellectual property regulation is more 
nuanced and complicated than a binary categorization of “rule-maker” or “rule-taker”. China’s 
international IP engagement is guided by a group of key principles, specifically the principles of 
IP instrumentalism and a set of foreign policy principles. These principles have been implemented 
through a process of modeling, while potential conflicts have been minimized through a strategy 
of balancing.  The effects of modeling are compliance and institutional isomorphism which makes 
the Chinese IP system similar to those of developed countries.  Balancing leads to constructed 
inconsistency and has led China into keeping a low-profile in international policy debates on 
intellectual property.  
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Chinese Phonetic Alphabet Spelling rules for Chinese Names (GB/T 28039-2011) 1 , which 
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Zheng Chengsi for 郑成思.  
The spelling of Chinese geographical names follows the pinyin system (the standard system of 
Romanised spelling for transliterating Chinese characters).  
Chinese laws, administrative regulations, ministerial rules, and terms originally used in Chinese 
are translated in English directly to facilitate the understanding by English speakers. The general 
rule to deal with these Chinese terms is: English translation + Chinese characters + [pinyin], for 
example: 
      The Belt and Road Initiative 一带一路倡议 [yidaiyilu changyi]. 
Publications in Chinese are cited extensively in this thesis. Author names, titles, and sources of 
the Chinese publications are translated into English in the reference lists. In translating titles of 
these publications, I directly adopt the English translation when such translation is available at 
the database China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) to facilitate research of the source, 
even if I may have a different translation personally.  
                                                     
1   Full text of this standard is available at: 
http://www.moe.edu.cn/ewebeditor/uploadfile/2015/01/13/20150113091249368.pdf.   
XV 
Abbreviations 
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project  
ABS access and benefit-sharing  
ACTA the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
AIIB the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
AmCham China the American Chamber of Commerce in China 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
AQSIQ the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine 
ASEAN the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AVS Audio Video coding Standards  
Beijing Treaty  the Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performance   
BRI the Belt and Road Initiative 
BRICS Bank BRICS Development Bank, also known as the New Development Bank 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBWIPSG China Broadband Wireless IP Standard Group  
CCP the Chinese Communist Party 
CCPIT China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
CESI China Electronic Standardization Institute  
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement   
CFDA China Food and Drug Administration  
CMFA China Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
CoCom the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 
DMCA Digital Millennium Copyright Act  
DSB WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
EEC the European Economic Community  
EFOW European Federation of Origin Wines 
EPO European Patent Office 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization  
FDI foreign direct investments  
FRAND fair, reasonable and non-discrimination  
FTA free trade agreement 
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
G-77 the Group of 77 
GAPP the General Administration of Press and Publishing 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GI geographical indication 
GI Extension extending higher-level protection to products beyond wines and spirits  
XVI 
GI Register a multilateral system for notifying and registering GIs for wines and 
spirits  
GVCs global value chains 
HIPO Heads of Intellectual Property Offices, a BRICS IP cooperation 
mechanism  
ICT information communication technologies  
IEEE the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IP intellectual property 
IPC international patent classification  
IPDRC the Intellectual Property Development and Research Centre of the State 
Intellectual Property Office of China 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IPR1 EU-China Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (1999-
2004) 
IPR2 EU China Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights  (2007-
2011) 
IPRCM BRICS IPR Cooperation Mechanism 
IRCC Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance  
IRPL Implementing Rules of the Patent Law  
ISO the International Standard Organization 
ISP Internet service provider 
ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture 
ITU International Telecommunications Union  
IUPGR International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources  
JCCT the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 
KOREU FTA South Korea-EU FTA 
KORUS FTA South Korea-US FTA 
LAC Legislative Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress 
LAO Legislative Affair Office of the State Council 
Lisbon 
Agreement 
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration 
LMMC Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries 
Madrid 
Agreement 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
Madrid Protocol the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks 
MEP the Ministry of Environmental protection  
MFN the most favored nation 
MII the Ministry of Information Industry  
MIIT the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
MNCs multinational corporations  
MOA the Ministry of Agriculture 
MOC the Ministry of Culture 
XVII 
MOF the Ministry of Finance 
MOFCOM the Ministry of Commerce 
MOST the Ministry of Science and Technology 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières  
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
Nagoya Protocol Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity  
NB national body 
NCAAC National Certification and Accreditation Administration Committee 
NCAC the National Copyright Administration of China 
NDB the New Development Bank 
NDRC the National Development and Reform Commission 
NPA the National Publishing Administration 
PAIC Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce  
PCCP the Politburo of Chinese Communist Party 
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty  
PDO Protected Designation of Origin  
PGI Protected Geographical Indication  
PGRFA genetic resources for food and agriculture  
PIC prior informed consent  
PIPA Protect Intellectual Property Act  
PLT Patent Law Treaty 
PPH patent prosecution highway  
PRC the People's Republic of China 
QUAD the coalition of Canada, the EC, Japan and the United States in TRIPS 
negotiations 
RAND reasonable and non-discrimination 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  
Rome Convention  International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations  
S&ED the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
SAC the Standard Administration Committee of China  
SAIC the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
SAPPRFT the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and 
Television 
SBQTS State Bureau of Quality and Technological Supervision  
SCT the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial 
Designs and Geographical Indications 
SCTK WIPO Standing Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions 
SEPs standard essential patents 
XVIII 
SFA the State Forestry Administration 
SIPO the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
SOPA Stop Online Piracy Act  
SPLT Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
SPO the State Patent Office of China (the predecessor of SIPO) 
SSOs standard setting organizations 
SSTC the State Science and Technology Commission 
TBT technical barriers to trade  
TKDL Traditional Knowledge Digital Library  
TNC the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TRIPS the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TTIP Trans-Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UPOV the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
UPOV Convention International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants  
USITC the United States International Trade Commission 
USSR  the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
USTR the United States Trade Representative 
WAPI WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure 
WCT WIPO Copyright Treaty  
WIPO the World Intellectual Property Organization 
WIPO IGC WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore  
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WPPT WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
WTO the World Trade Organisation 
 
 
XIX 
Table of Contents 
Declaration .................................................................................................................. III 
Dedication..................................................................................................................... V 
Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................ VII 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... XI 
Translation of Chinese Terms .................................................................................... XIII 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. XV 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... XIX 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... XXII 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................... XXIII 
Part One: Theory and History of China’s International IP Engagement ......................... 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 3 
1.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 3 
1.2 Four dimensions to approach China’s international IP performance ................... 4 
1.3 Research questions key concept and arguments ............................................... 6 
1.4 Literature review ............................................................................................... 12 
1.5 Research gap and significance......................................................................... 23 
1.6 Methods and methodology ............................................................................... 23 
1.7 Synopsis of this thesis ...................................................................................... 29 
References ............................................................................................................. 30 
Chapter 2 The History of China’s International Intellectual Property Engagement ...... 37 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 The making of modern intellectual property law in China (1840-1949) .............. 40 
2.3 Intellectual property abandoned as a bourgeois right (1949-1978) ................... 43 
2.4 Intellectual property re-embraced (1978 onwards)............................................ 50 
2.5 Is China a born pirate? Knowledge regulation in ancient Chinese society ........ 62 
2.6. Globalization of international IP regulation as a context for China’s international 
engagement .................................................................................................... 66 
2.7 Summary .......................................................................................................... 67 
References ............................................................................................................. 69 
Part Two: Case Studies .............................................................................................. 77 
Chapter 3 China Engages in the International Regulation of Geographical Indications 79 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 79 
3.2 International GI regulation: regime complexity and power contestation ............ 84 
3.3 GIs in China: legal fragmentation and regulatory competition ........................... 92 
3.4 China’s engagement in international GI regulation ........................................... 99 
XX 
3.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 113 
References ........................................................................................................... 115 
Chapter 4 China Engages in the Disclosure Obligation ............................................. 119 
4.1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 119 
4.2 Multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation ...................................... 126 
4.3 China navigating the multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation ..... 132 
4.4 Fruition of China’s multilateral engagement: Patent Law (2008) ..................... 138 
4.5 China’s engagement after Patent Law (2008) ................................................. 145 
4.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 150 
References ........................................................................................................... 152 
Chapter 5 China Emerges in International Standardization ....................................... 155 
5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 155 
5.2 The DVD case and its lessons ........................................................................ 159 
5.3 WAPI: failed attempts at standardization, both domestically and internationally
 ...................................................................................................................... 167 
5.4 Discussion: technology hegemony or technology nationalism?....................... 176 
5.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 182 
References ........................................................................................................... 183 
Chapter 6 China’s Bilateral IP Engagement: Intellectual Property in Chinese FTAs .. 187 
6.1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 187 
6.2 Chinese FTAs defending TRIPS standards .................................................... 197 
6.3 Active promotion of intellectual property in Chinese FTAs .............................. 202 
6.4 TRIPS-plus standards in Chinese FTAs ......................................................... 210 
6.5 Compliance with other multilateral intellectual property treaties ...................... 217 
6.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 219 
References ........................................................................................................... 220 
Chapter 7 China’s IP Engagement in Multilateral and Plurilateral Fora ..................... 223 
7.1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 223 
7.2 China and WIPO: a tale of reciprocal engagement ......................................... 224 
7.3 China engages the WTO: first IP proposal and its setback ............................. 230 
7.4 China’s response to the US-led plurilateral IP agreements ............................. 233 
7.5 Intellectual property in China-led regional/plurilateral agendas ....................... 237 
7.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................... 245 
References ........................................................................................................... 247 
Summary of Key Findings from Case Studies ........................................................... 253 
Part Three: Discussion .............................................................................................. 255 
Chapter 8 Who Governs? Actors in China’s International IP Engagement ................ 257 
8.1 Introduction..................................................................................................... 257 
8.2 Sub-state actors ............................................................................................. 257 
8.3 Non-state actors ............................................................................................. 266 
8.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 271 
References ........................................................................................................... 272 
XXI 
Chapter 9 Principles for China’s International IP Engagement .................................. 275 
9.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 275 
9.2 The logic of intellectual property: IP instrumentalism ...................................... 275 
9.3 The logic of international engagement: foreign policy agenda ........................ 282 
9.4 The variations of principles ............................................................................. 286 
9.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 289 
References ........................................................................................................... 290 
Chapter 10 Strategies to Manage Contesting Principles ........................................... 295 
10.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 295 
10.2 Modelling ...................................................................................................... 295 
10.3 Balancing ..................................................................................................... 299 
10.4 Summary ...................................................................................................... 305 
References ........................................................................................................... 307 
Chapter 11 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 309 
11.1 Strategies behind China’s engagement and their consequences .................. 309 
11.2 Tipping point for China to be a rule-maker? .................................................. 310 
11.3 Motivations for China’s international IP engagement .................................... 310 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 313 
Appendix I Multilateral Treaties Effective in China ................................................ 354 
Appendix II Intellectual Property Regulators in China ........................................... 356 
Appendix III IP targets in the Action Plan for Further Implementing the National IP 
Strategy (2014-2020) .................................................................................... 358 
 
  
XXII 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1 Findings from the Thematic Cases ................................................................. 11 
Table 2 Comments on the Literature ........................................................................... 22 
Table 3 Thesis Outline ................................................................................................ 29 
Table 4 Evolution of the Intellectual Property System in China .................................... 39 
Table 5 Categories of Chinese GIs, Their Economic Value, and Reputation  .............. 98 
Table 6 Major Disagreements in the Post-TRIPS Negotiation of GIs ......................... 101 
Table 7 Evolution of the International Rules on Ownership of Genetic Resources .... 122 
Table 8 Legal Mechanisms in Patent Law for the Disclosure of Origin ...................... 124 
Table 9 Positions on the Disclosure Obligation in WTO and WIPO Proposals .......... 129 
Table 10 The Protection of Genetic Resources in Patent Law (2008) ....................... 139 
Table 11 Disclosure Obligation in Multilateral Proposals and Patent Law (2008) ...... 143 
Table 12 Licensing Fees Paid by Chinese DVD Manufacturers to MNCs .................. 161 
Table 13 Timeline for Proposing WAPI as Compulsory National Standards .............. 168 
Table 14 Timeline of WAPI’s Failure as an ISO Standard ......................................... 171 
Table 15 Intellectual Property Provisions in Chinese FTAs ....................................... 187 
Table 16 Intellectual Property in Chinese FTAs: A Comparison with TRIPS.............. 193 
Table 17 Border Measures in Chinese FTAs ............................................................. 214 
Table 18 Summary of China’s International IP Engagement in Case Studies ............ 253 
Table 19 Sub-state Actors as Representatives for China in International Engagement
 .................................................................................................................... 258 
 
  
XXIII 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Four Dimensions to Understand China’s Role in the International IP System . 5 
Figure 2 Contesting Principles China Adheres to in Its International IP engagement .. 11 
Figure 3 Selected Cases for This Thesis .................................................................... 25 
Figure 4 Chinese Companies Sued at 337 Investigations and the Percentage of Patent 
Investigations (2001-2016) ............................................................................ 57 
Figure 5 Relationship between the Different Terminologies Relating to GIs ................ 80 
Figure 6 International GIs Regime Complexity ............................................................ 86 
Figure 7 Special Signs for GIs Issued by SAIC, AQSIQ, and MOA ............................. 96 
Figure 8 Number and Values of GIs in China (2005-2013) .......................................... 97 
Figure 9 Distribution of Registration among Three Regimes of GIs in China ............... 97 
Figure 10 the Spectrum of Opinions on the Disclosure Obligation ............................ 130 
Figure 11 Patent Grants in Biotechnology (Counted by the Origin of Applicants) (2000-
2016)........................................................................................................... 134 
Figure 12 PCT Publication in Biotechnology (Counted by the Origin of Applicants) (2010-
2017)........................................................................................................... 135 
Figure 13 Technology Distribution of Patent Applications in the Bio-industry ............ 135 
Figure 14 Top 10 PCT Patent Applicants in 2016 (as Compared with 2015) ............. 159 
Figure 15 The Smile of Value-creation ...................................................................... 162 
Figure 16 Distribution of Values for iPhone (2010) .................................................... 163 
Figure 17 Distribution of Values for iPad (2010) ........................................................ 163 
Figure 18 The Relationship between WAPI and Other Protocols .............................. 179 
Figure 19 Negotiating Progress of Chinese FTAs and Their Inclusion of Intellectual 
Property ...................................................................................................... 198 
Figure 20 Attitudes to the High IP Standards Led by the US and the EU (ACTA, TPP, 
TTIP, etc.) ................................................................................................... 236 
Figure 21 Mapping of ASEAN, TPP and RCEP Membership .................................... 239 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One: Theory and History of China’s 
International IP Engagement 
3 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Intellectual property (IP) has been a crucial issue for China for several decades. Internationally, 
it was central to China’s fifteen-year negotiations on its accession to the World Trade 
Organization WTO and has been a priority in China-US bilateral relations. Domestically, changes 
in intellectual property reflect rapid economic and social transition in China.  
After China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese applicants began to make much more active use of 
different IP systems. The number of IP applications from Chinese residents has surged 
dramatically in recent years. In 2001, the Chinese Trademark Office registered more trademarks 
than any other office in the world, and from 2011 the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(SIPO) became the world’s biggest patent office by receiving the largest number of patent 
applications. Intellectual property was promoted as a priority on China’s national agenda. In 2008, 
China released the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (National IP Strategy).1 
After 2012, the Chinese government promoted IP protection in its strategy of Innovation-driven 
Development,2 seeking to transform China into the world’s leading IP power.  
The efforts of the Chinese government to build China as an IP power have also been noticed 
internationally. For instance, Premier Li Keqiang highlighted China’s efforts in stimulating 
entrepreneurship and innovation at the Summer Davos 2017 in Dalian. An article in The Diplomat 
commented on Premier Li’s speech and other progress that China has made in intellectual 
property, stating that “overall, through a mix of market incentives and political pressure, China 
appears to be emerging as a global IP leader” (Zukus 2017). 
However, people who have participated in multilateral IP negotiations generally find Chinese 
representatives very quiet in most fora.3 They are generally very cautious about what they say and 
have been reluctant to make coalitions with other parties to propose any substantive IP agenda. 
This picture of China behind the scenes in international negotiations stands in clear contrast to its 
apparent ambition to be a leading IP power.  
                                                     
1  The State Council of China 国务院 [guowuyuan] issued Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 国家知识产权战略纲要 [Guojia Zhishichanquan Zhanlüe Gangyao], No. 18 2008 国发 
(2008) 18 号 [guofa (2008) 18 hao]. English version of the Outline is available at 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm. 
2  Innovation-driven Development 创新驱动发展 [chuangxin qudong fazhan] was concept first proposed 
in Section 4.2 of the Report of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress. The Report 
is available at http://en.people.cn/102774/8024782.html, last retrieved on January 28, 2018.   
3  For instance, minutes of speeches by Chinese representatives at the WTO TRIPS Council meetings show 
the cautiousness of the Chinese government in expressing its positions on the disclosure obligation 
(Chapter 4.3).  
4 
More broadly, China has been perceived as “increasingly assertive” in its international 
engagement in many issue areas over recent years, in particular in territorial disputes and in 
financial issues (Chen, Pu, and Johnston 2014, Christensen 2011, Yahuda 2013). Such 
assertiveness is further linked with the discourse surrounding the “rise of China” and its possible 
threat to the western world. Intellectual property is rarely mentioned as an example to illustrate 
the “assertiveness” of China. 
When, in 2011, SIPO received more patent applications than any other patent office in the world 
and continued to do so, I began to question why China was not more active in international IP 
rule-making. At this time, I was working at the Intellectual Property Development and Research 
Centre of the State Intellectual Property Office of China (IPDRC), a position I occupied from 
2009 to 2013. I participated in a research project which examined the new trend of international 
IP enforcement, and on China’s strategy to react to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) (Cheng 2011, Mao, Yang, and Cheng 2013). I also participated in research concerning 
domestic IP regulation in China, specifically how to design indexes for provinces to better comply 
with the IP targets set at the national level. This experience of working with an IP regulator in 
China has given me a thorough understanding of IP-related issues in China as well as how the 
Chinese government promotes IP applications and protection domestically and internationally.  
The different faces of China concerning intellectual property, in particular, the contrast between 
its domestic creations of large numbers of IP applications while keeping a low profile in 
international meetings, has led me to write this thesis. It is the puzzle that I encountered at SIPO 
that set me on the path of a detailed investigation of the different dimensions of China on 
intellectual property which consequently developed into this thesis which offers a detailed and 
holistic treatment of the puzzle of China’s performances on IP. Next section will discuss these 
dimensions. 
1.2 Four dimensions to approach China’s international IP performance 
This Ph.D. project was inspired by the controversial interpretations of China’s performance in 
intellectual property (Figure 1). One can isolate four core dimensions or views of China’s IP 
performance — intellectual property as part of a rising geopolitical China, a cautious China 
engaging with western IP systems, an IP rule-making China, and a market transforming China. 
There have been numerous data to support each of the four dimensions separately. However, when 
putting these dimensions together holistically, one can see some inconsistencies concerning what 
the data indicates. For instance, the proposition that China is, or should be, a global IP power 
often emphasizes China’s regulatory power and oversight of IP, but the evidence supporting this 
proposition is always based on its market power in IP registration (Section 1.4.4.2). Application 
numbers on their own do not necessarily support the claim that China is a regulatory power in IP. 
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For another instance, “becoming an international IP rule-maker” has been consistently proposed 
by Chinese IP regulators,4 but there is little evidence to support the view that China has taken a 
role as a “rule-maker”. Instead, the examples given are more about extending IP cooperation with 
other states and international organizations than about making new IP rules.  
Figure 1 Four Dimensions to Understand China’s Role in the International IP System 
This thesis is designed to provide a holistic interpretation of what appears to be the different, and 
at times inconsistent, dimensions of China’s international IP engagement. In particular, I examine 
the tension between China’s rising market power and its moderate regulatory power, as well as 
                                                     
4  State Council of China issued Several Opinions on Accelerating Building China as an IP Power under 
New Conditions 国务院关于新形势下加快知识产权强国建设的若干意见  [guowuyuan guantu 
xinxingshixia jiakuai zhishichanquan qiangguo jianshe de ruogan yijian] (Opinions on IP Power 
Building (2015)), No.71 2015 国发 (2015) 71 号 [guofa (2015) 71 hao]. These opinions are available 
at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-12/22/content_10468.htm. In 2016, the State Council 
issued another notice to disaggregate tasks mandated by the above opinions. It is worth noting that “知
识产权强国 [zhishichanquan qiangguo]”, the primary target for these opinions, has been translated into 
English either as “IP power” or “IP powerhouse”. Considering the goal for China was not only running 
IP numbers, but also “promoting the making and improvement of international IP rule-making, and 
constructing fair and rational international economic order” (Section 1.2), this thesis adopts the 
translation of “IP power”.  The  “new conditions” in its title refer to (1) the economic growth in China 
presents a “new normal” – the economic growth rate dropped from double-digit to 6-7% (Zhang and 
Chen 2017); and (2) the two centenary goals for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation proposed at the 
18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012 – first building China as a moderately prosperous society in 
2021, a centenary after the CCP establishment, and secondly building China as a prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious modern socialist state in 2049, a centenary after the 
PRC establishment. 
A rising geo-political China
• Increasing assertiveness of China 
as part of the "rise of China" 
discourse
An IP rule-
making China
• National agenda 
of building 
China as a 
leading 
intellectual 
property power
A market-transforming China
• skyrocketing number of 
intellectual property applications 
• enhanced capacity of 
commercialization
A cautious China 
in IP engagement 
• Cautiousness 
and silence of 
Chinese 
represent-atives 
in international 
intellectual 
property 
negotiations 
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China’s intention to be a rule-maker and its cautiousness in actual engagement with international 
IP rule-making.  
Evidence for China’s rising market power in intellectual property is clear: statistics show the 
rising number of IP applications and enhanced commercialization. Its increasing geopolitical 
importance has been well analyzed in the literature. However, China’s genuine intention to be a 
rule-maker is hard to verify, and the external interpretation of this intention is sometimes 
misleading. This thesis will focus on China’s tangible behavior, which is conceptualized as 
China’s engagement at the multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral levels in specific areas of 
intellectual property (see the case studies in Chapter 3-7). The exploration of China’s behavior 
concerning intellectual property provides a better understanding of the other dimensions indicated 
in Figure 1. In the discussion following the case studies, I will link the findings from the cases to 
these other dimensions. This approach will provide a holistic picture of why there are different 
interpretations of China’s international IP engagement. First, the contrast between China’s actual 
engagement (which is externally perceived as not willing to take leadership) and its skyrocketing 
IP application numbers stimulates the question — to what extent does Chinese market power in 
intellectual property translate into regulatory power? Secondly, my exploration of China’s 
ambition to be the world’s leading IP power along with its perceived low-profile engagement may 
help to understand some of the tensions in its domestic politics. Such tensions have to be managed 
by all major powers. Thirdly, China’s international IP engagement is one of the concrete examples 
of how assertive China actually is. Therefore, I hope that my study into China’s international IP 
engagement may provide some evidence relevant to claims about a rising China.   
1.3 Research questions key concept and arguments 
1.3.1 Research questions  
The research questions of this thesis are: 
(1) How has China engaged with the international IP system?  
(2) Does China’s international IP engagement indicate that China has already transformed 
into an international IP rule-maker? and 
(3) What underpins China’s international IP engagement? 
The first research question examines how China behaves and has behaved in the international IP 
system. By using “engagement” as the operational concept, this question strives to capture 
comprehensively and in detail China’s interaction with other states and international 
organizations on IP issues. The first research question drives the empirical exploration of this 
thesis. China’s engagement is explored by this thesis by way of case studies. I have three thematic 
cases on China’s international IP engagement in geographical indications (GIs) (Chapter 3), the 
requirement to disclose the source of genetic resources in patent applications (the disclosure 
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obligation) (Chapter 4), and intellectual property and standardization (Chapter 5). I also have two 
cases on China’s international IP engagement at the bilateral level (Chapter 6) and plurilateral 
and multilateral levels (Chapter 7).  My findings from these empirical analyses provide the basis 
for answering the second and third questions.  
The second research question focuses on the role of China in the international IP system. This 
question is also reflected in the title of this thesis. The answer to this question is based on 
engagement (the first research question). One way to explain the relationship between rule-
taker/rule-maker and engagement is to draw on the wisdom from traditional Chinese philosophy, 
in particular, the complex relationship between the name 名 [ming] and the actuality实 [shi].5 
From this perspective, rule-taker or rule-maker are the names given to certain actors; these names 
are generated from and defined by their actual behavior, specifically the way they engage. Though 
the primary relationship between the name (rule-taker or rule-maker) and the actuality 
(engagement) is compatibility because one should behave like a rule-maker to be called a rule-
maker, it is not a static relationship. The actuality is constantly changing while the name changes 
less. Therefore, the exploration of engagement is an exploration of actuality, which will enable 
one to judge whether the titles of rule-taker/rule maker or other names (e.g. rule-shaker or rule-
breaker) can be given. Since the literature review and the historical review (Section 1.4.4 and 
Chapter 2) of this thesis have already indicated that China has been a rule-taker in terms of 
intellectual property, this question adapts the title to emphasize the rule-making aspect.  
The third question asks why China engages the international IP system in the way that it does. 
This “why” question focuses on the intentions behind China’s engagement (the first research 
question). These intentions are explored at different levels of specificity: strategies →principles 
→ propositions (from more specific to less specific). The analytical framework of strategies and 
principles is adapted from the analytical concepts of actors, principles, and mechanisms as 
discussed in Global Business Regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). More fundamentally, 
these strategies and principles point to two different motivations — either China’s behavior and 
its strategy are responses to external pressure, or China is acting of its own accord. The question 
is whether China’s international IP engagement operates within the confines of US strategy or 
whether it is part of a distinct Chinese grand strategy (Section 1.3.3). 
The role of China in international IP regulation (research question 1) and China’s motivation for 
China’s international IP engagement (research question 3) have different focuses. While the role 
                                                     
5   “In ancient China, philosophical inquiry concerning language and logic focused on the use of 
‘names’(ming 名, also terms, labels, or reputation) and their semantic relations to ‘stuff’ (shi 实, also 
objects, features, events, or situations)” (Fraser 2016). There are also Chinese idioms reflecting this 
relationship such as 名至实归 [mingzhishigui] which describe the name or title deserves its actuality.   
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played by China (rule-maker or rule-taker) demonstrates the outcomes of China’s engagement 
and is determined by power contestation, the motivation aspect provides a reason to understand 
why China engages in a certain way and what the possible constraints on its engagement are.  
Normally, one can equate rule-making with grand strategy and rule-taking with being trapped or 
being under hegemonic domination. It is less clear in China’s case. For instance, the amendment 
of the major IP legislation in 2000 to comply with the requirements in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on the surface appeared to be rule-taking 
behavior, but it was also the case that the Chinese government strategically used the external 
pressure of compliance to push its domestic legal reform. From November 1999 to December 
2011, the Office of the State Council Leading Group on Sorting-out Legislation and Regulations 
sorted out 1,150 pieces of legislation, administrative regulations and ministerial rules into 
categories of “to remain, to amend, to abolish or to re-draft”. Three IP laws were among the nine 
major laws that were amended. As pointed out by Zhang Yuqing, the Chinese negotiator who 
participated in the negotiations regarding China’s accession to the WTO, this sorting-out was 
initiated at the discretion of China and not under pressure from the US (Zhang 2011, 7-12). 
Zhang’s comment indicates that rule-taking can be strategic and can be part of a grand strategy. 
In the conclusion of this thesis, I will analyze the nuances of these two dimensions informed by 
the case studies, and in particular how China strategically modeled IP rules from western countries 
and whether this necessarily indicates China is an IP rule-taker.   
In Sub-section 1.3.2, I will analyze engagement as the operational concept for this thesis, in 
particular, to answer the first research question. In Sub-section 1.3.3, I will raise two propositions 
to answer the third research question concerning motivation. As the second research question is 
based on empirical findings of this thesis, it will not be specifically addressed in the introduction.  
1.3.2 Engagement as the operational concept 
Engagement, in this thesis, refers to an actor’s conscious and purposive interaction with an 
international system. By introducing the concept of engagement, this thesis is able to take an 
inductive approach, collecting seemingly scattered pieces of China’s engagement with IP to see 
whether the pieces do or do not fit into a bigger jigsaw — some of the pieces may indicate both 
identities of rule-taker or rule-maker or neither. This approach, therefore, avoids first setting the 
criteria of rule-taker or rule-maker and then comparing and registering behavior of an actor under 
either identity — a deductive approach that may neglect inaction (as a result of the careful 
calculation) and a wide range of other types of behaviour if it is not identified in the first place.   
Engagement as a concept is focused more on process than outcomes. An analysis of the 
engagement process provides a better understanding of the rationale underpinning a decision of 
an actor and the context to make a certain decision. Though China failed to promote a rival 
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standard in the area of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) (Chapter 5.3), the perspective of 
engagement enables observation of China’s efforts and the obstructions to those efforts that came 
from the US. In other words, not successfully promoting a rival standard does not mean there has 
been no attempt and ambition to create one. The process-based exploration of engagement reveals 
China’s efforts even though the outcome was not positive. Though it may not necessarily make a 
meaningful contribution to the outcomes of international IP regulation, it is part of the actuality 
that enables outsiders to see what China has done. 
Engagement is cautious and purposive behavior. In this thesis, the purpose of China’s engagement 
is to participate in the global governance of an issue. Finkelstein (1995, 370-371) defines the 
behavior of global governance as including:  
Information creation and exchange; formulation and promulgation of principles and 
promotion of consensual knowledge affecting the general international order, 
regional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, and efforts to 
influence the domestic rules and behavior of states; good offices, conciliation, 
mediation, and compulsory resolution of disputes; regime formation, tending, and 
execution; adoption of rules, codes, and regulations; allocation of material and 
program resources; provision of technical assistance and development programs; 
relief, humanitarian, emergency, and disaster activities; and maintenance of peace 
and order.  
From an actor-centric perspective, this list can also be interpreted as the various ways that an actor 
can engage in global governance. Accepting this broad scope of global governance means 
accepting a broad scope of engagement. Though Finkelstein (1995) has provided a long list of 
behavior which can be categorized as global governance, this list is still not exhaustive. The open-
ended list also indicates that this thesis should take an inductive approach to exploring new forms 
of engagement by examining various cases. In Chapters 6 and 7, I aim for an extensive-as-possible 
account of China’s transnational and international interaction at the bilateral, plurilateral and 
multilateral levels. This process of discovering how China engages in international IP regulation 
is valuable because it may reveal a broader range of behavior of emerging participants in global 
governance than the behavior of global governors including creating issues, setting agendas, 
establishing and implementing rules and evaluating outcomes (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). 
Engagement is an actor-centric concept. With the Chinese state as the primary actor to analyze, 
engagement enables a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of China and other actors 
(including other states, intergovernmental organizations, and international organizations). By 
investigating who actually participates in international negotiations and cooperation, this thesis 
also identifies various sub-state actors that represent China in international IP engagement and 
non-state actors who have established transnational networks with their counterparts in other 
states. The examination of the behavior of sub-state actors bridges domestic IP regulation and 
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international IP engagement, in particular how regulatory competition and regulatory neglect 
(Chapter 8.2) can impact China’s international engagement.  
The actor-centric approach implied by the concept of engagement does not mean China is viewed 
in isolation from the international IP system. Instead, engagement focuses on interaction and 
provides a lens to observe the continuous dynamics between China and international IP fora, as 
well as between China and other states. It is not a once and for all deal, but many repetitive 
interactions starting from small steps. Over the long term, mutual understanding and trust are 
gradually developed through continuous engagement. Examples include China’s bilateral 
engagement with the US (Chapter 2.4.1) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
(Chapter 7.2).  
Engagement is also the starting point to analyze the strategies behind China’s behavior concerning 
IP. These strategies include modeling and balancing (Chapter 10). Since the strategies are 
purposive, they enable a closer look at the intentions of China in its international IP engagement. 
In this thesis, such intention is manifested as the principles to which China adheres.  
1.3.3 Proposed arguments  
1.3.3.1 Principles and strategies for China’s international IP engagement  
China’s international IP engagement is guided and bounded by various principles to which China 
simultaneously adheres (Figure 2). China took strategies of modeling and balancing to implement 
these principles or minimize their potential conflicts. Modeling is a strategy that China has used 
in all three thematic cases. In the case of GIs, China modeled the US and the EU legal mechanisms 
respectively, at a protection level of TRIPS. In the case of the disclosure obligation, China actively 
learned from proposals submitted to the WTO and WIPO by the megadiverse countries6 and 
promulgated domestic legislation which modeled these proposals before any international 
agreement is concluded on this issue. In the case of IP and standardization, though China was 
trying to promote rival standards, the strategy of using standardization to gain or maintain 
competitive advantages itself resulted from active learning from the US and the EU. Modeling 
leads to compliance and institutional isomorphism, which guided China to take similar positions 
to developed countries in many IP issues.  
Balancing is used by China to address the inconsistency of various principles. It includes three 
specific strategies: dissembling, reticence and the foreign policy chessboard. In addition to 
reconciling the inconsistency of principles, dissembling leads to constructed inconsistency of 
                                                     
6  Megadiverse countries refers to counties that are rich in biological diversity and associated traditional 
knowledge. In international negotiations, the megadiverse countries are coordinated by the group of 
Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC) to promote their priority related to the preservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. See Chapter 4.1. 
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China’s positions at different fora, while reticence and the foreign policy chessboard weaken its 
discursive power in the international policy debates on intellectual property.  
 
Figure 2 Contesting Principles China Adheres to in Its International IP engagement  
1.3.3.2 The role of China in international IP regulation 
I have drawn conclusions about the role of China from the case studies. The cases show variations 
of China’s role, even within the area of intellectual property, due to the structure of international 
power contestation and the scale of China’s preference to be a rule-maker. Table 1 illustrates the 
key findings from thematic cases of this thesis.  
Table 1 Findings from the Thematic Cases 
 Whether the US and the EU agree 
Yes  No  
China’s 
preference 
for a rival 
standard 
Low   TRIPS: rule-taker GIs: active modeler 
High IP and Standardization: attempted 
to be a rule-maker but failed 
Disclosure obligation: modeler 
of rules from elsewhere 
 
For the time being, China has not yet developed into an international IP rule-maker. The US is 
still powerful enough to block China’s initiation of rival rules. Data from China’s international IP 
IP instrumentalism 
-- IP should 
• Stimulate innovation; 
• Serve to transform the economy;
• Facilitate direct foreign investment.
Foreign policy principles
• Non-alliance under the independent 
foreign policy of peace;
• China is a developing country;
• Safeguarding the multilateral trade 
system;
• Keeping a low profile and getting 
things done.
Modelling 
Balancing 
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engagement also shows China’s role in international IP regulation is more nuanced and 
complicated than a binary categorization of “rule-maker” or “rule-taker”.    
In Table 1, the term “modeler” is used because China used the strategy of modeling (Chapter 
10.2), which demonstrates autonomy in adapting standards from others to meet its own demands. 
In the case of modeling, China may associate with other states to promote a standard it has 
modeled. However, the motivation for rival rule-making is low in cases of modeling and cannot 
qualify China as a rule-maker. This table demonstrates that 15 years after TRIPS, China has not 
yet developed into an international IP rule-maker (See more detailed findings from case studies 
in Table 18).  
1.3.3.3 Two propositions for China’s motivation  
The third research question of this thesis on the motivation underpinning China’s engagement is 
essentially a “why” question. I discuss two broad propositions to understand why China engages 
the international IP system in certain ways.  
Proposition 1. China is trapped by IP rules set by the hegemonic power of the US (the China-
trapped proposition).   
Proposition 2. China is engaging in the international regulation of intellectual property to achieve 
its grand strategy of technology catch-up (the grand strategy proposition).  
These broad propositions can be linked to the larger discussion on the rise of China. For instance, 
the China-trapped proposition is a concrete example of China playing the US’ game (Steinfeld 
2010) in the area of intellectual property. Though commentators may not agree on whether China 
does or does not have one (or more than one) grand strategy, the grand strategy proposition itself 
is not new (Shih and Huang 2014, Buzan 2014, Fallon 2015, Stanzel 2017). The second 
proposition provides a specific application of this broad narrative to intellectual property. 
These two propositions provide the fundamental explanation of the motivations for China’s 
international IP engagement. The history of China’s international IP engagement shows China 
was trapped in the early stage of its engagement (Chapter 2). The case studies of this thesis provide 
evidence supporting both propositions relating to China’s international IP engagement. From a 
chronological perspective, a grand strategy of utilizing intellectual property to achieve technology 
catch-up emerged after China acceded to the WTO, in particular after its National IP Strategy in 
2008. For the time being, it is still too early to evaluate whether this grand strategy will succeed 
or not.  
1.4 Literature review  
This is an interdisciplinary study broadly related to law and international relations (IR). In the 
legal discipline, there has been systematic research both on international IP law (Bently and 
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Sherman 2014, Abbott, Cottier, and Gurry 1999, Frankel and Gervais 2016) and Chinese IP law 
(Zheng 2003, Wu 2009b, Liu 2010). Relevant IP laws will be reviewed and discussed in the case 
studies (Chapters 3-7) rather than in this section. As indicated in its title (rule-maker/rule-taker), 
this thesis takes a processual perspective that focuses more on the legislative process domestically 
and the treaty negotiations internationally than on the established laws/rules. Therefore, the 
literature review will primarily focus on the literature in international relations in order to sharpen 
the understanding of the geopolitical dimension which influences China’s international IP 
engagement.  
1.4.1 The rise of China: a revisionist or status quo power? 
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the external perception that China is a rising power stems from the 
presumption that China is becoming increasingly assertive in its international engagement on 
many issues. The literature on the rise of China, in general, is important to demonstrate this 
presumption. This thesis contributes to an understanding of this emerging geopolitical theme 
about China.  
Following the realist tradition of international relations theory, power transition theories depict a 
scenario in which challengers seek to establish a new international order with their increasing 
power (Kugler and Organski 1989, Organski and Kugler 1981, Gilpin 1983, Kim and Morrow 
1992). The focus of the power transition theory is whether a peaceful power transition without 
wars between great powers is possible. Recently, researchers have tended to replace the power 
transition theory with the power shift theory (DiCicco and Levy 1999, Schweller and Pu 2011, 
Zangl et al. 2016). The key difference is that the power shift theory gives up the assumption of 
the complete transition of power and instead focuses on whether the emerging powers have gained 
the power lost by those in a position of former dominance.  
Historically, the UK was the dominant power, but the US is now the dominant power in the world. 
Entering the 21st century, some US commentators began to fear that the US will no longer be the 
unipolar power of the world because the rest of the world is catching up (Layne 2006, Zakaria 
2008, Layne 2012). Because of its remarkable performance in economic growth and development, 
there has been a debate about China’s rise and US’ decline (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Beckley 
2013, Beckley 2012, Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). The framework of power transition/shift 
theory is the major approach adopted by US IR scholars to analyze the implications of the rise of 
China. As highlighted by Schweller and Pu (2011), these theories, however, do not tell US 
scholars “how multipolarity will arrive and whether emerging powers will accept or resist the 
inherited Western order”.  
This body of literature proposed various scenarios for paths of the power shift on the basis of 
different assumptions about the nature of Chinese power. The debate went on and on because of 
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disagreement as to whether China is a “status quo power” that accepts the existing ordering 
principles of the international system or a “revisionist power” that seeks to undermine the 
established international order so as to increase its power in the system (Johnston 2003, Chan 
2004, Kastner and Saunders 2012, Feng 2009, Liang 2007, Swaine 2016). With China being the 
second largest economy in the world and overtaking the US in various areas, the revisionist 
portrait of China has become the prevailing view in US IR scholarship. This revisionist view 
further predicts, according to the power transition/shift theory, that China will exert greater 
influence to reshape the world order with its rising power.  
Nonetheless, some US IR scholars seem to be more optimistic about the rise of China not because 
of the nature of Chinese power, but because of the inclusiveness of the liberal international order 
that the US has built. Ikenberry (2008) argues the rise of China does not necessarily trigger a 
wrenching hegemonic transition because China faces an international order that is open, 
integrated and rule-based, an order that is fundamentally different to those confronted by rising 
powers in the past. He further argues that although the unipolar moments for the US are over, the 
Western order can accommodate rising powers. With a growing commitment to economic 
liberalization, China will eventually merge into this Western liberal order. However, according to 
the democratic peace theory (Minch 2011), there is a problem that universal and perpetual peace 
can only be reached among democratic states from the liberal point of view. China is an alien 
according to the “democratic peace” standpoint because the Chinese authoritarian regime is 
presumed to behave irresponsibly (Pan 2004). 
There are two effects of research on the rise of China based on the power transition theory. Within 
the US, relevant research has consistently informed foreign policy decision making. The debate 
on the nature of Chinese power transformed into a policy debate on the proper strategies that the 
US needs to confront a rising China, including either containing or socializing China (Lieberthal 
1995, Shambaugh 1996, Christensen 2006, Holslag 2006, Johnston 2003).7 These proposals were 
somewhat speculative, not really engaging in detail with China’s agenda (Legro 2007), but they 
nevertheless guided practices like the US returning to Asia under President Obama.  
The literature (including non-scholastic) on the rise of China has also resulted in a discourse on 
the new assertiveness of China in recent years (Chen, Pu, and Johnston 2014, Christensen 2011, 
Yahuda 2013). Though this claim of assertiveness is difficult to test, it has grown in popularity 
because of the focus on China by the mainstream media and the power of the internet in spreading 
                                                     
7  The strategy of socialization has also been practiced by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries through their utilization of regional forum/fora. Ba (2006) raises the question of 
whether regional forum initiated by less powerful states are able to socialize with the most powerful 
regional player. This strategy has been demonstrated as a failure by the South China Sea disputes (Chen 
and Yang 2013). 
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the misperception (Johnston 2013). As pointed out by Jerdén (2014), China’s new assertiveness 
is “not an objectively true phenomenon external to this discourse”, but it is attractive to the US 
because it provides a justification for the continuing existence of significant US power in East 
Asia. 
The rise of China is the most important background knowledge for this thesis, and the power 
transition/shift theory is the major analytical framework with which to approach this topic. The 
revisionist/status quo debate sets a foundation for the two propositions for China’s international 
IP engagement: if China is a revisionist power in international IP regulation, it will propose its 
own agenda for international IP regulation; but if China remains a status quo power, it will follow 
the international IP rules set by the US. Although the revisionist/status quo differentiation is a 
convenient way to categories China’s position, the problem of applying power transition/shift 
theory to the US-China power dynamics should not be ignored. As Pan (2004, 316) pointed out, 
the mainstream US IR literature tends to construct China as “otherness”:  
It seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, 
almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute 
strategic “other”, a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of 
this, “China” in US IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own 
subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the US self.  
It might be argued that this body of literature is not actually about the rise of China, but about 
how US IR scholars perceive the rise of China, which might be a misperception. This thesis 
develops its two propositions by exploring the intentions of China from an insider’s perspective. 
Nonetheless, the propositions of this thesis are still closely related to and informed by the body 
of literature mentioned above. First, for the proposition that China is “trapped”, the power 
transition/shift theory explains who would trap China, for what reason, and how — the US wanted 
to tame China as a status quo power to support the liberal international order through socialization 
and coercion. Considering that IP-related rules are an integral part of the international liberal 
economic order, it made sense for the US to follow the power transition/shift theory and to get 
China to develop a comprehensive domestic IP system. Secondly, the status quo/revisionist 
positions are two basic options for China’s grand strategy. Though the status quo/revisionist 
identifications are polarized, they are useful concepts for summarizing the basic positions that 
China might adopt when confronted by the existing international IP order. These two concepts 
will be used in the review of the literature on China’s role in global governance.  
1.4.2 China’s participation in global governance 
Scholars researching global governance/international regulation of specific issues began to notice 
the role of China in recent years. The literature on China’s participation in global governance 
extends to areas like the global governance of trade (Liang 2002, Potter 2001, Wang 2004, 
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Halverson 2004), health (Chan, Lee, and Chan 2009), finance (Walter 2010, Ren 2016, He 2016) 
and food security (Duggan and Naarajärvi 2015). The literature on China’s participation in global 
governance often takes an inductive approach by observing China’s behavior first without 
presuming an identity for China either as a status quo power or a revisionist power.8 Compared 
with the power transition/shift theories, this body of literature relies more on the empirical data 
and reaches more specific conclusions about the impact of China on a specific international 
regime, in particular in terms of transparency and accountability.  
Global Governance and China: the Dragon's Learning Curve (Kennedy 2018) comprehensively 
examines the role of China in global governance in various issue areas and concludes that the role 
of China varies with the issue areas that it engages — China is neither purely a savior nor scofflaw 
of the global economic system, and while China is a defender of the status quo in some areas, it 
is a reformer in others, and occasionally a revisionist in still other spheres. The articles in this 
book have important implications for this thesis in terms of research methodology — considering 
the various roles that China played in global governance in different issue areas, a case study 
method is necessary to investigate China’s role in international IP regulation.  
1.4.3 International IP regulation 
The early literature on intellectual property and TRIPS in particular focused on the dominant role 
of the US multinationals and the US-EU axis of power, explaining this domination in terms of 
concepts like mechanisms of coercion, and forum shifting (Drahos 1995, Drahos and Braithwaite 
2002, Gervais 2003, Sell 2003, Helfer 2004, Sell 2010a, b). Recent research has begun to 
distinguish the role of the emerging powers and other developing countries in the area of 
intellectual property. For instance, Drahos (2012) distinguished China’s interests in the patent 
system from those of weaker members of the G-77. This body of literature treats China as a 
member of the rising/emerging powers. Abbott, Correa, and Drahos (2013) proposed three roles 
for emerging powers in the international patent system: regulatory innovators, adaptive managers 
of the existing standards, and modelers of standards set elsewhere. Among the three roles of the 
emerging powers, researchers expect that the emerging powers are more likely to assimilate and 
adapt to international IP standards set by the developed countries than to become regulatory 
innovators reforming the international IP order (Benoliel and Salama 2010, Morin et al. 2017, Yu 
2014, Drahos 2012).  
In summary, the current literature suggests that the emerging powers will maintain the status quo 
in the international IP system and so will not oppose the fundamentals of the global IP system. 
                                                     
8  It is worth noticing that revisionist/status quo narrative is occasionally used in the analysis of China’s 
participation in the global governance of specific issues (Emmers 2007, Walter 2010).  
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Still, they seek greater influence, aim to maximize flexibilities within existing IP fora, and attempt 
to safeguard their regulatory sovereignty. But the current literature fails to analyze the nuances of 
the roles that the emerging powers play within the existing international IP system.  
Another problem with the literature around the emerging power perspective is it fails to distill the 
unique role of China in international IP regulation. Conclusions about the role of China in the 
international IP system are often drawn after an examination of the emerging powers (with Brazil, 
China, and India as representatives) collectively. But homogeneity of the emerging powers may 
not be the case in reality. Hopewell (2015) examined the different paths to power by China, India, 
and Brazil through the case of WTO, arguing that Brazil and India have assumed a more 
aggressive and activist position in WTO negotiations than China. This is because Brazil and India 
have endeavored to exert their power in mobilizing and leading developing country coalitions. 
Hopewell reveals the complicity and the heterogeneity of the roles played by the emerging powers 
in the global governance of trade. Their interests in intellectual property among emerging 
economies may be more diversified than first appears. Although some recent research has 
distinguished the role of China from that of India and Brazil in IP issues, the comparative 
approach has not sufficiently explored the domestic politics shaping the Chinese position.  
1.4.4 China in International IP regulation 
1.4.4.1 English literature 
After China’s accession to the WTO, there has been increasing literature dedicated to 
understanding the role of China in international IP regulation. For instance, Yu (2000, 2005) has 
documented the details of the US-China bilateral IP negotiations and China’s compliance with 
WTO rules. In The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, Yu (2011b) follows the 
recent development of China in international IP regulation. Yu (2011) claims that “China is at the 
cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a country respectful of intellectual property rights”, 
which is good news for US IP rights holders. Yu also warned that the rapid improvements in 
intellectual property in China would threaten the US because it would reduce their competitive 
edge over China. This line of argumentation is also common in the non-scholarly literature 
discussing the rise of Chinese IP power. For instance, Sobon (2017) raised the concern that “given 
China’s determination to advance its IP systems and stature, China may well eclipse the US and 
Europe as the global center for intellectual property in just a few decades”.  
Such allegations, though eye-catching, have several problems: (1) China’s regulatory power is 
often confused with its market power. Specifically, China’s surging IP application numbers are 
used to support the claim that it is a power in global IP regulation. (2) The conclusion that China 
will threaten the West with its increasing IP power is contradictory. If China eclipses the US and 
the EU in intellectual property, it only means that China plays well by rules set by the West, rules 
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that the West may yet change. (3) The intellectual property “maximalist” position is only one of 
the several worldviews of intellectual property and cannot be considered a universal assumption. 
(4) As occurs in US IR scholarship, this body of literature constructs China as otherness without 
understanding what is happening in China.  
The last point (constructing China as otherness), has led to the selective use of sources. For 
instance, Suttmeier and Yao (2004) and Suttmeier, Yao, and Tan (2006) are two of the earliest 
publications in the English language on China’s effort in proposing its homegrown Wireless Local 
Area Network (WLAN) standard, WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI),9  at 
the ISO. These articles used the case of WAPI to show China’s “increasing neo-technological 
nationalism” in which China uses the globalization process to benefit its own national interest. 
However, these publications did not mention China’s criticism on how the Chinese proposal was 
blocked through a series of unethical activities (SAC 2006). 
1.4.4.2. Chinese literature: memoirs, official stance, and the IR scholarship 
In addition to the English literature, there has been increasing research by Chinese scholars 
publishing in the Chinese language on IP issues. This body of literature provides a valuable first-
hand source to track the latest developments by China in its international IP engagement. There 
are three categories of Chinese literature on this issue. First are the memoirs and documentaries 
of the US-China IP negotiations. For example, Liu (1998a) and Intellectual Property and Reform 
and Opening-up in the Past 30 Years Compiling Committee (2008) compiled memoirs of former 
Chinese negotiators and government officials on the process of establishing the Chinese IP system, 
on the external pressures China experienced, and the calculations underpinning China’s decisions. 
Zhao (2003), a memoir written by one of the drafters of the Patent Law (1984), carefully 
documented the internal debates on the patent system in the late 1970s. Wu (2009a) has compiled 
observations and interviews with those involved in the US-China bilateral IP negotiations in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. These memoirs and documentary literature will be used as first-hand 
resources to investigate the domestic politics underpinning China’s international IP engagement. 
They compensate for the limited availability of interview data (Section 1.6.2). 
The second body of Chinese literature focuses on the policy response of China to the changing 
international IP configuration. Professor Zheng Chengsi, now deceased, was the pioneer of the 
first-generation IP law scholars in China. He proposed two strategies for China (Zheng 2006, 3):  
What we should do is on the one hand stimulating the companies and individuals to 
innovate with the high-level protection that the intellectual property system has 
already provided, and on the other hand to actively promote the creation of new 
                                                     
9  WAPI is a WLAN standard developed solely by Chinese entities. For more detailed discussions of the 
standard see Chapter 5.3. 
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intellectual property mechanism to protect traditional knowledge and bio-diversity 
which probably at present China may be at an advantageous position.  
In the last decade, these suggestions have been implemented by the Chinese government. In terms 
of the access campaign initiated by the developing countries, Wu (2006) proposed a positive 
position that China and other developing countries should actively engage in the international IP 
fora and promote the coordinated development of intellectual property and human rights.  
After China proposed the Outline of the National IP Strategy in 2008, Tian Lipu, the former 
Commissioner of SIPO, published a paper entitled How to Respond the Change of International 
IP Rules which recognizes the “unique” role that China plays in the international IP system (Tian 
2008, 6-7):  
The trend of multipolarity in the international IP system has provided opportunities 
and possibilities for China to struggle for more policy space for development and to 
safeguard China’s national interest and economic security in the making of 
international IP rules… (China/we) should increase its participation in the 
international IP rule-making, in order to create a better external environment. 
(China/we) should reinforce the implementation of the principle that “adjusting to 
national conditions, active engagement, getting something done, cooperation and 
win-win”, extend dialogues, exchanges and cooperation in intellectual property 
issues, and strengthen bilateral, multilateral and regional intellectual property 
cooperation. (China/we) should promote the international IP rules to change to a 
more just and reasonable direction, in order to seek more space and time for China’s 
development and to create a good international institutional environment for 
Chinese companies to participate in the international market competition. 
This quotation illustrates the authoritative position taken by China when it comes to its role in the 
international IP system. More recently, after China issued the Opinions on IP Power Building 
(2015),10 Li Jun and Cui Yanxin from the Research Institute of the Ministry of Commerce, 
proposed three specific strategies for China’s engagement in the reconstruction of international 
IP rules: (1) to prioritize multilateral fora and strive to strike a balance of interest; (2) to keep 
negotiation open and actively construct alliances; (3) to strive to dominate bilateral negotiations 
and to take into account the interests of all parties (Li and Cui 2015). These articles, although 
published by individual authors, reflect an authoritative view since the authors are regulators 
themselves. They indicate China’s intention to become an IP rule-maker.  
Academic publications have generally followed the above narrative and argument. For instance, 
Chen (2016b) argues that the domination of developed countries in international IP rule-making 
has encroached on China’s policy space, and that China should enhance its engagement in the 
participation of international rule-making, strengthen its negotiating powers and properly increase 
                                                     
10  See supra note no. 4. 
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its protection level to respond to the change. However, the continuation of the narrative from 2008 
to 2016 indicates either (1) China’s participation in international IP rule-making has not 
substantively improved in the last decade, or (2) current research has not fully appreciated the 
improvements made, if any. 
In summary, Chinese literature on China’s engagement/participation in international IP regulation 
takes a China-centric point of view. The positions are stated by authoritative sources, and 
scholastic positions are in alignment with those of the Chinese government. The authoritative 
governance positions themselves, however, are ideal proposals of what China should do. Hence 
this body of literature provides valuable insights into China’s position on international IP 
regulation, but it fails to investigate objectively what China has done and why it engages the 
international IP regulation in ways that do not meet the ideas proposed. 
The third body of literature covers the changing Chinese view on global governance. Chinese IR 
scholars, influenced by the US IR theories, have tried to rethink the world order and the role of 
China in global governance. At the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese scholars began to 
explore international theories from China’s own history by proposing a Chinese school of 
international relations (Zhang 2001, Yan 2008, Zhao 2006, Qin 2007, 2009). In parallel with 
theoretical exploration, Chinese IR scholars began to focus on strategic studies surrounding the 
rising powers and international order. In The Rising Power and International Order, Men (2004, 
141) reviewed the history of China’s role in the world order, arguing that “the role of China has 
changed from a marginalized, passive participation to active engagement and active construction”.  
The recent scholarship goes beyond assessing the identity of China in the international order (its 
role as a rising power is undisputable) by focusing on the strategies of the rising powers. For 
instance, Yan Xuetong proposed an IR theory of moral realism (Yan 2011, 2014b, 2016). Yan 
(2016) argues that when a state is close to being a dominant power, whether there is morality and 
the level at which it exists have a significant impact on the outcomes of power contestation, in 
particular, on the building of international norms. Based on this emphasis on morality, Yan 
suggests that China should base itself on the values of “fairness”, “justice” and “civility” in order 
to build a new international order.  
There is now an increasing focus on the extent to which China has changed its foreign policy 
guideline from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” (Yan 2014b). Under the 
proposed new guideline, China has actively participated in global governance in many issue areas. 
Typical examples are China’s regional Belt and Road Initiative 一带一路倡议 [yidai yilu 
changyi] (Huang 2016, Swaine 2015) and its increasing engagement in international financial 
regulation by initiating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New 
Development Bank (also knowns as the BRICS Development Bank) (Sohn 2013, Biswas 2015). 
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President Xi Jinping has proposed to “create a community of shared future of mankind 构建人类
命运共同体 [goujian renlei minyun gongtongti]”.11 This concept has been further elaborated by 
Wang Yi, the Foreign Affairs Minister of China, as one of the outcomes of the “foreign affairs 
theory with Chinese characteristics” and “Chinese agenda for international order and the change 
of the international system” (Wang 2016a, 7). It can be expected that under Xi’s leadership, China 
will be more active in many aspects of global governance.  
Specific to the issue concerning China’s engagement with the international IP system, the above 
theoretical studies and strategic studies by Chinese IR scholars have had little influence. Chinese 
IR scholars have not yet been involved in the issue of intellectual property; instead, legal scholars 
have dominated the research on this topic. Chinese IP law scholars, while familiar with the legal 
aspect of intellectual property, have not sufficiently studied the power contestation behind the 
rules. They have proposed more active engagement, including increasing China’s discursive 
power in the international IP system and setting the goals that China should be an “international 
IP rule-maker” without providing specific roadmaps to achieve these goals (e.g. Chen 2016). This 
dominance of legal scholarship in the research on China as an international IP rule-maker leads 
to potential problems. First, WTO is not only the “golden example of the international rule of law” 
as some IP law scholars have perceived (Du and Wang 2016) but is also the result of power 
contestation. Without a perspective from international political economy, legal scholarship cannot 
fully appreciate the power contestations behind the rules. Secondly, intellectual property in nature 
is a constructed monopoly (May and Sell 2006), but the legal scholarship takes a more normative 
approach, internalizing it as rights-based discourse. One can see a split in the policy 
recommendations of legal scholars. On the one hand, they recommend that China increase its 
discursive power and actively participate in international IP rule-making; on the other hand, their 
approach is to recommend moderate increases to the current level of IP protection without waiting 
for the outcomes of the increased discursive power. With the development of China’s IP 
applications and its scale of commercialization, this latter recommendation is understandable. 
Nonetheless, increased IP protection by itself will not lead China to be an international IP rule-
maker.    
1.4.5 Summary  
This section reviewed three major bodies of literature. The implications, shortcomings, and gaps 
are summarized in Table 2:  
                                                     
11 This term was first proposed by Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win 
Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, statement by the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New 
York on September 28, 2015, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305051.shtml.  
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Table 2 Comments on the Literature 
Body of 
literature 
Implications for this thesis Weakness/gap   
Power 
transition/shift 
and the rise of 
China 
– Power transition/shift theory is the 
foundation for the US to “trap” China to 
establish an IP system. 
-- The status quo and revisionist power are 
useful concepts for analyzing the positions 
of China and other emerging powers in on 
specific issues of global governance.  
-- This theory is biased because of its US-
centric perspective.  
--The allegation of the “new assertiveness 
of China” following this theory lacks 
evidence. 
 
China’s 
participation in 
global 
governance  
-- China’s position in global governance 
varies on different issues; 
-- Case study analysis is an appropriate 
methodology for this thesis 
-- China’s default position in global trade 
governance is as a status quo power to 
preserve the WTO;   
-- China’s international engagement in 
intellectual property as an issue area has 
not yet been comprehensively researched 
-- The conclusions from these empirical 
studies are very specific and limited to how 
China engages in that issue, and many of 
them do not touch on the strategies that 
China has come up with, or examine why 
China engages in a certain manner or 
changes its engagement 
International 
IP regulation 
-- The history of TRIPS negotiations and 
post-TRIPS power contestation is the 
background for China’s international IP 
engagement. 
-- Regime complexity in the area of 
intellectual property is the basic context for 
China’s international IP engagement. 
-- The conclusion that the default position 
for the emerging powers in the international 
IP system is a status quo leads this thesis 
to focus on the rule-making aspect of 
China.   
-- This body of literature often investigates 
China and other emerging powers as if 
they behave collectively, and therefore is 
not sufficient to understand the individual 
features of China’s engagement.    
China in 
international 
IP regulation 
(English 
literature) 
-- The acknowledgment of the efforts of 
China in TRIPS compliance directs the 
focus of this thesis to the rule-making 
aspect of IP. 
-- Similar to the literature on the rule of the 
emerging powers, this body of literature 
directed this thesis to focus more on the 
role of China as a rule-maker. 
-- This body of literature often confuses the 
regulatory power and the market power of 
China, using China’s surging IP application 
numbers to support claims about its power 
in global IP regulation. 
-- Self-contradictory in reaching the 
conclusion that China is threatening the 
West as a rising IP power. 
--not up to date with the latest initiatives  
China in 
international 
IP regulation 
(Chinese 
literature) 
-- The memoirs of the government officials 
and negotiators who were involved in the 
early stages of the establishment of the 
Chinese IP system are valuable to 
investigate the intention of China in its early 
IP engagement 
-- The authoritative resources demonstrate 
the ambition of the Chinese government to 
be an international IP rule-maker. 
-- The Chinese view on global governance 
provides an insider’s view of China on its 
role in global governance 
-- The arguments on the role of China in 
international IP regulation are 
homogeneous (aligned with the official 
position of the Chinese government), and 
there is no detailed investigation of what 
China has done. 
-- The dominance of legal scholarship in 
researching this topic means this body of 
literature cannot provide constructive 
suggestions on a reformist or revisionist 
perspective on China’s international IP 
engagement.    
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1.5 Research gap and significance    
As illustrated in Table 2, although there have been studies on the topic of the rise of China, its 
impact on the existing international order, and China’s participation in the global governance of 
various issues (including intellectual property), there has been little research aimed at the 
possibility of a unified understanding of China’s international IP engagement.  
This thesis also navigates the literature carefully and critically to avoid the weaknesses of previous 
studies and incorporate their implications (Table 2). First, concerning the role of China in the 
international IP system, there are polarized views constructing China either as otherness (by the 
US IR scholars) or as a leading international IP rule-maker (the Chinese government and scholars’ 
proposal). As discussed in the literature review, both positions have their weaknesses. This thesis 
tries to take a third approach by reaching its conclusions from the evidence of China’s actual 
engagement. The aim of this approach is to reach a more objective conclusion and avoid the biases 
of the polarized views identified above. Secondly, although the case study method is a proper 
approach suggested by the literature on the role of China in global governance considering the 
variegations of China’s behavior on different issues, there has been little empirical research using 
the case study method in China’s international IP engagement. Also, previous studies (in 
particular research by Chinese scholars) on the role of China often used normative analysis by 
focusing on the outcomes of rule-making or rule-taking. This thesis develops an interdisciplinary 
approach that draws on the scholarship of IP law and international relations, focusing on the 
process instead of outcomes.  
Intellectual property has been one of the key issues in US-China bilateral relations, China’s WTO 
accession negotiations and its goals for technology catch-up. This thesis provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the multi-faceted ways in which China has engaged with the 
international IP system. Its original contribution lies in showing the nuanced and complicated 
nature of the strategies that China has employed in this engagement. The findings of this thesis 
will contribute to the understanding of the “rise of China” through a specific but crucially 
important case and will add to the understanding of China’s role in the global governance of other 
issues.  
1.6 Methods and methodology 
The analytical framework of this thesis has been significantly influenced by the macro-micro 
analysis created by Braithwaite and Drahos in Global Business Regulation (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000).  
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1.6.1 The macro-micro approach 
The essence of the macro-micro approach is “to gather data on the most macro phenomenon 
possible from the most micro source possible - individuals, especially individuals who act as 
agents for larger collectivities” (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 13-14) This thesis adopts this 
approach to analyze China’s international IP engagement. The micro data in this thesis includes 
news, interviews and various forms of publications by government officials and academics that 
demonstrate China’s engagement in a specific area of intellectual property at the bilateral, 
plurilateral or multilateral level. The macro level issues this thesis investigates are twofold: first 
are the outcomes of power contestation (whether China has become an international IP rule-
maker), and second, what motivates or constrains China in its international IP engagement.   
1.6.2 Methodology: document analysis, interviews and case study 
1.6.2.1 Case study  
Case studies are used in this thesis to understand and compare the variations of China’s 
engagement in different IP issues. The selection criteria for the cases came from the second 
research question — only cases that potentially leave scope for China to act as an IP rule-maker 
were selected. This means that the three major types of intellectual property (patents, trademarks, 
and copyright) are not thematic cases for this thesis because the historical evidence demonstrates 
that China has been a rule-taker in these three areas (Chapter 2.4). It follows that this thesis has 
to venture into other areas to see whether China has exercised some form of leadership over IP 
rules. 
The cases were selected from two perspectives: the first being from the structural perspective, and 
the second from the perspective of actors. Consideration of the structural perspective raised the 
question of what the topics of the ongoing WTO negotiations are those China may have a voice. 
In the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration,12 two issues concerning intellectual property were: 
(1) the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines and spirits (Para 18); and  
(2) the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new 
developments (Para 19).13  
Given that China is rich in local specialties and genetic resources, GIs and the disclosure 
obligation were selected as cases for this thesis. In addition, since China’s first IP proposal at the 
                                                     
12 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, adopted on 20 November 2001.  
13 Though Para 17 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration also stresses the importance of intellectual property 
health, no further negotiations are mandated.  
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WTO concerned IP and standardization,14 an issue indicating China’s intention to promote a rival 
standard. Therefore, I selected the issue of IP and standardization as the third thematic case for 
this thesis.15  
Secondly, consideration from the perspective of an actor led to the question — what has China 
done in terms of its international IP engagement? After collecting data from various sources, I 
sorted the specific initiatives or incidences that may demonstrate China’s international IP 
engagement at different fora and then I categorized these fora into different levels. As a result of 
this categorization, China’s international IP engagement are analyzed at the bilateral level 
(Chapter 6) and plurilateral and multilateral levels (Chapter 7). Figure 3 illustrates the cases 
chosen for this thesis.   
 
Figure 3 Selected Cases for This Thesis 
 
1.6.2.2 Document review  
Document review is the second methodology used in this thesis. The categories of the documents 
reviewed included: 
(1) Treaties, legislation, administrative regulations, ministerial rules and other policies;  
                                                     
14 In May 2005, China submitted to the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee that intellectual 
property rights issues in standardization should be included in the 4th Triennial TBT Review (para 74-
76, G/TBT/M/35). China further clarified its position in its submission G/TBT/W/251 to the TBT 
Committee following the meeting. This submission is considered as China’s first WTO proposal 
concerning intellectual property (see Chapter 7.3).   
15 However, in the process of writing this case in Chapter 5, the focus of IP and standardization was changed 
from China’s WTO proposal to the process of China’s proposal of its own standards to be adopted by 
international standard setting organizations.  
China’s engagement in thematic issue 
areas of IP 
Geographical indications (GIs)
The requirement to disclose the source of 
genetic resources in patent applications (the 
disclosure obligation)
IP and standardization
China’s IP engagement at different levels
Bilateral: IP provisions/chapters in China’s 
FTAs with other countries 
Plurilateral and multilateral engagement
(Chapter 3-5) 
(Chapter 6-7) 
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(2) Journal articles, books, and other academic publications;  
(3) Research reports released by governments, nongovernmental organizations and research 
institutes; 
(4) Memoirs in compiled books; 
(5) Transcripts of presentations, press releases, and interviews; 
(6) Online and newspaper articles; 
(7) Live webcasts; and 
(8) Publicly available data by potentially inaccessible informants. 
In addition to the documents already mentioned, I used document review as a method to 
complement interview data (Section 1.6.2.3). Considering some of the key informants were not 
accessible during the fieldwork, I purposefully searched publications, transcripts of interviews 
and speeches, and webcasts by and about these key but inaccessible informants. Information from 
these sources proved a good way to compensate for the lack of interview data. These documents 
are specifically mentioned as a separate category because the snowball effect here starts from a 
potential informant and ends with published documents by that informant.  
As a native speaker of Chinese, I have searched for first-hand sources in the Chinese language. 
Many of these sources are summarized and translated into English for the first time. The use of 
these first-hand resources adds to the novelty of this research. 
1.6.2.3 Interviews and complementary resources 
I conducted 36 interviews in total during my fieldwork. Some key informants were not accessible. 
One of my potential informants told me that considering the public debate inspired by the 
documentary Under the Dome,16 she would not accept my request for an interview. Another 
incident involving a famous Chinese anchor made Chinese government officials more cautious 
about their speech at private occasions. 17 
For those informants who were accessible, my review of their interview transcripts sometimes 
indicated little information beyond the official government position (See Section 1.4.4.2). I did 
have several valuable interviews, but the interview data on its own was not sufficient to develop 
                                                     
16 Under the Dome is a documentary investigating pollution and air quality in China. It was first put online 
on February 28, 2015 and watched over 200 million times within 48 hours. Given the large-scale debates 
inspired by the documentary, it was taken offline since March 2, 2015 (Beaumont-Thomas 2015). 
Considering that interview data was used in this documentary, my perception is that after the Under the 
Dome event, Chinese government officials were warned to treat private interviews more cautiously. I 
believe this helps to explain the access difficulties that I encountered. 
17 Bi Fujian, an anchor affiliated with China Central Television (CCTV) was internally disciplined because 
of a video spread widely online. In this video, he made disparaging remarks about Chairman Mao. 
Someone secretly took this video of him during a dinner and put it online without his permission (Li 
2015a). As a result of this incident, Chinese government officials became more vigilant about their 
speeches on private occasions.  
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answers to my research questions. As part of a much wider data-gathering process I used the 
following strategies: 
(1) Referring to conference minutes kept by international organizations. For example, the 
WTO TRIPS Council has published minutes of its council meetings since its 
establishment, and the speeches given by Chinese representatives have been well 
documented. In the case study of GIs and the disclosure obligation, I use these publicly 
available data to investigate China’s position.  
(2) Referring to publications by Chinese government officials. From my previous 
experience working as an official of SIPO, I know that ministries of the Chinese central 
government often assign research projects to experts in the field. These projects yield 
data which were used to provide advice and to solve regulatory problems. Although the 
full text of the project reports is often not accessible, short versions of such reports are 
often published as journal articles. Sometimes, the government official representing the 
assigner of the projects appears as a co-author of the publication. When an interviewee 
was not accessible, I would go to the China Academic Journals Full-text Database 
looking for publications by the potential informant. Using this method, I targeted several 
valuable sources. For instance, Wang and Wan (2010), a paper co-authored by an official 
from the Ministry of Commerce and a GI expert, is the key source of information to 
identify China’s position in its international GI engagement.  
(3) Referring to transcripts of interviews, public speeches and a live webcast of high-level 
government officials and celebrated Chinese IP scholars on social media to collect 
relevant data. Due to the effects of Under the Dome and the anti-corruption campaign in 
China, high-level government officials were reluctant to accept my interview invitations. 
However, 2015 was the year that WeChat (the major Chinese social media) reached 700 
million users and the year that official accounts of Chinese governments, research 
institutions and individuals surged on the WeChat platform. This social network 
development makes the general practice of IP regulators in China and their international 
engagement of a department/ministry more traceable.  For instance, I saw the full text of 
a speech given by Dr. Shen Changyu, Commissioner of SIPO, at the 56th General 
Assembly of WIPO in October 2016 on WeChat, several days after the speech was given. 
It is used in this thesis as key data to show the relationship between China and WIPO. In 
addition, for the purpose of expanding influence or increasing transparency, webcasts 
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are also used to publicize high-profile events.18 Live webcasts are a key source of data 
for my analysis of China’s position on data exclusivity and the role of IP epistemic 
communities in China’s international IP engagement.       
(4) Referring to the compilation of memoirs on the history of China’s IP engagement. As 
shown in the Chinese language literature on China’s IP engagement before TRIPS, these 
compiled books represent an institutional memory of China’s engagement. Since some 
of the retired officials are not accessible and others have passed away, their personal 
memoirs have become the major information source concerning China’s IP engagement, 
since the late 1970s.   
In most cases, information from these other channels have compensated for the lack of interview 
data to identify the Chinese position on certain issues; however, the IP provisions in Chinese Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) are the exception. The FTA negotiators were not available for an 
interview, and there were few publications touching on the position of China on IP issues during 
various FTA negotiations. The only information available is the negotiated treaties. In Chapter 6, 
I will focus on a careful analysis and comparison of the text of IP provisions in Chinese FTAs, 
without analyzing the negotiating process which for the time being remains hidden. Though I 
have tried to triangulate the position of China through a comparison of various FTAs, TRIPS 
provisions, and Chinese IP laws, this chapter only analyses the position of the parties when there 
is sufficient textual evidence.  
1.6.3 Timeframe  
Chapter 2 of this thesis examines the history of China’s international IP engagement from its 
modern history (1840-1949) to the present day.  Findings of this history reveal that China has 
been an IP rule-taker until its accession to the WTO. Therefore, this thesis mainly focuses on the 
post-TRIPS period to answer the question whether China has shifted into the role of a rule-maker.  
During the writing of this thesis, several major events happened both internationally and 
domestically. Internationally, ACTA, a major plurilateral treaty initiated by the US failed after its 
rejection by the European Parliament. After the retreat of the US, the latest version of TPP in 
2017 saw the withdrawal of its major TRIPS-plus standards. In order to turn China into a leading 
IP power, there has been an extensive development of IP policies in China, in recent years 
(Chapter 2.4.3). These and other events that happened after the commencement of this thesis in 
2014 have been consistently incorporated into my discussion in this thesis. One exception is in 
                                                     
18 US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue used live webcast to record the conference for publishing their 2017 
report, see Press Release for the Report of US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue 中美知识产权学者对话
纪 要 发 布 会  [zhongmei zhishichanquan xuezhe duihua jiyao fabui] at 
http://zhibo.ifeng.com/video.html?liveid=106004.  
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Chapter 6 which concerns the China-Georgia and China-Maldives FTAs. The text of China-
Georgia FTA was published in December 2017, less than 4 months from the submission of this 
thesis, and the China-Maldives FTA was signed on December 2017 but the text had not been 
published by the end of January 2018. I mention the China- Georgia FTA as one of the Chinese 
FTAs that includes an IP chapter but do not elaborate on it. 
1.7 Synopsis of this thesis  
This thesis has three parts: Part One introduces the research question of this thesis, the proposed 
argument and the method and methodologies, as well as a historical review; Part Two is the body 
of this thesis, which elaborates five cases to investigate China’s international IP engagement with 
different issues and at different levels; and Part Three analyses China’s international IP 
engagement across three dimensions — actors, strategies and principles. Table 3 shows a detailed 
breakdown of the three parts.    
Table 3 Thesis Outline 
Part I  
Introduction 
Introduction Chapter 1  Research question, literature review, 
contribution, methods, and 
methodology  
Historical review Chapter 2  China’s international IP engagement 
from its modern history 
Part II 
Case studies 
International 
engagement in 
thematic issues 
Chapter 3  Geographical indications  
Chapter 4  Disclosure obligation  
Chapter 5 Intellectual property and 
standardization 
International 
engagement at 
different levels 
Chapter 6  Bilateral engagement: intellectual 
property in Chinese FTAs 
Chapter 7 Multilateral and plurilateral 
engagement  
Part III  
Discussion 
and 
conclusion 
 
Discussion：
actors, 
principles and 
strategies 
Chapter 8  Actors in China’s International IP 
Engagement 
Chapter 9  Principles in China’s international 
engagement in IP regulation  
Chapter 10 Strategies to manage contested 
principles 
Conclusion Chapter 11 Conclusion 
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Chapter 2 The History of China’s International 
Intellectual Property Engagement 
2.1 Introduction 
Before investigating China’s international IP engagement through specific case studies, this 
chapter sets the scene for such engagement from three perspectives. I will first review the history 
of intellectual property in China, from 1840 onwards, with special attention paid to its 
international engagement (Section 2.2. to 2.4). In Section 2.5, I will discuss the framing of 
knowledge regulation by the US in ancient Chinese society in the US-China bilateral negotiations. 
In Section 2.6, I will introduce the recent trends in international IP regulation that provide a 
broader context for China’s international IP engagement.  
The modern history of China’s engagement with intellectual property is traced in considerable 
detail in this chapter because China’s experience with intellectual property during this period was 
linked to memories of national humiliation and to early experiences with western models of 
intellectual property. Both the memories and experiences continued to affect its decision-making 
on intellectual property in the second half of the 20th century. China’s experience with intellectual 
property has covered a period of close to 100 years and involved conflict, colonialism, rejection, 
communist models, market opening, reintegration into global capitalism and importation of 
capitalist models of intellectual property. Whether China has moved beyond being a simple 
importer is the central question of this thesis.  
The history of intellectual property in China can be divided into three periods, based on paradigm 
shifts. China first introduced intellectual property under duress and from a position of weakness 
in its modern history (1902-1949), which later shifted to a system of knowledge regulation 
following the model of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (1949-1978). Since 1978, 
China has re-embraced the IP system following the normalization of US-China bilateral foreign 
relations and China’s domestic reform towards a market economy.  
The focus of this thesis is the third period. In these four decades (1978-2017), China integrated 
into the IP system that it had once abandoned. It has vigorously enacted IP laws and regulations, 
continuously increased its IP standards and facilitated its private actors to use intellectual property 
strategically.  For the purpose of this study, I have divided this period into three stages to provide 
a detailed context for the case studies used in this thesis. There are two milestones for the 
subdivision:  
(1) China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 when the external pressure on Chinese IP law-
making changed from the US pressure to the WTO compliance; 
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(2) China’s promulgation of the National IP Strategy in 2008 indicated that policies in China 
had become based on domestic and local conditions rather than being driven by external 
determinants. 
The US framed China as a “born pirate” in the China-US bilateral IP negotiations because China 
did not have statutory IP law throughout its prolonged history. This framing and its effects will 
be discussed in Section 2.5.  History is always a story of lost opportunities or paths that might 
otherwise have been taken. As we will see by framing China as a born pirate in the US-China 
bilateral negotiations, the US discouraged the study of knowledge regulation in ancient China. As 
a result, China has imported IP regulation and its justifications without developing a deep sense 
of how they fit with broader traditions of China’s ancient past. Intellectual property becomes law 
without Chinese characteristics.    
The globalization of IP regulation is the basic context for China’s international IP engagement. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) represented 
the true beginnings of the globalization of IP regulation. TRIPS, along with other IP treaties and 
ongoing IP negotiations set up the context for China’s international IP engagement.  
Table 4 provides a snapshot of the evolution of the IP system in China over time. It focuses on 
the major determinants/driving forces for domestic IP rule-making as well as international 
engagement. These determinants can be internal (domestic) or external (international or 
transnational), ideological or instrumental. At a macro level, the change of power relations among 
states, and domestic regime change have influenced the Chinese IP system. For instance, 
intellectual property was introduced into China in its modern history because China was the 
subject of colonial exploitation by the Western powers and Japan. After the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was established, China became a sovereign state and abolished all the unequal 
treaties signed by previous governments — including all the IP provisions in these treaties. In 
addition, the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism was a key determining 
factor for deciding whether China would remain in the IP system, in its first three decades after 
the PRC’s establishment. Since the IP system is a process of commodification of knowledge, the 
ultimate stage of capitalism, China defined intellectual property as a capitalist right and 
abandoned it after the start of the Cultural Revolution.  
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2.2 The making of modern intellectual property law in China (1840-1949) 
Developed countries began to spread IP systems to colonial territories as part of grand empire 
building projects involving the expansion of their trade and markets (Drahos 2002b, Okediji 
2004a). China, as a territory under colonial duress, first incorporated intellectual property in its 
bilateral treaties at the beginning of the 20th century. Following these bilateral treaties, three 
copyright laws, four patent laws, and three trademark laws were promulgated in the first half of 
the 20th century. China’s international engagement with intellectual property in its modern history 
has been, by and large, a process of regulatory importation from different sources. The regulatory 
importation happened during a period of the waning of China’s ancient traditions and values, 
including those related to the production and diffusion of knowledge. 
This section will focus first, on the unequal treaties which drove China to import IP regulation in 
the early 20th century, and second, on the two paths used by the western powers to influence 
modern China’s IP laws. 
2.2.1 Intellectual property in the bilateral negotiation of unequal treaties 
Intellectual property was not a prominent issue for foreign business in China until the 
Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 which allowed foreign business to engage in manufacturing in 
China.1 Following the principle of shared benefits among all colonists who had privileges in 
China, other western powers also enjoyed the privilege of manufacturing in China. Western 
businessmen soon found that the trademark was an effective instrument for them to secure their 
interests in the Chinese market. Meanwhile, trademark disputes between Chinese and foreign 
businesses, as well as among foreign businesses increased dramatically.  
In response to the demand from business, the Western powers began to seek opportunities to push 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) to legalize trademark rights (Cai and Wang 2005). The chance 
came in 1902 when the Qing Dynasty was involved in the negotiation of bilateral friendship and 
commerce treaties. When the Eight-nation Alliance2 conquered Beijing in 1900 and assisted the 
Qing Dynasty to repress its internal riot (the Boxer Rebellion), the eight nations signed the 
                                                     
1  The early unequal treaties, from the 1840s, allowed the Western powers to trade in open cities and ports 
in China. Article 6.5 of the Shimonoseki Treaty (1895) 马关条约 [Maguan Tiaoyue] (1895) provided 
“Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, 
towns, and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying 
only the stipulated import duties thereon”. The text of the Shimonoseki Treaty (1895) is available at: 
http://china.usc.edu/treaty-shimonoseki-1895, last retrieved on February 1, 2018. 
2  The Eight-Nation Alliance 八国联军 [baguo lianjun] was a coalition of Austria-Hungary, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, US, Belgium, Spain and Netherlands who invaded Beijing during 
the repression of the Boxer Rebellion 义和团运动 [yihetuan yundong].  
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Xinchou Treaty (also known as Boxer Protocol)3  with the Qing Dynasty in 1901. After the 
Xinchou Treaty, the UK, US, Japan, Portugal, and Germany separately negotiated commercial 
and navigation treaties with the Qing Dynasty, and intellectual property was put on the agenda in 
these bilateral negotiations. The Qing Dynasty agreed to introduce IP laws in the late Qing 
Dynasty, after its negotiation with the UK, the US, and Japan of the following treaties:4  
• New Commercial Treaty of 1902 between the UK and China (Mackay Treaty), stipulating 
provisions on trademarks; 
• Treaty between the US and China for the Extension of the Commercial Relations between 
Them (US-China Treaty of 1903), stipulating provisions on trademarks, patents, and 
copyright;  
• Japan-China Additional Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1903) (Japan-China Treaty of 
1903), stipulating provisions on trademarks and copyright (Wang 2008).  
These three treaties were part of the unequal treaties that China signed with the Western powers. 
They directly pushed China into IP law-making. Despite being in a weak bargaining position 
whilst negotiating these treaties, the Qing Dynasty still sought to minimize incursions on its 
sovereignty. When negotiating the Mackay Treaty, the Qing Dynasty made an enormous effort to 
persuade the Western powers to relinquish consular jurisdiction, on the condition that it would 
initiate comprehensive domestic legal reform (Zhang 2013a). Eventually, Article 12 of Mackay 
Treaty provided:  
China has expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into 
accord with that of the Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance 
to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights 
when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their 
administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing. (Cassel 2011, 175).  
The US-China Treaty of 1902 included exactly the provision on intellectual property as Article 
12 of the Mackay Treaty (Bishop 1926). By implementing these treaties, the Qing Dynasty started 
a legal reform process and formulated laws including the Copyright Code of Great Qing Dynasty 
(1910) 大清著作权律 [Daqing Zhuzuoquan Lü] (hereinafter Copyright Code (1910)).  
                                                     
3  After the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Xinchou Treaty 辛丑条约 [Xinchou Tiaoyue] 
was signed between China and the Eight-Nation Alliance. Article 11 of the Xinchou Treaty provided that 
“the Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed necessary by the foreign 
Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial 
relations with the object of facilitating them". The text of the treaty is available at: http://www.deutsche-
schutzgebiete.de/boxerprotocol.htm, last retrieved on February 1, 2018.   
4  Negotiations with Germany and Portugal were not finalized before the collapse of the Qing Government.  
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The unequal treaties also significantly influenced the process of legal transplants5 of IP laws after 
the negotiations. Since China was not colonized by one Western power, it did not completely 
adopt a legal system from one Western. Signing unequal treaties with different Western powers 
allowed the Qing Dynasty the flexibility to select which jurisdiction it would use as a model for 
its IP laws. However, as was the case almost a century later, the modeling was born out of 
pragmatism: it was intended to regain judicial sovereignty.  
2.2.2 Modern intellectual property law-making under western influence 
After the 1902-1903 negotiations, the Qing Dynasty began to formulate its own IP laws. The 
legislative process was closely monitored by the Western powers, in particular, the UK and Japan. 
The Western powers influenced Chinese IP law-making in two ways. First was through the control 
of an institution — manifested by the trademark legislative process which was manipulated by 
the UK through Hart’s control of the Chinese customs authority. The second path was through 
legal transplants, mainly from Japanese law, exemplified by the formulation of Copyright Code 
(1910).  
The Qing Dynasty started formulating its trademark law soon after the 1902-1093 negotiation. 
The first draft of the trademark law, Draft of Trademark Law, was submitted by Sir Robert Hart 
(1835-1911), a British consular official in China who served as the Inspector General of Chinese 
Maritime Customs for 48 years (Hart and Campbell 1975).6  Hart attempted to affiliate the 
trademark office with the Chinese Customs of which he was in charge. 7  Not only was this 
institutional arrangement favorable to the UK, but the draft focused on the protection of foreign 
trademark holders, confirmed consular jurisdiction over trademark disputes, and discriminated 
against Chinese applicants in various aspects including the terms of protection and fees (Bai 1994, 
Cui 1991, Qu 2012). Nonetheless, this draft was resisted by the other Western powers and the 
Ministry of Commerce of Qing Dynasty (Li 2012). Eventually, the Qing Dynasty was unable to 
promulgate the trademark law before its collapse in 1910.  
The Copyright Code (1910) was the only IP law promulgated by the Qing Dynasty. It was closely 
modeled on Japanese law. The legal transplants from Japan occurred for several reasons. First, 
the Meiji Reform in 1868 had set up a favorable model for China. Japan’s shared culture and 
                                                     
5 “Legal transplants” and “legal transplantation” 法律移植 [falü yizhi] were both used in literature of 
comparative legal studies. This thesis adopts “legal transplants” because it was first used by Watson 
(1974) who proposed the concept.  
6  The draft was prepared by Robert Edward Bredon (1846-1918), a British citizen and the then Vice 
Inspector General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs in the Qing Government.  
7  According to the draft, the trademark office was to be affiliated to the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs 
and two branches of the trademark office would be open in Shanghai and Tianjin to process trademark 
registrations (Li 2012). This arrangement allowed the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, controlled 
by Sir Robert Hart, to administer trademark registrations. 
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geographical proximity made it the most convenient source of knowledge for China (Zhang 2014). 
The process of legal transplants from Japan to China was further facilitated by Chinese students 
studying in Japan (Wang 2012, Zhu 2012, Xu 2016) and Japanese became the most popular 
second language in the legal discipline. Japanese jurists were also directly involved in the 
legislative process. Following their suggestions, the Copyright Code (1910) modeled the structure 
of Japanese copyright law and it adopted the terminology of authors’ rights 著作权 [zhuzuoquan] 
instead of copyright 版权 [banquan].    
 Interference in IP law-making, by the West, declined after World Word I. Domestically, the 
nationalist movement arising from the May Fourth Movement aimed to abolish unequal treaties 
and consular jurisdiction. However, in the 1920’s, Japan became increasingly assertive in 
interfering in the Chinese domestic policy process (Li 2009).  
2.2.3 Summary 
The Qing Dynasty introduced IP legislation after its bilateral negotiations with the UK, US, Japan, 
Germany, and Portugal, at the beginning of the 20th century. Formulating IP laws was part of the 
Qing Dynasty’s legal reform. Interference by Western powers in Chinese IP law-making 
continued throughout its modern history.  
The regulatory importation of intellectual property into modern China has had mixed effects. The 
imported IP laws/regulations were implemented in a top-down approach, which neglected the 
local norms concerning knowledge regulation. This lack of connection between Chinese local 
traditions and IP norms meant that the enforcement of IP legislation became a problem over the 
longer term. Moreover, since Chinese residents were not treated equally in the judicial procedure 
due to consular jurisdiction, the imported IP laws were essentially a privilege to protect the 
interest of Western businesses.  
2.3 Intellectual property abandoned as a bourgeois right (1949-1978) 
When the PRC was established, China was able to make sovereign decisions on domestic issues 
for the first time in a century. As a member of the Socialist Camp, China began to follow the 
model of the on the regulation of knowledge, in particular science and technology. The exclusive 
rights of patents and trademarks were seen as bourgeois rights 资产阶级法权 [zihanjieji faquan] 
and abandoned because of incompatibility with the communist ideology. This section will briefly 
review the history of legislation related to intellectual property, during this period, and discuss 
the impact of this neglected history.   
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2.3.1 The gradual abandonment of intellectual property 
In the first three decades of the PRC, China experienced dramatic social change. After four years 
of economic recovery (1950-1953), China initiated the socialist transformation from 1954 to 1956. 
Through public-private partnerships, private ownership in agriculture, handicraft, and capitalistic 
industry and commerce were partly transformed into socialist public ownership. During this 
period of economic recovery and social transformation, intellectual property as a proprietary right 
was first adopted to encourage domestic capitalists to invest in innovation, as well as attract 
foreign investment and stimulate technology importation. Once the socialist transformation was 
accomplished in 1956, however, intellectual property quickly lost ground. Furthermore, when the 
Cultural Revolution started in 1966, various types of IP regulations and laws were completely 
abolished. The following subsections will provide a more detailed account of the development of 
the patent, trademark and copyright system.  
2.3.1.1 Patents  
China issued its Provisional Regulations on the Protection of Inventors’ Right and Patent Right 
(hereinafter Inventors’ Right and Patent Regulations (1950)) in 1950.8 The Inventors’ Right and 
Patent Regulations (1950) introduced a dual-track system in which patents and inventors’ right 
coexisted. The patent system was designed to attract investment from domestic and foreign 
capitalists during the period of economic recovery (1950-1953). The term of patent protection 
could last for three to fifteen years (the exact term was decided by the grant letter). Foreigners 
were also qualified to apply for patents in China (Zhao 2003).  
The inventors’ right, a right for inventors to obtain a certificate of attribution, was modeled on the 
USSR’s regulation of science and technology. The inventors’ right differed from the patent right. 
A patent holder had the right to self-exploit and license his or her invention, and such right could 
be inherited. In contrast, an inventor’s right was an honorary title without economic rights: an 
inventor was issued a certificate acknowledging his/her contribution to the invention, but the right 
of exploitation belonged to the State.9 The patent system was not well utilized at the time of social 
change, only four patents being granted between 1953 and 1957 (Zhao 2003, 11). 
The Regulations on Remuneration for Inventions (1963)10 formally abolished the Inventors’ Right 
and Patent Regulations (1950). This brought about the end of the patent system, and only 
                                                     
8  Finance and a Committee of the Administrative Council of the Central Government of China 中央人民
政府政务院财政经济委员会 [zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhengwuyuan caizheng jingji weiyuanhui] 
issued the Provisional Regulations on the Protection of Inventors’ Right and Patent Right 保障发明权
与专利权暂行条例 [Baozhang Famingquan yu Zhuanliquan Zanxing Tiaoli] on August 17, 1950. 
9  See Article 7, Provisional Regulations on the Protection of Invention Right and Patent Right (1950).  
10 On November 3, 1963, the State Council promulgated the Regulations on Remuneration for Inventions
发明奖励条例 [Faming Jiangli Tiaoli].  
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inventors’ right remained. Regulations on Remuneration for Inventions (1963) also clarified that 
“the ownership of the inventions belongs to the state. Any individual or institution may not 
monopolize the invention. Any institution (including the collectively-owned institution) in the 
state can utilize an invention it needs” (Article 23 of the Regulations on Remuneration for 
Inventions (1963)).  
2.3.1.2 Trademarks 
Trademark policies played an important role during the economic recovery period (1950-1954) 
(Interview No. 23). In August 1950, China promulgated the Temporary Regulations for 
Trademark Registration (hereinafter Trademark Regulation (1950)).11 In six chapters and 34 
articles, the Trademark Regulation (1950) recognized 20-year exclusive rights for trademarks and 
adopted the principles of voluntary registration and first-to-file. It also provided limitations to the 
exclusive right. First, trademarks had to conform to socialist ideology. Second, the privilege of 
the foreign states on trademarks was abolished. Over 597 trademarks in the Anti-Japanese War 
Base Areas were incorporated into the trademark system, established by Trademark Regulation 
(1950), and 4,182 trademarks issued by the Nationalist Government were re-registered (Interview 
No. 23). Meanwhile, 542 trademarks were abolished in 1953 on the grounds that they supported 
colonialism, feudalism, superstitious thoughts or used foreign names of persons or geography.  
The nature of trademarks gradually changed from exclusive rights to a sign of quality. In March 
1954, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) changed the principle of 
voluntary registration to compulsory registration and abolished the exclusive right attached to 
registered trademarks in Trademark Regulation (1950).12 Without exclusivity and not being able 
to be licensed or transferred, trademarks were transformed into an instrument for market 
regulation. As such, domestic trademarks were to be effective permanently, and trademarks 
belonging to foreign enterprises were to be effective for ten years with possible renewal for 
another ten years. 
                                                     
11 State Council of China issued the Temporary Regulations for Trademark Registration 商标注册暂行条
例 [Shangbiao Zhuce Zanxing Tiaoli] on August 28, 1950.  
12 Unregistered trademarks were allowed to use in the initially after the PRC was established. For instance, 
the SAIC issued Guidelines for Un-Registered Trademarks 关于未注册商标的指示 [Guanyu Weizhuce 
Shangbiao de Zhishi] and Administrative Measures on Unregistered Trademarks 未注册商标暂行管理
办法 [Weizhuce Shangbiao Zanxing Guanli Banfa] in 1954. The principle of compulsory license, was 
introduced later by the SAIC Opinions on Implementing Comprehensive Registration on Trademarks 中
央工商行政管理局关于实行商标全面注册的意见  [Zhongyang Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju 
Guanyu Shixing Shangbiao Quanmian Zhuce de Yijian] in 1957. These SAIC opinions stipulated that 
trademarks used by enterprises and public-private-partnerships should be registered. In 1963, the 
principle of compulsory registration was confirmed in the Trademark Administrative Regulations 商标
管理条例 [Shangbiao Guanli tiaoli]. 
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During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), regulatory power of trademarks was transferred 
from SAIC to local governments (interview No. 23). Trademark Law (1982) was the first of all 
IP laws to be promulgated, mainly because the trademark system was not totally abolished in the 
first three decades of the PRC. The key issue was not to establish a new system but to transfer the 
power of trademark regulation from local governments to the central government.   
2.3.1.3 Copyright  
The Resolution Concerning the Improvement and development of Publishing in 1950 (hereinafter 
Publishing Resolution (1950))13 was the first policy concerning publication and copyright after 
the PRC was established. It provided that “the publishing industry should respect authors’ rights 
and copyright; behavior such as reproduction, plagiarism, and adaption should be prohibited” (Li 
2007, 12). The remuneration system was abolished in 196014 and restored in 1977, at the end of 
the Cultural Revolution.  
In contrast to patents and trademarks which existed as proprietary rights in the first few years of 
the PRC and were later abolished or transformed, “copyright” was not recognized as a propriety 
right in the first three decades of the PRC. Though the term copyright was mentioned in the 
Publishing Resolution (1950) and remunerations were paid in the early days of the PRC, no 
substantive right was attached to this term. The Publishing Resolution (1950) was formulated to 
serve the interests of the people and the socialist system; publishing was regarded as an 
ideological instrument for the proletariats to use in their struggle with the bourgeoisie.15 During 
the Cultural Revolution, the remuneration system was “considered as the staunchest fortress of 
bourgeois rights and was completely destroyed” (Lu 2008, 26).  
2.3.2 The neglected history and its impact  
The existence of intellectual property or its alternative form of knowledge regulation in the first 
three decades of the PRC has been neglected in the narrative of IP regulation in contemporary 
                                                     
13 The National Conference on Publishing in 1950 made the Resolution Concerning the Improvement and 
development of Publishing 关于改进和发展出版工作的决议 [Guanyu Gaijin he Fazhan Chuban 
Gongzuo de Jueyi]. It was considered the first copyright related policies after the PRC was established.  
14 It was abolished because the remuneration system was not compatible with the communist ideology of 
“transforming all classes into a working class.” As highlighted by a notice in 1960, “whether to abolish 
remuneration is an issue related to the transformation of living methods and worldview of authors, artists 
and intellectuals” (Zhou 2002, 123).  
15 For instance, the Publishing Resolution (1950) provided that “the Chinese people's publishing cause 
should conscientiously implement the national, scientific and popular cultural and educational policies, 
and resolutely fight against feudal, comprador, and fascist ideas”. In April 1963, The Propaganda 
Department of the CCP Central Committee 中共中央宣传部 [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu] 
held a National Publishing Conference, and the report from this Conference stressed that “publishing is 
a significant field for the ideological struggle between the proletariats and bourgeois” and “(we) should 
make publishing play an active role in the international and domestic class struggle as well as in China’s 
socialist construction.”  
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China. This was because the abovementioned IP-related regulations were not implemented, and 
the USSR model of knowledge regulation was not compatible with intellectual property. 
Nonetheless, this history had a significant impact on the current IP system in China, both 
institutionally and ideologically.  
Institutionally, the ministries governing knowledge were established in this period and continued 
their mandates after IP laws were promulgated. When China wanted a copyright regulator in place 
in the 1980s, it did not come from a vacuum. The National Copyright Administration of China 
(NCAC) established in 1985 was not a new institution but was a title 16 added to the National 
Publishing Administration (NPA).17  
The NCAC’s status of sharing the same institution with the State Administration of Press, 
Publishing, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) gave this copyright regulator a unique 
mandate to monitor the ideological representation of works, in addition to protecting the rights of 
authors. As mentioned, one of NPA’s mandates was to serve the class struggle18 and to perform 
ideological control in the early years of the PRC. During the drafting of the Copyright Law (1990), 
the most prominent issue was how to balance the protection of authors’ rights with the control of 
public opinion (Shen 2008a, 2-3). 
The institutional history of patent regulation followed a similar pattern. The State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC) was a regulator of science and technology following the USSR 
model in the first three decades of PRC. In 1978, the SSTC began to “integrate the regulation of 
patent” (Tang 1998, 92): Patent Law (1984) was drafted by a working group under the guidance 
of the SSTC. The State Patent Office of China (SPO) was directly affiliated to the State Council 
                                                     
16 In the Chinese administrative system, there are cases of “two titles for one agency 一个机构 两块牌子 
[yige jigou liangkuai paizi])” at both national and local levels. “One agency” refers to one legal 
representative, one financial account, one leadership team, and one set of personnel of the agency; “two 
titles” refers to two names for the same agency. An agency can choose an appropriate name when facing 
a different audience (Jing, Chen, and Xiao 2016).  
17 The Publishing Commission of Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee (CCP publishing 
commission) was established as a CCP propaganda institution before the PRC was established. In 1949, 
the PRC established the National Publishing Administration (NPA) as a successor of the CCP Publishing 
Commission. The NPA changed its name, upgraded its hierarchy, and expanded its mandates in the 
recent institutional reshuffles. In 2001, the NPA upgraded its hierarchy from vice-ministerial to 
ministerial level as the General Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP). During the latest 
institutional reshuffle in 2013, the GAPP and State Administration of Radio Film and Television 
(SARFT) of China was incorporated into a new ministerial level agency, the State Administration of 
Press, Publishing, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). At present, it is the SAPPRFT that shares a 
title with the NCAC. 
18 See supra note 15.  
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but monitored by SSTC,19  until in 1998 when the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) 
became independent from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST).20  
At present, institutions like the MOC and MOST still exercise tremendous regulatory power in 
IP-related issues in China. MOST is still responsible for the regulation of the commercialization 
of scientific and technological outcomes, an area that overlaps with intellectual property; however, 
its focus is to mobilize research resources nationally to achieve science and technology 
breakthroughs. MOST has promoted the establishment of a national innovation system in China 
since 2010.21 This approach of building a “national system”22 for innovation is a legacy of the 
planned economy (Zha, Li, and Wang 2010). It is an acknowledgment that knowledge regulation 
in China is more than the protection of private rights of innovators.  
In its first three decades, the PRC’s ideology was steered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
which in turn drew on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, according to which communal 
ownership did not only exist for tangible goods but also for intangibles. The widespread 
acknowledgment of the “communal ownership” of knowledge led to opposition to the formulation 
of IP legislation. For instance, the Minister for the Ministry of Machinery Industry opposed the 
patent system at the beginning of the 1980s: 
First, from the perspective of classical Marxist theory, economic base determines the 
superstructure. The patent system is a superstructure based on property right and 
commodity economy, therefore is incompatible with the public ownership and 
planned economy in socialist China… Secondly, patents protect foreign inventions 
and will impair the domestic industries… Thirdly, the patent system will damage the 
machinery industry which mainly relied on imported set equipment and prevent the 
spill-over of technologies (Tang 1998, 97-98).  
                                                     
19 SSTC was the predecessor of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). In the  institutional 
reshuffle in 1998, SSTC was renamed as MOST as a ministerial level agency affiliated with the State 
Council and the State Patent Office was renamed as the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) as a 
vice ministerial level agency affiliated to the State Council. 
20 At its early stage, the SPO was mainly responsible for patent examination. In the 1998 institutional 
reshuffle, the SPO’s mandates extended, along with renaming as SIPO, to intellectual property regulation 
in general, including the coordination of national and foreign related intellectual property affairs.    
21  It was proposed in Opinions on Deepening Institutional Reform for Science and Technology and 
Accelerate the Building of National Innovation System 中共中央国务院关于深化科技体制改革加快
国家创新体系建设的意见 [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Keji Tizhi Gaige 
Jiakuai Guojia Chuangxin Tixi Jianshe de Yijian], issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State 
Council in 2012, that China should establish a “national innovation system 国家创新体系 [guojia 
chuangxin tixi]”.  
22 In China, the “national system(s) 举国体制 [juguo tizhi]” exist for the regulation of many issues. It means 
that the government can collectively mobilize limited public resources and allocate them to critical areas 
to achieve a breakthrough. China modelled the national systems from the USSR, in particular in its 
development of critical industries in the early years of the PRC.  
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This quotation describes the ideological debate that intellectual property triggered among China’s 
policy-makers and regulators. Eventually, patent law survived three waves of such domestic 
debates and was promulgated with crucial political support from Deng Xiaoping (Zhao 2008). 
Ideological contestation also existed in copyright. The legislative process for copyright law took 
11 years (1979-1990). The long drafting process was mainly due to the tension between 
ideology/public opinion control and the protection of authors’ rights. During the deliberations 
over the draft for copyright law, some representatives for National People’s Congress (NPC) 
proposed to “first set the political criteria of what is allowed to be published and what not, then 
it’s time to talk about the right of authors” (Shen 2008a, 2). Finally, Copyright Law (1990) was 
promulgated without setting specific criteria for censorship, but the opposing opinion was 
embodied in its Article 4.23 This article caused a further dispute — it was one of the key issues in 
the US-China WTO dispute.24  
After the Cultural Revolution, the communal ownership of knowledge was consolidated in the 
minds of the general public. The prior recognition of communal ownership partly contributed to 
a defiant attitude of the general public towards intellectual property after China re-embraced the 
IP system in the 1980s.  
2.3.3 Technology importation: The prelude to re-embracing intellectual property 
The socialist ideology and the communal ownership of knowledge were the major norms for 
science and technology in the first three decades of the PRC. Though communal ownership might 
be sustainable domestically, it had little chance as an international operating philosophy in a 
capitalist world. China had to introduce technologies from other states to catch-up with, or even 
leapfrog, the international competition (Soete 1985). Although China first introduced the patent 
system in 1950, partly to facilitate technology importation, the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargoed exports to China (Hunt 1982). 
In the 1950s China began to implement a policy of “leaning to one side to the USSR 一边倒 
[yibiandao]” (Guan 2009) 25 which enabled China to receive technical assistance from the USSR 
and Eastern European states. In this decade, China introduced 156 major projects from the USSR 
and Eastern European nations in areas of energy, national defense, and mechanical industries. 
23 Article 4 of Copyright Law (1990) provided that “works, the publication or distribution of which is 
prohibited by law, shall not be protected by this law”. The background for this provision was the 
compromise of controversy on public opinion control and private right protection.  
24 WT/DS 362, China – Measures affecting the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
25 “Leaning to one side 一边倒 [yibian dao]” was generally considered as the primary foreign policy agenda 
in the 1950s. Niu (1999) argued this policy has two dimensions — first it was a guiding principle in 
foreign policy; secondly, it was also a domestic development agenda for China. The second dimension 
also explains why China modelled the USSR in knowledge regulation (Section 2.3.2). 
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Sets of equipment accounted for 89.3% of the contract price, while engineering design material, 
drawings and production process data accounted for only 1% of the contract price. Under the 
communist ideology of communal ownership, no patent fees were paid by China in these contracts 
(Xiao and Wu 2015). The USSR also helped nurture the first generation of Chinese technicians 
and engineers. It dispatched over 8000 experts to China and trained over 7000 Chinese technicians. 
For instance, Anshan Iron and Steel Plant 鞍山钢铁厂(鞍钢) [Anshan Gangtiechang (Angang)] 
(hereinafter Ansteel), a major iron and steel enterprise, established 156 projects, and further 
spread its technology to 237 projects over 28 cities in China (Xiao and Wu 2015, 151). However, 
when the Sino-Soviet alliance broke up in the early 1960s, the USSR stopped technical assistance 
by recalling their experts from China.  
Consequently, China began to diversify its technology importation: endeavoring to import 
technology and equipment from Japan, and the Western Europe (Zhang et al. 2005, 374-375). 
After US President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, China started seeking technology transfer 
from the US The second wave of technology importation occurred in 1973, with 26 projects on 
fiber, fertilizer, petrochemicals, integrated coal mining, power stations, etc. (Chen 2005). This 
wave of technology importation became the stimulus for China to re-embrace intellectual property 
because China could no longer ignore patents. In keeping with the communal ownership of 
knowledge, technologies imported to China were further disseminated at no cost. Due to the lack 
of patent protection for these technologies in China, some foreign companies were only willing 
to export equipment to China but not the technologies associated with the equipment. Chinese 
companies were trapped in the circle of “equipment importation, equipment aging, and equipment 
re-importation”.  
2.4 Intellectual property re-embraced (1978 onwards) 
China and the US normalized their foreign relations at the end of 1978. Intellectual property 
appeared in the first two US-China bilateral agreements: the US-China Agreement on High 
Energy Physics (1979) and Agreement on Trade Relations between the US and China (1979). The 
US and China negotiated more bilateral agreements on intellectual property from 1988 to 1996. 
Establishing an IP system and consistently improving it became a treaty obligation for China. 
Intellectual property was also central to China’s GATT negotiations (1986-2001). After China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, compliance with the multilateral IP system become a priority for 
China.  
Over time, IP regulation was internalized, by China, as a system to promote innovation. The 
National IP Strategy 26  demonstrated that domestic demands related to intellectual property 
                                                     
26 See note no. 1, in Chapter 1. 
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prevailed over external pressures, as the primary force for IP law and policy-making in China. 
Chinese companies and research institutions began to actively use the IP system. With the surge 
in patent applications and trademark registrations, China sought to transform itself into a leading 
IP power in the world.27 
There was no paradigm shift within these four decades, rather, IP legislation and policies 
developed consistently and incrementally through rounds of revision and amendment. 
Nonetheless, a closer examination of different stages throughout this period is necessary to 
understand the specific context for case studies in this thesis.   
2.4.1 US-China bilateral IP negotiations and domestic IP law-making (1978-2000) 
Cooperation on science and technology was the starting point for the normalization of US-China 
bilateral relations, and intellectual property was put on the agenda immediately. During Deng 
Xiaoping’s visit to the US in early 1979, Deng and Carter, the US President, signed the US-China 
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (US-China S&T Cooperation Agreement) 
which later became an umbrella agreement for US-China science and technology cooperation. 
During Deng’s visit, China and the US also signed the US-China Agreement on High Energy 
Physics in which China agreed on the mutual protection of copyright. In 1979, a more detailed IP 
provision28 was included in the US-China Agreement on Trade Relations as a condition for the 
most favored nation treatment (MFN) to each other’s products. According to US domestic law 
(Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974),29 having an IP system in place is a 
condition for MFN treatment (Maruyama 1999, 169-170). 
                                                     
27 State Council, Several Opinions on Accelerating Building China as an IP Power under New Conditions 
(2015). For details of this policy, see note no. 4 Chapter 1. In 2016, the State Council issued task 
disaggregation for these opinions, specifying 106 tasks for which presiding and participating ministries 
are accountable for. 
28 Article 6 of the US-China Agreement on Trade Relations stipulates that: “(1) both Contracting Parties in 
their trade relations recognize the importance of effective protection of patents, trademarks and 
copyrights; (2) Both Contracting Parties agree that on the basis of reciprocity legal or natural persons of 
either Party may apply for registration of trademarks and acquire exclusive rights thereto in the territory 
of the other Party in accordance with its laws and regulations; (3) Both Contracting Parties agree that 
each Party shall seek, tinder its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or 
natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and 
trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party;.(4) Both Contracting Parties shall 
permit and facilitate enforcement of provisions concerning protection of industrial property in contracts 
between firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of their respective countries, and 
shall provide means, in accordance with their respective laws, to restrict unfair competition involving 
unauthorized use of such rights; (5) Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall take appropriate 
measures, under its laws and regulations and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal 
or natural persons of the other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright protection 
correspondingly accorded by the other Party.” 
29 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 requires the US President to negotiate a bilateral 
trade agreement with a non-market economy (Communist country) to extend MFN to that country. The 
key criteria in Jakson-Vanik Amendment involved intellectual property requirement at least at the level 
of Paris Convention and Berne Convention to ensure fundamental protections to American nationals.  
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China started the legislative process for copyright after the US-China Agreement on High Energy 
Physics in January 1979. In April 1979, the NCAC proposed to the State Council to establish a 
copyright regulatory institution and formulate copyright law (Shen 2008b, 13). The patent law 
proposal abandoned in 1973 was also put on the agenda in April 1979, and the Patent Law 
Drafting Group was established by the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) (Tang 
1998, 92). In June 1979, the Trademark Law Drafting Group was established by the SAIC (Liu 
1998b, 125). 30 
As had occurred one century ago, China modeled its IP legislation on that of other states, by 
dispatching delegations and students overseas. China promulgated its Trademark Law in 1982, 
Patent Law in 1984 and Copyright Law in 1990. In general, this legislation was compatible with 
China’s initial stage of industrialization. For instance, in Patent Law (1984), chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals were not subject to patent protection and the right of importation was not 
recognized as part of the patent right (Wen 1992). China’s regulatory sovereignty started 
shrinking when the US came to consider effective protection pivotal to maintaining its 
competitive advantage (Lehman 1996) and when the Chinese economy started taking-off 
following the market-oriented reforms and inflow of foreign investment (Maruyama 1999). When 
multinational corporations shifted their labor-intensive assembly to China for lower cost, the US 
trade deficits with China skyrocketed.  
From 1988 to 1996, the US initiated bilateral negotiations with China on intellectual property on 
many fronts. The US began bilateral IP negotiations with China in 1989 because China was on 
the (priority) watch list in its Special 301 Report.31 Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
were signed in 1992, 1995, and 199632 after these negotiations. The US also made intellectual 
property a high priority when negotiating the renewal of the US-China S&T Cooperation 
                                                     
30 Generally, literature in Chinese attributes China’s re-embracement of intellectual property to the “Reform 
and Opening-up” policy started in 1978. Though it makes sense that China may not normalize its bilateral 
relations with the US without the opening-up policy, signing bilateral agreements with the US provided 
the direct momentum for China to initiate the legislative process.  
31 The US introduced the Special 301 Section in its Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the 
1988 Trade Act) to coerce its trading partners to improve intellectual property protection through the 
credible threat of unilateral retaliation. Procedurally, the Special 301 directs the US Trade Representative 
(USTR) to identify those foreign countries that deny “adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights”, or deny “fair and equitable non-discriminatory market access to United States persons 
who rely upon intellectual property protection” within 30 days after the issuance of the National Trade 
Estimate Report. For more details, see Bello and Holmer (1989). 
32 US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992), January 17, 
1992; China-United States Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights Memorandum of 
Understanding (1995), February 26, 1995, and China Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement (1996), June 17, 1996.  
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Agreement and the US-China Bilateral Agreement on China's Entry into the WTO in which new 
IP standards were a precondition for China’s accession to the WTO.33  
Negotiations on all three fronts went on in parallel, with the US skillfully creating synergies across 
levels and fora in order to push China into the highest possible levels of protection. For instance, 
the unilateral measure (Special 301 watch list) was a trigger for bilateral negotiations, and the 
threat of unilateral action coerced China into accepting the US conditions in bilateral negotiations. 
The US agreed to remove China from the Special 301 watch list for that year when China agreed 
to enter multilateral IP treaties and (or) amend its domestic legislation. The same cycle started 
again the following year when China was again put on the Special 301 watch list. This cycle of 
listing, threat of sanctions, and promises to lift the threat worked from 1989 till 1996. Although 
the bilateral IP negotiations stopped delivering huge gains for the US after the conclusion of Draft 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Draft 
Final Act (1991)),34 its unilateral approach continues: China has been high on the Special 301 
watch list each year, from 1989 to 2017. The bilateral negotiations on the three fronts were also 
intertwined. Conceding specific requirements in US-China bilateral IP negotiations was the cost 
for China to get the ticket to enter the GATT/WTO and to renew the US-China S&T Cooperation 
Agreement.  
The procedural synergies amongst the negotiations worked for the US for several reasons. First, 
the unilateral trade retaliation based on Special 301 pressured China into accepting the US’ 
requirements on IP protection. Secondly, the US proposed a principle of “reciprocal protection of 
intellectual property” in negotiating the renewal of the US-China S&T Cooperation Agreement. 
This principle required China to provide protection for intellectual property owned by US IP right 
holders in China at a level equivalent to the US protection of intellectual property owned by 
Chinese IP right holders. In cases of S&T cooperation, 35  if China could not provide such 
equivalent IP protection, the US right holders would solely own the intellectual property in the 
subject matter that was protected in the US and in any other third country. Accepting this principle, 
Patent Law (1992) extended the protected subject matter to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals 
                                                     
33 Though the ultimate aim of China’s GATT negotiation was to include China in the multilateral trade 
system, the negotiations concerning market entry were taken bilaterally. China and the US reached this 
bilateral agreement in which the US agreed to support China’s entry to the WTO in March 1995. This 
agreement considerably accelerated China’s GATT negotiation.  
34 MTN.TNC/W/FA, Uruguay Round, Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, December 20, 1991.. The text of the 
TRIPS Agreement made two minor changes on the basis of this Draft Final Act (1991): “(1) the addition 
to Article 64 of paragraphs 2 and 3 on non-violation disputes and (2) the addition of the language in 
Article 31(c) in regard to semiconductor technology.” See Otten (2015).  
35 Since it was proposed in the negotiation of the US-China S&T Cooperation Agreement, the scope of this 
principle was confined by the case of science and technology cooperation projects. It meant it was not 
applicable to intellectual property beyond these projects.  
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and extended patent terms to 20 years.36 Thirdly, China was willing to accept high IP standards 
in these bilateral negotiations based on the expectation that China would complete the GATT 
negotiations (starting in 1986) quickly and become a GATT/WTO Member soon. As long as the 
US requirements on IP protection in these bilateral negotiations were level with the expected 
TRIPS standards, it was acceptable to China because once it had joined the WTO, it would have 
to comply with TRIPS anyway. For instance, although China amended its patent law in 1992 
apparently to comply with the US-China MOU (1992), the amendment was also based on the 
Draft Final Act (1991) because China expected to become a GATT Member soon (Zheng 1998). 
No one foresaw the uncertainty in China’s GATT negotiations which eventually took another 
nine years to finish, after the Patent Law (1992) amendment.  
As was the case almost a century ago, China was again in a weak bargaining position in these 
bilateral IP negotiations. China needed access to science and technology, and the US had the most 
advanced science and technology; China wanted foreign investment, and US multinational 
corporations were the major investors worldwide; China was eager to enter the WTO, but it had 
to go through market access negotiations with the US first so that negotiations with other states 
could follow. The deterioration of foreign relations after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 
compounded the pressure on IP negotiations:  
Since 1989, IPR has featured prominently – even disproportionately – in US-China 
relations. While IPR would have been a source of friction in any case, the disputes 
cannot be separated from the US internal struggle to define a credible post-
Tiananmen policy toward China. By taking firm-line disputes, the Bush and Clinton 
Administration tried to show that they were prepared to confront China aggressively 
over certain issues within the broader context of US-China engagement. While China 
resisted US trade pressure, it accepted IPR as a legitimate topic for bilateral 
bargaining, in contrast to its staunch refusal to publicly negotiate over human rights. 
Patent, trademark, copyright, and enforcement negotiations provided scarce 
momentum at a time when fundamental issues bedeviling the overall US-China 
relationship appeared beyond solution (Maruyama 1999, 172). 
All China could do was to minimize the effect of this encroachment on its sovereignty in these IP 
negotiations, as it did a century ago. China reacted with two strategies: one was to take the TRIPS 
as a baseline in these US-China bilateral negotiations, and the other was to use its domestic market 
as a leverage for retaliation. China participated in TRIPS negotiations37 and was one of the 
                                                     
36 Patent Law (1984) Article 25.5 excluded “pharmaceuticals and substances obtained by chemical methods” 
from patent protection. Patent Law (1992) essentially extended the subject matter under patent protection 
by abolishing this provision.  
37 China was one of the co-sponsors for the GATT proposal MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71,14 May 1990. This 
proposal represented the developing country position in the TRIPS negotiation.  
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developing country representatives in the “10+10” group.38 Although the voice of China was not 
heard during the TRIPS negotiations,39 its participation allowed it to have direct access to the 
Draft Final Act (1991). After signing the Draft Final Act (1991), Chinese negotiators adjusted 
their position in US-China bilateral IP negotiations — defending the Draft Final Act (1991) and 
using it as a new baseline to resist higher standards pushed by the US (Wang and Wu 2001). 
China’s acceptance of the IP standards equivalent to the Draft Final Act (1991) was a prerequisite 
for it to re-enter GATT, but it did not have to and nor did it want to go further. However, the US 
continued to persuade China to accept IP standards in its own TRIPS proposals from 1992 to 1995 
and it succeeded in some issues. After the signing of TRIPS in 1995, it was almost impossible for 
the US to push China towards any TRIPS-plus standards.  
Once China began to safeguard the Draft Final Act (1991), it became harder for the US to achieve 
its domestic policy objectives. When the negotiations broke down, the US threatened China with 
trade retaliation, proposing a list of targeted goods on December 3, 1991. China retaliated on the 
same day with its own list of goods worth the same amount. This pattern was repeated in 
December 1994 (USD 2.8 billion) and May 1996 (USD 3 billion) when the US-China bilateral IP 
negotiations failed (Zhao 2009). The threat of trade retaliation did push the two parties to reach 
an agreement within the given timeframe, but it did not necessarily mean that the US gained from 
its threats: China was capable of initiating counter-retaliation on the same scale based on its 
market power.  
In summary, the US generated procedural synergies across various negotiating levels and fora 
and pushed Chinese IP protection standards to the global IP standard in the early 1990s. 
Meanwhile, China successfully safeguarded the baseline of TRIPS standards40 and successfully 
resisted the US’ threat of unilateral trade retaliations through the threat of counter-retaliations. 
Power relations underpinning US-China bilateral IP negotiations evolved from 1979 to 1996. 
China was in a weak position signing the early agreements in 1979. Establishing an IP system 
was the price China had to pay to progress S&T cooperation with the US. The US achieved most 
in the US-China MOU (1992) among the three MOUs. After China signed the Draft Final Act 
                                                     
38 This “10+10” group was not a negotiating group, but a consultation group in the late phase of the TRIPS 
negotiation. The group initially included ten developed countries and ten developing countries. But in 
practice, the group was open to any interested delegation. In the end, it included 14 developing countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Pakistan and Zimbabwe). 
39 The TRIPS negotiation was mainly influenced by the “Quad” (including Canada, the EC, Japan and the 
United States), and “the voice of China was not heard during the negotiations” (Cottier 2015, 86). 
40 There were a couple of TRIPs-plus standards that China accepted in these bilateral negotiations. One is 
customs protection of intellectual property for exporting goods, and the other is data exclusivity. For 
more detailed analysis, see Chapter 6.4. 
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(1991), the US did not gain substantially from the bilateral IP negotiations even with the threat of 
trade retaliation. This explains how the honeymoon started from 1996 (See below 2.4.2). 
2.4.2 Post-TRIPs era: Compliance, cooperation, and less coercion 
The decade from 1996-2007 was often referred to as a honeymoon (Harris 2008) for US-China 
bilateral IP relations. In this decade, China mainly focused on TRIPS compliance, making sure 
that domestic IP legislation did not conflict with TRIPS. The amended Chinese IP laws,41 in the 
year 2000, adopted the same language as is used in TRIPS to avoid any conflict with TRIPS. 
Market entities in China also began to use intellectual property to protect their own interests. 
Patent applications submitted to SIPO increased 26% annually since 2000(WIPO 2011b), which 
made SIPO the world’s biggest patent office in terms of the number of patent applications from 
2011. 
In this decade, China also became active in international IP engagement. It developed a positive 
relationship with WIPO (Chapter 7.2), signed 17 WIPO administered IP treaties (Appendix I), 
and joined other developing countries in submitting proposals to the TRIPS Council in the Doha 
Round. The honeymoon ended when the US sued China at the WTO in 2007.42 
Bilaterally, intellectual property emerged on the agenda of EU-China relations in 1999, when the 
EU incorporated intellectual property into its EU-China projects.43 Crookes (2013) argues that 
these programs of technical assistance have been among the most effective soft power instruments 
in shaping the EU’s influence on China. These projects are important channels for norm diffusion 
from the EU to China, in which the EU has transferred to China not only IP norms and standards 
but a certain set of “EU-specific” norms and standards (Wyzycka and Hasmath 2016). The sui 
generis protection of geographical indications (GIs), to be discussed in Chapter 3, is an example 
of EU-specific norms. In addition, these projects have “increased positive attitude by IP regulators 
in China, in particular, Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), towards intellectual property” 
(Wyzycka and Hasmath 2016, 9). 
In addition to the US and EU, other countries have endeavored to enhance bilateral liaison with 
China over intellectual property. IP attachés have been dispatched to China from Australia, 
Canada, the EU Delegation, Germany, Japan and the UK and the US [Interview No. 35]. 
Obviously, all countries dispatching IP attachés to China are technology/brand exporters to China. 
The US has 13 IP attachés worldwide, and three of them are based in China. The major mandate 
                                                     
41 This was often referred to as the second round of IP law revision, which included Patent Law (2000), 
Trademark Law (2000) and Copyright Law (2000). The primary focus of this round amendment was to 
comply with TRIPS. See Wen (2002). 
42 WT/DS362, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. 
43 So far, there have been three EU-China cooperation projects on the protection of intellectual property 
rights: IPR1 (1999-2004), IPR2 (2007-2011) and IP Key (2013-2017).   
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of these attachés in China is to facilitate the protection of intellectual property from their home 
country. They also facilitate bilateral communications because they gain access to information 
about the latest IP policy developments and legislative changes occurring in China and have a 
better understanding of the local conditions.  
In the decade after TRIPS, the US started using a mixed strategy of webs of coercion and webs 
of dialogue (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, Drahos 2002a) to address US-China IP issues. The US 
was still ready to deploy coercion. In addition to Special 301, the US International Trade 
Commission (USITC) also initiated 337 investigations into Chinese companies, another unilateral 
measure against IP infringement. 44  Since 2005, the 337 investigations targeting Chinese 
companies have accounted for 30% of total annual investigations. Patent infringement has been 
the major cause of action against Chinese companies (Figure 4). However, Chinese companies 
investigated are not well prepared to respond to the USITC; they are generally not familiar with 
the US legal system and procedures and are not able to provide evidence within the necessary 
time limits. Furthermore, they may find it difficult to afford expensive attorney fees. Ran (2017) 
shows that among 103 Chinese companies sued in the 18 investigations in 2016, only 30 
responded at the USITC. Considering this high percentage of trial in absentia and market 
exclusion as a penalty, there is a probability that some applicants abused the 337 investigations. 
 
 
Figure 4 Chinese Companies Sued at 337 Investigations and the Percentage of 
Patent Investigations (2001-2016)45 
                                                     
44 The 337 investigation is a procedure based on the Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. It is a unilateral 
measure against IP infringement by imported products. The investigated products may be permanently 
excluded from the US market because the 337 investigation introduced injection as a penalty for 
infringement. 
45 Data source: Ran (2017). 
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In addition to coercion through special 301 and 337 investigations, the US also used consultations 
and dialogues to softly steer China into doing more on intellectual property. Intellectual property 
has been discussed in bilateral fora, like the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) 
and the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).46 The JCCT is a joint commission 
co-organized by the USTR (representing the US) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
(representing China) since 1983. As one of the earliest US-China bilateral fora for commerce and 
trade-related issues, the JCCT became the major forum for intellectual property after the last US-
China MOU signed in 1996. Since 2009, intellectual property has also been on the S&ED agenda. 
The transition of US strategy towards a more dialogue-based engagement is also consistent with 
the observation of legal transplants to developing countries in general: “while one mechanism—
coercion—tends to initiate the transplantation process, it fades over time, and three others largely 
supplant it: contractualization, socialization, and regulatory competition” (Morin and Gold 2014, 
781).  
The honeymoon between the US and China ended in 2007 when the US initiated WTO dispute 
resolution47 on IP protection and enforcement in China (Gervais 2009a, Watal 2010, Yu 2011c, 
Guan 2014, Thomas 2017). The US’ resort to WTO instead of initiating bilateral negotiations 
with the threat of trade retaliation through Special 301, as it did one decade ago, indicated the 
increasing ineffectiveness of trade threats and the constraint of multilateralism on US hegemonic 
power. As one of the key architects of the WTO, the US had to comply with the multilateral rules 
it created, rules that to some extent constrain it in a globalized world. The panel report relating to 
the dispute48 does not fully support the US claim, in particular on the issue of assessing the 
effectiveness of a Member’s enforcement efforts. As a result, the US began to deploy the strategy 
of vertical forum-shifting in recent years (Sell 2010b).     
2.4.3 Towards Building China as An Intellectual Property Power (2008 onwards) 
After 2008, Chinese domestic IP regulation and its international IP engagement began to present 
a new trend towards IP instrumentalism. Intellectual property is perceived as an instrument to 
serve Chinese domestic policy objectives, in particular, to promote innovation instead of an 
institution born from external coercion. Though 2008 is selected to mark this new stage because 
China promulgated its National IP Strategy in this year, some changes relevant to this new stage 
occurred before this year. The process of change has been gradual.  
                                                     
46 The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) started in 2009, which will be discussed in 
detail in Section 2.4.3.  
47  US Request for Consultations, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 2007 (WT/DS362/1, IP/D/26, G/L/819).  
48 WTO Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 2009 (WT/DS362/R). 
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In May 2006, the Politburo of the CCP (PCCP) held its 31st public lecture. Professor Zheng 
Chengsi and Wu Handong, two celebrated IP law professors, delivered the lecture International 
IP Protection and Building IP Legal Institutions in China. The lecture was presided over by Hu 
Jintao, the then CCP Central Committee General Secretary and the President of China. Following 
the lecture, President Hu made a speech, pointing out: 
At present, the core competitiveness of a state is more and more manifested by its 
capacity to cultivate, deploy and control the intellectual resources and outcomes, 
which is essentially the capacity to possess and use intellectual property… 
Intellectual property plays a significant role in the construction of an innovative 
state… China would accelerate its formation and implementation of the National IP 
Strategy. Politburos and governments at all levels should attach great importance to 
intellectual property, put intellectual property related work on high agenda and 
improve accountability concerning its implementation… The whole society should 
make concerted efforts to promote the priority of intellectual property (Xinhua News 
Agency 2006).    
Within China’s hierarchical governance structure, this speech sent a clear signal to various levels 
of government to treat intellectual property as a priority. Following President Hu’s instruction, 
the Outline of the National IP Strategy (National IP Strategy) was promulgated on June 5, 2008. 
The National IP Strategy (2008) set IP targets to be achieved in 2013 and 2020 and specified tasks 
for their implementation. The National IP Strategy (2008) has significantly improved the priority 
of intellectual property through institution-building and implementation. Institutionally, the Inter-
Ministerial Joint Meeting for Implementing the National IP Strategy (Inter-Ministerial Joint 
Meeting) was established. With its general office affiliated to and located in the State Council,49 
the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting has all 31 IP regulators as members (Appendix II). The 
National IP Strategy (2008) is implemented through the “pressure driving mechanism” (Cheng 
and Drahos 2018) which propels local governments to achieve the targets it sets.  
After achieving its mid-term targets in 2013, China released the Action Plan on Further 
Implementing the National IP Strategy (2014-2020) 50 (National IP Strategy 2.0) as the second 
stage of the National IP strategy. The National IP Strategy 2.0 set specific, measurable, and time-
based targets for invention patent applications, patent applications via the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT), trademark and copyright registrations, as well as IP services and financing, etc. 
                                                     
49 Before 2016, the general office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting was affiliated with SIPO.  
50 State Council General Office 国务院办公厅 [guowuyuan bangongting], Circular of the General Office 
of the State Council on Forwarding the Action Plan by SIPO and Other Departments on the Further 
Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2014-2020) 国务院办公厅关于转发知
识产权局等单位深入实施国家知识产权战略行动计划 (2014—2020 年)的通知  [Guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu zhuanfa zhishichanquanju dengdanwei shenru shishi guojia zhishichanquan 
zhanlüe xingdong jihua (2014-2020) de tongzhi], No 64 (2014), 国办发 (2014) 64 号 [Guobanfa (2014) 
64 hao].   
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(Appendix III). Without any targets on the limits or exceptions to intellectual property or the 
promotion of technology dissemination, the National IP Strategy 2.0 demonstrates a strong pro-
intellectual property tendency.  
In 2015, China further clarified its targets for 2020: building China as a leading IP power of the 
world. The State Council issued Several Opinions on Accelerating Building China as an IP Power 
under New Conditions (2015) which clarifies the role of intellectual property in its “innovation-
driven development 创新驱动发展  [chuangxin qudong fazhan]”. Intellectual property, it is 
proposed, will enhance the competitiveness of China, stimulate innovation, and facilitate 
industrial development.  
China has continuously reformed its domestic IP regulation. Specialized IP courts were 
established in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai at the end of 2014.51 IP tribunals, functioning 
as circuit courts with trans-regional jurisdiction and concerted procedure, were established in 
2017 in another ten cities. 52  Some local governments also experimented with combined or 
integrated IP regulators in order to solve the problem of low efficiency in the current fragmented 
regulation of intellectual property.53 
The major justification for strengthening IP regulation in China is the innovation stimulation 
theory (see Chapter 9.2.1). The rhetoric about stimulating innovation carefully and skillfully 
diverts a nationalist debate, on whether the Chinese IP system essentially benefits foreigners or 
the Chinese people towards a functionalist discourse on whether the IP system promotes 
innovation. While the issue of who benefits from an enhanced IP system is still part of the debate 
in China, it is not the focus of the debate anymore.  
China has achieved significant S&T breakthroughs in recent years. The latest high-speed train 
“复新 [fuxin]” (which means rejuvenation in Chinese), boasting a top speed of 400 km/h and a 
consistent speed of 350 km/h, has shortened the 1318 km traveling time between Beijing and 
Shanghai to 3.5 hours. By the end of 2016, Chinese railway networks reached 22,000 kilometers, 
                                                     
51  Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued Decision on the Establishment of 
Intellectual Property Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 关于在北京、上海、广州设立知识
产权法院的决定 [Guanyu zai Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou Sheli Zhishichanquan Fayuan de Jueding] 
on August 31, 2014.  
52 By the end of August 2017, Nanjing and Suzhou, Wuhan and Chengdu Hefei, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Fuzhou, 
Jinan and Qingdao had established intellectual property tribunals under the approval of the Supreme 
People’s Court of China.  
53  The General Office of the State Council, Notice on Issuing the Overall Plan for the Pilot Program on 
Reform concerning Comprehensive Administration of Intellectual Property 国务院办公厅关于印发知
识产权综合管理改革试点总体方案的通知 [Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Zhishichanquan 
Zonghe Guanli Gaige Shidian Zongti Fang’an de Tongzhi], No. 106 [2016] 国办发 (2016) 106 号 
[Guobanfa (2016)106 hao]. Local governments (Xiamen, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Changsha, Suzhou, 
Xuhui) have already experimented on combining fragmented local patent, trademark and copyright 
regulators into one institution to enhance the efficiency in particular in intellectual property enforcement.  
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accounting for 60% of the world’s total (Xinhua 2017a). Chinese companies owned intellectual 
property for the overall design and key technologies involved in these high-speed trains, for 
example, Chinese standards account for 84% of the 254 standards in the high-speed trains (He et 
al. 2017). 
The high-speed train is not the only example. The Chinese submersible “Jiaolong” has dived in 
the Mariana Trench (Zhang 2017e); the Sunway Taihu-Light has been the world’s fastest 
supercomputer (Xinhua 2016); and the Hualong One demonstration nuclear project, constructed 
in 2017, will soon be operational (Xinhua 2017b). China has also developed the world’s first 
prototype quantum computer (Xinhua 2017c) and the world’s largest radio telescope “FAST” 
(Xinhua 2017d). This wave of technological breakthroughs has also occurred in consumables and 
services, being led by companies like Taobao, WeChat, and Xiaomi (Shao 2017). China has begun 
to expand its cultural projection through the development of the digital creative industry, 54 
specifically prioritizing projects both on equipment development (such as virtual reality, 
enhanced reality, holographic imaging, naked eye 3D graphics display) and content creation 
(digitalization of the arts, cultural relics, intangible cultural heritage and culture with local 
specialty). These and other examples show that China possesses significant independent 
innovative capabilities and so can look to IP rights as an instrument of protection. Indeed, 
intellectual property has become an important part of industrial and cultural policy-making.55 One 
typical example is Made in China 2025 56 which was proposed in 2015 as the first step of an 
overarching, systematic, long-term plan to build China as a leading innovative power by 2045. 
SIPO has been a member of the Made in China Leading Group and has endeavored to establish 
and improve the IP evaluation mechanism on the ten prioritized industries in Made in China 2025 
(Zhang 2017a).  
In parallel with the increasing domestic demands for intellectual property, internationally TRIPS 
compliance does not worry China anymore and the US’ threat of unilateral trade retaliation is not 
as effective as in the previous decade. Through webs of dialogue, bilateral (often informal) 
negotiations become the main channel for the US to influence Chinese IP regulation. The US has 
two primary concerns about intellectual property in China at this stage: trade secrets and Chinese 
                                                     
54 In the 13th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of China, a target that “cultural industry 
will become one of the pillar industries in China” is set. To achieve this target, Digital creative industry 
was promoted as one of the strategic emerging industries in China.  
55 The relationship between intellectual property and economic growth in China are manifested by the 
economic contribution principle of intellectual property. In addition to measuring and quantifying the 
direct contribution of various types of intellectual property to the economic growth directly. This 
principle also knitted intellectual property into the industrial policies. See Chapter 9.2.2. 
56 State Council, Notice on Issuing Made in China (2025) 国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025》的通知 
[Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Zhongguozhizao (2025) de tongzhi], No. 28 (2015) 国发(2015) 28 号 [Guofa 
(2015) 28 hao]. 
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indigenous innovation policies.57 Since both issues are beyond the scope of TRIPS,58 the US could 
not table a dispute at the WTO as it did in 2007. In the case of indigenous innovation policies, the 
American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China) successfully prevented the Chinese 
from implementing the indigenous innovation policies, by putting it high on the agenda of US-
China bilateral relations (Chapter 8.3.2). For trade secrets, the US exerted its influence through 
transnational networks, in particular, the Chinese IP epistemic communities to reinforce trade 
secret protection in China (Chapter 8.3.1). In summary, the US strategy in this decade was 
primarily first identifying a specific issue, framing an improved IP protection on this issue as 
conducive to innovation, proving the US experience as “successful or advanced”, and 
disseminating the successful experiences of the US to Chinese epistemic communities and 
technocrats. At the time of writing, it is still too early to say whether these strategies, based on 
influence through dialogue with key organizations and communities, are successful or not. 
After 2008, China began to more active in engaging with international IP regulation on various 
issues at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral levels. During this period, China developed 
various strategies to manage contested principles. Chinese sub-state actors and non-state actors 
also developed transnational networks with their counterparts in other states or with international 
organizations. China’s multi-level and multi-forum IP engagement at this stage is the focus of this 
thesis and will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.  
2.5 Is China a born pirate? Knowledge regulation in ancient Chinese society  
Before addressing specific cases on China’s international IP engagement, this section will discuss 
how the US isolated China from its own history of knowledge regulation, during US-China 
bilateral negotiations. In the US-China bilateral negotiations from 1989 to 1996, the US 
negotiators framed China as a born pirate (Wu 2009a)59 on the basis that China did not have any 
IP statutes as part of its ancient history. This section focuses not on facts of IP/knowledge 
                                                     
57 See, for instance, the US Fact Sheet of the 27th JCCT, which includes bad faith trademarks, licensing, 
online infringement of intellectual property, sports broadcast copyright protection, and trade secret as 
top concerns from the US side, available at: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-
sheets/2016/november/us-fact-sheet-27th-us-china-joint#. “Prohibiting knowingly theft of trade secret 
and other know-how online” was also on the agenda of the S&ED in the 9th meeting in 2016, available 
at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/t1370469.shtml .    
58 This is because there were no arguable violation of the WTO rules in these cases. In the case of trade 
secrets, China has already established a legal mechanism that is compliant with the TRIPS standards. In 
the case of indigenous innovation policy, the controversy does not lie in intellectual property but the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The indigenous innovation policies required 
Chinese governments at various levels to give priority to products with “indigenous intellectual property” 
in their government procurement. Considering China is not yet a member of the GPA, China is not 
obliged to follow national treatment during government procurement (Shi 2009).  
59 The US negotiators said they were negotiating with thieves. The Chinese negotiators countered by saying 
they were negotiating with pirates because the Chinese cultural relics exhibited in Western museums 
were being exhibited without China’s permission. 
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regulation in ancient China, but on the framing of these historical facts and the impact of such 
framing.     
2.5.1 Framing China as a born pirate in negotiations: A strategy of naming and 
shaming 
The US framed China as a “born pirate” in the US-China bilateral IP negotiation. This framing 
was not new. The US had adopted the same tone in the TRIPS negotiations. While proposing that 
the function of intellectual property was to promote trade and investment, the US also associated 
intellectual property with zero tolerance of infringement, by using the emotional words of “piracy” 
and “theft” (Odell and Sell 2006). Framing China as a born pirate was essentially a strategy of 
stigmatization through naming and shaming (Braithwaite and Drahos 2002). As pointed out by 
Braithwaite and Drahos, naming and shaming is a bad policy for the powerless but can be a 
strategic one for the powerful. In the context of US-China IP negotiations, China was very 
responsive to naming and shaming not only because China increasingly self-identified as a 
responsible stakeholder who wished to participate in international society but also because China 
was proud of its thousands of years continuous and prosperous civilization and wanted to avoid 
losing face (Ho 1976) in international society.  
One may argue that the stigmatization of China did not work well. Apparently, stigmatization like 
other coercive strategies met with a direct response from China. Stigmatization stimulated 
questioning by Chinese officials regarding the legitimacy of Chinese cultural relics being 
exhibited in western museums, just like trade retaliation from the US triggered counter-retaliation 
from China. One could also argue that China’s acceptance of IP rules was out of pragmatism, not 
because of stigmatization by the US. China did not have strong bargaining power in the US-China 
IP negotiations anyway (Section 2.4.1), so it did not matter whether or not China was framed as 
a born pirate.  
 The impact of the framing (and the acceptance of such framing) is more profound and indirect 
— it matters, in particular, what would follow after the regulatory importation of intellectual 
property. As pointed out by the Patent Protection Declaration (Lamping et al. 2014), TRIPS is 
not the worst-case scenario in terms of exclusive rights, because it still leaves many areas of 
flexibilities for state regulation. If China was confident in its history of knowledge regulation, it 
would explore its own history of social and legal norms, in particular, customary norms; it could 
then further fashion rules that were societally embedded and that met the TRIPS standards. But 
in reality, China seems not to have had that confidence. This lack of such confidence perhaps 
explains its acceptance of the born pirate framing and its failure to explore local legal sources for 
IP regulation. The framing negated the value of China’s own traditional legal sources for 
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knowledge regulation and left China with only one way to go, that is, the wholesale importation 
of “advanced” IP systems.  
The US continued to employ this naming and shaming strategy towards China after the US-China 
bilateral negotiations. China has been on the watch list of the Special 301 for 28 consecutive years. 
Recently, the US started targeting Chinese companies that are going global. For instance, USTR 
has put Taobao, China’s largest and the world’s second largest e-commerce platform, on its list 
of notorious markets in 2012.60 Since then, the notorious markets list directly correlated with 
Alibaba’s reputation and share price. The logic is the same: naming and shaming is a strategic 
policy that works well for the powerful.   
2.5.2 Beyond negotiation: How China was framed as a born pirate by academics  
In addition to the bilateral negotiations, a similar argument was proposed in Alford’s book, To 
Steal a Book Is An Elegant Offence (Alford 1995).61 Alford raised the question of why ancient 
China had not, over a very long period, developed a statutory copyright law. Specifically, Alford 
argues that even if there was evidence in ancient China concerning restrictions on the 
unauthorized reproduction of books, symbols, and products, they were not the same as those in 
the modern Western IP system. The key difference was that in ancient China, the restrictions on 
unauthorized reproduction were for the purposes of ideological control, rather than for the 
protection of civil property rights.  
Alford (1995) was translated into Chinese, which stimulated a prolonged debate on whether or 
not ancient China had an IP law (Li 1998). To prove IP laws did exist in ancient China, Chinese 
IP scholars have searched for elements in Chinese traditions that resembled intellectual property. 
For instance, Zuo (2005) argues that China had a history of trademarks for over 2000 years. 
Relatively advanced systems of agriculture and handicrafts produced many symbols with 
functions akin to trademarks and geographical indications.62 Considering these signs can mark 
the source of products, Zuo concludes they generally functioned as trademarks (Zuo 2005, 5-8).  
There is clear evidence that (trade)marks indicating the source of products existed in ancient 
China, but such marks did not have the traits of private property that existed in western countries. 
                                                     
60 USTR first identified notorious markets as part of its Special 301 Report in 2006. Since 2011, it was 
separately from the Special 301 Report as a stand-alone report published annually. The lists of notorious 
markets included physical and online marketplaces. Alibaba, which owns Taobao.com, China’s biggest 
online shopping platform has been on the Notorious Markets since 2011. 
61 The main argument was already put forward by Alford (1993). Since his 1995 book has been translated 
into Chinese and has a wider audience and impact, this section will focus on the book.  
62  The areas included metal fabrication, casting, reeling, embroidery, liquor brewing, tea, traditional 
Chinese herb medicine, ceramics, and arts and crafts in ancient China. Four famous embroideries were 
named after their origin, and the world-renowned ceramics were also named after their origin 
Jingdezheng. 
65 
Misappropriation of trademarks in ancient Chinese society was therefore regulated following a 
different logic — misappropriation was generally considered a violation of a traditional moral 
standard, rather than of a specific law (Wang 2008). Understanding the value of trademarks in the 
context of the Chinese legal tradition requires understanding what constituted the traditional 
morality around their use and how this impacted on the regulation of individual behavior. A 
Confucian proposition provides an insight into understanding the effects of regulation by morality, 
instead of law: 
Lead people by law and policies and make them comply by imposing a penalty, and 
the people will try to escape without a sense of shame. Lead people by moral and 
make them comply through li,63 and they will have a sense of shame and try to comply 
with the highest standard. 64  
This explanation is just the tip of the iceberg in understanding the legal tradition of ancient China. 
The protection of trademarks is best understood, in this broad context, from a perspective of legal 
pluralism and not from a Western-centric perspective of IP laws. The delicate spelling out of how 
the institution of knowledge regulation worked in ancient China, may even reach a conclusion 
that “history may teach us that the connection between intellectual property, science, and 
economic development is contingent and local rather than necessary and universal” (Drahos 1995, 
18). Such a historical exploration might have equipped China with a theoretical foundation to 
initiate rival standards that were able to compete with the theoretical justifications for western IP 
norms. But in reality, this historical investigation never took place. Chinese epistemic 
communities were trapped by the Western-centric assumption, proposed by Alford, that the 
proprietary (intellectual property) protection of knowledge is necessary and universal. In the 
investigation of Chinese history from this perspective, the only conclusion one can reach is that 
China did not have an IP system as part of its ancient history. The inference that naturally follows 
from this conclusion is that China should comprehensively import an “advanced” IP system from 
the West.  
The strategy of framing China as a born pirate contributed to integrating China into the 
international IP system. The search for evidence that the concept of intellectual property existed 
                                                     
63 The li 礼 were one of the core concepts in Confucianism. They appeared in many Confucian classics and 
were left open-ended in definition. Like many other Confucius concepts, li were comprehensible but 
not-articulated, mainly because their explanation is contextual and interactional, and one definition will 
exclude other possible explanations of them. Unger summarizes key features of li as “hierarchical 
standards of conduct; they governed relationships according to the relative social positions of individuals. 
The li were perceived as customary forms of behaviour intrinsic to particular social situations and 
positions. The li were not positive rules; indeed, in a sense they were not rules at all. They lacked the 
quality of positiveness because they were not understood, formulated, or obeyed as something apart from 
the concrete relationships that established an individual's identity and social place” (Unger 1977, 93-96).     
64 This is a direct quote by Confucius in the Analects 论语 [Lunyu]. The original text was “道之以政，齐
之以刑，民免而无耻；道之以德，齐之以礼，有耻且格。” 
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in ancient China made it extremely difficult for China to promote a rival system of knowledge 
regulation that drew on broader Chinese traditions and values. 
2.6. Globalization of international IP regulation as a context for China’s 
international engagement 
Intellectual property rights were a Western European phenomenon. As international markets 
began to expand dramatically, there was a demand for international protection through such 
proprietary systems. The earliest formal agreements were the Paris Convention (1883) and the 
Berne Convention (1886). Subsequently, there was a wave of bilateral treaties, such as the US-
China bilateral agreement (1902) (Okediji 2004a).  
After World War II, WIPO became the central forum, at the multilateral level, to coordinate IP 
regulation. The voting system of WIPO (one state one vote) favored developing countries. From 
1984, the US skillfully employed the mechanism of forum-shifting (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, 
Sell 2003), which shifted the negotiation of intellectual property to the Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations which later brought about TRIPS. The US and the EU (European Communities (EC) 
at the time of the negotiation) were the two most powerful actors in the TRIPS negotiation.65 
TRIPS was essentially a compromise between the US and the EC. Once developing countries and 
international civil societies focused on the implications for health outcomes a process of challenge 
and debate commenced (Helfer 2004). Developing countries and international civil societies 
reframed intellectual property as a barrier to access, in particular, access to medicine (Correa 
2002a, Abbott 2004, Correa 2006, Morin 2006, Sell 2007, Fink and Reichenmiller 2006) and 
access to knowledge (Kapczynski 2007). 66 This reframing arose from a series of rational choices 
by these weak actors (Odell and Sell 2006).67 The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
was the best example of this reframing (Drezner 2008). In addition to the access campaigns, the 
developing countries also proposed international rule-making to protect traditional knowledge 
and associated genetic resources (Gervais 2005, Carvalho 2007). 
The post-TRIPS era was also characterized by the US and other developed countries abandoning 
the multilateral fora of intellectual property and initiating a new round of vertical forum-shifting. 
                                                     
65 In the process of TRIPS negotiations, the “Quad” (Canada, the EC, Japan and the United States) was a 
powerful coalition for promoting higher IP standards (Otten 2015). In addition, there was a 10+10 group. 
See supra note no. 38. For the negotiation process of TRIPS, see Sell (2003), Drahos and Braithwaite 
(2002). 
66  The milestone for the access to knowledge campaign was the WIPO Treaty on Access to Knowledge, 
May 9, 2005 draft.  
67 As pointed out by Odell and Sell (2006), the rationale for the reframing is that “a weak-state coalition 
seeking to claim value from dominant states in any regime will increase its gains if it captures the 
attention of the mass media in industrial countries and persuades the media to reframe the issue using a 
reference point more favourable to the coalition’s position, other things equal.” 
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Intellectual property negotiations were shifted to plurilateral and regional fora, such as Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Sell 2010b). 
These initiatives sought to set TRIPS-plus IP standards, in particular for test data protection 
(Chapter 6.4).  
The continuous contestations along with the simultaneous international IP rule-making initiatives, 
in various fora, led to international IP regime complexity (Alter and Meunier 2009, Raustiala and 
Victor 2004). Structurally, regime complexity introduces legal fragmentation and rule ambiguity, 
as well as facilitating cross-institutional political strategies of states (Gomez-Mera 2015). The 
presence of regime complexity also means that powerful actors can no longer play the game of 
“winner-takes-all”. When more than one regime exists, an actor will not win in every regime, 
besides, other actors can opt out by regime shifting or creating new regimes (Morse and Keohane 
2014). In summary, legal fragmentation, rule-ambiguity, and opportunities for cross-institutional 
strategizing are the basic conditions of China’s international IP engagement in the post-TRIPS 
era. 
2.7 Summary  
History shows China was a rule-taker in the area of intellectual property, from the 1902 UK-China 
bilateral IP negotiation, until China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. In this thesis, I ask the 
question: has China had a chance to be a rule-maker, since its accession to WTO when IP laws 
and policies are determined by China’s domestic demands, rather than by external pressures. 
During the first three decades of the PRC, China made a sovereign decision to model its 
knowledge regulation on systems devised by the USSR. This period had a profound influence on 
the distribution of mandates among Chinese IP regulators, and some of those knowledge 
regulators continue to regulate IP related issues to the present day. For instance, while SIPO has 
skillfully mobilized private actors and research institutions to utilize the patent system to protect 
their own inventions, MOST still plays a critical role in collecting and centralizing research and 
development resources to promote science and technology breakthroughs. The high value placed 
on communal ownership by the PRC also paved the way for a defiant attitude by the public 
towards intellectual property, after China re-embraced the IP system in the late 1970s. 
This chapter focused on China’s re-embracing of the IP system after 1978. Before China’s 
accession to the WTO, China engaged in multi-front negotiations at both the bilateral and 
multilateral levels. The US generated procedural synergies across levels and fora to push China 
to adopt high IP protection standards. Standing in a weak bargaining position, China managed to 
adhere to TRIPS standards and resist the US’ threat of unilateral trade retaliations through 
counter-retaliations. After China’s accession to the WTO, its main focus has been on TRIPS 
compliance; the US has gradually changed its strategy from the threat of trade coercion to one 
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incorporating more dialogue. After 2008, when China promulgated its National IP Strategy, 
China began to reinforce IP regulation to serve its domestic policy objectives. This recent history 
provides the context for China’s engagement in specific issues, as will be discussed in chapters 3, 
4 and 5.  
In this chapter, I also discussed the US’ born pirate framing of knowledge regulation in ancient 
China and its influences. Though this framing did not work effectively in the bilateral negotiations, 
it did enough to persuade China not to look back to the traditional ways of thinking in order to 
construct an IP system with Chinese characteristics. The born pirate framing, therefore, provided 
justification for a comprehensive regulatory importation of intellectual property.  
China was a latecomer to the international IP system, arriving on the stage of international 
economic law after it joined the WTO when the international rules concerning major types of 
intellectual property had been set by TRIPS. As mentioned, this background constrained the 
choice of thematic cases of this thesis. Geographical indications, the disclosure obligation, and 
technical standardization are areas in which international negotiations are still on-going, and so 
they are the only IP areas in which China has a chance to engage and demonstrate influence. If 
China cannot impact these areas as a rule-maker, then arguably it will not influence any IP issue 
area. Chapters 3 to 5 will examine these three thematic cases, one by one.  
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Chapter 3 China Engages in the International 
Regulation of Geographical Indications 
3.1 Introduction  
Geographical indications (GIs) are intellectual property rights in place names that evoke the 
typical qualities of agricultural products and foodstuffs that originate in particular districts 
(Gervais 2009b). Typical examples of GIs are Champagne, Feta, Longjing Tea, and Colombian 
Coffee. As a type of intellectual property, the communities in the demarcated locality have 
exclusive right to use these indications. Some GIs have built their reputation over centuries, they 
are often perceived by consumers as being of “better” quality than other similar products, and 
thus have the potential to bring added value to the producers.  
3.1.1 GIs as an international intellectual property right 
GIs are identified as a type of intellectual property from a legal perspective. Different terms are 
used, and different definitions are provided in different international agreements. The Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) protects “indications of 
source or appellations of origin”; the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks (Madrid Agreement) protects “indications of source”; 1  the Lisbon 
Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration 
(Lisbon Agreement) protects “appellations of origin”; 2  and TRIPS protects geographical 
indications.3  
These different terminologies indicate their different scope of protection to the subjects on the 
basis of the relationship between the place of origin and particular quality of a product. Correa 
(2007, 211-212) divides indications related to sources/origin into two categories: (1) simple, 
quality-neutral indications (like “made in China”), for which the use is merely subject to the 
condition that a product originates from the place designated by the indication of source; and (2) 
                                                     
1  “Indications of source” is used in in Articles 1(2) and 10 of the Paris Convention and throughout the 
Madrid Agreement. However, these two treaties do not provide any definition of the term. According to 
(WIPO 1997, 379), indications of source “include any name, designation, sign or other indication which 
refers to a given country or to a place located therein, which has the effect of conveying the notion that 
the goods bearing the indication originate in that country or place”.  
2  “Appellations of origin” is mentioned in the Paris Convention and defined by the Lisbon Agreement. 
According to Article 2 (1) Lisbon Agreement, “Appellation of origin means the geographical name of a 
country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and 
characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including 
natural and human factors.” 
3  “Geographical indication” is defined by Article 22.1TRIPS as “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”. 
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qualified indications which have a particular descriptive meaning because the characteristic, 
quality, or reputation of products are essentially attributable to a country, region, or locality. 
Based on this categorization, the difference between the terminologies relating to GIs becomes 
clearer. Indications of source are quality-neutral marks because it does not imply the presence of 
any link between the special quality, or other characteristics of the product and its place of origin. 
Appellations of origin and GIs are qualified indications. Both appellations of origins and GIs fall 
into the second category because they both require a qualitative link between the product to which 
they refer and its place of origin, but the link with the place of origin must be stronger in the case 
of an appellation of origin (WIPO 2016a). That’s why appellations of origin are considered as a 
special type of GIs.  
 
Figure 5 Relationship between the Different Terminologies Relating to GIs 
The different definitions and effects of the GI terms in international conventions/agreements and 
the domestic laws of various countries make the scope of the term unclear, which to some extent 
causes further confusion and uncertainty in the interpretation of the term (Caenegem 2003). 
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the three terminologies. Indications of source, the 
simple quality-neutral indications, could also be protected against misuse based on unfair 
competition law, consumer protection law or trademark law. For the purpose of the case study, 
this chapter only focuses on the various international fora pertinent to GIs and indications of 
source are not within its scope. 
3.1.2 Contested legal mechanisms for GI protection  
There are two primary legal mechanisms for the protection of GIs: sui generis protection and 
trademark protection. The EU, representing the Old World, has established a sui generis 
mechanism for GI protection. This rigid sui generis mechanism has been justified by (1) the 
concept of terroir as the core to GIs (Josling 2006); (2) the welfare argument to protect consumers 
(Grunert 2005, Combris, Lange, and Issanchou 2006); (3) the necessity of using GIs to preserve 
cultural diversity (Broude 2005); and (4) the benefits of GIs for developing countries (Guerra 
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2010). On the basis of these justifications, France, and later the EU, continuously promoted sui 
generis protection as global standards. However, these justifications and rule-making efforts have 
been resisted by New World countries such as the US, Australia, and Chile. These countries prefer 
the trademark mechanism (Watson 2016). Essentially, the battle over sui generis and trademarks 
can be summarized as a battle over standards regarding what indicates good quality, what shapes 
consumers’ perception of quality, and what constitutes consumer confusion (Das 2015).  
As legal mechanisms, the sui generis protection promoted by the EU and the trademark protection 
promoted by the US are different in various aspects. First, a registered GI is a description 
associated with products from a particular geographical location. A trademark has to be distinctive, 
that is, it cannot use ordinary words that should be left free for other producers to use. Secondly, 
all producers from the demarcated geographical location have the right to use the GI label and 
exclude wrongful appropriation of a GI while the (individual) trademark holder has the sole 
exclusive right over a trademark. Thirdly, a GI is also seen as a guarantee of quality, where 
producer associations are responsible for quality monitoring. Trademarks may also be relevant to 
quality, but this relationship is built upon an accumulated reputation of the producer rather than 
on the special characteristics of the geographical location. Finally, a GI is not freely transferable 
because of the required association with the geographical location (Blakeney 2012).  
The conflict over common versus proprietary ownership has been bridged by the introduction of 
certification or collective marks within the trademark mechanism. This does not, however, 
reconcile the legal conflict caused by the EU’s concept of terroir (the right to the GI name has 
been established historically) and the US’s first-to-file trademark principle. The EU has promoted 
terroir as the standard set out in Article 23 TRIPS (the higher-level protection for wines and 
spirits). The US rejects the EU’s geographical names policy because either these names have 
already been registered as trademarks, or because they have become generic names and thus lost 
distinctiveness (Goebel and Groeschl 2014). The global GI battle over a sui generis versus a 
trademark mechanism is one over which mechanism will be used and the quality standard for GI 
products that will be set. 
In the post-TRIPS era, contestation over international rule-making on GIs has continued at various 
levels. Many developing countries, being convinced by the EU of the positive effect of GIs on 
agriculture, joined the EU in promoting GI-related negotiations at the WTO. The US and other 
New World countries have firmly adhered to the Article 22 TRIPS standards of GIs. As a result, 
the US has consistently blocked the post-TRIPS proposals by the EU and some developing 
countries. At the plurilateral level, the EU attempted to incorporate GIs into ACTA but was again 
blocked by the US. Bilaterally, the EU and the US each have developed their own template on GI 
provisions in their FTAs based on the sui generis or trademark rationales respectively. In the 
negotiation of the Trans-Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US, the 
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EU is ready for a trade-off between agriculture and GIs — “the EU will accept increased EU 
market access for some US agricultural products on the basis that the US will accept to protect 
certain EU GIs in the United States” (O'Connor 2015, 14). However, at the time of the writing 
TTIP negotiations are on hold.  
In the recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU and Canada 
achieved some interesting compromises. While Canada agreed with Article 23 level protection 
for specified EU GIs, CETA allows the coexistence of existing trademarks with GI names 
(O'Connor 2015). However, Canadian producers retain perpetual rights to use certain EU-
registered GI names such as feta and Asiago. CETA thus demonstrates an interesting compromise 
between the EU and New World positions.    
3.1.3 GIs as a Chinese phenomenon 
Though GIs are generally considered to be a European form of intellectual property (Caenegem, 
Cleary, and Drahos 2014), it is not uncommon in the Chinese traditional tributary system (Zhang 
and Buzan 2012). Shangshu 尚书, one of the Five Classics of ancient Chinese literature, recorded 
that Xilü 西旅 (a tributary state at that time) submitted local specialties as a tribute to the new 
emperor of Zhou around BC 1046.4 The tributary system lasted until the end of Qing Dynasty in 
1911, and over 3000 types of objects were given as a tribute to the central empire, including food, 
fabric, exotic beasts and birds, traditional Chinese medicines, and musical instruments etc. (Hu 
1996). Current Chinese GI applicants still refer to the history of a local specialty as being 
submitted as a tribute in their application document as evidence of premium quality or other 
characteristics of GIs. A reputation built on being a tribute in the past is well recognized by 
Chinese consumers. Nonetheless, the traditional usage of geographical names in China was not 
considered intellectual property in the same way as in the EU.  
Institutionally, there was no legal system originating from China to regulate these local specialties. 
In the early 20th century, Portugal sought to add GIs in its Agreement of Friendship and 
Navigation with Qing Dynasty (Wang 2008), but the negotiation was not finalized so GIs were 
not then introduced to Modern China. In the 1980s, following China’s Reform and Opening-up 
policy which introduced foreign investment, and as a result of complaints from EU GI right 
holders China encountered the concept of EU style GIs for the first time in its history (Section 
3.4.3). 
                                                     
4  It read that “the intelligent kings paid careful attention to their virtue, and the wild tribes on every side 
acknowledged their subjection to them. The nearer and the more remote all presented the local specialties, 
such as robes, food, and vessels for use. 明王慎德，四夷咸宾。无有远迩，毕献方物，惟服食器用 
[Mingwang shende, siyi xianbin. Wuyouyuaner, bixianfangwu, weifushiqiyong].” See Shangshu Zhoushu 
Lv’ao《尚书·周书·旅獒》. In this quote, “方物 [fangwu]” refers to local specialties.  
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The first domestic regulations concerning GIs were Administrative Measures Concerning the 
Registration of Collective Marks and Certification Marks (1994) which established trademark 
protection for GIs. Following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China established three 
parallel domestic systems for the protection of GIs, including trademark protection by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and sui generis protection by the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and a sui generis 
system by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Twelve years after WTO accession, around 3,210 
GIs have been registered in all three parallel systems in China, with an economic value amounting 
to CNY1.3 trillion (USD 213 billion)5 (Liu 2013). These numbers show that the concept of GIs 
has taken root in China.  Against this background, this chapter will examine China’s international 
GI engagement.   
3.1.4 Justification for GIs as a case study 
GIs are selected as a case study for China’s international IP engagement for several reasons. First, 
the “Old World” and the “New World” have consistently contested international GI standard-
setting (Evans and Blakeney 2006, Cortés Martín 2004). On the one hand, some European 
countries have a tradition of protecting GIs via a sui generis system; on the other hand, countries 
such as the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand treat GIs as a type of trademark and protect 
them with their trademark systems. Because of earlier waves of migration, with European 
migrants bringing their traditional knowledge with them, some EU GIs are considered to be 
generic names in the US and cannot, therefore, be protected by US trademark law (Gervais 2013). 
Investigating this case will reveal how China, as a latecomer in the international IP system, 
established its GI systems under the influence of contested GI standards.  
Secondly, China has identified GI protection as being important to its national interest. China has 
been in a weak bargaining position in IP negotiations until its accession to the WTO, and the 
momentum for China’s IP rule-making has been external pressure (Chapter 2.2 and 2.4). For a 
long period, IP laws in China did not reflect Chinese domestic interests in intellectual property. 
GIs are different. From its infancy, GIs have been associated with China’s interest in rural 
development and enhancing farmers’ incomes. Therefore, China may have more incentive to 
engage with international GI regulation, in comparison to other IP issues, to steer relevant 
international standards toward a direction that will advance its domestic policy objectives.  
                                                     
5  Converted by the exchange rate “USD 1= CNY 6.10” based on the Announcement of Middle Price for 
RMB Foreign Exchange Rate by Ministry of Commerce (31st December 2013). The announcement is 
available: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jshz/rlzykf/201312/20131200447598.shtml (accessed 8 
November 2016). 
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Thirdly, GIs are also an area that demonstrates fragmentation of power in domestic regulation 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). For the three GI systems in China, each regulator has certain 
authority over international cooperation. This domestic structure of competing systems under 
three sub-state regulators enables an in-depth investigation of the interaction between sub-state 
actors and their foreign counterparts and international organizations through multiple channels of 
contact. In this sense, this case study will reveal a more complex and nuanced engagement of 
China at bilateral and multilateral levels by various sub-state actors.  
3.1.5 Application of the research question to the GI case  
This chapter focuses on how China engages with the international GI system. Specifically, this 
chapter focuses on (1) how does the international GI system influence China? (2) whether or not 
robust domestic institutional building has stimulated any “Chinese agenda” in international GI 
regulation? If yes, how has this agenda manifested itself? If not, why not? 
The case of GIs will demonstrate that although the Chinese GI systems have been influenced by 
the US and the EU respectively, its domestic GI protection standards are the same as TRIPS. This 
means although China has accepted the concept of sui generis protection from the EU, the Chinese 
sui generis system does not substantively create GI protection standards equivalent to the EU. 
However, China has been convinced by the EU and through its own observation that GIs are an 
effective rural policy instrument. Based on this understanding, China joined the coalition of the 
EU and the developing countries to promote higher standards for GIs beyond wines and spirits at 
the WTO. China also actively promoted GI negotiations at the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC). At the bilateral level, China has experimented with a mutual recognition mechanism for 
GIs with the EU and three FTA partners.  
Section 3.2 will set the scene for China’s international GI engagement by examining the complex 
international regime for GIs and the power contestations between the EU and the US in the 
international GI system. Section 3.3 will examine how China has established its domestic GI 
systems under the influence of the US, the EU, and the TRIPS Agreement. Section 3.4 will focus 
on China’s outward engagement at the multilateral and bilateral levels after its domestic 
institutions were established.  
3.2 International GI regulation: regime complexity and power contestation 
Before exploring China’s role in the international GI system, this section first examines the 
landscape of the international GI regimes. Several authors have already analyzed the specific legal 
rules for international GI protection (Cortés Martín 2004, Okediji 2007, Gervais 2010, Blakeney 
2012, Gangjee 2016). The international GI system demonstrates considerable complexity (Orsini, 
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Morin, and Young 2013). Gomez-Mera (2015) has identified three consequences of regime 
complexity for regional governance: (1) introducing legal fragmentation and rule ambiguity; (2) 
facilitating opportunistic forum shopping and forum shifting; and (3) eroding regional unity 
through competition and other feedback effects. Informed by the theoretical inquiry raised by 
Gomez-Mera, this examination of the international GI regime complexity will focus on its impact 
on China and China’s response. More specifically, it will look at (1) whether international GI 
regime complexity has introduced legal fragmentation to China, and how; (2) whether China has 
taken any cross-forum strategies such as forum shopping and forum shifting by taking advantage 
of the international GI regime complexity; and (3) whether the international GI regime complexity 
has eroded unitary domestic GI regulation in China. Considering that China integrated into the 
international GI system only after TRIPS, this section will focus on international GI regime 
complexity in the post-TRIPS era.  
3.2.1 Mapping the international GI regime complexity   
The Paris Convention is the first international convention which refers to GI protection. Article 
1.2 of the Convention protects “indications of source or appellations of origin” but does not define 
these concepts. Though the Paris Convention mentions “appellation of origin”, it does not further 
specify protection for it. Instead, it only provides protection for “indications of source” in Article 
10 (1) which provides the obligation to seize imported “goods bearing false indications as to their 
source” (Correa 2007, 214). Article 10bis further provides against unfair competition by 
protecting against the use of confusing, false, or misleading names. Because WTO Members are 
also committed to complying with the Paris Convention and TRIPS does not specify how WTO 
Members should protect GIs, the mechanisms mentioned in the Paris Convention become one of 
the available mechanisms that WTO Members could adopt to protect GIs.  
The Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol create an international registration system for 
trademarks that enable one filing of an application with the International Bureau that is effective 
as separate national filings in the contracting member states. Currently, the Madrid Agreement 
has 98 members, covering 114 countries, and represents over 80% of world trade. The Madrid 
Agreement and Madrid Protocol aim to protect sources of origin (quality-neutral indications), the 
scope of which is broader than GIs.  
The Lisbon Agreement is a special and optional agreement based on Article 19 of the Paris 
Convention and is administered by WIPO. The subjects under protection in the Lisbon Agreement 
are appellations of origin, a form of labeling with a narrower scope than GIs because the link 
between appellations of origin with the place of origin is stronger than in the case of GIs. The 
Lisbon Agreement has not been a notable success for the international protection of GIs (Josling 
2006). WIPO attempted to establish a new system for the international registration of GIs, but all 
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attempts failed. The Lisbon Agreement became more marginalized after TRIPS because of its 
small membership. In recent years, however, there is a proposal to reinvent the Lisbon Agreement 
for TRIPS GI Register (Gervais 2010). The revival of interest in the Lisbon Agreement is mainly 
due to the deadlock in WTO GI negotiations. Also, developing countries rich in GIs on products 
other than wines and spirits prefer the Lisbon Agreement, because it provides equal protection to 
all products (Vivas-Eugui 2001). 6  The WIPO Working Group on the Development of the Lisbon 
System facilitated the adoption of the highly controversial Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement 
in a diplomatic conference on May 20, 2015. However, the influence of the Lisbon Agreement is 
still limited due to its small number of contracting parties.  
 
Figure 6 International GIs Regime Complexity 
During the TRIPS negotiations, the EU successfully introduced the concept of GIs as well as 
relevant regulatory rules to the WTO. Although GIs have been on the agenda in the slow-moving 
Doha Round of WTO negotiations, they have generally encountered a deadlock (Ezeani 2013). 
                                                     
6  Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement provides that the member states have to ensure protection against “any 
usurpation or imitation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in 
translated form or accompanied by terms such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘make’, ‘imitation’, or ‘the like’”. 
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Facing the stagnancy of GI negotiations at WTO,7 the EU and the US have each engaged in the 
strategy of forum shifting (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). GI negotiations, like other IP 
negotiations, were, as the next section will show, gradually shifted from multilateral fora to 
plurilateral and bilateral for a (Sell 2010b).     
3.2.2 TRIPS provisions on GIs and post-TRIPS GI negotiations   
TRIPS is the first multilateral agreement that protects GIs as a separate category of intellectual 
property and sets up minimum standards for GI protection. TRIPS has a broader membership than 
previous WIPO treaties and is more effective because it can be enforced through the WTO. 
Articles 22 to 24 of TRIPS deal with GIs. Meanwhile, according to Article 2 to Article 4 of TRIPS, 
provisions in the Paris Convention and the basic principles of national treatment and MFN 
treatment also apply to GIs.  
Article 22.1 of TRIPS defines GIs without specifying any specific mechanisms for WTO 
Members to implement such protection domestically. Article 23 of TRIPS provides differentiated 
levels of protection for GIs. Basic protection is granted to products other than wines and spirits, 
to prevent the use of certain indications from misleading the public. Higher/additional protection 
is available to wines and spirits “even if misuse would not cause the public to be misled”. The 
difference between the basic protection and higher protection for GIs granted by TRIPS can be 
illustrated by the following example: a label “Parma ham, produced in Canberra” is allowed under 
TRIPS Article 23 because ham is not a wine or spirit and the real origin of the product is indicated. 
However, “Champagne, produced in Canberra” is not permitted by TRIPS Article 23.8 This 
differentiated protection for wine and spirit GIs was also an EU-US compromise in the TRIPS 
negotiation where the basic protection is in nature a trademark protection proposed by the US, 
while higher protection is the sui generis protection proposed by the EU. Consequently, though 
TRIPS does allow flexibility to implement GI protection (Article 22), Article 23 TRIPS requires 
a higher minimum protection standard for GIs for wines and spirits. 
In sum, GI provisions in TRIPS present a constructed inconsistency. TRIPS include provisions to 
reconcile legal issues between the sui generis protection and trademark protection, such as using 
GIs as generic terms and coexistence between earlier trademarks and GIs. As the EU was not 
satisfied with the TRIPS outcomes, it has pressed for continuing negotiations at the WTO on 
issues related to establishing a multilateral system for notifying and registering GIs for wines and 
                                                     
7 See TRIPS Council Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical 
Indications for Wines and Spirits, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Alfredo Suescum (Panama), 
TN/IP/22 (2014). 
8  Nonetheless, Article 24.4, 5, and 6 of TRIPS are grandfather provisions that allow continuous practice of 
a WTO Member concerning certain aspects of GIs before TRIPS. See Heald (1996).  
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spirits (GI Register) and extending higher-level protection to products beyond wines and spirits 
(GI Extension) (See Section 3.2.2.1). 
3.2.2.1 Post-TRIPS GI Negotiations at WTO 
Negotiations on the GI Register and GI Extension started from 1997 and no consensus has yet 
been reached on these two issues. Considering most of these negotiations happened after China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, these debates provide a landscape against which to understand 
China’s position on GIs at the multilateral level.  
GI Register negotiations aim to create a compulsory multilateral system for notifying and 
registering GIs for wines and spirits. GI Register negotiations after TRIPS are a built-in agenda 
because TRIPS Article 23.4 clearly requires WTO Members to enter into further negotiations on 
a multilateral registration system for wines and spirits. Major disagreements in negotiations lie in 
(1) different interpretations for the required participation and (2) the legal basis for protecting a 
name as a GI. The US has led proposals for a voluntary multilateral GI register system which 
assesses the appropriate protection on the basis of domestic law and does not introduce any 
additional burdens beyond TRIPS.9 In contrast, the EU has led for a compulsory multilateral 
register with prima facie legal effect.10  
GI Extension negotiations aim to extend higher level protection to products beyond wines and 
spirits. Negotiations on GI Extension have been more controversial among WTO Members (WTO 
2008). Since GI Extension is not explicitly mandated as a built-in agenda in Article 24.1 TRIPS, 
the primary disagreement was not substantive but centered on whether this issue should be put on 
agenda for negotiation at all. Supporters of GI Extension argue there is no justification for the 
hierarchical protection based only on different types of goods. Opponents maintain that the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration did not provide a mandate for negotiations because these negotiations 
may introduce new rights and obligations for WTO members.  
The initial proponents of GI Extension were primarily developing countries. When the EC joined 
this group, both sides began to harden their positions, for instance, in the IP/C/W/353 and 
IP/C/W/386 proposals (Rangnekar 2002). The US even requested a consultation on the EC’s GI 
                                                     
9  Other co-sponsors supporting the US proposals include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, and South Africa.  
10  Other proponents supporting the EU proposals include Albania, Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, 
Ecuador, Georgia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP 
Group and the African Group. 
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regulation at the WTO Dispute Settlement body.11 So far, there has been no substantive progress 
in WTO negotiations on either issue.12 
3.2.2.2 GI-related initiatives at WIPO  
WIPO has been active in promoting the harmonization of international GI rules since the Madrid 
Agreement and Lisbon Agreement. WIPO set up a Committee of Experts on the International 
Protection of Appellations of Origin and Other Indications of Source. This committee prepared a 
draft of a Treaty on the Protection of GIs to the WIPO International Bureau in 1975 (TAO/II/2),13 
but this failed. WIPO then submitted two proposals for revising the Paris Convention to address 
specific issues related to GIs in the late 1970s, but this attempt failed again. In 1990, a new 
Committee of Experts on the International Protection of GIs was established to initiate another 
treaty on the international protection of GIs.14 The third attempt failed as well.15 The EU took a 
strategy of forum shifting by incorporating GI negotiation into the Uruguay Round, which 
generated TRIPS.  
In the Post-TRIPS era, WIPO remains an important forum for multilateral GI negotiations. The 
Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications 
(SCT) was established in 1998 to address issues related to trademarks, industrial designs and 
GIs/appellations of origin. Specific to GIs, the SCT aimed to be “the forum to discuss issues, 
facilitate coordination and provide guidance concerning the progressive international 
development of the law of trademarks, industrial designs and geographical indications, including 
the harmonization of national laws and procedures”.16 By the end of 2016, SCT had 36 sessions. 
GIs were intensively discussed in the first ten sessions, but the US and its alliance proposed to 
keep GIs as second priority thereafter. From the 30th session of SCT in 2013, GIs returned to the 
SCT agenda, but no substantive achievement has been made at this forum.  
                                                     
11  European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs (WT/DS174, WT/DS290). 
12  See WTO General Council Trade Negotiations Committee, Paragraph 9 of Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits (2002). See also 
Paragraph 17 of Issues Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided 
for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products Other Than Wines and Spirits and Those Related 
to the Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
WT/GC/W/633, TN/C/W/61 (2011).  
13  WIPO Committee of Experts on the International Protection of Appellations of Origin and Other 
Indications of Source, Second Session, Draft Treaty on the Protection of Geographical Indications, 
TAO/II/2, August 25, 1975.  
14 WIPO Committee of Experts on the International Protection of Geographical Indications, First Session, 
The Need for a New Treaty and its Possible Contents, GEO/CE/I/2, April 9, 1990.  
15 WIPO SCT, Sixth Session, Geographical Indications: Historical background, Nature of Rights, Existing 
System for Protection and Obtaining Effective protection on Other Countries, SCT/6/3, January 25, 2001. 
16 WIPO SCT, First Session, Organizational Markets and Overview of the Issues to be Considered by the 
Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs, and Geographical Indications, 
SCT/1/2, March 12, 1998.  
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In sum, although multilateral GI rule-making shifted from WIPO to WTO, WIPO has not ceased 
its attempts to be a major influence in international GI rule-making. The GI discussions revived 
in the 30th SCT Meetings. In 2015, the adoption of Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement was 
controversial and indicates the competing GI rule-making approaches in WIPO (Gervais 2015). 
3.2.2.3 Failed GI proposal in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement  
The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was a recent plurilateral forum for 
IP negotiations (Chapter 7.4). Some European NGOs and industrial associations (such as oriGIn 
and the European Federation of Origin Wines, EFOW) lobbied the European Commission to 
include GIs in the ACTA negotiation agenda. Among the eight negotiating parties for ACTA, 
Switzerland and Mexico also supported the EU’s proposal on GIs. However, their proposal was 
rejected by the US and Australia. The final text of ACTA only focuses on IP enforcement and 
contains no provisions on GIs (Blakeney 2012, 92-95).  
3.2.2.4 GIs in bilateral FTAs  
Besides multilateral and plurilateral agreements, GIs also appeared in bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) or other bilateral arrangements such as bilateral investment agreements. The 
EU and the US are the two main initiators for GI provisions in FTAs. When WTO trade 
negotiations encountered a deadlock, both parties intensified GI negotiations at the bilateral level.  
The EU has negotiated specialized wine and spirits agreements with some New World countries 
(such as Australia, Mexico, and South Africa) in parallel with the TRIPS negotiation (Blakeney 
2014). In these early agreements, the EU succeeded in preventing the use of EU origin names as 
generic names in the New World. This was realized through the provision of “phasing-out 
periods”.17 After TRIPS, GI provisions were included in FTAs/RTAs between the EU and South 
Korea (2011),18 Colombia and Peru (2012),19 the Central American countries (2012),20 Georgia 
(2014), 21 and Canada (2016).22 The EU has generally achieved its negotiating objectives in GIs 
in above-mentioned recent FTAs/RTAs, including: (1) establishing a list of EU names to be 
protected directly and indefinitely by its trading partner; (2) extending higher level protection 
                                                     
17 For instance, the EU Australia Wine Agreements of (1994) provided a “phasing-out” period for various 
types of Australian wines, after which the use of the EU origin was prohibited (Dechent and Sadler 2010).  
18 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part. 2011 OJ L 127/1. 
19 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia 
and Peru, of the other part. 2012 OJ L 354/3. 
20 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one 
hand, and Central America on the other, 2012 OJ L 346/3. 
21 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and 
their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, 2014 OJ L 261/4.  
22   EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). CETA entered into force 
provisionally on 21 September 2017. 
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granted by Article 23 TRIPS to products beyond wines and spirits; (3) providing for the co-
existence of GIs with prior trademarks; (4) phasing out prior uses of names originating in the EU 
(Engelhardt 2015).  
On the other hand, the US also strategically used FTAs to influence regional and multilateral 
agreements. The US also incorporated GIs in its own FTAs/RTAs, so that the EU model of sui 
generis protection (See Section 3.1.2) would not become the default global standard. In practice, 
US FTAs/RTAs with Australia, Central American Countries, Chile, Jordan, Morocco and 
Singapore incorporate provisions for the protection of specific types of GIs (Pugatch 2007). For 
instance, in the South Korea-US FTA (KORUS FTA), GIs were stipulated under the heading 
“Trademarks including GIs”. This structural arrangement reflects the US view that trademark 
protection is enough for the protection of GIs. The KORUS FTA also confirms the legitimacy of 
the generic use of a GI if the geographical name cannot meet the requirement of distinctiveness.   
GI provisions in EU-dominated FTAs and the US-dominated FTAs are incompatible (O’Connor 
2014). For instance, after South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA), 162 GI-designated products 
from the EU became protected in South Korea while 64 South Korea GI-designated products 
became protected in the EU. The US dairy sector has become concerned because the sui generis 
protection of various EU cheeses may impair the US producers’ use of identical names as generic 
terms thus affecting US sales into the Korean market (Cooper et al. 2011). South Korea further 
agreed with the US that it would allow the generic use of GIs (Article 18.2.3 KORUS FTA).23 It 
is very difficult for South Korea to simultaneously meet the obligation of both (1) providing 
higher level protection equivalent to Article 23 TRIPS to specified EU agricultural products as 
required in the KOREU FTA, and (2) guaranteeing generic use of geographical names as required 
in KORUS FTA. Unless the EU and the US reach a compromise through TTIP, countries having 
trade negotiations with both EU and the US will have to, like South Korea, commit to both 
mechanisms (Frankel 2017). 
3.2.3 Regime complexity and vertical regime shifting 
The international GI regime complexity has led to rule ambiguity. Various concepts (appellations 
of origin, sources of origin and GIs) are introduced by different international agreements. 
Considering that TRIPS has more Members as a WTO agreement than previous WIPO 
agreements, the concept of GIs in TRIPS has to some extent dominated other concepts.  
In contrast to other types of intellectual property, there is no North-South divide based on 
innovative capacity in the issue of GIs. This is because GIs are the one form of IP that is based 
                                                     
23 Letter from Jong-Hoon Kim South Korean Minister for Trade to USTR Ron Kirk, June 20, 2011. In this 
letter, South Korea Clarifies GI Provisions in KOREU FTA to USTR Satisfaction.  
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on tradition. Instead, GIs are continuously contested between the Old World and the New World. 
This power contestation in international GI regulation is between the US and the EU, and their 
disagreement potentially provides opportunities for a third country to have some influence.  
Recently, the trend of vertical forum-shifting emerged in the competing GI rule-making in EU-
dominated and US-dominated FTAs. EU-US power contestation through these FTAs leads to 
further legal fragmentation. The recent proliferation of GI provisions in both EU and US FTAs 
has made it difficult for some third countries to reconcile their treaty obligations. At the domestic 
level, both sui generis protection and trademark protection have been introduced, in particular to 
many Asian countries (Frankel 2017).  
China’s international GI engagement is based on the landscape of international GI regime 
complexity, and continuous EU-US contestation concerning (1) global GI standards based either 
on Article 22 or Article 23 TRIPS and (2) protecting geographical names either through a sui 
generis or a trademark mechanism.  
3.3 GIs in China: legal fragmentation and regulatory competition 
Against the international background discussed in Section 3.2, China has introduced both sui 
generis and trademark mechanisms for GI protection under EU and US influence. This section 
will concentrate on (1) how the various legal mechanisms to protect GIs were introduced to China 
and the impact of TRIPS, (2) how domestic legal fragmentation has introduced regulatory 
competition among ministries regulating GIs, specifically the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC), the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). In Section 3.3.1 will review how China 
established its GI systems under foreign influence. Section 3.3.2 will focus on the coexistence of 
different GI systems after TRIPS. Section 3.3.3 will focus on the actual regulatory competition.   
The existence of EU and US influence on GI standards in China does not mean that China 
passively took GIs rules from the EU and the US. China developed a mechanism for GI protection 
because it has been seen to be in its national interest. As mentioned in Section 3.1, local specialties 
in China have built their reputation over a historical period where they were used as tributes. In 
recent years, GIs have been incorporated into agricultural policies to promote the higher quality 
agricultural products. 24  SAIC has developed a “strategy to help farmers get rich through 
                                                     
24 The CCP issued its first document at the beginning of every year to address policy priorities of the year. 
Though with various titles specifically, these documents are called “No.1 Policy Document 一号文件 
[yihaowenjian]”. From 2004 to 2016, “agriculture, rural areas and farmers 农业、 农村、农民 [nongye, 
nongcun, nongmin]” has been the focus of No.1 Policy Documents for consecutive 13 years. GIs are 
frequently mentioned as a method in these No. 1 Policy Documents to promote incomes for farmers. 
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trademarks 商标富农战略  [Shangbiao funong zhanlüe]” (Zhang 2009) and certification or 
collective marks to protect GIs are an integral part of this getting rich strategy. 
3.3.1 Chinese GI systems: another battlefield for EU-US power contestation  
Though China has a long tradition of recognizing local specialties through its tributary system 
spanning thousands of years, geographical names and related labels were not traditionally 
constructed as an (intellectual property) right in China. Like other types of intellectual property 
regulation, the concept of GIs and legal mechanisms to protect GIs were introduced to China 
through regulatory importation.  
Geographical names were first excluded from protection in its trademark system. Trademark Law 
(1982) did not cover GIs as a subject for protection. In 1986, SAIC issued a reply to Anhui 
Provincial Administration for Industry and Commerce (PAIC). 25  The SAIC Reply (1986) 
prohibited, on four grounds, 26 using geographical names of administrative divisions at or above 
the county level27 as trademarks. The SAIC Reply (1986) indicated that after China became a 
contracting party to the Paris Convention, the SAIC began to notice the demand for the protection 
of GIs. Before any specific law was in place, China first rejected trademark registration for GIs 
in order to systematically protect geographical names in the future. However, the four grounds 
only excluded registration of geographical names as trademarks, they did not grant any protection 
to Chinese geographical names.  
The SAIC Reply (1986) does not show how GIs were protected in the early stage, but rather how 
domestic geographical names were excluded from trademark protection. The SAIC Reply (1986) 
demonstrated how the Chinese IP regulator understood GIs initially — the “ignorance” of the 
legal significance of GIs meant China acquired the discourse of GI as an imported agricultural 
policy.  
 
                                                     
25 SAIC issued Reply Concerning Issues of Using Names of Administrative Divisions above the County 
Level 国家工商行政管理局商标局就县级以上行政区划名称做商标等问题的复函  [Jiu Xianji 
Yishang Xingzheng Quhua Mingcheng Zuo Shangbiao Deng Wenti De Fuhan] in 1986 (hereinafter SAIC 
Reply (1986)).  
26 According to Para. 1 of the SAIC Reply (1986), the four grounds include: “first, it is the international 
custom not to use geographical names of administrative divisions as trademarks. Secondly, geographical 
names of an administrative division should not be used by a specific enterprise or individual which 
excludes usage by other enterprises or individuals from the same region of the same name in the same 
or similar products. Thirdly, using geographical names of administrative divisions at or above the county 
level as trademarks in a manner that is contradictory with the protection of source of origin. Fourthly, 
geographical names of administrative divisions at or above the county level can only indicate the source 
of origin of a product, which is lack of distinctiveness when using as a trademark.” 
27 There are four levels of administrative divisions in China, specifically the provincial level, the prefectural 
level, the county level and the township level.  
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3.3.1.1 Case-by-case protection of foreign GIs 
The SAIC’s practice of excluding geographical names from trademark protection led to 
complaints by foreign businesses. SAIC responded to these complaints by granting protection for 
the source of origin on a case-by-case basis. Danisa 丹麦牛油曲奇 [Danmai niuyou quqi] and 
Champagne 香槟 [xiangbing] were two typical cases. In 1987, SAIC issued an opinion to Beijing 
PAIC to investigate the false use of the translated Chinese characters of Danisa “丹麦牛油曲奇” 
by a food company located in Beijing. PAIC ordered the Beijing food company to stop 
infringement immediately. In 1989, upon consistent complaints from French Champagne 
producers, SAIC issued an Opinion to PAICs nationwide to protect the French geographical name 
Champagne. According to the Opinion, Chinese enterprises cannot use “Champagne” or its 
Chinese translation “香槟” in any wines and spirits. The Chinese government used these two 
cases to demonstrate its compliance with international IP conventions in the 1980s (SAIC 2012). 
Though this case-based protection was only an expedient before a formal system was built for all 
products, such protection was considered as a super-national treatment because domestic 
geographical names were not protected. Such asymmetrical treatment for domestic and foreign 
geographical names stimulated extensive research on legal mechanisms for protecting GIs. China 
began to explore the international debates on GIs and learned the propositions for sui generis and 
trademark protection of GIs simultaneously from the EU and the US.  
3.3.1.2 Domestic law-making before TRIPS  
In 1995, former State Bureau of Quality and Technological Supervision (SBQTS) 28started its 
cooperation on GIs with the French Ministry of Agriculture, the Cognac Association, and Ministry 
of Finance through personal exchange and training. In 1997 and 1998, China and France signed 
the Sino-French Joint Statement and Sino-French Statement on the Establishment of the 
Cooperative Committee on Agriculture and Foodstuffs (Liu 2015b). AQSIQ has officially 
recognized that “these two statements dramatically pushed the progress for China to establish sui 
generis protection for GIs under the leadership of AQSIQ” (AQSIQ 2007). Later, the EU replaced 
France to promote sui generis protection of GIs in China through the EU-China bilateral IP 
cooperation projects. However, new substantive rules were promulgated before China’s accession 
to the WTO.  
After China signed the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks in 
1989, foreign applicants began to submit collective/certification mark applications to China. In 
addition, domestic disputes also arose because of the lack of protection for domestic geographical 
                                                     
28 SBQTS is the predecessor of the current regulator AQSIQ. AQSIQ provides sui generis protection for 
products of GIs in China.  
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names (see the Jinhua Ham case (Lü and Wu 2006)). To process foreign applications for 
collective/certification marks, China started using collective marks and certification marks to 
protect geographical names in 1994.29 China learned from the US its experience in regulating the 
use of geographical names by a trademark system through the bilateral exchange of ideas among 
techno-bureaucrats and epistemic communities (SAIC 2012). The Chinese collective/certification 
mark system was similar to that of the US.  
3.3.2 TRIPS as a new model for GI protection in China  
China amended its IP laws comprehensively after its accession to the WTO. In order to guarantee 
full compliance, the amended Chinese IP laws use the same language as TRIPS. Specific to GIs, 
China provided trademark protection for GIs through collective/certification marks 30  and 
provided higher protection for wines and spirits after TRIPS. The AQSIQ established a sui generis 
system to protect “GI products 地理标志产品 [dilibiaozhi chapin]” in 2005.31  Later, the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) established the third independent (sui generis) system to protect 
“GIs for agricultural products 农产品地理标志 [nongchanpin dilibiaozhi]” in 2007.32 In 2013, 
the State Forestry Administration (SFA) proposed to establish a system similar to that of MOA 
to protect “GIs for forestry products 林产品地理标志  [linchanpin dilibiaozhi]”,33  but this 
proposal has not yet been approved by the State Council.  
  
                                                     
29 SAIC issued Administrative Measures Concerning the Registration of Collective Marks and Certification 
Marks 集体商标、证明商标注册和管理办法 [Jiti Shangbiao, Zhengmingshangbiao Zhuce he Guanli 
Banfa] by SAIC Order No. 22 (1994) (hereinafter Collective/certification Marks Regulation 1994). 
These measures issued in 1994 did not provide higher protection for wines and spirits. The higher 
protection was introduced by new measures in 2003. See note 30.   
30  The trademark protection for geographical names are provided by the Trademark Law (2001), 
Implementing Regulations to Trademark Law (2002), Measures on Collective Marks and Certification 
Marks (2003), and Measures for the Administration of Special Signs of Products of GIs (2007). It is 
worth noticing that the Measures on Collective Marks and Certification Marks (2003) abolished the 
Collective/certification Marks Regulation 1994 and provides higher protection for wines and spirits for 
the purpose of TRIPS compliance.  
31  AQSIQ promulgated the Provisions on the Protection of GI products 地理标志产品保护规定 
[Dilibiaozhi Ghanpin Baohu Guiding] by AQSIQ Order No. 78 (2005).  
32 MOA promulgated the Measures for the Administration of Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products 农产品地理标志管理办法 [Nongchanpin Dilibiaozhi Guanli Banfa] by MOA Order No. 11 
(2007). “GIs for Agricultural products” are the subjects under protection, which refer to special 
agricultural product indications which are named after geographical names and whose purpose is to note 
that the indicated agricultural products are from a specific area and that the quality and major 
characteristics of the products mainly lie in the natural and ecological environment as well as the cultural 
and historical factors of the area.  
33 The State Forestry Administration has proposed Measures for the Administration of GIs for Forestry 
Products (Draft for Comments) 林产品地理标志管理办法 (征求意见稿) [Linchanpin Dilibiaozhi 
Guanlibanfa (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao)].  
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Figure 7 Special Signs for GIs Issued by SAIC, AQSIQ, and MOA 
Previous studies, in both Chinese and English, have already discussed details of these three 
parallel systems (Wang and Kireeva 2007, Zhang 2007, Wang and Huang 2006). For this chapter, 
it is only necessary to understand the architecture of the three systems and their relationship to 
one another. First, the three systems under three ministries in China are completely independent 
of each other. Secondly, trademark protection for GIs by the SAIC has been influenced by the US 
(SAIC 2012), while the EU has influenced both the AQSIQ protection for GI products and the 
MOA protection for GIs for agricultural products. Thirdly, all three systems model TRIPS 
standards. Though AQSIQ modeled the EU’s system of sui generis protection when it was seeking 
to take its place in the WTO world trade order, the EU could not persuade China to grant sui 
generis protection beyond wine and spirits. Finally, the three domestic systems indicate how the 
EU-US power competition introduced legal fragmentation on GIs into China.  
3.3.3 Practice of GIs protection in China  
Though the concept of GIs originated in Europe, China has gradually embraced it and tried to 
make it work in its own interests. In practice, 12 years after China established the first GI system, 
3,210 GIs have been registered in all three parallel systems in China, with an economic value of 
CNY 1.3 trillion (USD 213 billion)34 by the end of 2013 (Liu 2013). These numbers indicate that 
national interest is one of the major justifications for China’s further international engagement 
with GIs. Figure 8 shows the number and value of GIs in China in the years 2005, 2010 and 2013 
respectively. Over these eight years, the number of GIs granted in all three systems continued to 
increase. The number of registered GIs in 2013 reached 3,210, which is ten times what it was in 
2004. Meanwhile, the estimated economic value increased 12 times from 2005 to 2013 (Zhongjun 
Research Center 2014). 
 
                                                     
34 Converted by the exchange rate “USD 1= CNY 6.0969” in accordance with the Announcement of Middle 
Price for RMB Foreign Exchange Rate by Ministry of Commerce (31st December 2013), 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jshz/rlzykf/201312/20131200447598.shtml (accessed 8 November 
2016). 
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Figure 8 Number and Values of GIs in China (2005-2013) 
Data on the internal distribution of the applications submitted to the three systems show more 
applications have been submitted to the SAIC for trademark protection than to the other two 
systems. By the end of 2013, SAIC registered 1643 (45.57%) certification/collective marks; 
AQSIQ approved 1,328 products as GI products; MOA approved 1,028 products as GIs for 
agricultural products (Figure 9). Considering double applications or triple applications for the 
same products, there are 23 products protected by all three systems simultaneously. Double 
protection is granted to 563 products (390 products protected by both SAIC and AQSIQ, 141 
products protected by both SAIC and MOA, and 32 products protected by both AQSIQ and MOA). 
It seems if users seek dual protection, they often submit applications to both SAIC and AQSIQ. 
It is clear that seeking double or triple registration is a waste of resources, which perhaps explains 
why a fourth system for the protection of GIs for forestry products has not been approved.      
 
Figure 9 Distribution of Registration among Three Regimes of GIs in China35 
                                                     
35 Data source: China Geographical Indications Research Report (2013, Third Edition) (Liu 2013, 11).   
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According to the types of products, Chinese GIs are divided into ten categories. Among all ten 
categories of GIs registered in China, the number of registrations, economic value and reputation 
varies from one type to another. Fruit has the largest number of registrations (21% of total GIs) 
followed by vegetables (16% of total GIs) and other foodstuffs (11% of total GIs) (Table 5). With 
regard to economic value, fruit GIs generate more added value in total, followed by wines and 
spirits. Considering the small number of wines and spirits that are registered, this data shows that 
individually wines and spirits generate most added value. Statistics on the reputation of GIs show 
that wines and spirits are the most renowned, followed by tea and Chinese medicine.  
Table 5 Categories of Chinese GIs, Their Economic Value, and Reputation 36 
Types of Products Numbers  Total Economic 
Value  
Reputation index 
Tea 236 718.5 41.4 
Wines and spirits 95 2122.8 85.8 
Grain and oil  334 1649.7 6.9 
Foodstuff 354 822.7 14.3 
Vegetables 514 1294.4 10.0 
Seafood 232 957.8 12.5 
Fruit 680 2152.6 14.1 
Livestock and poultry 324 1123.4 9.3 
Chinese herbal medicine 256 631.6 20.2 
others  185 1885.8 50.3 
 
The above data on economic value and reputation underpin China’s position in the international 
negotiations relevant issues. First, China has its own liquor and other spirits that are registered as 
GIs (such as Shaoxing Wine) but they are mainly made from grains (such as sorghum and rice) 
rather than grapes. On the other hand, many wines from Europe and other western countries have 
already expanded their market in China. A GI Register agenda at the WTO may, therefore, benefit 
Chinese products. Secondly, though Chinese tea and traditional medicines have good reputations, 
they do not have the same level of protection as TRIPS Article 23. Thus, China is motivated to 
promote negotiations for a GI Extension at TRIPS. 
China’s promotion of GI protection is also based on some successful cases of using GIs to increase 
incomes for farmers. For instance, Guanxi Pomelo 琯溪蜜柚 [Guanxi Miyou] was a pomelo 
named after the little creek of “Guanxi” in the town of Xiaoxi in Pinghe County at Zhangzhou 
Prefecture, Fujian Province. According to a survey, a total of 635,000 tons of Guanxi Pomelo was 
sold in China in 2009, with major cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Ningbo, etc. 
as destinations. Meanwhile, 120,000 tons of Guanxi Pomelo were exported to Hong Kong, Macao, 
                                                     
36 Data source: ibid. Unit for the calculation of economic value is CNY 100 million.  
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EU, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. As one of the 10 Chinese GIs in the EU-China mutual 
recognition project for GIs (See Section 3.4.2), 60% of the above exported Guanxi Pomelo were 
sold in the EU market. In Guanxi, over 99% of pomelo producers used the collective trademark 
of “Pinghe Guanxi Pomelo”. With annual capita income from pomelo exceeding 4,700 CNY 
(almost 800 USD), Guanxi Pomelo becomes a typical example where farmers can get rich from 
the use of GIs (Sun 2016b). 
To summarize, against the backdrop of EU-US power contestation, China has learned from both 
the EU and the US about different mechanisms to protect GIs. Eventually, China adopted the 
TRIPS standards, a hybrid of sui generis protection for wines and spirits and trademark protection 
for other products. By doing so, China has avoided moving to the higher protection standard — 
the comprehensive Article 23 standard sui generis system proposed by the EU. This strategy has 
only been made possible because of the disagreements between the US and EU that have 
generated rule complexity, thereby allowing China to pick and choose rules and provisions 
depending on the negotiating context. Regulatory competition has emerged among the three 
Chinese ministries, SAIC, AQSIQ, and MOA in their GI regulation (See Chapter 8.2).  
3.4 China’s engagement in international GI regulation  
Although international GI regime complexity offers more pathways for China to select a model 
of domestic GI regulation, China did not actually make a selection as both the EU and the US, 
directly or indirectly, influenced China to establish sui generis systems and a trademark system 
for GI protection. Therefore, instead of being forced to choose, China adopted both systems 
because of the EU-US contestation over GI standards. This section, based on the previous 
discussion of the landscape for international GI regulation and domestic institution building and 
practice, analyses China’s GI engagement at different levels.  
China is constrained in various aspects of its international GI engagement. First, China is a 
latecomer to the international IP system, and it is difficult for China to understand the trade-offs 
in the GI negotiations in TRIPS and to properly interpret the text. TRIPS was part of the most 
complex set of agreements The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the history of international trade negotiations. The complexity 
and range of these agreements meant that probably only a few players had any real understanding 
of them as a package (Drahos 2001b).  
The same is true of Chinese engagement in WIPO. China has been a Member of the WIPO since 
June 1980 and joined the Paris Convention in March 1985 and Madrid Agreement in October 
1989, and Madrid Protocol in December 1995. When China became a party to these international 
agreements, their text had already been negotiated. In this sense, China was more a rule-taker than 
a rule-maker when joining these GI-related agreements.  
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Admitting the constraints on Chinese engagement in international GI regulation, this section 
focuses on the position of China in the ongoing multilateral GI negotiations (Section 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2), as well its bilateral GI cooperation with the EU (Section 3.4.3) and other FTA partners 
(Section 3.4.4). China was not a negotiating party for ACTA or the TPP. AQSIQ proposed China 
should promote GIs in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, 
but there has been little information available about how China has actually behaved in the RCEP 
negotiations on GIs. For this reason, China’s engagement at the plurilateral level will not be 
analyzed in this section.  
3.4.1 China’s position at the WTO 
China was not fully involved in the post-TRIPS negotiations in the first few years after its 
accession to the WTO. This is partly because China did not have a nuanced understanding of 
previous negotiations immediately after its accession to the WTO. Another reason is that 
compliance with TRIPS was the priority for China following its entry to the WTO. China has 
amended or formulated its domestic IP laws to comply with TRIPS standards (Li 2002, Hu 2002), 
and GI laws were part of these (Section 3.3.2). In recent years, China has promoted GI-related 
policies to boost incomes for farmers, and domestic producers have begun to use various types of 
GIs in China to protect their interests. Recognizing that protecting GIs is in its national interest, 
China has engaged in international GI negotiations with a view to promoting relevant international 
rules in a direction that fits its domestic objectives.  
As mentioned, two issues related to GIs have been simultaneously discussed at the WTO after 
TRIPS. One part of this involved the GI Register which aims to establish a multilateral 
notification and registration system for wines and spirits, and the other is GI Extension which 
aims to extend the higher-level protection standard to products beyond wines and spirits. Table 6 
provides a summary of the contesting positions in the post-TRIPS negotiations on these two issues.  
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Table 6 Major Disagreements in the Post-TRIPS Negotiation of GIs  
Issues Position US  
Representing the 
New World 
EU 
Representing the 
Old World 
Developing 
countries 
(including China) 
GI 
Register 
Participation  Voluntary and non-
burdensome 
Compulsory Compulsory 
The legal 
basis for 
deciding 
whether a 
foreign GI is 
protectable 
Domestic law  International Law/ 
Prima Facie based 
on Article 22.1 of 
the TRIPS 
Prima Facie 
evidence based 
on Article 22.1 
TRIPS 
GI 
Extension 
Procedural  GI Extension was 
not a built-in issue 
in post-TRIPS 
negotiations. 
Not clear -GI Extension 
shall be 
addressed in the 
regular meetings 
of the TRIPS 
Council on a 
priority basis.  
-Text-based 
negotiations shall 
be undertaken.  
Substance GI Extension will 
create difficulties 
because:  
- The distribution of 
GIs is not balanced 
among WTO 
Members.  
- The provision of 
Article 22 is 
sufficient; 
- the extension will 
impair the use of 
genetic terms 
- GI Extension 
would incur 
substantial costs to 
governments, to 
manufacturers, and 
to consumers.   
- All GIs should be 
protected equally; 
- The Protection of 
Article 23 TRIPS 
should be extended 
to all products.  
 
- All GIs should be 
protected equally; 
- The Protection of 
Article 23 TRIPS 
should be 
extended to all 
products.  
 
 
Though the table above shows that the EU and the developing countries have taken almost the 
same positions, this consensus was only reached in 2008 when EU and the developing countries 
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(108 WTO Members)37 submitted together the proposal Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related 
Issues (TN/C/W/52 proposal)38 to the Trade Negotiations Committee of the WTO. Before that 
proposal, the GI Register proposals were mainly sponsored by the EU while the GI Extension 
proposals were supported by developing countries. China was a co-sponsor for the TN/C/W/52 
proposal, and it was the only proposal that China has submitted to the WTO concerning GI-related 
issues. Therefore, this proposal was the only chance to investigate China’s GI engagement at the 
WTO after TRIPS.   
The TN/C/W/52 proposal was intended to provide modalities to kick off text-based negotiations 
to amend TRIPS. It was submitted on July 19, 2008, by two-thirds of WTO Members. It consists 
of three issues, and two of them are GI related – GI Register and GI Extension. On the issue of 
GI Register, the proposal clarifies that the “register shall be considered as a prima facie evidence” 
based on the definition of GIs in Article 22.1 TRIPS and that participation in the multilateral 
notification and registration system is mandatory. On the other issue of GI Extension, the proposal 
recommends initiating text-based negotiations in special sessions in order to amend TRIPS. This 
proposal incorporates both the EU’s position on the GI Register and the developing countries’ 
proposal on GI Extension. It was a strategic coalition between the EU and the developing 
Members of the WTO to promote GI negotiations at the WTO.     
As China joined 107 other WTO Members to co-sponsor this proposal, it is hard to distinguish a 
clear Chinese position on this issue only from the text of this proposal. However, the behavior of 
co-sponsoring TN/C/W/52 per se has indicated that GIs are seen as being in China’s national 
interest. China had a tradition of referring to products by their geographical names in its tribute 
system and generally supports the promotion of WTO negotiations on both the GI Register and 
GI Extension.  
More specifically, China’s position on GIs at the WTO was expressed by Chinese negotiators via 
academic publications. Wan Yiting, the Vice Division Director for the WTO Department in 
MOFCOM, co-authored a journal article in Chinese (Wang and Wan 2010) which analyses 
China’s position and strategy in the GI negotiations at the WTO. The first footnote of this article 
reads “this article is the conclusion of a research project assigned by MOFCOM, and the results 
of the project have been adopted by the MOFCOM in the WTO Doha Negotiations.” Considering 
                                                     
37 The co-sponsors for the proposal included: China, the EU, Albania, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, 
Georgia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, Moldova, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP Group and 
the African Group.  
38 WTO Trade negotiations Committee, Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues, Communication from 
Albania, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Communities, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP Group and the African Group, TN/C/W/52, July 19, 2008. 
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the article was published in 2010 and the TN/C/W/52 proposal in 2008 was the only GI proposal 
that China has ever submitted to the WTO, “the WTO Doha Negotiations” in the abovementioned 
footnote refers to China’s position in the TN/C/W/52 proposal. The content of the article further 
confirms this conclusion. Given the difficulty in accessing interviewees (Chapter 1.6.2), the 
following analysis is mainly based on Wang and Wan (2010).  
According to Wang and Wan (2010), China held the following positions on GI-related issues in 
proposing TN/C/W/52. First, China intended to strike a balance between the EU position and the 
US position on the controversial issue of GIs. On the one hand, China joined the EU in the 
TN/C/W/52 proposal at the WTO on GI Register and GI Extension. On the other, China did not 
join the EU in blaming the US firms for using EU GIs as generic names. Instead, China referred 
to the principle of mutual respect for each other’s state sovereignty and non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs.39 According to this principle, the legitimacy of US firms’ behavior in using 
EU GIs is an internal affair of the US, and China respects the US’ sovereignty in regulating this 
issue based on US domestic laws and regulations (Wang and Wan 2010). The principle of non-
interference is linked to the principle of avoiding offense to others.  
Secondly, China strategically made a procedural proposal to show its substantive preference. 
Between the two issues of the GI Register and the GI Extension, China was more interested in the 
GI Extension than the GI Register. This was because China is a country rich in resources and 
many of them are internationally renowned products. However, most of them are not wines and 
spirits (See Table 5). To promote this preference for GI Extension, China proposed to bind the 
negotiations on these two issues together, but TRIPS does not give these two issues the same 
priority. The GI Register has already been given a higher priority than the GI Extension by virtue 
of Paragraph 18 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration: 
With a view to completing the work started in the TRIPS Council on the 
implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for 
wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. We note that 
issues related to the extension of the protection of geographical indications provided 
for in Article 23 to products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the 
Council for TRIPS pursuant to paragraph 12 of this declaration.40 
As revealed in this quotation, the GI Register is a built-in issue which WTO Members are 
committed to negotiating after TRIPS, but the GI extension is not a built-in issue. China proposed 
to bind the negotiations on these issues together in order to increase the priority of the GI 
Extension. However, binding the negotiations on these two issues might also have had the effect 
                                                     
39 Respect state sovereignty is the key element in the five principles of peaceful co-existence (Fifield 1958). 
40 Doha Ministerial Declaration, 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
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of slowing the progress of negotiations on the GI Register, as due to the strong resistance of the 
US on GI Extension (in particular by its dairy industry). Together with other developing countries, 
China’s procedural proposal on binding the two issues together actually amounted to a request to 
the EU to support their position on GI Extension substantively. Enhancing the priority of GI 
Extension worked as a condition to co-sponsor the proposal with the EU— if the EU wanted the 
coalition on GIs to work, it had to support the developing countries’ position on GI Extension.      
Thirdly, on the issue of the GI Register, while China generally agreed that the multilateral register 
on wines and spirits should be compulsory, China prefers to have greater flexibility. Comparing 
the Chinese position as manifested by Wang and Wan (2010) and the text of the TN/C/W/52 
proposal, there are three differences on the issue of the GI Register: (1) they differ in the governing 
law concerning whether a geographic name can be protected as a GI. While the TN/C/W/52 
proposal maintains that such a decision should be made on the basis of international law,41 China 
took a position that the decision should be made on the basis of domestic law; (2) While the 
TN/C/W/52 proposal put forward a restrictive enforcement mechanism of the multilateral register 
to protect the interest of right holders, China proposed a principle of sufficient notification. 
Following this principle, there would be more flexibility in the enforcement — if an infringer uses 
the GIs because he/she does not know the registration, he/she will be exempted from punishment; 
(3) While the TN/C/W/52 proposal does not mention anything about any protection available to 
a third party, China proposed that the right of a third party should be protected by enabling them 
to have the right to sue in a local court of a WTO Member (Wang and Wan 2010). Referring to 
Table 6, some of these positions are more similar to the US position than to the EU  
In sum, though China jointly proposed the TN/C/W/52 proposal with the EU and other developing 
countries, China does not take the same position as the EU. China’s preference on GI Extension 
was expressed in a subtle way — through binding the negotiations of the GI Register and GI 
Extension together to raise the priority of GI Extension. This subtlety is caused by (1) the limited 
benefits that China will gain from negotiations on the GI Register (Wang and Wan 2010), and (2) 
China prefers the proposal of GI extension because it will increase the value and reputation of 
Chinese products (especially those attached to cultural heritage and traditional knowledge) by 
granting a higher protection standard protection for other products.  
                                                     
41 Paragraph 2 of the proposal stated that “in the framework of these procedures, and in the absence of proof 
to the contrary in the course of these, the Register shall be considered as a prima facie evidence that, in 
that Member, the registered geographical indication meets the definition of ‘geographical indication’ 
laid down in TRIPS Article 22.1.” 
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3.4.2 China and the WIPO SCT 
In all WIPO administered treaties regulating GIs, China has not yet signed the Lisbon Agreement, 
the major international agreement on GIs administered by WIPO. In May 2015, the Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of a New Act of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of 
Appellations of Origin and their International Registration’ was held in Geneva. Since China is 
not yet a member of the Lisbon Agreement, China only dispatched a delegation as an observer to 
the Diplomatic Conference (WIPO 2015).42 In June 2016, the Working Group for the Preparation 
of Common Regulations under the Lisbon Agreement and the Geneva Act of the Lisbon 
Agreement held their first meeting, China again dispatched a delegation as an observer to the 
conference. Domestically, so far there is no indication that China is interested in joining the 
Lisbon Agreement.  
In recent years, the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs 
and Geographical Indications (SCT) has become another forum within WIPO for GI negotiations 
(Section 3.2.2.2). Chinese representatives participated in the WIPO SCT Sessions. However, 
looking through the SCT conference minutes,43 China has rarely expressed its opinion and has 
never been involved in any debate. On the very few occasions a Chinese delegation has expressed 
an opinion, the representative made sure not to introduce any controversy. For instance, at the 
Sixth Session SCT, the Chinese delegation said:  
China was in support of examining the protection of geographical indications 
because its country was currently revising its legislation in marks and the 
relationship between geographical indications and trademarks appeared to be a 
problem that needed to be overcome. The Delegation said that it would appreciate a 
continuing discussion and that awaiting the outcome of the work that was currently 
undertaking on geographical indications within the Council for TRIPS was not 
necessarily satisfactory.44 
Though China is not interested in engaging in the SCT debate on GIs, China is keen to show its 
achievement in its domestic practices of GI registration and protection, as well as how GIs have 
contributed to boosting its agriculture. For instance, SAIC and WIPO co-organized the 7th biennial 
International Symposium on GIs at Beijing in 2007 (WIPO/GEO/BEI/07) (WIPO 2007). During 
the International Symposium, Chinese representatives made clear the following: “China is 
                                                     
42 WIPO Working Group for the Preparation of Common Regulations under the Lisbon Agreement and the 
Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement, First Session, Summary by the Chair, LI/WG/PCR/1/5, June 9, 
2016.  
43 The minutes of the SCT meetings are available at the WIPO website: 
http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/sct/.    
44 WIPO SCT, Sixth Session. Report, SCT/6/6, December 5, 2001.  
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systematically engaged in the exploitation of GIs as a means of adding value to her agricultural 
products and boosting her rural economy” (March 2007). 
One explanation for China’s muted engagement at the WIPO SCT is that SAIC represented China 
in GI-related events at WIPO SCT. 45  As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, SAIC established the 
trademark protection for GIs following the US model. Therefore, it is hard for the SAIC, as a 
trademark regulator, to input substantively for the negotiations on GI extension, even if the 
extension is in China’s interest. However, the SAIC can be active in disseminating its proven 
success in the use of trademark protection for GIs in China.  
To summarize, if judging China’s engagement at WIPO on GI-related issues using the criteria of 
“rule-making” and “rule-taking”, one cannot define China either as a rule-maker or a rule-taker. 
Instead, China keeps its general interest in the progress of negotiations by sending observers to 
every conference but is relatively quiet in these sessions.  
3.4.3 EU-China mutual recognition of GIs  
China started negotiating its own bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) from 2003. GIs are an 
important part of Chinese FTAs because GIs are considered to be in China’s national interest. The 
EU and China have also started bilateral cooperation on GIs independent from the FTA channel. 
Unlike its ambiguous position on GI issues in multilateral fora, China shows its pragmatism in its 
bilateral negotiations on GI-related issues. Section 3.5.3 will examine the EU-China bilateral 
reciprocal arrangement on GIs, and Section 3.5.4 will analyses China’s FTA provisions on GIs 
with other states. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the US has been putting high pressure on China in IP related issues 
in the last few decades. By contrast, the EU-China IP cooperation saved face for China instead of 
shaming China as a pirate. EU-China IP cooperation mainly takes the form of technical assistance 
(Crookes 2014), which focuses on training, capacity building, and disseminating experience of 
best practices(Drahos 2008). EU-China IP cooperation is also implemented in a way that involves 
all relevant stakeholders, including IP regulators in levels of government, local IP enforcement 
agencies, and judges of IP tribunal at all levels.  
EU-China IP cooperation is implemented by EU-China IP projects. So far, there have been three 
EU-China Projects on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: IPR (1999-2004), IPR2 
(2007-2011), and IP Key (2013-2017). The EU-China IP projects focus on learning and capacity 
                                                     
45 This mandate is manifested in the Memorandum between SAIC and WIPO in Further Strengthen 
Cooperation 工商总局和世界知识产权组织关于进一步加强合作的谅解备忘录 [Gongshangzongju 
he Shijie Zhishichanquanzuzhi Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Hezuo de Liangjie Beiwanglu] in 2010. Text 
of the Memorandum in Chinese is available at: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-
04/27/content_1593670.htm. 
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building, setting up a long-term process of enculturation into the IP world: the EI-China IP 
projects “contributed to China gaining a greater appreciation and understanding of the values 
contributed to the economy by technology, and the importance of fostering technological growth 
through IP protection, and therefore helped raise IPR issues within the country’s domestic 
political agenda” (IPKey 2018).  
EU-China IP cooperation projects played an important role in facilitating an EU-China 
arrangement on the mutual reconnection of GIs. So far, the major achievement on GIs between 
EU and China is the “10+10 Project” finalized in 2012. The 10+10 project was a reciprocal 
scheme where ten Chinese geographical names were registered and protected in the EU and 
labeled either as a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) or a Protected Geographical Indication 
(PGI). Meanwhile, ten EU geographical names were registered in China as GI products and 
protected by the AQSIQ.46 Following this pilot project, a similar “100+100” Project, where 100 
geographical names will get recognition and protection as GIs in each other’s territory, is in 
progress.  
The 10+10 project demonstrated some key features of EU-China cooperation on GIs. First, it 
provided channels for deeper integration. Relevant Chinese and EU GI regulators and users, rather 
than ministries in charge of trade and foreign affairs in general, met and discussed GI issues 
directly in these projects. Direct involvement of AQSIQ focused only on bilateral cooperation in 
GIs, a cooperation shielded from the broader considerations and trade-offs that typically occur in 
formal international cooperation with China through the Ministry of Commerce. Big issues in 
EU-China relations, such as the EU’s protective measures on the iron industry and the EU’s 
position of not recognizing China’s status as a market economy, are not relevant to this 
cooperation. Initially, AQSIQ and EC Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and Directorate for Trade signed conference minutes on bilateral GI cooperation in 
October 2006 (AQSIQ 2007). However, when the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) became 
the coordinator for EU-China GI cooperation, it replaced AQSIQ as the key negotiator. The 
difference between MOFCOM and AQSIQ representing China in IP negotiations will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.2.4    
                                                     
46  Ten EU GIs protected in China include: Grana Padano, Prosciutto di Parma, Roquefort, Pruneaux 
d'Agen/Pruneaux d'Agen mi-cuits, Priego de Cordóba, Sierra Mágina, Comté, White Stilton Cheese/ 
Blue Stilton Cheese, Scottish Farmed Salmon, West Country Farmhouse Cheddar. The Chinese list of 
GIs protected in the EU comprises: Dongshan Bai Lu Sun 东山白芦笋(asparagus), Guanxi Mi You 琯
溪蜜柚(honey pomelo), Jinxiang Da Suan 金乡大蒜 (garlic), Lixian Ma Shan Yao 蠡县麻山药 (yam), 
Longjing cha 龙井茶 (tea), Pinggu Da Tao 平谷大桃 (peach), Shaanxi ping guo 陕西苹果 (apple), 
Yancheng Long Xia 盐城龙虾 (crayfish), Zhenjiang Xiang Cu 镇江香醋 (vinegar), Longkou Fen Si 龙
口粉丝 (vermicelli).  
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Secondly, the EU-China GIs cooperation manifested the pragmatism of the two parties. Since 
AQSIQ is only a ministry under State Council, it does not have the authority to sign international 
agreements. The EU-China cooperation on the 10+10 project was confined to the implementation 
level mutual recognition because there was no formal agreement between the EU and China. 
Based on the successful experience of the 10+10 project, a larger scale EU-China 100+100 project 
is in progress in which 100 geographical names from each side will be protected in the other’s 
territory as GIs. 
3.4.4 GI provisions in Chinese FTAs 
Since 2003, China has signed fourteen FTAs with ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Peru, Hong Kong, Macau, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, South Korea and 
Australia. In addition, another seven FTAs are under negotiation. Chapter 6 will analyze IP 
provisions in these Chinese FTAs systematically. This sub-section will focus on GI provisions in 
these Chinese FTAs. So far, nine Chinese FTAs contain provisions on GIs, including China-Chile 
FTA (2008), China-Peru FTA (2009), China-Costa Rica FTA (2010), China-New Zealand FTA 
(2008), China-Iceland FTA (2013), China-Switzerland FTA (2013), China-South Korea FTA 
(2015), China-ASEAN FTA (2002, update in 2015), and China-Australia FTA (2015).47 The nine 
Chinese FTAs mentioning GIs can be divided into three categories:  
(1)   those mentioning GIs in the definition of intellectual property;  
(2)   those listing GIs for mutual recognition;  
(3)   others.   
3.4.4.1 Category I: FTAs mentioning GIs in the definition of intellectual property rights  
In the China-New Zealand FTA (2008), China-Iceland FTA (2013), China-South Korea FTA 
(2015) and China-ASEAN FTA (2002, upgraded in 2015), GIs are mentioned in the definition of 
intellectual property. For instance, Article 63.2 of the China-Iceland FTA provides that:  
For the purpose of this Chapter, the term “intellectual property rights” refers to 
copyright and related rights, rights in trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, patents, undisclosed information, layout designs of integrated 
circuits, and rights in plant varieties as defined in TRIPS.     
This provision defines the concept of intellectual property rights with a reference to TRIPS. Since 
South Korea, Iceland, New Zealand and ASEAN countries are all WTO Members, GIs protection 
should be at least consistent with the standards in Article 22-24 of TRIPS. Other than this 
definition, there are no further provisions for a special mutual recognition mechanism of GIs in 
                                                     
47 The full text of these FTAs are available in both English and Chinese at the website of Ministry of 
Commerce of China at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/georgia/georgia_agreementText.shtml.  
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these four FTAs. As a result, geographical names from one party have to go through the formal 
procedure of registration and examination in the other party, in order to be protected as a GI in 
the territory of the other party.  
Generally, China adheres to TRIPS standards in its GIs negotiations. The reiteration of GIs is 
consistent with China’s interests. In Chapter 6, the above FTA provisions on GIs are considered 
as passive defensive provisions (Chapter 6.2.1).  
3.4.4.2 Category II: listing GIs for mutual recognition  
The China-Chile FTA (2008), China-Peru FTA (2009), and China-Costa Rica FTA (2010) list 
specific geographical names to be recognized and protected in the territory of the other party. 
Article 116 of the China-Costa Rica FTA designates ten Costa-Rica GIs to be protected in China, 
48 but the Chinese GIs to be protected in Costa Rica are not yet confirmed in the FTA text. Article 
146 of the Peru-China FTA lists 22 Chinese GIs to be protected in Peru and four Peru GIs to be 
protected in China.49 Article 10 in the China-Chile FTA lists two Chinese GIs to be protected in 
Chile and one Chile GI to be protected in China.50 The standards of protection granted to these 
listed products are equivalent to TRIPS Article 22 protection for general products and higher-
level Article 23 protection for wines and spirits. Some of the listed products are types of wines, 
including Shaoxing Wine, Pisco Perú, and Chilean Pisco, so they are granted higher-level 
protection as stipulated in Article 23 of TRIPS.   
Despite their similarity in listing various type of GIs for mutual recognition and protection in the 
above-mentioned FTAs, these FTAs expand the scope of bilateral cooperation on GIs. For 
instance, both the China-Peru FTA (2009) and China-Costa Rica FTA (2010) contain a provision 
for possible extension of geographical names on the list through consultation by mutual consent 
                                                     
48 The 10 ten Costa-Rica GIs include: (1)Banano de Costa Rica (Banana of Costa Rica), Café de Costa Rica 
(Coffee of Costa Rica), (3) Guanacaste Madera (wood), (4) Orosi (coffee), (5) Tres Ríos (coffee), (6) 
Turrialba (coffee), (7) West Valley (coffee), (8) Brunca (coffee), (9) Central Valley (coffee), and (10) 
Guanacaste (coffee).  
49 The 22 Chinese GIs include: (1) Anxi Tie Guanyin (Tieh-Kuan-Yin)Tea 安溪铁观音, (2) Shaoxing 
(Yellow) Wine 绍兴黄酒 , (3) Fuling Pickled Mustard Tuber 涪陵榨菜  (4) (Ningxia) Zhongning 
Matrimony Vine （宁夏）中宁枸杞, (5) Jingdezhen Porcelain 景德镇瓷器, (6) Zhenjiang Aromatic 
Vinegar 镇江香醋, (7) Pu’er Tea 普洱茶 (8) (Xihu) Longjing Tea （西湖）龙井茶 , (9) Kinghwa 
(Jinhua) Ham 金华火腿, (10) Shanxi Mature Vinegar 山西老陈醋, (11) Xuanwei Ham 宣威火腿, (12) 
Longquan Celadon 龙泉青瓷 , (13) Yixing Dark-red Enamelled Pottery 宜兴紫砂陶 , (14) Korla 
Fragrant Pear 库尔勒香梨 , (15) Min County Tang-Kuei (Chinese angelica root) 岷县当归 , (16) 
Wenshan Notoginseng 文山三七, (17) Wuchang Rice 五常大米, (18) Tongjiang White Fungus 通江银
耳 , (19) Bama Miniature Pig 巴马香猪 , (20) Taihe Blackbone Chicken 泰和乌鸡 , (21) Fuding 
Shaddock 福鼎四季柚, and (22) (Nanjing) Cloud-pattern Brocade （南京）云锦. The four Peru GIs 
are (1) Pisco Peru (Pisco Perú), (2) Chulucanas Pottery (Cerámica de Chulucanas), (3) Cusco Giant 
White Corn (Maíz Blanco Gigante Cusco), and (4) Pallar Bean from Ica (Pallar de Ica).     
50 The Chinese GIs are Shaoxing Wine 绍兴黄酒 (wine) and Anxi Tieguanyin 安溪铁观音 (tea) (Annex 
2A), and the Chile GI is Chilean Pisco (Annex 2B). 
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of the parties in the future. Moreover, the China-Costa Rica FTA (2010) includes a provision on 
GI regulatory collaboration through information exchange, cooperation on technical mechanisms 
and registration procedures. 
The practice of including a list of GIs to be mutually recognized as GIs by the other party follows 
the EU model of GI provisions in FTAs (Engelhardt 2015). Interestingly, though Chile has 
vigorously opposed the proposal on the GI Register (TN/IP/W/10) and GI Extension (IP/C/W/386) 
at the WTO, it still managed to come to a bilateral arrangement for GIs with China within the 
current TRIPS framework.  
3.4.4.3 Category III: miscellaneous 
The China-Switzerland FTA (2013) and China-Australian FTA (2015) constitute the outliers of 
Chinese FTAs in terms of GIs. The China-Switzerland FTA (2013) foresees possible mutual 
recognition, while the China-Australia FTA confirms the legitimacy of trademark protection for 
GIs. The contrast between the two FTAs shows China’s flexibility of approach on GIs in FTA 
negotiations.  
In the China-Switzerland FTA (2013), the definition of GIs is the same as in TRIPS. In addition, 
it also introduces the concepts of appellations of origin and indications of sources (See Figure 5 
of this Chapter for the scope of different concepts related to GIs). Footnote 18 of the China-
Switzerland FTA clarifies that appellations of origin in Switzerland could be protected as GIs in 
China. Footnote 19 confirms indications of source are part of IP protection in Switzerland. 
However, Footnote 19 does not further clarify the relationship between indications of source and 
GIs. Considering the scope of indications of source is broader than GIs, it leaves space for further 
interpretation of whether indications of source could be recognized as part of intellectual property 
in China. 
A specific provision on GIs in the China-Switzerland FTA is Article 11.13. This provision is 
ambiguous and may have different interpretations. Article 11.13.3 provides that:  
Without prejudice to Articles 22 and 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Parties shall 
take all necessary measures, in accordance with this Agreement, to ensure mutual 
protection of the geographical indications referred to in paragraph 2 that are used 
to refer to goods originating in the territory of the Parties. Each Party shall provide 
interested parties with the legal means to prevent the use of such geographical 
indications for identical or similar goods not originating in the place indicated by 
the geographical indication in question.51 
The term “mutual protection” in the first sentence of Article 11.13.3 may introduce ambiguity 
because the text itself does not clarify the requirement for such mutual protection, in particular, 
                                                     
51 Highlights are added by the author.  
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whether registrations are needed for a product from the other party to enjoy such mutual protection. 
Wenfei Attorneys-at-Law Ltd. (2013, 12) interpreted this provision to mean that “the FTA 
allows for a comprehensive protection of indications of source, country names and flags with 
regard to all goods and services”. However, Footnote 20 in Article 11.13.1 provides “Parties may 
require an indication to be registered in accordance with respective legislation and regulation on 
geographical indications in order to enjoy legal protection as a geographical indication.” 
Combining Footnote 20 and the main text of Article 11.13.1, a proper interpretation for this article 
is that both parties agreed to provide protection for GIs from the other party when these had 
already been registered with competent regulators. This interpretation makes more sense if we 
consider the desire of China to avoid any possible TRIPS-plus requirement in its FTAs. Though 
Article 11.13.3 explicitly mentions “mutual protection”, a wide reading of this protection for GIs 
will trigger the application of Most-favored Nation (MFN) principle. That means China has to 
protect GIs from all WTO Members on a reciprocal basis. If registration is not a requirement in 
order for the obligation of mutual recognition and protection to operate, China and Switzerland 
would be taking on extensive duties of protection. Ironically, if we do consider registration as a 
requirement for mutual protection, such protection already exists according to TRIPS for both 
parties.  
It seems that the second sentence of Article 11.13 in the Chinese-Swiss FTA is a TRIPS-plus 
requirement because protection for the GIs is based on the logic of terroir, not the trademark 
doctrine of misleading consumers (see Section 3.1.2). However, this sentence is not as specific as 
Article 23 TRIPS which prohibits various ways of using GIs following the logic of terroir. 
Therefore, whether products beyond wines and spirits could be protected on a level equivalent to 
Article 23 TRIPS needs to be further clarified.  
If the China-Swiss FTA stands at the expansive end of the spectrum of Chinese FTA provisions 
on GIs, the China-Australia FTA stands at the other end, representing the most flexible protection 
for GIs. Article 11.15 of China-Australian FTA provides: “Each Party recognizes that 
geographical indications may be protected through a trademark or sui generis system or other 
legal means.” In practice, GIs (except for wine GIs) are protected by the trademark system in 
Australia. Since FTAs may not exempt a party from its TRIPS obligations, the term “may be 
protected” may not be interpreted as a choice of protecting or not protecting. Instead, it should be 
interpreted as a choice concerning a legal mechanism to implement such protection.  
The flexibility of trademark protection and sui generis protection in the China-Australia FTA, 
though compatible with the Chinese domestic systems, may cause problems with China’s 
commitment to the China-Switzerland FTA. Imagine the following examples: (1) a type of cheese 
that is protected as a GI in Switzerland (Product A) and is exported to the Chinese market and has 
been registered and approved as a GI to be protected in China; and (2) another Australian cheese 
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(Product B), using the same geographical name as product A is also exported to China. To comply 
with the China-Switzerland FTA (Sentence 2, Article 11.13.3, see above quotation), China should 
prevent the Australian product from using the registered Swiss name. Meanwhile, China is also 
committed to allowing imports into China in accordance with the China-Australia FTA. Similar 
conflicts are possible since China is to negotiate more FTAs with both Old World and New World 
countries. The same difficulty in reconciliation is seen with South Korea’s FTA with the EU and 
the US respectively (O’Connor 2014).  
The GI provisions in Chinese FTAs provides a valuable opportunity from a regulatory perspective 
to explore China’s true interest in GIs, and its willingness to involve itself in rule-making on 
bilateral and multilateral levels. Instead of a uniform template, the GI provisions in Chinese FTAs 
demonstrate different patterns when China negotiates with different parties. The diversity of 
Chinese FTAs text in terms of GI provisions indicates the pragmatism of China in FTAs 
negotiations.  
Such pragmatism is also evident in FTAs where GIs are intentionally not mentioned or dealt with 
in detail. Considering the homology in culture between China and South Korea, there have already 
been conflicts between Chinese and South Korean producers concerning GIs in practice. For 
instance, though South Korean Kimchi has been listed as a cultural heritage item by UNESCO 
and registered as a GI in South Korea, the same/similar process to season vegetables has been 
extensively used in North-eastern China for centuries, and Kimchi 泡菜[Paocai] is used as a 
generic name in China (Cheng 2014). In another instance, while Chinese Ginseng Changbai 
Mountain Renshen 长白山人参 is a registered GI in China and South Korean Ginseng a registered 
GI in South Korea (Na and Wei 2013), they are essentially the same products originating from 
Changbai Mountain on the China-North Korea border. In other words, the geographical 
conditions determining the qualities or other characteristics of the products are the same, but they 
are registered as different GIs in different states only because the origin of the products are 
demarcated by the border of states. Recognizing GIs by either party will impair the competitive 
advantage of the domestic products. In the final text of the China-South Korea FTA, the two 
parties shelved the controversies surrounding these GIs by only mentioning the term in the 
definition of intellectual property.   
3.4.5 Summary of China’s positions  
China began to engage with the international GI system only after its domestic GI systems had 
been established. With three independent systems for GIs protection in place after 2007, China 
acknowledged that GI protection will offer added-value to its farmers and is in China’s interest. 
On this basis, China joined the EU and other developing countries to submit the TN/C/W/52 
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proposal at the WTO, experimented with a mutual recognition mechanism for GIs with the EU, 
and incorporated lists of GIs for mutual protection in its FTAs with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica.  
The US-EU contestation over international rule-making for GIs has been intensified in the post-
TRIPS era. China developed subtle and sophisticated positions at the multilateral level. First, 
while making a coalition with the EU to co-sponsor the TN/C/W/52 proposal, China supported 
the US position in applying domestic law to regulate the use of GIs as generic names. Secondly, 
while China joined the EU in co-sponsoring the TN/C/W/52 proposal, its proposal of combining 
the negotiation of GI Extension and the GI Register together reflected its own preference on GI 
Extension.  
At the bilateral level, the frequent reference to TRIPS in the definition of GIs in Chinese FTAs 
indicated China’s preference for the WTO, at a time when the US is actively pursuing TRIPS-
plus standards through FTAs. Thus, the GI provisions in Chinese FTAs serve the overall goal of 
Chinese FTAs to make the promise of trade deliver for China. In addition, Chinese FTAs are 
flexible and diversified, extending from a commitment to preventing “the use of GIs for identical 
or similar goods not actually from the place of GIs” (China-Switzerland FTA) to allowing 
flexibility to choose trademark protection or sui generis protection (China-Australia FTA). 
Between these polarized positions, three Chinese FTAs also pragmatically incorporated lists of 
GIs for mutual recognition and protection. The diversified positions of China at the multilateral 
level and bilateral level can be considered as an example of China’s strategy of dissembling in its 
international IP engagement (Chapter 10.3.1).   
3.5 Conclusion  
The international GI system is characterized by rule complexity and fragmentation. This has 
everything to do with the EU and US clash over protection standards (TRIPS Article 22 versus 
Article 23) and which legal mechanism (sui generis or trademark) should have priority in the 
wine/food domains. The condition of hegemonic stability that characterized the origins of TRIPS 
has been replaced by one fractured hegemony. It is very difficult to impose fine-grained positive 
rules on states under conditions of fractured hegemony. As pointed out by Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000, 27), “when the US and EC can agree on which direction global regulatory change should 
take, that is usually the direction it does take.” Arguably, when the US and the EU cannot agree, 
the opportunities for other states include: (1) developing a middle power strategy to make 
coalitions to push forward one standard or (2) taking standards both from the EU and the US. 
Looking at the domestic level, China, like other East Asian Countries (Japan and South Korea), 
established dual protection systems for GIs under the influence of both the EU and the US. Three 
independent systems for GIs protection were established under the regulation of SAIC, AQSIQ, 
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and MOA. This is a typical case of how power contestation at the international level introduced 
legal fragmentation to national laws.   
At the international level, China is behaving like a middle power to ally with the EU and other 
developing countries to promote a rival standard. China is interested in international GI rule-
making. With over 3,000 plus GIs registered in China, the GIs systems have been used as an 
instrument to promote farmers’ income and it is generally in China’s interest to promote higher 
protection for GIs for products beyond wines and spirits. In this sense, China holds the same 
position as other developing countries in the international GI negotiations. Though China joined 
the EU in promoting negotiations on the GI Register and GI Extension, it strategically promoted 
its own interest in GI Extension by proposing linking the negotiations. It also reiterated the 
principle of state sovereignty to respect the interests of the US. Bilaterally, China has been flexible 
about its GI rules on the basis of reciprocity. 
Though China has engaged in international GI regulation for more than one decade, it plays more 
a role as a quiet intervener and coalition partner, than a rule-maker. This is so for several reasons. 
First, China’s GI engagement is motivated by its national interest. In the EU-US contestation over 
global GI rule-making, it is the EU that has promoted a rival standard of GIs at various levels. 
The US has resisted the EU’s attempts effectively, at least at the multilateral level. While China 
appeared to join the EU in the TN/C/W/52 proposal, its interest lies in GIs Extension and differs 
from the EU’s enthusiasm for the GI Register.  
Secondly, because of cultural differences, Chinese GIs have a better reputation within the Chinese 
market, and the Chinese market itself is huge. Currently, the producers’ focus on the domestic 
market will not incentivize the Chinese government to push for higher global standards for GI 
protection. This will only happen when large volumes of Chinese food and agricultural products 
enter the global market.  
Thirdly, the fragmented and competing regulatory systems for GIs within China have hindered 
China’s strategic and systematic GI engagement internationally. China delegated agencies from 
different ministries to negotiate GIs at different international fora. Multilaterally, WTO-related 
issues are generally negotiated by the Department of WTO at MOFCOM; WIPO SCT 
negotiations have been followed up by SAIC. On the bilateral level, SAIC developed its 
transnational cooperation with countries that support the use of the trademark system for GIs, 
while AQSIQ cooperated with countries that have interests in the sui generis system. The EU-
China projects on GI mutual recognition has been facilitated by the EU-China IP projects, directly 
negotiated by MOFCOM and implemented by AQSIQ while Chinese FTAs are negotiated by 
MOFCOM.  
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Chapter 4 China Engages in the 
Disclosure Obligation  
4.1 Introduction  
As a second case study in this thesis, this chapter will explore how China has engaged 
international regulation concerning the disclosure obligation in patent applications. “Disclosure 
obligation” refers to the mandatory requirement to disclose the origin of genetic resources in a 
patent application. If the invention is finished relying on any genetic resources; non-compliance 
will have legal consequences.  
The disclosure of origin or source of genetic resources in patent applications lies at the intersection 
of the international regulation of genetic resources and the international regulation of intellectual 
property. Section 4.1.1 will provide justification of the choice of China’s engagement in the 
disclosure obligation as a case study for this thesis. Section 4.1.2 will introduce the position of 
the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources at the intersection between the regulation of 
genetic resources and intellectual property. Section 4.1.3 will summarize the general debates over 
the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources. 
4.1.1 China’s engagement with the disclosure obligation as a case study 
Disclosure obligation is selected as a specific issue area for China’s engagement with the 
international IP system for the following reasons. First, China as one of the megadiverse countries 
in the world is rich in genetic resources. According to National Biodiversity Conservation 
Strategy and Action Plan of China (2011-2030).1 
China is one of the 17 megadiverse countries in the world. China is the home of 
territorial ecosystems in the form of forest, shrub, meadow, steppe, desert, wetland, 
as well as marine ecosystems including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China 
Sea and Kuroshio Basin. China has up to 34,984 species of higher plants, ranking 
the third in the world; China also has 6,445 vertebrate animal species, accounting 
for 13.7% of the total species in the world; the fungi species known in China are 
more than 10,000, making up 14% of the total in the world.  
The quotation indicates China has a clear national interest in protecting its genetic resources from 
misappropriation and embracing multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation. China is 
                                                     
1   Ministry of Environment Protection issued Notice Concerning issuing the National Biodiversity 
Conservation Strategy and Action Plan of China (2011-2030) 关于印发《中国生物多样性保护战略
与行动计划》(2011-2030 年) 的通知 [Guanyu Yinfa Zhongguo Shengwu Duoyangxing Baohu Zhanlüe 
yu Xingdong Jihua (2011-2030nian) de Tongzhi], No. 106 (2010) 环发 (2010) 106 号 [huanfa (2010) 
106 hao].  
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one of the Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries2 (LMMC) in international negotiations on topics 
related to the protection of genetic resources. Therefore, China has clear incentives to actively 
engage international regulation of the disclosure obligation, one of the key issues to guarantee 
sufficient protection of genetic resources.     
Secondly, discussions and negotiations concerning disclosure obligation took place at various 
levels. At the multilateral level, the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources was negotiated 
at the WTO TRIPS Council and the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). It is included in several 
Chinese FTAs. It is adopted by the Chinese Patent Law (2008) at the domestic level. Minutes of 
meetings at TRIPS Council and WIPO IGC and text of FTAs and domestic regulations provide 
first-hand data to analyze China’s position on this issue. 
Thirdly, the disclosure obligation is an area that the US and the megadiverse countries have 
continuously contested in international rule-making. In contrast to most international IP standards 
that eventually become international standards, the disclosure obligation was not initiated by the 
US or EU but by the megadiverse countries as a rival standard. This standard was opposed by the 
US and other developed countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea. The EU 
takes a hedging position by proposing a more naturalized agenda on this issue. Therefore, the 
debates and negotiations on the disclosure obligation provide a unique opportunity to explore how 
China, as one of the megadiverse countries and a major economic power, promotes a rival 
standard. 
Fourthly, the disclosure obligation is a lively and debated issue after TRIPS. As mentioned in the 
methodology (Chapter 1.6.2), it is one of the few cases in which China could become a rule-maker 
as a latecomer to the international IP system. Indeed, China incorporated the disclosure obligation 
into its domestic law before any international agreement was reached on this issue.  Hence, the 
investigation of China’s position on this issue will reveal China’s potential to engage alternative 
rule-making in promoting access. 
4.1.2 Why disclosure of origin is important 
The disclosure of origin of genetic resources is part of the broader issue of the overlap between 
international regulation of genetic resources and international regulation of intellectual property. 
                                                     
2  The Group of LMMC was set up in 2002 by 17 countries including Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela. These counties have about 70% of 
the Earth’s species. The LMMC was established to promote consultation and cooperation related to the 
preservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
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Understanding the overlap, especially the direct legal basis in international law, builds a 
foundation to analyze positions held by different states on the disclosure of origin.  
Genetic resources refer to any material of plant, animal, microbe or other organism containing 
functional units of heredity that has actual or potential value.3 Along with the expansion of 
colonialism, the 19th century international law tended to consider genetic resources as the 
“common heritage of the humankind”. Following this rationale, the exploitation of genetic 
resources was free for everyone. For instance, during the 19th century, the Chinese kiwifruit was 
first introduced by missionaries to New Zealand (Zhang 2008) and there were no international 
laws prohibiting such practice at that time. This makes it difficult to claim that the practice was 
unauthorized. 
Free exploitation of genetic resources and related traditional knowledge from indigenous 
communities in their territories continued after WWII. Countries rich in genetic resources framed 
such misappropriation as bio-piracy. 4  Typical cases of misappropriation include Basmati, 
Bolivian Habanero Pepper and Artemisia Judaica (Robinson 2012). When big pharmaceutical 
companies seek patent monopoly control over inventions using these genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, the contestations over “who owns the genetic resources” have been 
intensified. The megadiverse countries made a coalition to promote state sovereignty over genetic 
resources.  
State sovereignty over genetic resources was established as a principle in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)5 and revised International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 
(IUPGR) and International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA).6 State sovereignty does not equal state ownership (Roa‐Rodríguez and Van Dooren 
2008). It confirms that states have powers of command over the genetic resources. The CBD also 
                                                     
3  This definition is made on the basis of WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) 29th Session, Consolidated Document 
Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/29/4, November 30, 2015. 
The CBD tends to interpret the concept of genetic resource more broadly, which could either be the 
genetic structure per se can be utilised; or the information encapsulated in the nucleotide sequence of the 
genetic material can be read and digitalized and easily acquired (Schei and Tvedt 2010). 
4  Robinson (2010, 21) distinguishes patent-based bio-piracy and non-patent based bio-piracy. In terms of 
terminology, this chapter uses the term misappropriation to describe the problem of unauthorized 
exploitation to avoid the stigmatization associated with “bio-piracy”. 
5  Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) governs the international protection of plant genetic resources. 
The principles of state soverignty can be located in the 5th paragraph of the Preamble and Article 3 of 
the CBD. 
6  Both treaties are administered by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and they are governing 
genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA). For a detailed discussion of the international 
regulation of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, see Gerstetter et al. (2007). 
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sets access and benefit-sharing (ABS)7 as one of its objectives. To achieve the objective of ABS, 
any exploitation of genetic resources needs authorization: prior informed consent (PIC) must be 
obtained from relevant government authorities and local communities (Perrault, Herbertson, and 
Lynch 2006). The prior informed consent (PIC) is the evidence that a local community consents 
to people from outside of the community to have access to a certain genetic resource. It is also 
the basis upon which the local community can later claim benefit-sharing of this genetic resource 
when it generates values. 
Considering that the value of genetic resources is often crystallized as a patent right, the principles 
of the CBD become relevant to rules of intellectual property, in particular, TRIPS and the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention).  
Table 7 shows the evolving international laws relevant to the determination of ownership of 
genetic resources.  
Table 7 Evolution of the International Rules on Ownership of Genetic Resources8 
 Common heritage 
of mankind 
Property rights 
Sovereign (state-
controlled) 
Private and 
community right  
Genetic resources in 
general 
Traditional 19th-
century system 
CBD 
Nagoya Protocol  
TRIPS 
UPOV Convention 
Genetic resources of 
food and agriculture 
IUPGR (1983) 
ITPGRFA  
1991 revision to the 
IUPGR 
ITPGRFA (other 
worked) 
TRIPS 
ITPGRFA (other 
raw) 
Genetic resources 
beyond territories of 
states  
   
 
The CBD is a framework treaty that by itself cannot achieve the objective of ABS. It needs to be 
underpinned by a more detailed system of rules that help to define ownership and right to use. 
Considering the CBD has already set up the principle of state sovereignty over genetic resources, 
the next step is to obtain authorization from the local communities. The disclosure obligation is 
one of the proposed mechanisms to guarantee that such authorization is granted properly. Along 
                                                     
7  Access and benefit-sharing refers to the way genetic resources may be accessed, and how benefits 
resulting from their use are shared between the people or countries using the resources (users) and the 
people or countries that provide them (providers). ABS is based on prior informed consent (PIC) being 
granted by a provider to a user and negotiations between both parties. ABS is one of the three objectives 
of CBD, and is stipulated in detail in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Nagoya Protocol). 
8  Data source: Raustiala and Victor (2004). 
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with the debates over the specific mechanisms, there is also a debate over whether this issue 
should be governed by national law or international law.  
4.1.3 The debates over the disclosure of origin of genetic resources 
Given that the focus of the case study is the disclosure obligation in patent law, an overall 
examination of the regime complexity in the international regulation of genetic resources and 
intellectual property (Raustiala and Victor 2004), the contract-based voluntary mechanism, and 
disclosure requirement in the application of intellectual property other than patents (plant variety 
rights) are beyond the scope of the chapter. However, as a general background for the discussion 
of the disclosure obligation this section will summarize the broader debates concerning the 
disclosure of origin of genetic resources. So far, the debates concerning the disclosure of origin 
of genetic resources have concentrated on three issues: (1) whether embedding disclosure into the 
patent law is the solution to guarantee the ABS; (2) whether the disclosure should be voluntary 
or mandatory; and (3) whether international consent on this issue is necessary.  
4.1.3.1 Is patent law a solution to guarantee access and benefit sharing? 
Considering that the major economic benefits for genetic resources are derived from the 
exclusivity of intellectual property rights (in particular patent rights), the megadiverse countries 
proposed the disclosure solution to prevent misappropriation through the patent system.9   
Disclosure has been one of the fundamental principles in the history of patent law. According to 
the social contract theory, patent holders can only obtain a certain period of monopoly for an 
invention, on the condition of adequate disclosure of the technical information encapsulated in 
the invention. During TRIPS negotiations, the article on disclosure mainly followed the model of 
US law. The working obligation proposed by developing countries10 was not incorporated in the 
final text of TRIPS. An early draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) negotiated at 
WIPO included a rule requiring “sufficiently clear and complete disclosure for the invention to 
be carried out by a person skilled in the art”.11 Due to lack of consensus among members, 
negotiations of the SPLT have been on hold since 2006. The disclosure requirement negotiated at 
these multilateral fora, however, is a general requirement to balance the interest between the 
patent right holders and the public. They are not specific to the disclosure of the origin of genetic 
resources used in the invention discussed in this chapter.  
                                                     
9  WTO TRIPS Council, The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, Note by the Secretariat, IP/CIW/368/Rev.1, 
February 8, 2006.  
10 The proposal of working obligation was reflected by the Brussel Text of December 1990. For more 
detailed discussion of the negotiation process, see Hiroko (2011).   
11 Articles 11, Alternative A of the SPLT. See WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), 
Fifth Session, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, SCP/5/2, April 4, 2001.   
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Specific to the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources, the megadiverse countries proposed 
that once a patent relying on genetic resources has been published, the relevant indigenous 
community could further check whether this patent was based on the use of PIC and so open the 
way to a claim for benefit-sharing. In other words, information disclosed in the patent application 
is the key evidence as to whether there are benefit-sharing obligations if the national law has 
already established the ABS mechanism.  
Inside the patent system, the megadiverse countries proposed the disclosure of origin of genetic 
resources to be the part of the substantive requirement for patent examination. It means that in the 
case of non-disclosure, the patent will not be granted for an application under examination, or a 
granted patent will be invalidated. However, the US opposed this proposal of linking the 
protection of genetic resources to patent law. It proposed a contract-based approach that considers 
the PIC a contract between the external exploiter of a type of genetic resource and the local 
community, the idea being that the local community can claim ABS later on the basis of this 
contract.  
4.1.3.2 Voluntary disclosure versus mandatory disclosure   
Dutfield (2005) has distinguished two types of disclosure of origin, mandatory disclosure 
(disclosure obligation) and voluntary disclosure according to burdens posed on patent applicants. 
Disclosure obligation mandates the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources in a patent 
application, and non-compliance will have legal consequences. A voluntary mechanism mainly 
involves the contract-based approach where disclosure is voluntary, and no legal consequences 
will occur other than the obligation for non-compliance o contracts (Table 8).  
Table 8 Legal Mechanisms in Patent Law for the Disclosure of Origin 
 Voluntary disclosure  Mandatory disclosure  
(disclosure obligation)  
National law  Disclosure of the origin of genetic 
resources is voluntary  
Disclosure of the origin of genetic 
resources is mandatory 
-No legal consequences for non-
disclosure 
-Non-compliance with the ABS is 
a breach of contract 
In the case of non-disclosure: 
- patent application rejected; 
granted patent invalid or 
unenforceable; or 
- other civil and criminal 
consequences result from non-
compliance.  
International law  Not necessary Proof of legal acquisition 
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The proponents of voluntary disclosure argue a binding mechanism is not the only way to achieve 
the goal of ABS. The US proposed “national based approaches” to the WTO, 12 which included 
measures of permits, contractual obligations, visa systems, and civil and criminal penalties for 
non-compliance. The national-based approach applies the same logic as the above-mentioned 
contract-based approach. The problem with this contractual approach, as pointed out by some 
megadiverse countries, is that the equitable and fair benefit sharing is unlikely to be achieved 
because of asymmetric negotiating power and the lack of transparency.  
4.1.3.3 International law versus national law  
The law-making on the disclosure of origin started at the national level. For instance, Indian 
Patent Act of 2002 (Second Amendment) provides that non-disclosure or wrongful disclosure of 
origin of biological resources in a patent application will lead to rejection of the application or 
revocation of the patent if it is granted. Regionally, the Andean Group established the “Common 
Regime on Access to Genetic Resources” to promote access.13 These practices and initiatives 
gradually associated the old patent law doctrine of disclosure with the protection of genetic 
resources, by incorporating disclosure of origin of genetic resources as a requirement in patent 
law. 14   
In most cases, the problem of misappropriation is a transnational infringement: the patent holders 
are not coming from the same country as the indigenous communities. In these cases, a mandatory 
requirement at the national level is not enough. That is why an international consensus on the 
proof of legal acquisition and other international coordination is the best option to tackle the 
problem (Dutfield 2005). A binding international rule will also help to coordinate the variegated 
legislations and practices of countries on the disclosure of origin at the national level, in particular, 
on issues of whether disclosure should be considered as a substantive versus formal requirement 
for patent application, the legal consequences of non-disclosure and the scope of information to 
be disclosed. However, such consensus is difficult because the US, home to many big 
biopharmaceutical companies, opposes any type of international law to govern this issue.  
After clarifying the critical issues of the debate concerning the disclosure obligation, Section 4.2 
will provide an overview of the multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation. Section 4.3-
4.5 will analyze China’s international engagement on the disclosure obligation in three stages. 
                                                     
12 WTO TRIPS Council, IP/CIW/368/Rev.1. See supra note no. 9. 
13 Andean Community, Decision No. 391 establishing the Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources. 
Decision No. 391 was issued in Caracas, Venezuela by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement 
(the Commission of the Andean Community) on July 2, 1996. It was published in the Official Gazette 
of the Cartagena Agreement No. 213 of July 17, 1996, in Lima, Peru. 
14  In addition to genetic resources, megadiverse countries also promoted the disclosure of origin of 
traditional knowledge or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.   
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Section 4.3 will examine how China navigated the multilateral negotiations on the disclosure 
obligation at WTO and WIPO after its accession to the WTO. Section 4.4 will analyze how China, 
informed by the multilateral debates, engaged its domestic legislative process as exemplified by 
the amendment of the Patent Law (2008). Section 4.5 will investigate the post-patent law 
engagement, both at the multilateral and bilateral levels, to see how the domestic legislation has 
fed back to its international engagement.     
4.2 Multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation  
This section sets the scene for the case study by analyzing multilateral negotiations on the 
disclosure obligation after TRIPS. Section 4.2.1 will summarize different categories of opinions 
at TRIPS council, and Section 4.2.2 will trace the multi-forum negotiations at TRIPS Council to 
the WIPO IGC.   
4.2.1 A spectrum of positions on the disclosure obligation  
Though international laws are non-hierarchical in general, Article 16.5 CBD provides a guide to 
the relationship between intellectual property laws and the CBD:  
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property 
rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall 
cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation and international law in order 
to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives.15 
Megadiverse countries proposed at the WTO forum that TRIPS and CBD are in conflict with each 
other. They further proposed the disclosure obligation as a solution to reconcile the conflict by 
subordinating intellectual property law to ABS, one of the CBD objectives. Most developed 
countries do not recognize the conflict because the text of the CBD does not contain a clause 
expressly overriding intellectual property rights in the case of express inconsistency. As a result, 
the necessity to incorporate the disclosure obligation into the international and national laws 
becomes questionable.  
The TRIPS-CBD relationship was incorporated as one of the outstanding implementation issues 
into the Doha Round work program. The disclosure obligation has been proposed as a solution to 
the conflict. As a result, the TRIPS Council became the forum for the discussion of the disclosure 
obligation since 2002, following the Doha Ministerial Declaration.16 However, these discussions 
were informal, and the disclosure obligation has not been negotiated as an independent issue. 
India, Brazil and other megadiverse countries, including China, endeavored to promote text-based 
                                                     
15 Article 16.5 of CBD.  
16 Paragraphs 12 and 19 of the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
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negotiations on the disclosure obligation,17 but the efforts failed in 2006. Since then, discussions 
on the disclosure obligation have remained part of the Director-General’s consultative process, 
and no substantive negotiations on this issue have taken place.  
There are three categories of opinions on the disclosure obligation among WTO Members (Table 
9). First is the need for a strong disclosure obligation on the basis that there is an inherent conflict 
between TRIPS and CBD. India first proposed the possibility of disclosure obligation as a solution 
to the relationship between TRIPS and CBD.18 Brazil added support to India’s initiative by further 
specifying that Article 27.3 TRIPS should be amended to include evidence of PIC as a condition 
for patentability. 19  After the Doha Ministerial Declaration, more megadiverse countries 
associated with India and Brazil with a clearer agenda of disclosure of origin by adding a new 
Article 29bis to TRIPS dedicated to the disclosure of origin of genetic resources.20   
The second category is a weak disclosure obligation supported by the EC, Switzerland, and 
Norway, arguing that there need be no inherent conflict between the two agreements, but the 
disclosure requirement could be included in the patent application procedure as a formal 
requirement. Accompanying this position of non-conflict between CBD and TRIPS, the EC and 
Switzerland also proposed that WIPO IGC should be a proper forum for related discussions or 
negotiations. Nonetheless, both the EC and Switzerland played a cross-forum game and 
                                                     
17 WTO General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee, TRIPS Council, Doha Work Programme – the 
Outstanding Implementation Issue on the Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Pakistan, 
Peru, Thailand and Tanzania, IP/C/W/474 (also circulated as WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 and 
TN/C/W/41/Rev.2), July 5, 2006.   
18 WTO TRIPS Council, Proposals on Intellectual Property Rights Issues, Communication from India, 
IP/C/W/195, July 12, 2000. See Para. 16 of this communication.   
19 WTO TRIPS Council, Review of Article 27.3 (b), Communication from Brazil, IP/C/W/ 228, November 
24, 2000. See Para. 25 of this communication.  
20 WTO TRIPS Council, The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Communication from Brazil, China, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
IP/C/W/356, June 24, 2002. See Para 10 of this communication. Also see IP/C/W/474, supra note no.17.  
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strategically involved both fora of WIPO and WTO. 21 Norway also supported the view that 
disclosure should be a formal requirement. However, in contrast to the EC and Switzerland, 
Norway proposed to amend TRIPS to incorporate the disclosure obligation.   
In 2008, the EU and Switzerland joined the developing countries to support starting negotiations 
on the disclosure obligation in Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues (TN/C/W/52). 22 Over 
two-thirds of WTO Members co-sponsored this proposal. As discussed in Chapter 3, the GI 
Register and GI Extension are the other two issues included in this proposal. This proposal was 
intended to balance the different interests. It did not mention the discrepancy between the 
megadiverse countries and the EU on this issue but focused on making a joint effort to promote 
text-based negotiations.  
The third category of opinion was led by the US. The US proposed the contract-based approach 
to solving the problem of misappropriation.23 The US also argued that the introduction of the 
disclosure obligation will neither guarantee the PIC nor prevent misappropriation, but add 
uncertainty to the patent system and introduce administrative burdens.24  This argument was 
opposed by the megadiverse countries, who argued that the fact that the disclosure obligation is 
only one of the elements to prevent misappropriation should not be the reason to abandon this 
approach and take the alternative voluntary approach. Instead, a broader approach is necessary to 
coordinate the disclosure obligation with issues such as how to distinguish a certain origin when 
                                                     
21 The European Community proposed to the TRIPS Council and the WIPO IGC simultaneously. See 
TRIPS Council, Review of Article 27.3 (B) of the TRIPs Agreement and the Relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, 
IP/C/W/383, October 17, 2002; and WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Eighth Session, Disclosure of Origin or Source 
of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11, May 17, 2005. Switzerland first proposed to reform the PCT regulations to 
incorporate disclosure requirement at WIPO (PCT/R/WG/5/11) and then proposed to the TRIPS Council 
to gain support for this proposal at WIPO (IP/C/W/446). See WIPO International Patent Cooperation 
Union Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Fifth Session, Proposals by 
Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
in Patent Applications, PCT/R/WG/5/11, November 19, 2003; and WTO TRIPS Council, The 
Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore and the Review of Implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement Under Article 71.1, Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/446, May 30, 2005.       
22 WTO Trade negotiations Committee, Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues, Communication from 
Albania, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Communities, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the ACP Group and the African Group, TN/C/W/52, July 19, 2008. 
23  WTO TRIPS Council, Views of the United States on the Relationship between the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the TRIPS Agreement, Communications from the United States, IP/C/W/257, 
June 13, 2001, page 5-6.   
24 WTO TRIPS Council, Article 27.3 (B), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Communication from the United States, 
IP/C/W/434, November 25, 2004, Page 2-5. 
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more than one is identified, and how to monitor patent publication from other countries and 
initiate the legal procedure. Table 9 shows the specific positions.  
Table 9 Positions on the Disclosure Obligation in WTO and WIPO Proposals  
The relationship 
between CBD 
and TRIPS 
Representative 
supporters  
Proposals Positions related to the disclosure 
obligation 
Inherent conflict  African Group, 
Brazil, China, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, EC, 
India, 
Indonesia, 
Peru, Thailand, 
Turkey， 
Venezuela，  
IP/C/W/195 
IP/C/W/284 
IP/C/W/356 
IP/C/W/403 
IP/C/W/420 
IP/C/W/429 
IP/C/W/438 
IP/C/W/441 
IP/C/W/442 
IP/C/W/443 
IP/C/W/459 
IP/C/W/470 
IP/C/W/474 
IP/C/W/475 
TN/C/W/52 
TN/C/W/59 
-Two proposals 
(1) Amend Article 27.3(b), 
incorporating disclosure of origin 
as well as PIC and ABS as part of 
the requirement for patentability.  
(2) Amend Article 29bis of TRIPS 
to incorporate the disclosure of 
origin as part of the disclosure 
obligation.  
- The nature of disclosure should 
be substantive: without disclosure, 
the patent application will not be 
processed before being granted or 
be invalidated after granted.  
- The scope of information to be 
disclosed is extensive, including 
associated traditional knowledge.   
- No inherent 
conflict; but 
- International 
action should 
be enhanced in 
relation to the 
patent system 
to ensure 
implementing 
the mutual 
supportiveness 
of both 
Agreements  
EC,  
Norway,  
Switzerland  
Switzerland: 
IP/C/W/284 
IP/C/W/400 
IP/C/W/423 
IP/C/W/433 
IP/C/W/446 
Norway: 
IP/C/W/473 
IP/C/W/491 
European 
Communities: 
IP/C/W/383 
WIPO/GRTKF
/IC/8/11 
(proposal to 
the WIPO 
IGC) 
TN/C/W/52 
 
Disclosure obligation with three 
proposals: 
- Amend Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) to explicitly 
incorporate the disclosure 
obligation (Switzerland); 
- Amend existing international legal 
framework for patents, such as the 
proposed Patent Law Treaty (PLT), 
or the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) to incorporate the disclosure 
obligation. Disclosure should be a 
formal requirement in patent 
applications (EC);  
- Amend Articled 29 TRIPS to 
incorporate the disclosure 
obligation. Disclosure is the formal 
requirement and penalties incur for 
non-compliance outside the patent 
system (Norway).  
No conflict  Australia, 
Canada, 
Japan, South 
Korea, United 
States, New 
Zealand 
IP/C/W/257 
IP/C/W/434  
IP/C/W/449 
IP/C/W/469 
- No amendment of TRIPS; 
- No disclosure obligation;  
- Alternatively, tailored national 
solution based on contracts is 
recommended.  
Note: red text indicates proposals co-sponsored by China.  
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The three categories of opinion on the disclosure obligation can be seen as a spectrum of options 
for the disclosure obligation and depicted as such (Figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 10 the Spectrum of Opinions on the Disclosure Obligation 
To date, no consensus on the disclosure obligation has been reached in these WTO negotiations. 
That means WTO Members are free to decide on: (1) whether to introduce the disclosure 
obligation into their domestic law, and (2) a specific mechanism for the disclosure, either in its 
weak form or strong form. 
4.2.2 Disclosure obligation negotiations: from TRIPS to WIPO 
In parallel with negotiations on the disclosure obligation at the TRIPS Council, the WIPO IGC 
was established in 2001 and gradually became another forum for the negotiation of the disclosure 
obligation. Disclosure obligation was one of the key issues at the IGC. So far, IGC has held 37 
meetings on issues related to genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore.  
The EU and Switzerland first proposed the disclosure obligation to IGC because this forum could 
best accommodate their positions of recognizing disclosure as a formal requirement in patent 
applications and avoiding discussion of the controversial issue of the CBD-TRIPS relationship. 
This initiative also gained support from Canada,25 Japan, and New-Zealand26 who denied conflict 
between the TRIPS and the CBD.  
The developing countries initially opposed negotiations at the WIPO IGC. They emphasized that 
the WIPO IGC and TRIPS Council have different mandates, in particular, an examination of the 
relationship between TRIPS and CBD is a mandate specific to WTO Members27 and so the TRIPS 
Council should be the main forum for related negotiations. However, some developing countries 
                                                     
25 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on June 5, 2007, 
IP/C/M/54, July 26, 2007, Para. 58.  
26  WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on June8-9, 
IP/C/M/60, September 28, 2009, Para. 37.  
27 Ibid, Para. 55.  
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also actively followed up with discussions or negotiations at WIPO IGC. While there has been no 
obvious progress in the negotiations of the disclosure obligation at TRIPS Council from 2002 to 
2010 because of consistent opposition from the US, WIPO IGC reached an initial agreement to 
undertake text-based negotiations in March 2010. Since then, WTO Members have put more 
weight to the text-based negotiations at the WIPO IGC.  
Notwithstanding the forum shift, negotiations at the WIPO IGC have not been easier than at the 
TRIPS Council. Since the same key players are involved, and so the same diversity and 
divergence of opinions reproduced themselves at the IGC. 28 In early 2012, delegations of WIPO 
member states started to negotiate the draft of a consolidated document at IGC meetings. 29  The 
disclosure obligation has been one of the controversial issues in the negotiations of the 
consolidated document during rounds of revision.30 In one version, the disclosure obligation was 
listed as one of the options in parallel with the defensive protection of genetic resources by 
establishing related databases.31 This version basically denied the mandatory disclosure option as 
proposed by the megadiverse countries and the EU. The latest version in June 2016, though 
stipulating the disclosure obligation in an independent article, contains footnotes to the effect that 
defensive protection can be considered as the alternative to the disclosure obligation by some 
contracting members. 32  Such an ambiguous and somewhat self-contradictory arrangement 
suggests the likely strong influence of the US (and Japan).  
US dominance has been at work procedurally. The IGC negotiations broke down in 2014 because 
of the US’ opposition. As a non-permanent committee of WIPO, the mandates of the IGC are 
                                                     
28 See proposals from African Group, Like-Minded Countries, European Communities and its Member 
States, Switzerland, and Japan (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/11). See WIPO IGC, Twentieth Session, 
Proposal of the African Group on Genetic Resources and Future Work, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/12, 
October 17, 2011; WIPO IGC, Twentieth Session, Like-minded Countries Contribution to the Objectives 
and Principles on the Protection of genetic Resources and Preliminary Draft Articles on the Protection 
of Genetic Resources, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/20/6, October 11, 2011; WIPO IGC, Twentieth Session, 
Disclosure of Origin or Source of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in Patent 
Applications, Document submitted by the European Community and its Member States, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/8, October 17, 2011; WIPO IGC, Twentieth Session, Declaration of the 
Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications: Proposals by 
Switzerland, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/10, October 17, 2011; WIPO IGC, Twentieth Session,  
Additional Explanation from Japan Regarding the Document WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/13 on the Patent 
System and Genetic Resources, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/11, October 17, 2011. 
29  WIPO IGC, Twenty-Third Session, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/23/4, November 2, 2012.  
30 WIPO IGC, Twenty-Fifth Session, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/25/5, May 30, 2013. WIPO IGC, 
Twenty-Eighth Session, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/4, June 2, 2014. WIPO IGC, 
Thirtieth Session, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/30/4, March 9, 2016.   
31 See ibid, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/25/5, Article 3. 
32 See supra note no. 30, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/30/4, Footnote 1. 
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subject to biennial renewal. The renewal was not successful in 2014 because the US did not agree 
with its normative work program (Saez 2015). In 2015, the African Group proposed to promote 
IGC as a standing committee of WIPO (the proposed name was Standing Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions, SCTK) 33  to avoid biennial review of its mandates. Then the US submitted a 
counterproposal to discontinue the mandate of the IGC and replace the IGC Committee with 
seminars, studies, and an expert working group.34 The breakdown shows how powerful actors like 
the US are skillful in executing a forum-braking strategy to obstruct negotiations on issues it does 
not favor. It also shows that WIPO IGC is actually a forum vulnerable to games of delay on 
negotiating the disclosure obligation.  
4.3 China navigating the multilateral negotiations on the disclosure obligation  
China’s position on the issue of disclosure obligation is based on and constrained by the following 
facts: As a contracting state of CBD, China has to establish a legal system to guarantee the 
achievement of the ABS. As a latecomer to WTO, China has to operate in the context of existing 
negotiations, fitting its domestic position into a pre-existing historical context. As an emerging 
economy with an ambition to boost its own bio-industry, China has to balance the interests of big 
biotech companies, its domestic biological companies, and the development of the local and 
indigenous communities. In particular, the ambition to cultivate a domestic bio-industry may see 
China’s position diverge from that of other megadiverse countries.  
In this context, China first identified itself as a megadiverse country and co-sponsored various 
proposals at the TRIPS Council (Section 4.3.2). China also learned from the debate at the TRIPS 
Council, in particular, proposals by Norway and Switzerland as well as EU, and established the 
disclosure obligation in its domestic law Patent Law (2008) (Section 4.4). With this clear pro-
disclosure position in patent law, China engaged relevant negotiations more actively after 2008 
(Section 4.5).   
4.3.1 Context for China’s engagement in the disclosure obligation 
China is a contracting member of various intellectual property treaties, including TRIPS, 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention, 
                                                     
33  WIPO General Assembly, Forty-seventh (22nd Ordinary) Session, Conversion of WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore (IGC) into a Standing Committee: Proposal by the African Group to The 2015 General 
Assembly, document prepared by the Secretariat, WO/GA/47/16, July 28, 2015.  
34  WIPO General Assembly, Forty-Seventh (22nd Ordinary) Session, Matters Concerning the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore (IGC): Proposal of the United States of America to the WIPO General Assembly, document 
prepared by the Secretariat, WO/GA/47/17, September 4, 2015. 
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1978),35 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and other WIPO treaties.36 These memberships mean 
China has to undertake treaty obligations on the protection of intellectual property. On the other 
hand, China joined the CBD in 1992, and participated in the negotiations of the ITPGRFA, 
although it has yet to sign the latter. These agreements create obligations that in turn create a need 
for models, thus opening the door to a transplanted model as a possible solution. For instance, 
becoming a member of both the CBD and TRIPS pushed China into addressing issues of the 
TRIPS-CBD relationship and to develop its own position when any conflict occurred in domestic 
implementation or international negotiation.  
In contrast to China’s engagement in other IP issues, in which compliance was the first step, there 
is no compliance pressure in the case of the disclosure obligation. This is because no international 
agreement has yet been concluded. This allows for plenty of freedom for China to decide which 
position it should take. As one of the megadiverse countries of the world, strengthening protection 
of genetic resources on the multilateral level appears to be consistent with China’s interest. This 
basic fact incentivized China to be active in the international negotiations and shapes China’s 
position in supporting the disclosure obligation.  
As a latecomer to the WTO, China has missed international rule-making for most IP issues at the 
TRIPS negotiation. The negotiations on the disclosure obligation remain an ongoing process. As 
a latecomer, China could identify the different positions and then take a side. It could also select 
the most suitable model for its domestic conditions by learning about the subtle differences among 
various models in the continuing debate. Indeed, China was a quick learner. Six months after its 
accession to the WTO, China took the position of supporting other megadiverse countries by co-
sponsoring the proposal IP/C/W/35637 at the TRIPS Council in June 2002. 
Different from some megadiverse countries that proposed to amend TRIPS to exclude life forms 
and parts thereof from patentability,38 China has the ambition to develop its bio-industry. In 2010, 
China identified seven strategic emerging industries 战略性新兴产业  [Zhanlüexing xinxing 
chanye] to be the backbone for industrial modernization and technological development in the 
35 The relevant Chinese law is Regulations on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (2013).    
36 See Appendix I for the multilateral agreements in which China is a contracting member.  
37 WTO TRIPS Council, The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Brazil on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
India, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe, IP/C/W/356, June 24, 2002.  
38 For instance, Bolivia proposed an amendment of Article 27.3(B), which gained support from many 
megadiverse countries. See WTO TRIPS Council, Article 27.3(B) and the Legalization of Biopiracy: 
Trends, Impacts and Why It Needs to Be Amended, Communication from the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, IP/C/W/554, March 28, 2011.  
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next stage, and biological breeding is one of the seven39. In 2015, the Made in China (2025)40 
explicitly emphasized the bio-industry as one of the ten high-end industries for China to gain or 
maintain its competitive advantage.  
According to the WIPO IP Statistics Data Centre, 41  patent grants to Chinese applicants for 
biotechnology have surged since 2010. The number of patent grants to Chinese applicants first 
overtook those to US applicants in 2013, although the US exceeded China again in 2015 (Figure 
11).  
 
Figure 11 Patent Grants in Biotechnology (Counted by the Origin of Applicants) (2000-2016)  
China is not only playing the domestic game of numbers. PCT applications from Chinese residents 
in the area of biotechnology have also increased gradually. Although there is still a big gap 
between China and other industrialized countries, the gap narrows each year (Figure 12).  
                                                     
39 State Council, Decision on Accelerating the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries 国务院关于
加快培育和发展战略性新兴产业的决定 [Guowuyuan Guanyu Peiyu he Fazhan zhanlüexing Xinxing 
Chanye de Jueding], No. 32 (2010) 国发 (2010) 32 号 [Guofa (2010) 32 hao].  
40 See note no. 56 of Chapter 2.  
41 WIPO, Intellectual property Statistics, available at: http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/.  
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Figure 12 PCT Publication in Biotechnology (Counted by the Origin of Applicants) (2010-2017) 
Considering that not all biotechnology patents are related to the use of genetic resources, it is 
necessary to look further into the internal structure of bio-patent applications in China. According 
to a report by SIPO on the strategic emerging industries (SIPO 2016a), applications submitted to 
SIPO and the USPTO in the area of biotechnology presented a similar pattern – with intensive 
patent applications in the field of bio-drugs, bio-medical equipment, and biochemical products. 
China had more applications than the US in the manufacturing of bio-agricultural products and 
applied environmental management technology (Figure 13). 
Figure 13 Technology Distribution of Patent Applications in the Bio-industry42  
From the above figures, the deployment of patents in biotechnologies means that China may not 
fully support the megadiverse countries’ proposal on the disclosure obligation. China may have 
to balance the legal consequences of non-disclosure and demand to guarantee certainty for granted 
                                                     
42 Data for this figure comes from Table 7, SIPO (2016a, 62-63). 
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patents. The need to promote its domestic patent system in the strategic sector of biotechnology 
also keeps China silent at the TRIPS Council when it comes to the proposal to amend Article 27.3 
to exclude patentability of life forms.    
4.3.2 China’s position at the TRIPS Council  
China first encountered the issue of the disclosure obligation at the TRIPS Council after its 
accession to the WTO in 2001. Relevant discussions and debates at the TRIPS Council created 
opportunities for China to differentiate between various proposals and select an appropriate 
position to suit its domestic context. Through a process of learning and adaptation, China soon 
developed a position.  
The TRIPS Council Meeting started discussions on the TRIPS-CBD relationship in March 2002,43 
three months after China’s accession to the WTO. The Chinese representatives to the TRIPS 
Council were ignorant of what was going on and what was at stake in the TRIPS-CBD relationship. 
At this meeting, the Chinese representative said: “the question of potential conflicts between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the CBD might not be of great importance.” She acknowledged that 
biological diversity was a “relatively new concept”,44 and showed interest in the US proposal of 
the contract-based solution. This speech was not a surprise because China was overwhelmed at 
that moment by the need to amend its domestic IP laws to comply with TRIPS standards. China 
gradually realized the problems of the US proposal — the unequal bargaining power between the 
parties.45  
China soon developed its position of supporting the disclosure obligation and positive protection 
of traditional knowledge.46 However, in the early stages, China vacillated between the strong and 
weak forms of disclosure obligation (Figure 10). On the one hand, China was very cautious in co-
sponsoring proposals initiated by other megadiverse countries for the disclosure obligation. 
Among the various proposals submitted by megadiverse and other developing countries (Table 
9), China only co-sponsored two of them (IP/C/W/356 in 2002, and IP/C/W/474 in 2006) before 
2008 when its domestic legislation introduced a standard on disclosure obligation. Besides 
cosponsoring, China sometimes expressed its support for a proposal by other megadiverse 
countries at the TRIPS Council meetings without being a co-sponsor of that proposal.  
China also showed interest in the EU and Norwegian proposals for a weak disclosure obligation. 
Both proposals considered disclosure as a formal requirement for patent applications, with non-
                                                     
43 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on March 5-7, 2002, 
IP/C/M/35, March 22, 2002. 
44 Ibid, IP/C/M/35, Para. 248.  
45 Ibid. 
46 See supra note no. 37.  
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compliance not causing the invalidity of a patent already granted. Chinese representatives took 
advantage of the TRIPS Council meetings to learn the details of the mechanism proposed by the 
EU and Norway.47 Such knowledge to a certain extent influenced Chinese domestic rule-making 
on disclosure obligation (Section 4.4.2).   
After China’s announcement of its intention to amend its patent law in 2005, dynamics occurred 
between China’s position at the TRIPS Council and its domestic legislative process concerning 
disclosure obligation. Before announcing the patent law amendment in 2005, China had clearly 
expressed its support for megadiverse countries’ proposals.48 After the legislative process for the 
patent law amendment started in April 2005, Chinese representatives kept silent in the two TRIPS 
Council meetings (48th and 49th meeting). These two meetings have been the only two TRIPS 
Council meetings where Chinese representatives did not speak a word on the disclosure obligation. 
China’s silence during the 48th and 49th TRIPS meetings shows how careful it was to maintain the 
consistency of its international position and domestic legislation. After it becomes clear that the 
expected patent law would set a rule on the disclosure obligation, China reassumed its engagement 
with the TRIPS Council by cosponsoring a proposal49 to support the disclosure obligation. After 
the promulgation of Patent Law (2008), the Chinese position at the TRIPS Council on the 
disclosure obligation became firm and clear (Section 4.5.1). 
In addition to the TRIPS Council, the EU and Switzerland consistently took the cross-forum 
strategy to negotiate the disclosure obligation at the WIPO IGC. Before the amendment of the 
patent law, China did not actively engage at the WIPO IGC either. As occurred at the TRIPS 
Council, China used the IGC as another forum to learn subtle differences between different 
proposals concerning the disclosure obligation.  
                                                     
47 For instance, Chinese representative to the TRIPS Council posed questions to the EC for the details of 
the disclosure obligation regarding the legal consequence of violation, whether civil or criminal remedy 
would be appropriate. See WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William 
Rappard on February 18-19, 2003, IP/C/M/39, March 21, 2003, Para. 135.  
48 See WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 8-9 and 31 
March 2005, IP/C/M/47, June 3, 2005, Para 57. In this speech, the Chinese representative showed his/her 
support for the proposals, specifically, WTO TRIPS Council, the Relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge – Elements of the Obligation to Disclose Evidence of Benefit-Sharing under the Relevant 
National Regime, Submission from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic Ecuador, 
India, Peru and Thailand, IP/C/W/442, March 18, 2005; and WTO TRIPS Council, the Relationship 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge – Technical Observation on Issues Raised in a Communication by the United 
States (IP/C/W/434), Submission from Brazil and India, IP/C/W/443, March 18, 2005.  
49 See supra note no. 17. 
138 
4.4 Fruition of China’s multilateral engagement: Patent Law (2008) 
Although China is rich in genetic resources, it did not develop legal mechanisms for the protection 
of genetic resources. Instead, China engaged in a process of regulatory importation again, to 
introduce the rules on disclosure obligation to its Patent Law (2008) for the first time. This section 
will first explore Chinese Patent Law (2008) provisions on the disclosure obligation (Section 
4.4.1) and then further analyze where the rules come from through a comparative analysis 
(Section 4.4.2). This is a valuable example to show how China took the strategy of modeling 
(Chapter 10.2) to achieve its domestic policy objectives in a case where international rules are not 
yet in place.  
4.4.1 The disclosure obligation in Patent Law (2008) 
Before Patent Law (2008), China had already regulated genetic resources in some specific areas. 
For instance, Law of Seeds (2000) introduces the principle of state sovereignty on germplasm 
resources. Although these laws50 sometimes confuse the principle of state sovereignty with state 
ownership, they confirm the regulatory power of other ministries beyond SIPO on genetic 
resources. This pre-patent law landscape influenced China, to some extent, to take its own 
approach to the disclosure obligation. Nonetheless, these laws only focus on specific types of 
genetic resources without defining them. The Implementing Rules of the Patent Law (2010) (IRPL 
2010) 51  defines genetic resources as “any material taken from human, animal, plant or 
microorganism, containing genetically functioning units with actual or potential value” (Article 
26.1 IRPL). This definition is very broad though it does not use the term biological resources as 
does India and other megadiverse countries. 
The Patent Law (2008) introduced two provisions on the protection of genetic resources: one is 
the disclosure obligation (Article 26.5), and the other is Article 5.2 which I refer to as the linkage 
arrangement. In addition to these two basic provisions, the IRPL 2010 further stipulated the legal 
consequences of non-compliance with the disclosure obligation. Article 26.5 and Article 5.2 are 
compared in Table 10.  
 
 
 
                                                     
50 See the Constitution of China 宪法[Xianfa], Article 9; the Law of Forest 森林法 [Senlin Fa], Article 3; 
the Law of Grassland 草原法[Caoyuan Fa], Article 9; Law on the Protection of Wild Animals 野生动
物保护法 [Yesheng Dongwu Baohu fa], Article 3; Law of the animal Husbandry 畜牧法 [Xumu Fa], 
Chapter 2; Law of Sees 种子法 [Zhongzi Fa], Article 11.  
51 State Council, Implementing Rules of the Patent Law 专利法实施细则 [Zhuanlifa Shishi Xize], 2010. 
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Table 10 The Protection of Genetic Resources in Patent Law (2008) 
 Disclosure obligation 
Article 26.5 Patent Law (2008) 
Linkage arrangement 
Article 5.2 Patent Law (2008) 
Violation  Not to submit a document disclosing 
origin and direct source of the genetic 
resources in patent applications  
Apply for a patent of which the 
invention relying on genetic 
resources have been accessed 
or used in a way that violates 
other laws and regulations 
Formal 
examination 
stage  
The applicant should state his/her 
observations or correct the application 
within the specified time limit.  
If the applicant fails to make any 
response within the specified time limit, 
the application shall be deemed to have 
been withdrawn (Article 44.2 IRPL 
2010) 
The applicant should state 
his/her observations or correct 
the application within the 
specified time limit.  
If the applicant fails to make 
any response within the 
specified time limit, the 
application shall be deemed to 
have been withdrawn (Article 
44.2 IRPL 2010). 
Substantive 
examination 
stage 
Application rejected (Article 53.2 IRPL 
2010) 
Application rejected (Article 
53.1 IRPL 2010) 
Post-grant  Not mentioned Invalidity announcement upon 
petition by a third party (Article 
65.2 IRPL 2010) 
 
4.4.1.1 Weak disclosure obligation 
Article 26.5 specifies that the Registration Form for Indicating Source of Genetic Resources 
should be submitted along with other documents in patent applications: “with regard to an 
invention accomplished by relying on genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent 
application documents, indicate the origin and direct source of the genetic resources. If the 
applicant cannot indicate the origin, he/she shall state the reasons.” This provision confirms that 
Chinese patent law has adopted the model of weak disclosure that considers disclosure as a formal 
requirement for the patent application. The logic of Article 26.5 Patent Law is that the examiners 
will only check whether or not the Registration Form for Indicating Source of Genetic Resources 
is included, not the credibility of the information that has been disclosed. Following the logic, 
legal consequences are only relevant in the pre-grant stage — for those applications where a Form 
of Source of Genetic Resources has been submitted, a patent will be granted; otherwise, if the 
application relates to genetic resources and no form(s) has been submitted, the application will be 
rejected. Since the disclosure is only a formal requirement, and an application without disclosure 
(where it should have been made) will be rejected, the post-grant legal consequences are not 
mentioned. However, this deduction ignores the situation when someone gives a false statement 
about the origin, for which a post-grant remedy is necessary. Currently, there is no incentive for 
a patent applicant to submit a false statement about the source of genetic resources because the 
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PIC has not yet been established in the Chinese legal system. Nonetheless, misrepresentations 
might occur after the legal mechanism of ABS is introduced to China.  
4.4.1.2 Additional protection for genetic resource: the linkage arrangement 
Article 5.2 of Patent Law (2008) stipulates that “Patent rights shall not be granted for inventions 
that are accomplished by relying on genetic resources which are obtained or used in violation of 
the provisions of laws and administrative regulations.” This provision intends to link the patent 
law to other laws and administrative regulations. If other laws have specific provisions that have 
been violated, such a violation will invoke the application of Article 5.2.    
 Article 5.2 of Patent Law (2008) has introduced some controversy in its interpretation. The focus 
of Article 5.2 and Article 26.5 are different. Article 5 is a provision for maintaining public order 
and protecting the public interest in patent law. Article 5.1 provides that “patent rights shall not 
be granted for any inventions that are against the law, social ethics or impairs public interest.” It 
is a more a miscellaneous provision to complement the existing specific provisions. Article 5.2 
was part of the patent law to protect the genetic resources, and the scope of “violation” may be 
broader than non-disclosure and may include not obtaining the PIC from relevant communities. 
This provision was included in the Patent Law (2008) to compensate for the drawbacks of the 
weak disclosure mechanism in Article 26.5. As the patent office of China, SIPO did not think it 
would have the capacity to examine the credibility of the information in the Registration Form 
for Indicating Source of Genetic Resources. China, as a country planning to boost its bio-industry, 
wanted certainty for its patent system; however, it also acknowledges that the weak disclosure 
alone is not enough for sufficient and effective protection of genetic resources. So SIPO first put 
Article 5.2 in place with the expectation that other laws and regulations could fill the gap by 
referring to this provision. In short, Article 5.2 provides the legal consequences within the patent 
system when certain behavior related to accessing genetic resources on which an invention patent 
relies has violated other laws and regulations. In cases of such violation, the legal consequence 
would be a rejection of a patent application before a patent is granted and invalidation when a 
patent has been granted.  
The ideal scenario for a functioning linkage between various laws and Article 5.2 Patent Law 
(2008) would be: (1) both the law and regulation governing a specific type of genetic resource in 
China and the law of the access and benefit sharing include clear provisions specifying either the 
legitimate ways to access genetic resources or otherwise what constitutes a violation in accessing 
genetic resources; (2) all of the above laws and regulations refer to legal consequences in Article 
5.2 Patent Law (2008) when a patent application relying on genetic resources accessed these 
genetic resources in the illegal ways stipulated in (1). However, such ideal type has not operated 
in practice. The major problem is that while Article 5.2 provides a linkage between the patent law 
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and other laws and regulations, these other laws and regulations have not yet been formulated. 
Whether Article 5.2 is enforceable will depend entirely on whether the laws or regulations to 
which it refers provide specific mechanisms for legitimate access to genetic resources, in 
particular, the PIC. Though some laws and regulations referred to by Patent Law contain the 
principle of state sovereignty over genetic resources (Xue and Cai 2009a), a mere declaration of 
state sovereignty itself could not constitute the basis upon which to decide whether the access is 
legitimate in a specific case. It is the specific mechanisms including the PIC, not the state 
sovereignty, that define legitimate access.  
China ratified the Nagoya Protocol in September 2016. This indicates domestic rule-making of 
ABS on plant genetic resources will take place for the purpose of compliance with the Protocol. 
Also, since China also negotiated the ITPGRFA and there are recommendations that China should 
join the treaty (Zhang 2012), ABS for genetic resources for food and agriculture would also need 
to be considered. Considering problems of lack of coordination, communication and mutual 
support among various regulators on genetic resources (Xue 2015), there is a long way to go to 
establish such linkage to genetic resources. Nonetheless, there is an upside to the linkage. Though 
the linkage arrangement has been an empty promise because relevant laws and regulations are not 
in place, the signature of the Nagoya Protocol means that China will have the mechanism of ABS 
(including the PIC) in place quickly. There is a basis for this conjecture: China started its drafting 
of the Law of Biodiversity in 2016 (Xinhuanet 2016). If the law takes an overall approach by 
requiring ABS for all types of genetic resources, the linkage will be established. By then, the 
linkage approach could be a remedy for the “softness” of the weak disclosure obligation in Article 
26.5. These laws and regulations can directly stipulate that misrepresentation in disclosure 
constitutes a violation of these laws or regulations, so Article 5.2 instead of Article 26.5 will apply 
to deter misrepresentation in the disclosure.  
4.4.2 The introduction of the disclosure obligation to China: an active learning 
process  
After analyzing the Chinese patent law provisions on the protection of genetic resources, this 
section further explores where these rules have come from. I take a comparative approach in this 
section, using three proposals on the disclosure obligation submitted to the WTO TRIPS Council 
or WIPO IGC52 as references. I then compare relevant provisions in Patent Law (2008) with 
                                                     
52 See WTO General Council, Trade Negotiation Council, and TRIPS Council, the Relationship between 
the TRIPS Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the protection of traditional 
knowledge — Amending the TRIPS Agreement to Introduce an Obligation to Disclose the Origin of 
Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, Communication from Norway, 
IP/C/W/473 (Also circulated as WT/GC/W/566 and TN/C/W/42), June 14, 2006; see details for the 
megadiverse country proposal IP/C/W/474 at supra note no. 17, and EU proposal at WIPO IGC 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11 at supra note no. 21. 
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elements of these proposals. I also refer to the publications on the SIPO website to show how 
active learning has happened. Due to the lack of interview data to deeply investigate the legislative 
process, I make my argument on the basis of text analysis. 
China undertook active learning to introduce the disclosure obligation into Patent Law (2008). 
China encountered the problem of misappropriation at the TRIPS Council (Section 4.3.2) and 
WIPO IGC and learned from other WTO Members how the disclosure obligation could be part 
of the solution. In contrast to the pressure of (TRIPS) compliance with other types of intellectual 
property, China did not have the external pressure to establish a law for disclosure obligation 
domestically.  
 SIPO started its project of the third amendment of the Patent Law in April 2005, and the first 
draft by SIPO was submitted to the State Council on December 27, 2006. The megadiverse 
countries proposed a strong disclosure model (IP/C/W/474) and Norway proposed a weak 
disclosure model (IP/C/W/473) 53  in July 2006 54  to promote text-based negotiations on the 
disclosure obligation. These two proposals were submitted during the drafting of the Patent Law 
(2008) and China had access to the text of both proposals. In particular, and the Chinese 
representative showed interest in the Norwegian proposal at the TRIPS Council Meeting.55 The 
Norwegian proposal was soon translated into Chinese and published in the specialized column on 
the protection of genetic resources at the SIPO website.56 Translation enabled this proposal to 
reach more decision-makers who may not have been proficient in English.  
The EU proposal (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11) shows the nuances of the weak disclosure obligation.57 
The EU circulated its proposal on the disclosure obligation at the WIPO IGC meeting in 2005 and 
took a cross-forum strategy by reiterating its position at the TRIPS Council. Though both the 
                                                     
53  Ibid, IP/C/W/473. 
54 The deadline was set by the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in December 2005. The proposals should 
be submitted before that date so that the General Council shall review progress and take any appropriate 
action. 
55 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 14-15 June 2006, 
IP/C/M/51, September 20, 2006, Para. 85: “He welcomed Norway's support of the amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement to introduce a mandatory disclosure obligation in patent applications, although he 
had reservations on the effectiveness of sanctions outside the patent system.” WTO TRIPS Council, 
Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 5 June 2007, IP/C/M/514, July 26, 
IP/C/M/54, Para 51: “While welcoming the constructive attitude of Norway, he took note of the 
substantial difference between Norway’s proposal and the joint proposal, particularly with regard to the 
nature of the disclosure requirements.” 
56 The site for the protection of generic resources and traditional knowledge at the SIPO website was 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/yczyhctzsbh/zlk/ggty/ (this website is not valid when last retrieved on 
May 6, 2018). That section only updated during March 2005 and April 2007, which was the period for 
preparing Patent Law (2008) amendment. The Norway Proposal was the only one of the proposals 
submitted to the TRIPS Council that has been translated.  
57 Recent literature also examined the impact of the EU intellectual property projects on Chinese intellectual 
property rule-making (Wyzycka and Hasmath 2016). The EU-China IPR2 project had provided advice 
to the Patent Law (2008).  
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Norwegian proposal and the EU proposal are similar in promoting a weak disclosure model, they 
differ in several aspects. Table 11 provides a detailed comparison of the disclosure obligation in 
these four documents.  
Table 11 Disclosure Obligation in Multilateral Proposals and Patent Law (2008)58 
 Megadiverse 
Country Proposal 
(IP/C/W/474),  
Norwegian Proposal 
(IP/C/W/473) 
 
EU Proposal 
WIPO/GRTKF/I
C/8/11  
Chinese 
Patent Law 
(2008) 
Article 26.5 
Nature of 
disclosure 
obligation 
Substantive 
requirement 
Formal requirement  Formal 
requirement 
Formal 
requirement  
Non-
compliance 
effect  
(Pre-grant) 
No granting 
because of 
failure to meet 
patentability   
Regarded as 
withdrawn because 
of not satisfying 
formal requirement 
(Para 7)  
Reject or 
consider as 
withdrawn 
An application 
shall be 
rejected 
because of 
nonfulfillment 
of the formal 
requirement in 
Article 26.5 
(Article 53 
IRPL 2010) 
Non-
compliance 
 (Post-grant)  
Invalidity or 
unenforceable  
Administrative or 
criminal punishment 
outside of the 
patent system (Para 
8) 
Outside the 
field of patent 
law 
 
- 
Information to 
be disclosed 
Source and 
origin of genetic 
resources,  
Evidence of PIC, 
Evidence of ABS 
Origin of genetic 
resources 
Source of 
genetic 
resources; and  
information 
concerning PIC 
Origin and 
direct source 
of genetic 
resources 
Disclosure of 
traditional 
knowledge 
Mandatory  Mandatory  Optional to 
disclose  
Not required 
 
The 
relationship 
between the 
genetic 
(biological) 
resources and 
the invention 
patent  
Invention derived 
from or 
developed with 
biological 
resources and/or 
associated 
traditional 
knowledge 
- The invention 
must be directly 
based on the 
specific genetic 
resources 
Invention 
accomplished 
by relying on 
genetic 
resources 
 
                                                     
58  The proposals for the multilateral fora also includes contents specific to the arrangement on the 
international level, such as the necessity to amend TRIPS. Such information is not included in the table 
because the focus of the comparison is about the design of the domestic legal mechanism.  
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One basic conclusion from the comparison in Table 11 is that the Patent Law (2008) bears more 
similarity with the Norwegian and the EU proposal than the megadiverse country proposal 
because it considers disclosure as a formal requirement for patent application. The scope of 
information to be disclosed is limited to genetic resources and does not include traditional 
knowledge. The legal consequences for non-compliance are only limited to the pre-grant stage. 
However, as a co-sponsor of the megadiverse countries’ proposal, China realized the problem of 
the weak disclosure and incorporated Article 5.2 into the Patent Law (2008) to protect genetic 
resources (Section 4.4.1.2).  
This comparison demonstrates that the introduction of the disclosure obligation to Chinese patent 
law is generally a modeling process through learning. Nonetheless, one can still see the creativity 
of Chinese regulators, in particular, the linkage established in Article 5.2 Patent Law (2008) to 
relevant laws and regulations (Section 4.4.1.2). Under this arrangement, Article 5.2 picks up 
violations relating to the use of genetic resources outside of the patent law and imposes a penalty 
(invalidity) using patent law. This broad protection for genetic resources does not exist in the EU 
and Norwegian proposals for weak disclosure. In this way, the disclosure obligation in Article 
26.5 Patent Law (2008) is consistent with the logic of weak disclosure, where disclosure is still 
not among substantive requirements for patentability — patentability is still only decided on the 
basis of novelty, inventive step and applicability. However, the additional protection provided by 
Article 5.2 Patent Law (2008) does include invalidity of a patent as a penalty, if certain provisions 
for the protection of genetic resources are violated.  
In addition to the linkage arrangement, there are also minor adjustments to the building blocks of 
the disclosure obligation. For instance, the disclosure of traditional knowledge is not mentioned 
at all in Patent Law (2008). In this respect, Patent Law (2008) is more cautious than both the 
Norwegian and the EU proposals on the disclosure concerning traditional knowledge. Patent Law 
(2008) only covers genetic resources, excluding either (1) traditional knowledge per se (Proposed 
by the megadiverse countries and Norway), or (2) associated traditional knowledge, or traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources (proposed by the EU).   
In summary, the inclusion of a provision on the disclosure obligation in Patent Law (2008) is the 
fruition of China’s multilateral engagement since its accession to the WTO. China started 
implementing what it proposed multilaterally into its domestic law before any consensus had been 
reached at the multilateral level. This learning process was different from China’s efforts to 
comply with TRIPS. Without external coercion or pressure, China incorporated the disclosure 
obligation through active learning from various proposals at the multilateral level.  
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4.5 China’s engagement after Patent Law (2008) 
The disclosure obligation is an issue that demonstrates interactions between China’s domestic 
law-making and international engagement. Before 2008, China learned from international 
negotiations to build a disclosure mechanism into its patent law. After the disclosure obligation 
was incorporated into the Patent Law (2008), the domestic provision on the disclosure obligation 
fed back into Chinese multilateral engagement on the issue. The incorporation of disclosure 
obligation into Chinese domestic law provided a clear position for China at the level of 
multilateral negotiations. At the bilateral level, the disclosure obligation is also included in the 
China-Peru FTA and China-Switzerland FTA. This section will analyze feedback at the 
multilateral level (Section 4.5.1) and the bilateral level (Section 4.5.2).   
4.5.1 China engages in multilateral negotiations  
After Patent Law (2008), China has been committed to promoting substantive negotiations on the 
disclosure obligation at the TRIPS Council. China also supported initiatives at the TRIPS Council 
to guarantee the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. China even started making coalitions 
with other megadiverse countries at the TRIPS Council from 2013 to 2015. This subsection will 
investigate China’s multilateral engagement after Patent Law (2008). Some of the issues 
discussed in this chapter indicate that China’s position at TRIPS Council on the disclosure 
obligation consolidated as soon as the disclosure obligation was included in the draft of Patent 
Law (2008), prior to the promulgation of the Patent Law (2008).    
4.5.1.1 China promoting substantive negotiations at the TRIPS Council 
Just before the promulgation of the Patent Law (2008), China co-sponsored the TN/C/W/52 
proposal at the WTO. The TN/C/W/52 proposal was different from previous proposals China 
previously cosponsored. 59  The previous two proposals clearly demonstrated the interest of 
megadiverse countries by promoting the strong disclosure model. TN/C/W/52, however, was a 
balanced proposal, accommodating interests of 108 WTO Members.60 Cosponsored by the EU, 
Iceland, Switzerland, megadiverse countries, African Groups and other developing countries, this 
proposal affected a compromise between the weak and strong disclosure models and consolidated 
the issue of the TRIPS-CBD relationship, the GI Register, and the GI Extension (See Chapter 
3.2.2). The main purpose of the proposal was to seek common ground and promote text-based 
negotiations in the WTO forum. Therefore, controversial issues, such as the nature of the 
disclosure obligation (a formal or substantive requirement for patent application) and legal 
                                                     
59 IP/C/W/356, see supra note no. 20; IP/C/W/474, see supra note no. 17.  
60 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 27-28 October 
and 6 November 2009, IP/C/M/61, 12 February 2010, Para. 80.   
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consequences for non-compliance after a patent is granted, were intentionally left untouched.61  
Two-thirds of WTO Members, including China, supported the proposal because of its generality 
and ambiguity.  
After co-sponsoring the TN/C/W/52 and the promulgating Patent Law (2008), China’s position 
at the TRIPS Council meetings became more affirmative. Before the proposal, the Chinese 
representative at the TRIPS Council “encouraged all Members to engage in text-based discussions 
in informal consultations and to hold focused technical discussions on the amendment proposal 
at the Council’s regular meetings.”62 After the proposal, the Chinese representative started to 
“urge that text-based negotiations on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD 
be undertaken in Special Sessions of the TRIPS Council immediately”.63 The underlined words 
or phrases indicate that China took a stronger position on supporting negotiations on the 
disclosure obligations at the TRIPS Council.   
After years of negotiations, the Chinese representative at the TRIPS Council started to present a 
clear position on specific issues to support megadiverse countries. For instance, China insisted 
that the WTO TRIPS Council should be the major forum for negotiations concerning disclosure 
obligation when the US and other developed Members suggested shifting the forum of 
negotiations to WIPO IGC.64 China also rejected the proposal of defensive protection for genetic 
resources, a proposal based on the idea of establishing databases as an alternative to the disclosure 
obligation, on the basis that information contained in databases is limited and may not be 
accessible by patent examiners.65 One can see that the sophistication of Chinese representatives 
has developed when we compare these positions with their remarks soon after China joined the 
WTO (See Paragraph 1, Section 4.3.2).   
4.5.1.2 China supporting the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol at WTO   
The Nagoya Protocol was the first multilateral agreement on ABS. After incorporating the 
disclosure obligation in Patent Law (2008), China, as a member of the LMMC in the negotiations 
of Nagoya Protocol, supported incorporating the disclosure obligation into the Nagoya Protocol. 
Though the Nagoya Protocol failed to incorporate the disclosure obligation into its final text 
                                                     
61 See TN/C/W/52 in supra note no. 22. 
62 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 23-24 October 
2007, IP/C/M/55, December 21, 2007, Para. 112. Underlines are added by the author. 
63 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 13 March 2008, 
IP/C/M/56, May 21, 2008, Para. 37. Underlines are added by the author.   
64  WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 2 March 2010, 
IP/C/M/62, June 1, 2010, Para. E.27; WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center 
William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010, IP/C/M/63, October 4, 2010, Para. 64.   
65 See supra note no. 38. 
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(UNCTAD 2014), its achievement on ABS stimulated the megadiverse countries to further 
promote negotiations at the WTO to comply with the ABS requirement in the Nagoya Protocol.  
In 2011, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP Group, and 
the African Group cosponsored a new proposal66 in the Trade Negotiations Committee of the 
WTO. It was not tabled at the TRIPS Council because there had been little progress there. 
TN/C/W/59 proposed an updated Article 29bis TRIPS on the disclosure obligation which 
incorporated an Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance (IRCC) as part of the 
information to be disclosed. The IRCC is required by the Nagoya Protocol as part of ABS. So, 
the TN/C/W/59 proposal aimed to incorporate the IRCC as a TRIPS standard to guarantee 
achievement of the CBD objective.  
Comparison of the TN/C/W/59 with the previous megadiverse proposal IP/C/W/474 on Article 
29bis TRIPS shows that the TN/C/W/59 proposed weaker legal consequences for non-compliance 
of the disclosure obligation at the post-grant stage. In TN/C/W/59, the post-grant sanctions for 
non-compliance may include (1) administrative sanctions, criminal sanctions, fines and adequate 
compensation for damages, or (2) other measures and sanctions, including revocation. In 
IP/C/W/474, the revocation or rendering unenforceable of a patent is essential to penalties for 
post-grant non-compliance. The text of the proposal TN/C/W/59 on Article 29bis TRIPS in 
TN/C/W/59 bares similarities to Chinese Patent Law (2008). Nonetheless, there is little data to 
verify China’s influence in the proposal.  
4.5.1.3 China as part of the coalition to push negotiations forward 
After ten years of negotiations, the TRIPS-CBD relationship was still not listed for an early 
harvest in preparation for the 9th Ministerial Conference of WTO in 2013. Since 2013, China has 
made coalitions with Indonesia, Brazil, India, Peru, South Africa, Cuba, Ecuador, and other 
megadiverse countries, proposing text-based negotiations on the disclosure obligation at TRIPS 
Council meetings. The opening remark by a Chinese representative at the TRIPS Council Meeting 
that “China would like to associate itself with the delegations of Indonesia and Brazil”67 was 
unprecedented. It is the first time that China has announced a coalition (in expressive language) 
at a TRIPS Council Meeting on this issue.  
                                                     
66 WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Decision to Enhance Mutual Supportiveness between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Communication from Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, the ACP Group, and the African Group, 
TN/C/W/59, April 19, 2011.  
67 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 5-6 March 2013, 
IP/C/M/72, Para. 5.5. 
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This coalition lasted for two years. From 2013 to 2015,68 China was one of the main supporters 
for the disclosure obligation and the exchange of information between CBD and TRIPS. The 
coalition was resisted by the US, South Korea, Japan and Canada. Given no prominent progress 
has been achieved by this coalition, the megadiverse countries focused more on the negotiations 
at the WIPO IGC (Section 4.2.2).  
4.5.2 China incorporates the disclosure obligation into its FTAs 
In addition to multilateral engagement, the disclosure obligation is also mentioned in Chinese 
bilateral FTAs. Generally, China actively promoted the protection of genetic resources in its FTA 
negotiations. Chapter 6.3.1 will analyze Chinese FTA provisions on the protection of genetic 
resources. This section will focus specifically on the FTA provisions of the disclosure obligation. 
China-Peru FTA and China-Switzerland FTA include stipulations on the disclosure obligation. 
As both FTAs were signed after the Patent Law (2008), they will allow us to assess the impact of 
China’s domestic law on its FTAs.     
4.5.2.1 China-Peru FTA 
In the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, India, Brazil, and Peru proposed to include the 
disclosure obligation in the final ministerial text addressing the need for further consultation on 
implementation issues concerning the TRIPS-CBD relationship. They proposed to negotiate the 
disclosure obligation at the WTO. Notwithstanding such position multilaterally, Peru accepted a 
side letter in its FTA with the US bilaterally in 2005. In this side letter, although both parties 
agreed to the protection of genetic resources, Peru agreed to the US position of only using 
contracts to access genetic resources and traditional knowledge and not requiring the disclosure 
obligation in patent applications (Gerhardsen and New 2005). The contract-based approach means 
the FTA supports non-binding voluntary disclosure (Figure 10), which is different from Peru’s 
original position at the WTO. Moreover, this position also diverged from the position of 
megadiverse countries, a coalition in which Peru was a leader. 
The China-Peru FTA was signed against this background. As the first Chinese FTA that mentions 
the disclosure obligation, the China-Peru FTA stipulates that both parties agree on further 
discussion of “disclosure obligation of the origin or source of genetic resource and/or the prior 
informed consent”. Although no substantive negotiations are required by this article, the 
                                                     
68 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center William Rappard on 11-12 June 2013, 
Adeendum, IP/C/M/73/add.1, Para. 8; WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Center 
William Rappard on 10-11 October 2013, Adeendum, IP/C/M/74/Add.1, Para. 15.  
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mentioning of “disclosure obligation” is consistent with Peru’s position at the WTO. 69 This 
provision indicates that Peru attempted to subtly manipulate its positions at different fora —
supporting the disclosure obligation at the TRIPS Council and China-Peru FTA while accepting 
the contract-based approach in the US-Peru FTA. Considering this provision only appeared in 
China-Peru FTA, not in other Chinese FTAs, it was probably proposed by Peru. In this case, 
China supported the position of its FTA partner to promote the disclosure obligation, something 
that conforms to their common interest.  
4.5.2.2 China-Switzerland FTA  
China-Switzerland FTA is the other Chinese FTA mentioning the disclosure obligation. In 
contrast to the China-Peru FTA in which both parties actively promoted the disclosure obligation, 
the focus of the China-Switzerland FTA on the disclosure obligation is the legal consequences of 
non-compliance. Switzerland has supported the model of weak disclosure obligation and has 
demonstrated this position at both the TRIPS Council and the WIPO IGC.  
Switzerland agreed with the megadiverse countries that international IP rules should be supportive 
of CBD goals, but denied conflict between TRIPS and CBD. Following this basic position, 
Switzerland proposed to amend the PCT or the SPLT to incorporate the disclosure obligation 
instead of amending TRIPS.70 Switzerland also cosponsored the TN/C/W/52 proposal to the WTO 
                                                     
69 WTO TRIPS Council, Article 27.3(B), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD and 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Communication from Peru, IP/C/W/441, March 8, 
2005; WTO TRIPS Council, Article 27.3(B), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD 
and Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Communication from Peru, IP/C/W/447, June 
8, 2005; WTO TRIPS Council, Analysis of Potential Cases of Biopiracy, Communication from Peru, 
IP/C/W/458, November 7, 2005.  
70  WTO TRIPS Council, Review of Article 27.3 (b): the View of Switzerland, Communication from 
Switzerland, IP/C/W/284, June 15, 2004; WTO TRIPS Council, Article 27.3(B), the Relationship 
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/400/Rev.1, June 18, 2003; WTO 
TRIPS Council, Additional Comments by Switzerland on its Proposal Submitted to WIPO Regarding the 
Declaration of Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, 
Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/423, June 26, 2003; WTO TRIPS Council, Further 
Observations by Switzerland on Its Proposals Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, Communication from Switzerland, 
IP/C/W/433, November 25, 2004; WTO TRIPS Council, The Relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore and the Review of Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1, 
Communication from Switzerland, IP/C/W/446, May 30, 2005; WIPO International Patent Cooperation 
Union (PCT Union) Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Fourth Session, 
Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge in Patent Applications, PCT/R/WG/4/13, May 5, 2003; WIPO International Patent 
Cooperation Union (PCT Union) Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 
Fifth Session, Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources 
and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, PCT/R/WG/5/11, November 19, 2003; WIPO 
International Patent Cooperation Union Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), Sixth Session, Additional Comments by Switzerland on Its Proposals Regarding the Declaration 
of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, PCT/R/WG/6/11, 
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Trade Negotiation Committee to promote text-based negotiations on this issue. Although Patent 
Law (2008) of China generally adopted the formal disclosure approach, provisions on legal 
consequences of non-compliance were fragmented in the IRPL 2010. The China-Switzerland 
FTA, therefore, was intended to confirm the legal consequence already existing in the Chinese 
Patent Law (2008).  
Article 11.9.5 China-Switzerland FTA provides “Parties may set a time limit by which the 
applicant must correct the defect. 71  The Parties may refuse the application or consider it 
withdrawn if the defect according to this paragraph has not been corrected within the set time 
limit.” This provision is consistent with Article 44.2 IRPL 2010 (Table 10) and the Chinese Patent 
Examination Guideline.72 Since this article merely reiterates the position in the Patent Law (2008), 
it seems this provision does not pose an extra obligation on either party of the FTA. However, it 
is possible for this provision to have a lock-in effect so that it is more difficult for China to revise 
the current domestic law as compared with no such provision in the FTA. Nevertheless, the China-
Switzerland FTA uses “may” in this provision, so the lock-in effect is debatable.  
Both China-Peru FTA and China-Switzerland FTA have mentioned the disclosure obligation, but 
their impacts on implementation are different. The China-Peru FTA is more ambiguous in its text, 
tends to reinforce the bilateral cooperation on the negotiation and implementation of the 
disclosure obligation. The China-Switzerland FTA, though seemingly consistent with the current 
Chinese patent legislation, has the potential to eliminate the freedom for China to amend its 
domestic regulations on the legal effect of non-compliance.  
4.6 Conclusion 
No multilateral agreements, including TRIPS, have yet reached consensus about the disclosure 
obligation, which is different from the case of GIs. Without consensus at the multilateral level, 
China enjoys the flexibility to select models for its domestic rule-making and take sides in the 
ongoing negotiations at various fora. Similar to the GIs, international standards for the disclosure 
obligation was also a rival standard in the international IP regulation because the US prefers no 
standard at all.  
                                                     
April 21, 2004; WIPO International Patent Cooperation Union Working Group on Reform of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Further observations by Switzerland on Its Proposals Regarding the 
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications 
Seventh Session, PCT/R/WG/7/9, April 5, 2005.  
71 According to context, the defect refers to not satisfying the disclosure requirement.  
72 Article 5.3 Patent Examination Guideline 专利审查指南 [Zhuanli Shencha Zhinan] stipulates that patent 
applicants can still submit the disclosure form during substantive examination. If the disclosure 
obligation is still not fulfilled at this stage, the patent application will be refused.  
151 
This chapter investigated how China incorporated the disclosure obligation into its domestic laws 
and engaged in international negotiations at the TRIPS Council, the WIPO IGC, and its FTAs. 
Generally, China took a pro-developing country position to support the disclosure obligation in 
multilateral negotiations. Along with other megadiverse countries, China promoted text-based 
negotiations on this issue and supported the proposal to amend Article 29bis TRIPS to implement 
the Nagoya Protocol and realize the ABS objectives of the CBD. The legislative process of Patent 
Law (2008) revealed that China prefers to maintain certainty of the granted patent and promote 
its own bio-industry, thus following the model of the weak disclosure obligation.    
This case also indicates the dynamics between China’s multilateral negotiations and its domestic 
rule-making over time. The inclusion of the provisions on the disclosure obligation in Patent Law 
(2008) was inspired by China’s engagement in discussions at the TRIPS Council. After Patent 
Law (2008), China’s position at the TRIPS Council was consolidated. China had a clearer position 
and even made a coalition with other megadiverse countries to promote text-based negotiations.     
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Chapter 5 China Emerges in 
International Standardization  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter will focus on China’s international engagement in standardization, in particular how 
China began to engage in the process of international (and domestic) standardization and how 
these attempts were blocked by the US. Standardization and standards are twin concepts. A 
standard is a set of technical specifications that adhere to a particular technology, and 
standardization is the process of developing, ratifying and implementing a standard (Gerst, 
Bunduchi, and Williams 2005).1 
Standardization is a critical strategy for industries to maintain their competitive advantage. States 
which are interested in seeing their firms maintain a dominant position in 
standards/standardization have less incentive to restrict the standard-setting capacity of their firms. 
They prefer this issue to be regulated by their respective national laws and unregulated at the 
international level or loosely regulated by international standard-setting organizations in the form 
of soft law. In addition, the anti-competition effects of standards are different before and after a 
standard is set. As pointed out by Farrell et al. (2007, 607):  
Ex ante, before an industry standard is chosen, there are various attractive 
technologies, but ex post, after industry participants choose a standard and take 
steps to implement it, alternative technologies become less attractive. Thus, a patent 
covering a standard may confer market power ex post that was much weaker ex ante. 
In the extreme, a standard could be built around initially arbitrary choices that 
become essential once the standard is established. 
Typical ex post anti-competitive behavior includes patent hold-up and royalty stacking (Lemley 
and Shapiro 2006, Farrell et al. 2007).2 There is little chance for a latecomer to take an initiative 
when a standard for a certain technology is set. Chinese companies in most cases are latecomers 
to a technology and have to accept and follow the standards ex post. That means skyrocketing 
royalties and little chance to surpass the existing standard due to the high cost of switching to 
another incompatible standard (Farrell and Klemperer 2007, Shin and Kim 2008). As a result, the 
                                                     
1   Standardization and standard-setting are used interchangeably in academic publications. However, 
standard-setting is also used to describe the process of setting protection standards for intellectual 
property in general Drahos (2002a). This thesis uses standardization to avoid possible ambiguity in the 
term “standard-setting”.  
2  According to Lemely and Shapiro, in the case of patent hold-up, a standard owner (as licensor) may 
refuse to license or charge a licensee excessively high royalty rates for standard essential patents (SEPs). 
Users may be locked into the standardized technology, leaving them little choice but to pay. In the case 
of formal standardization, royalty stacking may exist where multiple licensors each charge more than 
marginal cost for their patents, thereby raising the overall burden on the licensee. 
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only chance for a newcomer to win the standardization game is to participate in the ex ante 
competition, beating other competitors to set the standards. Therefore, in comparison to the 
previous cases where China engages in the international regulation of GIs or the disclosure 
obligation, this case focuses on China’s engagement in standardization per se, not the 
international regulation of standardization.3  
Technically standardization and intellectual property (mainly patents) intersect in the form of 
standard essential patents (SEPs). However, this chapter will not emphasize the intersection but 
focus on two specific cases of how standardization influenced China (through the case of DVD) 
and how China participated in standardization (through the case of WLAN Authentication and 
Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI)). Given the strategic significance of standards to various industries 
including the Information and Telecommunication industry, the Chinese government has a clear 
interest in promoting its self-developed standards as compulsory national standards and 
international standards. However, it is a highly contentious area where Chinese strategies 
inevitably encounter resistance. The Chinese DVD industry tried to persevere but ultimately failed. 
Section 5.2 shows how the Chinese DVD industry has been destroyed by royalty stacking by 
multinational corporations (MNCs). Section 5.3 shows how China’s plans to establish a national 
standard and participate in international standardization for Wireless Local Area Network 
(WLAN) were defeated, defeated because there is more to the game than just having a patent 
portfolio. The failed attempts indicate that a country needs a complementary set of institutional, 
organizational, and negotiating skills if it is to make a standard come alive globally. It’s not 
enough just to have a patent portfolio. In this sense, this is a case that explains what it means for 
China to be an IP power in the world.  
5.1.1 Standardization as an instrument to survive in competition    
Economically, compatibility is the main justification for standards. On the supply side of a 
product, the diverse parts or components manufactured by multiple firms need to be compatible 
with each other to produce a product. The process of Standardization makes things similar enough 
to be compatible or interoperable with each other (Farrell 1989).  
Standardization means more for a firm than just compatibility. For users, standards produce a 
network externality4— the more users in the same network, the cheaper it is for a single user to 
consume a related good. For firms, the network externality can bring increasing returns for firms 
                                                     
3  China’s efforts to engage in the international rule-making related IP and standardizing at the WTO TBT 
Committee will be discussed in Chapter 7.3. 
4  The term network externality was first defined by Katz and Shapiro: “there are many products for which 
the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents 
consuming the good. The utility that a given user derives from a good depends upon the number of other 
users who are in the same network” (Katz and Shapiro 1985). See also Liebowitz and Margolis (1994).  
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in the network, a mechanism whereby the more products that are sold, the more profitable for the 
firms involved (Arthur 1996; Lee and Oh 2006). The increasing returns further stimulate firms to 
strategically use standards — once a standard is established in a network, it is likely to continue 
because the cost of switching to another incompatible standard will be very high. Firms, therefore, 
use standards to exclude competitors’ entry as well as lock in users.  
Looking beyond firms, the controversial role of standards in both facilitating compatibility and 
excluding competition has long been used by governments to secure their competitive advantage 
in a market where a network externality effect is at work. With the development of the 
international supply chain, the importance of international standardization has also increased. 
More and more actors are involved in the game of standardization where the “winner-takes-all” 
is the key principle (Shin, Kim, and Hwang 2015). This principle explains the fierce competition 
in elevating potential candidates to a standard. Firms use standards to secure the first mover 
advantage; states use standards as non-tariff barriers to trade. As pointed out by Büthe, 
“standardization is often as intensely political as it is technical” (Büthe 2010, 294).  This principle 
also explains why, as will be discussed later in this chapter, it is so difficult for China to initiate 
international standardization as a latecomer in the ICT industry.  
5.1.2 The North-South contestation in international standardization 
In history, states acted unilaterally as standard-setters for their telegraph systems (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000, 332). With the development of international trade, regional and international SSOs 
were created later to solve the incompatibility problems among different jurisdictions. Since 
Standardization has become an intense international competition, states have reassumed their 
important role in the process of international standardization (Lee and Oh 2006). The North-South 
tension in standardization is increasingly prominent considering that (1) the existing consortia of 
the ICT industry emerged from alliances of companies from developed countries and (2) 
companies from emerging countries are increasingly involved in the process of standardization 
thanks to their recent technology development. The case of WAPI illustrates the battle over 
standardization from the north-south perspective.  
As international standard setting organizations (SSOs) gradually gained the normative power of 
standardization during their evolution (Büthe 2010), states cannot directly manipulate the process 
of international standardization in the ICT industry as they once did. Nonetheless, a state can still 
have regulatory power over standardization within its jurisdiction. States can directly set de jure 
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standards through the proper procedural channels of national SSOs, and MNCs can set the de 
facto standards as the first mover by taking advantage of the network externality of standards.5  
In the post-WTO era, states’ power over standardization has been further limited by the 
Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT), a WTO agreement aiming at ensuring technical 
regulations and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Under this 
agreement, WTO Members have to notify their adoption of certain national standards and 
guarantee these standards do not constitute a barrier to trade. With major international SSOs as 
its observers, the TBT Committee also draws up basic principles to provide guidance for the 
procedure of international standardization. These principles include transparency, openness, 
impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and consideration of the 
development dimension.6  
5.1.3 Standardization as a lifeline for Chinese ICT companies  
Standards are crucial to the development of Chinese information communication technologies 
(ICT). On the supply side, Chinese manufacturers have long operated on a model of Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). This labor-intensive development model makes them the least 
profitable in global supply chains (Section 5.2.3). In recent years, some Chinese companies have 
begun to focus on innovation, increasing their research and development (R&D) expenditure and 
patenting. The number of patents applied for by Chinese ICT companies has reached phenomenal 
levels – ZTE and Huawei were the top two applicants for Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent 
applicants in 2016 (WIPO 2017, Figure 14). Their accumulated patents have helped them catch 
up with the existing giants in the industry. Nonetheless, MNCs often block the catching-up firms 
through standards and IP litigation. In particular, standards have become the glass ceiling for these 
Chinese ICT companies. 
                                                     
5  The de facto standardization is market based, while the de jure standardization is committee-based. For 
more detailed discussion, see Farrell and Saloner (1988).  
6  WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee), Second Triennial Review of the 
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/9, 13 
November 2000, para. 20 and Annex 4.  
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Figure 14 Top 10 PCT Patent Applicants in 2016 (as Compared with 2015)7 
On the demand side, China has grown into the world’s largest mobile phone market, benefiting 
from the large number of the Chinese population. This market size provides China with a certain 
leverage regarding standards regulation: domestic regulations within its jurisdiction may have a 
significant impact on MNCs doing business in China or selling products to China.  
Section 5.2 will analyze how China learned from the DVD case where multiple licensors relied 
on their standards and each charged licensees more than marginal cost for their patents, which led 
to the destruction of the Chinese DVD industry. It was a painful lesson from which China learned 
about standards. As result, Chinese companies became determined to develop its own standards. 
Section 5.3 will examine one of these standardization processes through the case of WAPI. 
Section 5.4 will discuss the implications of the WAPI case.  Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 The DVD case and its lessons  
5.2.1 The rise and fall of the DVD industry in China 
The DVD industry in China experienced a rise and a fall within a decade (1997-2007). The 
industry rose because the global supply chain extended to China. It perished because Chinese 
                                                     
7  Data source: WIPO (2017c). 
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companies could not afford patent fees which MNCs charged based on their SEPs. Because of 
this case, the Chinese government, Chinese companies and Chinese academics started to pay 
attention to standards. From this case, China further developed strategic thinking about its position 
in global value chains (GVCs) and the importance of technology dependence. 
Baldwin (2013) identified two reasons for the rise of the GVCs in the mid-1980s: “the ICT 
revolution made it possible to coordinate complexity at distance; the vast wage differences 
between developed and developing nations made separation profitable.” China became the world 
workshop for many industries because of its comparatively low wages.8 The comparatively lower 
labor cost of manufacturing in China was directly responsible for the prosperity of the global 
DVD industry. The world DVD market was only one billion dollars in 1998 when Japanese and 
European firms dominated the market. After the entry of Chinese firms, the market grew 
dramatically to USD 19 billion in 2004 (Shintaku, Ogawa, and Yoshimoto 2006, 18).  
Though China quickly developed into the global production base for DVDs, its labor-intensive 
production mode quickly caused IP and standard problems because most of the intellectual 
property embodied in DVDs was owned by Japanese and EU companies. Since 2000, patent 
holders, which have established de facto standards in the DVD industry, started requesting patent 
royalties from Chinese firms. From 2002 to 2008, the number of the licensors increased from one 
to 37, with the royalty rate increasing from USD 4/unit to USD 21.3/unit (Lu and Gao 2010, 79). 
Table 12 shows the internal structure of the royalties. In addition to the royalties, Chinese 
companies also imported core components of DVD players such as optical heads, encoder chips, 
and servo controllers at a cost of USD 27/unit (2003 price). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8  AAlthough there has been a dramatic increase in wages in China since 1978, Yang, Chen, and Monarch 
(2010) argue China retains its comparative advantage in wages due to the uneven growth across 
ownership types, industries and regions. 
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Table 12 Licensing Fees Paid by Chinese DVD Manufacturers to MNCs9 
Patent holders/ 
alliances  
Member companies  Royalty rate 
(USD/unit) 
DVD6C Hitachi Consumer Electronics,  
JVC KENWOOD,  
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,  
Panasonic Corporation,  
Samsung Electronics,  
Sanyo Electric Co,  
Sharp Corporation,  
Toshiba Corporation, and  
Warner Brothers  
4  
DVD 4C Union Sony Corporation,  
Philips Electronics, 
Pioneer Corporation, and  
LG Electronics. 
5 (3.5 since 
July 2002) 
MPEG-2 The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), is a 
joint committee of the International Organization 
of Standardization (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The MPGE-
LA consists of some 24 different companies 
4 (2.5 since 
July 2006) 
Thomson - 2 
Dolby - 4.95 
TDS - 2-3 
  
The price of DVD players dropped dramatically from the year 2000: “prices for the first (DVD) 
players in 1997 were $1000 and up. By the end of 2000, players were available for under USD100 
at discount retailers. In 2003, players became available for under USD 50” (Taylor 2013). Most 
licensing agreements mentioned above provided fixed licensing rates that did not change with the 
retail prices. While in 2002, there were over 100 DVD manufacturers in China, the number 
dropped to 14 in 2007. The Chinese DVD industry quickly perished due to unreasonably high 
licensing fees that did not reflect the drop in retail prices of DVD players.  
5.2.2 Two lessons from the DVD case 
Chinese DVD manufacturers in a sense paid a tuition fee for a lesson about the importance of 
standards and their control through patents. Knowledge gained from the lesson has gone beyond 
                                                     
9  In addition to Lu and Gao (2010), other sources indicated different rates of licensing fees in the DVD 
industry, for instance Mei (2012, 122). But various sources indicate the overall licensing fees were 
around USD 20 for one DVD.  
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the DVD industry. The Chinese government and other stakeholders began to find solutions. For 
instance, the China Electronic Standardization Institute (CESI) claimed China had fallen victim 
to a new form of non-tariff barrier, an “IP-centric technology barrier” (CESI 2003). During the 
waves of discussions that followed, China began to recognize the position of Chinese companies 
in GVCs (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) and to think strategically about the importance 
of technology independence.  
Studying 560 GVCs from 1995 to 2008, Timmer et al. (2014) find that the GVCs provide a similar 
pattern in the distribution of value-added parts when sliced up. Other scholars called the U-shape 
value-distribution curve “the smiling curve” (Shin, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2012, Sunny Li, Hao, 
and Erin 2010, Wang and Jia 2010, Chen 2004) (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15 The Smile of Value-creation10 
The smiling curve reveals that the greatest value is captured by upstream (R&D) and downstream 
(marketing) firms, and the lowest value is captured by the assembly firms located in the middle 
of GVCs (Shin, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2012).11 The value distribution in GVCs generally presents 
a smiling curve because MNCs have control over the two ends of the curve. They possess product 
planning capabilities and market access advantages, so they can decide the distribution of value 
derived from the GVCs (Chen 2004, 341). The smile is getting deeper as Timmer et al. (2014) 
finds that value-added shares of low-skilled workers in emerging economies declined from 1995 
to 2008. A typical example of the smiling curve is Apple. According to Kraemer, Linden, and 
                                                     
10 Source of data: Mudambi (2008). 
11 It is worth noting that the smiling curve describes the phenomenon of values captured by firms at different 
locations in a GVC. It has different meaning for different actors. Chinese manufacturing firms are the 
least profitable actors of a GVC. However, for the MNCs, it means their costs in this part of the curve 
are low. Mudambi (2008) suggests MNCs can control GVCs by concentrating on R&D and marketing 
while outsourcing low value-added assembly and processing to firms located in emerging economies. 
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Dedrick (2011), Chinese labor accounts for 1.8% of the total value for iPhone (Figure 16) and 2% 
of the total value for iPad (Figure 17).  
 
Figure 16 Distribution of Values for iPhone (2010)12  
 
 
Figure 17 Distribution of Values for iPad (2010) 
As pointed out by Chen (2004), the smiling curve indicates an underpinning power relation. In a 
GVC, the MNCs are the regulators while the Chinese OEM firms are the regulatees. As suppliers 
for MNCs located at the ends of a smiling curve, Chinese OEM firms are dependent on these 
MNCs (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008). As revealed in the DVD case, the dependence mainly 
lies in technologies, in particular, those protected by patents and adopted as standards.  
                                                     
12 Data source for Figure 16 and 17: Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick (2011).  
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5.2.3 Strategies to avoid a similar trap 
After the DVD case, the Chinese government and firms became familiar with the doctrine that 
“First-class enterprises set standards; second-class enterprises develop technology; third-class 
enterprises manufacture products.”13 China responded to the DVD case directly by developing its 
own standards, exemplified by the Audio Video coding Standards (AVS). With the development 
of the 3G and 4G wireless networks, DVDs are gradually being replaced by online TV where 
people can watch live programs, sometimes for free. When high-definition digital TV became a 
potential market, China started early to develop its own national standards for the industry. In 
early 2002, China set up the Audio Video Coding Standard Working Group (AVS Workgroup).14 
The AVS standards have saved Chinese digital TV producers patent royalties amounting to tens 
of billions of dollars (Huang and Zhang 2017).  
But the two lessons mentioned above revealed more imperative problems behind standardization. 
The fact that most Chinese firms are located in the middle of the smiling curve (location 3 in 
Figure 15) indicates they capture the lowest value in GVCs. China began to find ways to push its 
domestic firms up the smiling curve, either through investing in innovation (towards the input 
side) or through enhancing the reputation of “Made in China” (towards the market side). But such 
efforts encountered inertia from some domestic firms. MNCs come to China for its lower labor 
cost. Climbing up the smiling curve means Chinese firms have to abandon the labor-intensive 
development model that has made them profitable. The risk is that they will lose their competitive 
advantage; some of them may not survive. This paradox is compounded by the unbalanced 
development between regions (Gao et al. 2017). There are always some places with cheaper 
wages that provide Chinese firms with the incentive to make profits based on labor costs, rather 
than shifting to another part of the smiling curve.  
China began to develop and deploy standards in all strategic industries because standardization is 
also critical to the competitiveness of a state. In 2015, China promoted standardization as a 
national strategy15 which set clear goals that (1) the impact and contribution of Chinese standards 
                                                     
13 This is translated from Chinese. This slogan has been widely used by the Chinese government and firms 
regarding what they have learned about the importance of standards. It has been popular in IP training 
materials with government officials and corporate managers as the audience.   
14 See the official website of the Audio and Video Coding Standard Workgroup of China (AVS Workgroup) 
for its mission, organization and history: http://www.avs.org.cn/english/. 
15  State Council issued the Notice of the State Council on the Scheme for Deepening Reform of 
Standardization 国务院关于印发深化标准化工作改革方案的通知  [Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa 
Shenhua Biaozhunhua Gongzuo Gaige Fang’an de Tongzhi], No. 13 (2015) 国发(2015) 13 号 [guofa 
(2015) 13 hao]. State Council General Office issued the Notice of the General Office of the State Council 
on Issuing the Plan for the Construction and Development of the National Standardization System (2016-
2020) 国务院办公厅关于印发国家标准化体系建设发展规划（2016-2020年）的通知 [Guowuyuan 
Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Guojia Biaozhunhua Tixi Jianshe Fazhan Guihua (2016-2020 nian) de 
Tongzhi], No. 89 (2015) 国办发（2015）89 号 [Guobanfa (2015) 89 hao]. 
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should be considerably enhanced, and (2) China will become the world’s leading standard power 
标准强国 [biaozhun qiangguo] in the world by 2020.16 In the 39th ISO General Assembly held in 
Beijing in 2016, the Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a written message to the Assembly: 
China will actively implement the strategy of standardization. We will promote 
innovative, coordinated, green, open and sharing development with the support of 
standards. Together with all countries in the world, we are ready to deepen 
cooperation in standards, enhance exchanges and mutual learning, and improve the 
system of international standards (Gasiorowski-Denis 2016). 
Both hosting the ISO General Assembly and the content of President Xi’s message demonstrate 
the political will of China to engage and lead international standardization. Since 2006, China 
also promoted indigenous innovation through the accreditation of indigenous innovative 
products17 Indigenous innovation 自主创新 [zizhu chuangxin] has been measured by whether a 
product was accredited as “indigenous” intellectual property in various policies. Specifically, 
patents for a patented product must be wholly owned by Chinese firms and trademarks for a 
branded product must be first registered in China. Products accredited as containing indigenous 
intellectual property were given preferential treatment in public procurement. After these 
indigenous innovation policies were first implemented in 2009 for six selected technology 
fields,18 they were criticized by the US as measures discriminating against MNCs (McGregor 
2010, USITC 2011). These criticisms were groundless because China was not a member of the 
WTO Governmental Procurement Agreement (GPA). However, under pressure, the 
implementation policy for the second round of accreditation was significantly changed in 2010, 
so that MNCs can apply for indigenous innovative products on an equal footing as Chinese 
                                                     
16 Section 1.3, Plan for the Construction and Development of the National Standardization System (2016-
2020). 
17 Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Ministry of Finance (MOF) and National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly issued the Administrative Measures for Accreditation of 
Indigenous Innovative Products for Trial Implementation 国家自主创新产品认定管理办法（试行）
[Guojia Zizhu Chuangxin Chanpin Rending Guanli Banfa (Shixing)], No. 539 (2006) 国科发计字(2006) 
539 号 [Guokefajizi (2006) 539 hao]. These Measures were officially abolished by MOST, MOF and 
NDRC from July 10, 2011 by their Notice on Stop Implementing the Administrative Measures for 
Accreditation of Indigenous Innovative Products for Trial Implementation 关于停止执行《国家自主
创新产品认定管理办法（试行）》的通知  [Guanyu Tingzhi Zhixing Guojia Zizhu Chuangxin 
Chanpin Rending Guanli Banfa (Shixing) de tongzhi], No. 260 (2011) 国科发计字(2011) 260 号 
[Guokefajizi (2011) 260 hao].   
18 These fields include: computer and application equipment, communications products, modern office 
equipment, software, new energy and equipment and energy efficient products.  
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entities.19 After this change, the indigenous innovation policy is less likely to be able to fulfill its 
purpose of promoting the technology independence of Chinese companies.  
Following the failed indigenous innovation policies, China relied on a subtler use of mechanisms 
of intellectual property law and competition law. The key IP policy was Regulations on National 
Standards that Involve Patents (Temporary)20, formulated by the SCA and SIPO at the end of 
2013. It addresses issues arising from the procedure of developing national standards, such as the 
disclosure of patent information and using fair, reasonable and non-discrimination (FRAND) as 
a principle to determine royalty rates in the licensing of the SEPs. The Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law (2007) provides a legal basis for investigating unreasonable licensing fees. The regulators21 
have actively enacted supplemental rules for the Anti-Monopoly Law (2007) on IP related issues. 
For instance, in February 2015, the NDRC completed its investigation into Qualcomm and found 
Qualcomm violated the Anti-Monopoly Law (2007) by abusing its market power, specifically by 
attaching an unreasonable requirement in patent licensing. The NDRC ordered Qualcomm to stop 
its abuse of market power and imposed NDRC imposed a fine equal to 8% of Qualcomm’s 
revenue in 2013, resulting in a fine of CNY 6.088 billion (USD 975 million).22 
Recent regulations have also addressed the dynamics between competition and intellectual 
property. For instance, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) promulgated 
Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property to Exclude or Restrict Competition 
                                                     
19 According to the 2010 Notice Concerning the Accreditation of Indigenous Innovation Products (draft for 
comments), the requirement of indigenous intellectual property has been abandoned. A company can be 
accredited as long as a company has the right to use an intellectual property and there is no dispute about 
the ownership of the intellectual property.  
20 Standard Administration Committee of China (SAC) and the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) 
jointly promulgated the Regulations on National Standards that Involve Patents (Temporary) 国家标准
涉及专利的管理规定 (暂行) [Guojia Biaozhun Sheji Zhuanli de Guanli Guiding (Zanxing)], No. 1 
(2013) 2013 年第 1 号 [2013 nian di 1 hao]. 
21 There are three regulators on anti-monopoly in China: SAIC and the NDRC are responsible for the 
investigation of monopolistic agreements among business operators and abuse of dominant market 
positions by business operators (Article 3.1 and 3.2 of Anti-monopoly Law (2007); specifically, the SAIC 
is responsible for non-price related violations while the NDRC is responsible for price related violations. 
In addition, MOFCOM is responsible for investigations concerning concentration of business operators 
that eliminates or restricts competition or might be eliminating or restricting competition (Article 3.3 of 
Anti-monopoly Law (2007)).  
22 NDRC Decision for Administrative Penalty No. 1 (2015) General Office of NDRC 国家发展和改革委
员会行政处罚决定书 发改办价监处罚 (2015) 1 号 [Guojia Fazhan he Gaige Weiyuanhui Xingzheng 
Chufa Jueding Shu Fagai Ban Jiajian Chufa (2015) 1 Hao].  
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in 2015. 23 The Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights24 are in 
the drafting process. As will be discussed in Section 5.4.3, these IP and competition laws and 
regulations get private actors and rule-implementers on board to regulate standardization on a 
case-by-case basis.  
5.2.4 Summary  
The DVD case was a trigger for China to think about its position in the GVCs that form the basis 
of modern production, as well as its degree of technology independence after two decades of 
market reform and opening-up. The DVD case stimulated China into developing various 
strategies to push its own companies into climbing up the smiling curve and achieve a greater 
degree of technology independence. To summarize, these strategies include: (1) promote 
standardization as a national strategy, (2) develop indigenous innovation policies, and (3) apply 
IP and competition laws and regulations to standards. So far, indigenous innovation policies have 
proved a failure. Over time, China emphasized the other two strategies. An overview of this big 
picture is important to this chapter because it provides a contextual explanation for why China 
undertook Standardization as a national strategy.  
5.3 WAPI: failed attempts at standardization, both domestically and 
internationally  
Informed by the DVD case, China deployed standardization as a key strategy to develop the ITC 
industry. Of the seven strategic emerging industries in China, 25  next-generation information 
technology26 is the only one that may represent the “international competitive advantage” of 
China. This section will use China’s attempts to implement its home-grown WLAN standard, 
Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) as compulsory national standards and 
international standards. These attempts illustrate how China has engaged international 
standardization and the difficulties it has faced.   
                                                     
23 SAIC, Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property to Exclude or Restrict Competition 
关于禁止滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为的规定  [Guanyu Jinzhi Lanyong Zhishichanquan 
Paichu, Xianzhi Jingzheng Xingwei de Guiding], SAIC No. 74, 国家工商行政管理总局令第 74 号 
[Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju Ling di 74 Hao].These Provisions regulate market entities’ 
monopolistic behaviour in the use of their intellectual property, including exercising their IP rights in a 
way that violates the Anti-Monopoly Law (2007), the implementation of a conspiracy or collusion, and 
the abuse of their market domination position.  
24 The guideline has been drafted jointly by the NDRC, SAIC, MOFCOM and SIPO, and it has already 
gone through three rounds of calling for comments. 
25 China has formulated various policies to cultivate seven strategic emerging industries in recent years, on 
the assumption that they represent the direction for the development of future industries and will be 
determinants of the competitiveness of states in the future. See note no. 39 in Chapter 4.  
26 The new generation information technology covered industries like the "next-generation communications 
network, Internet of things, integration of Telecommunications networks, computer networks and cable 
television networks, new flat panel display, high-performance integrated circuits and cloud computing". 
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5.3.1 WAPI failed to be adopted as compulsory national standards  
So far, WLAN standards have been developed mainly by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), a standardization organization in the US. The WAPI standard was developed 
by the China Broadband Wireless IP Standard Group (CBWIPSG) to make up the security hole 
in the existing WLAN standards. Developing the WAPI standards was part of indigenous 
innovation efforts to gain China more technology independence. As pointed out by (Gao 2008), 
China expected its own WAPI standards to replace the incumbent WLAN technologies controlled 
by foreign companies. Table 13 illustrates how various Chinese stockholders attempted to 
promote WAPI standards27 as compulsory national standards and how their efforts are resisted by 
the US. The US government and Intel politicalized this issue by putting it on the agenda of 
bilateral negotiations. As a result, the implementation of WAPI as compulsory national standards 
was suspended indefinitely in 2004.  
Table 13 Timeline for Proposing WAPI as Compulsory National Standards 
Time  Actor  Event  
June 2001  Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII), 
China Broadband Wireless IP 
Standard Group (CBWIPSG) 
The Ministry of Information Industry announced a research and 
development plan for drafting China’s own WLAN standards. In total, 
26 research institutes and firms were recruited to implement the plan.  
They later established the CBWIPSG to undertake a research project 
to develop a Chinese WLAN standard.  
May 12, 
2003 
Standard Administration 
Committee of China (SAC) 
The SAC announced two standards (GB15629.11-2003 and 
GB15629.1102-2003) drafted by the CBWIPSG, which are the key 
standards of WAPI. 
July 9, 2003  Ministries in charge of 
standardization 
Eight ministries in China, including MII and SAC, organized a 
promotion and implementation conference in Beijing, which 
determined the WAPI standards as compulsory national standards. 
The WAPI standards were to be implemented in China by December 
1, 2003.  
  
                                                     
27 WAPI primarily include two standards: (1) GB15629.11-2003 which refers to Information Technology 
– Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems Local and Metropolitan Area 
Networks – Specific Requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and 
Physical Layer (PHY) Specification 信息技术系统间远程通信和信息交换局域网和城域网特定要
求第 11 部分: 无线局域网媒体访问 (MAC)和物理(PHY)层规范; and (2) GB15629.1102-2003 
Information Technology – Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems – Local 
and Metropolitan Area Networks – Specific Requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access 
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specification: Relatively High Speed Physical Layer of 
2.4GHz Frequency Expanding Specification 信息技术系统间远程通信和信息交换局域网和城域网
特定要求第 11部分：无线局域网媒体访问(MAC)和物理(PHY)层规范：2.4GHz频段较高速物理
层扩展规范. 
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Time  Actor  Event  
November 
23, 2003 
IEEE Paul Nikolich, Chair, IEEE 802, sent a letter28 to Li Zhonghai, 
Chairman of the SAC and Wang Xudong, Minister of the MII, saying 
that WAPI would unnecessarily fracture the world market for WLAN 
products.  
November 
26, 2013 
General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ),   
SAC 
The AQSIQ and SAC jointly published a notice29 stating China would 
implement compulsory certification to WLAN products. The WAPI 
standards would be the only standards on which compulsory 
certification would be issued. The WAPI standards would be 
implemented from December 1, 2003. From that date, any importation, 
production, and selling of WLAN products not conforming to the WAPI 
standards would be forbidden.  
December 
2003 
AQSIQ, 
National Certification and 
Accreditation Administration 
Committee (NCAAC) 
AQSIQ and the NCAAC jointly announced a notice, which extended 
the implementation of WAPI as a compulsory national standard until 
June 1, 2004.  
March 2004 US politicians US Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans, US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell and US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick jointly sent 
a letter to Chinese Vice Premiers Wu Yi and Zeng Peiyan, asking 
China to reconsider the implementation of WAPI as a compulsory 
national standard.  
March 2004 Intel and other US 
chipmakers 
Inter and Broadcom, the major Wi-Fi chipmakers, opposed the WAPI 
standards by announcing that they would stop selling products with 
Wi-Fi chips in China from June 1, 2004 (Kanellos 2004). 
April 22, 
2004 
US and Chinese high-level 
officials at the US-China Joint 
Commission on Commerce 
and Trade (JCCT) in 2004 
In the 2004 JCCT, WAPI was one of the top priorities for the US. 
China agreed to “suspend indefinitely its proposed implementation of 
WAPI as a mandatory wireless encryption standard.” The US also 
agreed to “support Chinese WAPI to become an international 
standard”. 30 
 
Intel was one of the key MNCs opposing WAPI and the biggest winner from the indefinite 
suspension of WAPI beginning in April 2004. Intel first introduced its flagship of Centrino in 
early 2003, in which its wireless network conforming to Wi-Fi standards was tied to its processor 
and chipset. Intel was concerned about China’s plan to adopt WAPI as compulsory national 
standards. This is because such adoption meant that Intel’s Centrino, featuring Wi-Fi, could not 
enter the Chinese market without installing WAPI, the competing Chinese WLAN standard.  
Intel lobbied the US government to prevent China from adopting WAPI as compulsory national 
standards and threatened China with an embargo on Wi-Fi chips. Later, the US put WAPI as a 
                                                     
28 IEEE 802 LMSC and SAC Standards GB15629.11 and GB 1529.1102, the letter from Paul Nikolich, 
Chair, IEEE 802 Local and Metropolitan Area Network Standards Committee, to Li Dongsheng, 
Standardization Administration of China (SAC), November 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.ieee802.org/16/liaison/docs/L80216-03_19.pdf.  
29 AQSIQ and SAC, Notice Concerning the Implementation of the Compulsory National Standards in 
WLAN 关于无线局域网强制性国家标准实施的公告 [Guanyu wuxian Juyuwang Qiangzhixing 
Guojia Biaozhun Shishi de Gonggao], No. 110 (2003), November 26, 2003.  
30  USTR, The US-China JCCT: Outcomes on Major US Trade Concerns, available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/The_US-
China_JCCT_Outcomes_on_Major_US_Trade_Concerns.html.   
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top agenda at Joint Committee Commerce and Trade (JCCT) in 2004, one of the highest-level 
US-China bilateral fora. Finally, Wu Yi, the Chinese vice Premier announced that China would 
indefinitely suspend implementing WAPI as national compulsory encryption standards.31  
 China’s development of WAPI also attracted academic attention from the US. Some academics 
argued that WAPI would constitute a violation of the WTO TBT Agreement and the national 
treatment principle in GATT (Cromer 2005, Gibson 2007). Following such argument, the only 
conclusion would be that WAPI should not be implemented, which in turn justified the US’ 
intervention in the implementation of WAPI policy in China. For the TBT violation accusation, 
China could have counter-argued that WAPI could be considered as standards to fulfill the 
“legitimate objective of national defense” as stipulated in TBT Article 2.2.32 But the Chinese 
government give up this position.   
5.3.2 The journey for WAPI to go global  
The 15th JCCT report in 2004 announced that while China agreed to indefinitely suspend WAPI 
as compulsory national standards, the US promised that it would support WAPI to become 
international standards.33 China initiated the international standardization of WAPI two weeks 
after the announcement of the domestic suspension. The SAC, as a National Body (NB) 
representing China, proposed a WLAN standard (JTC1 N7506) based on WAPI at the 
International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrochemical Commission 
Joint Committee (ISO/IEC JTC1). One month after the ISO/IEC JTC received the Chinese 
proposal, the UK opposed this proposal and submitted a competing proposal (JTC1 N7537) on 
the basis of IEEE 802.11i. The process of China’s efforts to globalize WAPI is illustrated in Table 
14. The timeline shows that the ISO did not treat China NB in the same way that it did the IEEE 
in the procedure for assessing WAPI and 802.11i. The Chinese proposal was canceled in 
September 2004 and it missed the opportunity to be discussed at the Orlando meeting. The reason 
                                                     
31 There were news reports that China used WAPI as a bargaining chip so that the US relaxed its restrictions 
on the exporting of defense technologies to China. But this claim was not officially confirmed.  
32 Article 2.2 TBT stipulated that “members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted 
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For 
this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate objectives are, inter 
alia:  national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health 
or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.  In assessing such risks, relevant elements 
of consideration are, inter alia:  available scientific and technical information, related processing 
technology or intended end-uses of products.” 
33 Though such support was not clearly stated in the USTR fact sheet, Intel expressed its positive attitude 
that China would propose WAPI as an international standard. Intel commented after the JCCT that “the 
decision by China to work through the international standards process to evolve the WAPI standard 
demonstrates its commitment to leadership in the IT industry.” This information was further reiterated 
by the Vice Minister of the MIIT in 2007 when Intel established its manufacturing base in Dalian. See 
Section 5.2.5.1 
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for this cancellation, “an administrative error”, was announced three months later. The proposal 
was ignored again at the Frankfurt Meeting in 2005. After persistent appeals by the Chinese NB, 
the Chinese and UK proposals were put on a parallel fast-track starting from the same date, despite 
the Chinese proposal being submitted one month earlier. The IEEE 802.11 Working Group 
engaged in intensive lobbying during the five-month balloting process by releasing detailed 
arguments against WAPI (EE Times 2006), something China unsuccessfully appealed.      
Table 14 Timeline of WAPI’s Failure as an ISO Standard  
Time  Event  
July 27, 
2004 
The SAC, the China National Body, submitted a proposal for WAPI security 
mechanism at ISO/IEC JTC1 SC634 and requested a fast-track procedure. 
August 2, 
2004 
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC6 published the Chinese WAPI proposal in document JTC1 
N7506. It took three months for publication and review of the proposal.  
August 25, 
2004 
The UK NB submitted a rival standard (JTC1 N7537) on the basis of IEEE 
802.11i to the SC6.  
Mid-
September, 
2004 
The Chinese proposal JTC1 N7506 was canceled before the end of the 
publication and review period without explanation. The UK proposal JTC1 
N7537 was published and put on a fast-track procedure.  
Nov. 8-12, 
2004 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 Orlando Meeting 
 The Chinese proposal N7506 was not discussed because it was “non-
existent.” 
 Four of the six Chinese delegation members (including three drafters of 
WAPI standards) were denied their visas to go the US to participate at the 
Orlando Meeting.  
 China NB addressed the meeting, revealing the obstacles that China NB has 
experienced.35 
 Because of the resistance from the Chinese NB, the Orlando Meeting 
resolved that the Frankfurt Meeting to be held in February 2005 would 
“discuss China’s submission and China’s comments on 802.11i”.36 
  
                                                     
34 ISO/IEC JTC1 SC6 refers to the Joint Technical Committee, Subcommittee 6, of the International 
Organization for Standardization and the International Electrochemical Commission. 
35 ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 6 Plenary and WG Meetings, Opening Comments of China NB, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 
N12766, November 8, 2004, available at: http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/N12766.pdf.   
36 IEEE 802.11 ISO JTC1-SC6 SG1 Ad-Hoc Committee Conference Call, IEEE 802.11/JTC1 
Engagement, submission from Jesse Walker, IEEE 802 Liaison to JTC1/SC6, doc.: IEEE 802.11-
04/1547/ro, December 2004, Slide 4, available at: https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/04/11-04-1547-
00-0000-ieee-802-jc1-sc6-engagement.ppt.   
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Time  Event  
December 
2004 
 The IEEE clarified why the Chinese proposal was canceled: “through 
administrative error, the JTC1/SC6 Secretariat removed China’s submission.” 
In addition, “JTC1/SC6/WG1 Project Editor has invited China to resubmit its 
proposal.”37 
 The China NB sent a letter to the SC6 Secretariat, complaining that the 
resubmission would let the UK proposal enter the ballot stage earlier.38 
January 
2005 
SC6 recommended China to first submit the WAPI standard to the IEEE to get 
approval. However, China rejected this recommendation as unnecessary.39 
February 
2005 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 Frankfurt Meeting 40 
 Chinese proposal JTC1 N7506 was not discussed as planned in the Orlando 
Meeting resolution.  
 China NB withdrew its attendance at the meeting before the end and 
published an announcement protesting the unfair treatment.41  
April 21, 
2005 
China appealed to the Technical Management Board (TMB) of the 
ISO,42condemning the unfair treatment in the Frankfurt Meeting and requesting 
the suspension of the balloting for N7537. The balloting for N7537 was 
suspended.  
May 15-17 
2005 
Geneva Meeting (exceptional meeting to address the Chinese appeal).  
The ISO formed a special group to resolve the technical issue.43   
  
                                                     
37 Ibid, Slide 4 of IEEE 802.11-04/1547/ro. 
38 “N7506 didn’t turn back to normal process on the basis of SC6 Orlando meeting resolution. But N7537, 
which was submitted later than N7506, has entered DIS ballot stage”, in the letter from Chinese NB to 
Ms. Jooran Lee, Chinese NB’s Urgent Request for Action on 1N7506 and 1N7537, December 20, 2004, 
available  at:  
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/Chinese%20NB%20Urgent%20Request%20for%20Action%20on%20
1N7506%20and%201N7537.pdf.  
39  Chinese NB reply about WLAN proposal, letter from Zhang Lin, Director General of the SAC 
International Standards Department to Mrs. Lisa Rajchel, February 6, 2005, available at: 
http://www.sc6.org/doc/Chinese%20NB%20reply%20about%20WLAN%20proposal.pdf.  
40 Ibid. As part of the communications before the Frankfort Meeting, this letter from the Chinese NB 
suggested that the Chinese proposal was first approved by the IEEE before discussion at the ISO, but 
this suggestion was rejected by the Chinese NB. 
41 ISO/IEC JTC1 SC6 WK1 Interim Meeting, Disputes Surrounding N7506 and N7537 Emerged on the 
First Day Meeting, Letter submitted by the Chinese NB, February 22, 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/1F03_20050222-ChinaFirstdayrecordsFrankfurtmeeting.pdf. ISO/IEC 
JTC1 SC6 WK1 Interim Meeting, Final Statement of the Chinese National Body, February 23, 2005, 
available at: http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/ATT2-
Final%20Statement%20of%20the%20Chinese%20National%20Body,Germany,%202005-02.pdf.  
42 A Letter of Appeal to ISO/IEC SMB/TMB from Chinese National Body, submission from Chinese NB 
after the Frankfort Meeting in 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/A%20Letter%20of%20Appeal%20to%20ISOIEC%20SMBTMB%20f
rom%20Chinese%20National%20Body.pdf. 
43 Fast-track Processing of IEEE 802.11i and SAC’s WAPI Proposal, Letter from Slan Bryden, Secretary-
General of ISO and Aharon Amit, General Secretary of the IE, to the National Bodies of ISO/IEC JTC 
1 SC6 and to all ISO/IEC JTC 1 National Bodies, available at: http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/Fast-
track%20processing%20of%20IEEE%20802.11i%20and%20SAC%20WAPl%20proposal.pdf. 
Revised Recommendations and Resolutions from the Special Working Group meeting, Beijing, 8-12 
August 2005, ISO/IEC WAPI N36 Rev.1, August 19, 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/N%2036%20Rev.%201%20Revised%20Recommendations%20and%
20resolutions%20from%20the%20Special%20Working%20Group%20meeting,%20Beijing,%208-
12%20August%202005.pdf. 
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Time  Event  
August 29 -
September 
2, 2005 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 St Paul De Vence Meeting 
 China NB proposed to establish a joint working team to harmonize the two 
proposals.44 
 The meeting resolved to undertake a parallel fast-tracking ballot for 
IEEE802.11i and WAPI with voting closing on the same date (Resolution 
6.1.6).45  
September 
7, 2005 
Despite China’s objection to the above resolution of the St Paul De Vence 
Meeting, the balloting started from September 7, 2005, and voting lasted five 
months. 
February 
22, 2006 
China sent a letter to all members of the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 about the “IEEE’s 
unethical activities”46 during the balloting.  
March 
2006 
The ISO rejected the Chinese proposal and adopted IEEE 802.11i as an 
international standard for WLAN.  
April 21, 
2006 
China NB summited to the ISO/TMB, IEC/SMB and the Central Secretariat of 
ISO/IE an appeal: Unjust Activity, Undue Process, Unfair Results Ethical and 
Procedural Violations in WAPI-11i Fast-track Process.47 
2009 
onwards 
China NB resubmitted WAPI in 2009, but eventually withdrew WAPI in October 
201148 for unknown reasons. 
 
The above timeline also shows that when facing controversies in the ISO procedure, the Chinese 
NB tried to communicate with the ISO and appealed to the TMB on issues of unfair treatment. 
For instance, at the Orlando Meeting, the Chinese representative addressed a series of events that 
formed “a pattern of irregularity, deception, mishandling, discrimination, and obstruction against 
the China NB within this group”.49 These obstacles included (1) China’s request to put WAPI into 
fast track was ignored; (2) the Resolution Group discarded China NB’s comments and canceled 
the Chinese proposal before the end of the review period, (3) visas for the Chinese delegation to 
go to the US were denied. After the balloting result came out, China NB submitted its second 
appeal, complaining that the ISO balloting was unfairly influenced by IEEE's unethical behavior 
and prejudices.50 China NB also demonstrated its discontent by withdrawing attendance from the 
                                                     
44 Action plan proposed by Chinese National Body on August 30, 2005, available at: 
http://jtc1sc6.org/doc/SC6WG1-SPV025-CHN-007-Solutions%20from%20CNB.pdf  
45 SC6 WG1 Resolutions for Closing Plenary of WG1, August 31, 2005, available at: 
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/SC6%20WG1%20Resolutions%20for%20Closing%20Plenary%20of
%20WG1-v5.pdf  
46 Chinese National Body (SAC), Urgent Alert on IEEE’s Recent Unethical Activities, available at: 
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/Urgent%20Alert%20on%20IEEE%20Recent%20Unethical%20Activit
ies.pdf.  
47 Chinese National Body, Unjust Activity, Undue Process, Unfair Results: Ethical and Procedural 
Violations in WAPI-11i Fast-track Process, April 21, 2006, available at:  
http://www.chinabwips.org/doc/Unjust%20Activity,%20Undue%20Process,%20Unfair%20Results.pd
f. 
48 IEEE 802 JTC1 Standing Committee, Minutes of JTC1 standing committee in Jacksonville in January 
2012, Para. 8.c: “China NB announced WAPI withdrawn on 21 Nov 2011 comment resolution call,” 
avail-able at https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/12/11-12-0199-00-0jtc-jacksonville-minutes-jan-
2012.doc . 
49 See supra note no. 35.  
50 See supra note no. 46.  
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Frankfurt Meeting and publishing an open comment afterward. Nonetheless, the Chinese effort 
did not change the result — 802.11i was adopted as an international standard. Though China tried 
to resubmit WAPI in 2009, China NB eventually withdrew it in November 2011.  
An unbiased procedure would not necessarily have changed the result, but the prejudiced 
procedure definitely demonstrated how the US, through IEEE, counteracted China’s effort to 
make WAPI a global standard. Another explanation for the failure of WAPI is that China did not 
form a coalition for the ballot (Kennedy 2006). This argument, however, neglects the point that it 
was the wide coalition made by IEEE that denied basic procedural justice to China.   
All these details indicate what it means for China to be an IP power in the world. Even if China 
manages to match the US in terms of IP standards, there are other dimensions to winning a 
standards game. The liaison with the ISO, the familiarity of application procedures (including 
intentional mistakes to delay the procedure), subtle manipulation of the balloting, coalition 
building, and even small tricks such as denying a Chinese representative his/her visa contributed 
to the US’ win. For China, having patents is not enough — it is only the first step. 
5.3.3 The mobile phone market: a new opportunity for WAPI? 
After the indefinite suspension of WAPI as compulsory national standards, the marketing 
expansion of WAPI became slower than that of Wi-Fi in China. Nonetheless, products with WAPI 
standards were prioritized in government procurement. In addition, the Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Games exclusively adopted WAPI standards. The WAPI Alliance, the successor of the CBWIPSG 
was established in 2006 (Cao 2006). 
WAPI did not completely lose the Chinese market due to the indefinite suspension, in particular 
in the mobile phone market. The suspension worked differently for PCs and mobile phones. This 
is mainly because the vendors of mobile phones in China are the three state-owned 
telecommunication operators in China (China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom) and 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) tightly controlled market access for 
mobile phones in the Chinese market through issuing a unique identification number for each 
phone. In April 2009, the MIIT convened a meeting with all mobile phone producers selling 
products in the Chinese market, informing them that if a mobile phone with Wi-Fi wanted to enter 
the Chinese market, it should also install WAPI (Cheng 2009).  
This tie-in strategy proved to be successful. In 2009, using mobile phones to access the Internet 
became popular. Motorola, Apple, Samsung competed to enter the huge smartphone market in 
China. Motorola was the first company complied with the MIIT requirement to install WAPI and 
became the first to launch Internet-enabled mobile phones in the Chinese market. At first, Apple 
refused to install WAPI for its iPhone, but then it ultimately agreed and entered the Chinese 
market in May 2010 (Qin 2010). 
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There are several reasons for the effectiveness of adopting the WAPI standards in mobile phones. 
First, the market structure of mobile phones is different from that of PCs. Since access to the 
mobile phone market is controlled by the MIIT and the interests of vendors are divergent, it is 
difficult for mobile phone vendors to act collectively. Secondly, the timing was different. In 2003, 
Intel was eager to be the first mover in the Chinese market. In 2009, with the wide-spread use of 
hotspots, Wi-Fi had become a de facto WLAN standard in China. After losing its first opportunity 
to expand the market, IWNComm, the major developer of WAPI, could not afford to deploy 
adequate hotspots. That determined Wi-Fi’s dominance of the market because a consumer would 
not choose to use WAPI due to insufficient hot-spots. Thirdly, Intel, as a supplier of the Wi-Fi 
enabled chipset, was tolerant rather than confrontational in 2009 when the MIIT announced its 
decision and did not interfere in the process.  
5.3.4 Standard without market: the implementation game for WAPI 
 After Internet-enabled mobile phones equipped with WAPI spread in the Chinese market, 
IWNComm, the leading company of the WAPI Alliance and the patent holder of SEPs related to 
WAPI, started collecting royalties for WAPI-related SEPs. However, some mobile phone 
manufacturers that had WAPI installed on their phones refused to pay royalties. For instance, 
IWNComm claimed that Sony refused substantive negotiations, or intentionally prolonged the 
negotiations with IWNComm over the royalties of WAPI-related SEPs. IWNComm thus sued 
Sony at the Beijing Intellectual Property Court in 2015 for patent infringement.  
The Beijing Intellectual Property Court found (1) the patent at issue was a basic invention in the 
area of WLAN, (2) the patent was granted science and technology prizes by the Chinese 
government and had been adopted as SEP in the national compulsory standard, and (3) the 
defendant was at fault in the licensing negotiations. The court argued that the fact that the patents 
at issue in that case were SEPs did not change the criteria to determine infringement. The court 
further decided that infringement was established, issued an injunction ordering Sony to stop 
infringement, and decided the reasonable royalty rate for WAPI-related SEPs (1 CNY/phone) 
based on the market price. In addition, the court supported IWNComm’s claim for treble 
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damages51 as well as reasonable costs, which amounted to CNY 9.1 million (USD 1.32 million 
Equivalent).52  
This IWNComm vs Sony case became the start for IWNComm to collect royalties for using 
WAPI-related SEPs. While the procedure of the case against Sony was still going on, IWNComm 
waged another lawsuit against Apple in April 2014. The case has not yet been concluded at the 
time of writing this thesis. According to MIIT statistics, there were CNY1.47 billion mobile phone 
users in China by the end of March 2018, 81.5% of which are mobile broadband users (MIIT 
2018). That means the WAPI Alliance may collect CNY 1.47 billion licensing fee based on the 
CNY 1 per phone established by the case against Sony, not to mention possible treble damages 
in similar cases that may follow. 
A prominent part of the decision was the treble damages. Though China proposed to revise its 
patent law to include treble damages,53 it is not stipulated in a promulgated law and thus is not 
enforceable. The enforcement of treble damages prior to the enactment of an amendment was a 
case of judicial activism where judges not only articulate the law but also create the law.  
Considering the size of the Chinese market, MNCs cannot afford to defy the court judgment and 
exit the Chinese market. As long as they do business in China, they are subject to regulation by 
domestic laws and court decisions. In this context, judicial activism means that courts, as a rule-
implementers, began to be part of the standardization game. Section 5.4.2 will further analyze the 
role of law-implementers.  
5.4 Discussion: technology hegemony or technology nationalism? 
From the initiation of the WAPI standard until the decision in the IWNComm vs Sony case, the 
WAPI story lasted 17 years. Various non-state actors, including MNCs, domestic Chinese 
enterprises, and international SSOs were involved in the case. So far, domestic implementation 
of WAPI has been successful in mobile phones but has failed for the PC market. The globalization 
                                                     
51 “Treble damages” refers to recovery of three times the license fees of the patent at issue in the case. It is 
worth noticing that though treble damages were proposed in the draft of the fourth amendment of the 
Patent Law in 2015, it was not in Chinese legislation when the decision was made. Treble damaged was 
proposed in Article 68.1 of the Draft for Comment the Fourth Amendment of the Patent Law: “regarding 
intentional patent infringement, a people's court may determine the amount of loss according to the 
circumstances, scale, damage consequences, etc, and then determine the damages to be paid by the 
infringer more than one time and less than three times of the loss.” See the Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council, Notice Concerning Call for Public Comment on the Draft for Patent Law Amendment 
(Draft Submitted for Deliberation) 国务院法制办公室关于《专利法修订草案（送审稿）》公开征
求意见的通知  [Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi Guanyu Zhuanlifa Xiuding Cao’an (Songshengao)  
Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi], December 2, 1015, available at: 
http://images.chinalaw.gov.cn/www/201512/20151202075620423.doc  
52 The exact number of the damages is CNY 9,103,367. The exchange rate of the day on which the decision 
was made is USD 1 = CNY 6.8889. 
53 See supra note no. 51.  
177 
journey of the WAPI standard has failed completely. The war for royalty collection for WAPI-
related SEPs in domestic Chinese courts has just started and the WAPI owner won the first case. 
WAPI has been one of the most debated Chinese standards in literature in the English language. 
In addition to the criticism that it may violate the WTO TBT agreement which China has not yet 
signed, it has also been used as an exemplar to show the increasing “neo-technological 
nationalism” of China, in other words China using the globalization process to benefit its national 
interest (Suttmeier and Yao 2004, Suttmeier, Yao, and Tan 2006).  
However, after an examination of the whole WAPI standardization saga in relation to the life 
cycle of the WLAN technology, both domestically and internationally, one can see another 
interpretation for the WAPI case. While WAPI is a case where China has tried to establish a rival 
standard, it also reveals the limitations of the influence of Chinese economic and regulatory 
institutions. Winning standardization contests demands a subtle combination of global regulatory 
influence (e.g. in ISO), firm dominance (e.g. Intel), incremental innovation capability, patent 
capability (the use of the PCT to build a global patent portfolio), negotiating prowess, and 
competent regulators who know the tacit rules of the game.   
The WAPI case shows that the technology dominance of the US does not rest on a simple 
incentive model of intellectual property and innovation, but rather on managing the interplay of 
firms, regulatory and market variables of the kind listed above. China’s technology nationalism 
is at the beginning of its journey and arguably it has a lot to learn from the US The struggle for 
technology independence that was initiated by the Chinese government in the WAPI case is an 
example of a journey that will probably be repeated by Chinese companies and relevant 
stakeholders, but perhaps with more success over time. 
This section will discuss the role of various actors more closely, in particular, the role of the US 
in resisting China’s effort to promote a rival standard (Section 5.4.1), as well as the major criticism 
of the WAPI standards on the basis of compatibility (Section 5.4.2). Section 5.4.3 will discuss 
what China learned from the WAPI case and how it changed its strategy of engagement.  
5.4.1 The US strategy against WAPI 
One of the mysteries of the WAPI case was why China agreed with the US to indefinitely suspend 
implementing WAPI as compulsory national standards. There was a speculation that China used 
WAPI as a bargaining chip so that the US would agree to release restrictions on defense 
technology exports to China. But given that China had put standardization as a high priority on 
its national agenda, it seems likely that it would hesitate to compromise its national interest in 
standardization. A more plausible hypothesis would be a reciprocal arrangement whereby China 
agreed to the indefinite domestic suspension while the US agreed to support proposals to turn 
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WAPI into an international standard. I have proposed this argument in Section 5.3.1 and will 
elaborate on it here, to reveal a comprehensive strategy by the US to eliminate WAPI.  
 Evidence for the US’ promise can be found in the following address. In 2007, at the ground-
breaking ceremony for Intel’s manufacturing base in Dalian, one of the north-eastern coastal cities 
in China, Luo Qinjian, the Vice Minister of MIIT stated that “MIIT would promote Intel’s 
cooperation with Chinese enterprises in areas of computer and next-generation communication. 
Meanwhile, Intel should support WAPI standards to become international standards to fulfill the 
US’ promise at the 15th JCCT” (Lin 2009). Intel was not mandated to fulfill a promise made by 
the US government, but the address indicated there was a promise by the US and the promise was 
that the US would support WAPI to be international standards.  
After persuading China to suspend the domestic implementation of WAPI by promising to support 
its internationalization, the US began its all-around encirclement of the WAPI standards. 
Domestically, Intel launched its flagship Centrino PCs which tied Wi-Fi to its processor and 
chipset. With the popularity of Centrino PCs, the Wi-Fi standards soon became de facto WLAN 
standards in the Chinese market. Internationally, IEEE, the national representative for the US at 
the ISO, blocked WAPI both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the IEEE argued that 
WAPI may only become “an optional standard complementing 802.11i”, because 
-WAPI implementation still optional under China’s policy 
-IEEE 802 feels the market can decide when to use which security standard 
-Compatibility with the rest of 802.11 [is the] most important issue.54 
The US government first persuaded China to suspend domestic implementation of WAPI as 
compulsory national standards at the 15th JCCT. Then, the fact that WAPI was optional in China 
became “evidence” for the IEEE to suggest that WAPI was not suitable for international standards. 
This strategy, complemented by various procedural irregularities, administrative errors, and the 
visa denials for Chinese experts to participate in the ISO meetings, saw the IEEE achieve its goal 
of getting WAPI rejected and 802.11i adopted as a WLAN standard by the ISO.  
In addition, the US also delicately shaped public perception of the WAPI standards. The only 
source found regarding the procedural irregularities (see Table 14) that WAPI underwent is the 
official website of the CBWIPSG. In English, there was rare media coverage or academic 
publications on these procedural issues. What was highlighted in the English publications was not 
the technical issues relating to the standard themselves, but rather the origin of WAPI. The origin 
was framed as mysterious big government planning. For instance: 
                                                     
54 Slide 4, IEEE 802.11-04/1547/ro, see supra note no.36. 
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Unlike the WAPI process—where the initial technology did not mature in the market 
but was almost immediately sponsored by the national standardization body—the 
802.11 standard was developed over time…Substantial ambiguities surrounded the 
WAPI program. For instance, the objectives of the national standardization body 
sponsoring the project was a mystery (DeLacey et al. 2006). 
Basically, the logic of this argument is that since WAPI was sponsored by the Chinese national 
standardization body affiliated to the Chinese government, it must be a bad thing. On the other 
hand, the China NB’s appeals about the improper conduct of the IEEE and clarification of the 
technical details of WAPI were not treated seriously (Suttmeier, Yao, and Tan 2006). 
5.4.2 Ex ante standards and the compatibility argument  
One of the strongest criticisms of WAPI is that it is not compatible with the existing WLAN 
standard. The relationship between WAPI and other WLAN standards developed by the IEEE are 
illustrated in Figure 18. The initial standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) had security flaws 
which lead the Wi-Fi Alliance to implement another encryption system Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA). When the WPA was still not able to guarantee a satisfactory level of security, Wi-Fi 
Protected Access II (WPA2, IEEE 802.11i) was developed. Technologically, although WPA and 
WPA2 are not secure enough to survive hacker attack, they are compatible with the other WLAN 
standards. WAPI developed an encryption algorithm that needs double authentication, so its 
security level is higher than WPA2 which only requires unilateral authentication. However, the 
compatibility problem was highlighted by the IEEE at the ISO balloting process.  
 
 
Figure 18 The Relationship between WAPI and Other Protocols55  
However, this argument exaggerated the need for compatibility before a standard is adopted. 
Compatibility can only be an ex post problem (Farrell et al. 2007) because ex ante the market 
should be open so that candidates for standards status can compete to become the standard. In the 
                                                     
55 Data source: Lee and Oh (2006).  
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case of WAPI, when it was announced as a compulsory national standard, the market size of Wi-
Fi was very small. Statistics show that even in 2004, the same year WAPI was suspended 
indefinitely, there were only 1.29% of US inhabitants and less than 0.72% of UK inhabitants who 
used Wi-Fi (UNICTTF 2005). Even if IEEE’s 802.11 standards had been gradually developed 
since 1999, they were not yet the standards widely used in the market, even in the US If the market 
share of the 802.11 standard was only 1%, there was no real basis on which to block the 
development of other standards completely. The WLAN market is still in an early stage of 
standards development. Since the network was not yet established, compatibility was not really 
the issue. The issue here was an ex ante competition (Farrell et al. 2007, 607), a competition for 
the market.  
Intel launched its Centrino PCs integrated to Wi-Fi standards in the potentially huge Chinese 
market in 2003. If WAPI had been implemented as compulsory national standards, Intel’s market 
would have been lost. Intel lobbied the US government and successfully entered the Chinese 
market through the US government’s intervention in the 15th JCCT. After securing the Chinese 
market, Intel also led public opinion on the compatibility issue and the immaturity of WAPI. In 
2006, Intel’s Centrino had more than two-thirds of the Chinese PC market, meaning that Wi-Fi 
had developed exponentially into a de facto standard. Thereafter, the competition was over, and 
compatibility did become an issue. Then Intel took the position that “it is up to the market to 
decide which standard is more feasible” (Xin and Wang 2006). 
The same logic also applies to the process of international standardization of WLAN standards. 
When WAPI was first proposed, the WLAN market was not yet established. But as we have seen, 
the application process for WAPI to become an international standard was deeply flawed and 
ultimately delayed WAPI to a point where the Chinese withdrew from the process. At the same 
time, the international market for Wi-Fi was expanding and 802.11i was put into fast-track 
balloting. In sum, compatibility was an issue after Wi-Fi was established as a de facto standard, 
but not initially.  
The debate over compatibility shows how US technology domination flows from a mix of 
regulatory, negotiating and organizational capabilities. Without these capabilities, an innovative 
technology will not of its own accord flower into a global standard.  
5.4.3 Lessons learned: China embracing inclusive development in the ICT industry 
Lee and Oh (2008) compared WAPI and WIPI, a similar WLAN standard ratified in South Korea 
and concluded that: 
Despite some similarities of “aiming for a de jure national standard”, “government-
initiated” and “anticipatory”, the outcomes of the two efforts are different. WIPI 
was ratified in (South) Korea, while WAPI was indefinitely postponed as the national 
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standard and failed to be ratified as an international standard…. Different outcomes 
(of these two standards) are attributed to differences in the openness of the standards 
and of institutional processes of standardization, combined with the government role 
and the timing of market entry. 
Indeed, the lack of transparency in WAPI and its exclusivity to Chinese entities in drafting the 
standards were the major reasons for the US to frame WAPI as a thrust of China’s neo-technology 
nationalism (Suttmeier and Yao 2004, Suttmeier, Yao, and Tan 2006). Till 2014, by which time 
the outcome of the competition between Wi-Fi and WAPI was clear, the US Information 
Technology Office (USITO) still recommended the US government raise the issue of WAPI at 
the JCCT because “WAPI are developed outside of international norms in an opaque manner that 
limits foreign participation” (USITO 2014, 14). 
China also realized that WAPI failed because its formulation excluded the vested interests in the 
industry — MNCs and the US government. China changed its course after the WAPI failure. It 
began to compromise and took a more inclusive strategy. For instance, China was inclusive in the 
development of standards in the area of cellular telecommunications network technologies.   
The Chinese role in the development of the cellular telecommunications network has been 
summarized as China was absent in 1G, a follower in 2G, made a breakthrough in 3G, catching 
up in 4G and will leap forward in 5G. In the late 1990s, China did not have any leading 
technologies in the 2G cellular network and had to pay significant amounts of patent royalties to 
the patent holders like Qualcomm. In the development of 3G, China gained access to TD-CDMA 
technologies from Siemens. This helped Chinese companies to equip themselves with SEPs in 
cellular communications technologies. The Chinese TD-SCSMA (Li et al. 2005) on the basis of 
Siemens’ TD-CDMA was approved by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as one 
of the three standards for 3G, in parallel with the US standard CDMA2000 and the EU standard 
WCDMA (Chen 2016a). In this way, China made the breakthrough in 3G technology. In the 4G 
era, Huawei submitted 546 proposals for the core 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) standards by 
the end of 2014, accounting for 25% of the world’s total (Huawei 2015).   
China also started early in the 5G standardization process. In 2014, MIIT, NDRC and MOST 
jointly established “IMT-2020” to promote cooperation with MNCs to co-operatively develop 5G 
technologies.56 This inclusive approach was different from WAPI. After experiments in the lab, 
China Mobile announced that China will have experiments on the application of 5G in five 
Chinese cities in 2018 and scaled commercialization from 2020 (Sun 2017). The standard of 5G 
                                                     
56  Three ministries in China (the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National 
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Science and Technology) jointly established 
the IMT-2020 (5G) Promotion Group IMT-2020 推进组 [IMT-2020 tuijinzu] in February 2013. It is the 
major platform to promote the research of 5G in China. 
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is not only technology intensive, but capital intensive, which means it can only happen in places 
big enough to absorb the investment and ensure returns to investors. China Telecom had deployed 
5G base stations in six cities in China by the end of 2017 (Zhang 2017b). Though Qualcomm still 
holds the most SEPs in 5G technology (15% of total) (Jefferies 2017, 5), cooperate with Chinese 
mobile network operators is of vital importance for its license-based business model. 
China also increased its liaison with international ISOs. In the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP)57 in the latest election in 2017, China’s representatives occupied ten of the 57 positions.  
5.5 Conclusion  
Though the Chinese patent office has been the largest in the world for years, running patent 
numbers is not enough. China needs quality patents to be part of international standards, but the 
processes of standardization per se are not easy. If we compare this case with the case of China’s 
international engagement in GIs and the disclosure obligation, China’s intention to engage in 
international standardization was clearer and stronger. This is mainly because standards are 
crucial to China’s core interest. The DVD case showed standards are the lifeline of an industry 
and allow firms to occupy the high-end of the smiling curve. However, for the same reason, 
standards are crucial for every state, in particular for the US to maintain its competitive advantage. 
Such strategic importance underpins each attempt China has made in promoting WAPI as both 
national and international standard. This strategic importance also underpins each counteraction 
the US undertook to promote its own Wi-Fi standards. Chinese companies have climbed up the 
PCT patent ladder, but they were still defeated in the battle over WAPI through a combination of 
US’ non-compliance in the JCCT commitment, various procedural irregularities, administrative 
errors and the visa denials.  
To make a standard come alive globally, a newcomer not only needs a complementary set of 
institutional, organizational, and negotiating skills but also to compromise its national interests to 
guarantee the standard is inclusive and open. With China growing as the world largest market for 
telecommunications and the Internet, China did gain a certain leverage from its huge market size. 
MNCs in the Chinese market must comply with Chinese laws and regulations and court decisions 
to continue operating in the market — a market that they cannot afford to lose. As shown by 
IWNComm vs Sony, Chinese companies and courts have been involved in law implementation 
and used market leverage to convert outcomes in the implementation game. 
                                                     
57 3GPP is an international SSO setting cellular telecommunications standards. It unites 7 
telecommunications standard development organizations as organizational partners, including ARIB, 
ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC. 
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Chapter 6 China’s Bilateral IP Engagement: 
Intellectual Property in Chinese FTAs 
6.1 Introduction  
6.1.1 The Chinese free trade agreement strategy in the changing world 
China started signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries in 2003. In more than a 
decade, China has signed 14 FTAs with 22 trading partners, with another seven FTAs under 
negotiation (Table 15). 1 China first started its experiment with FTAs with small developing 
countries such as Chile and Costa Rica. In recent years, China also signed FTAs with developed 
countries like Iceland, Switzerland, and Australia. 
Table 15 Intellectual Property Provisions in Chinese FTAs  
                                                     
1  For the text of the Chinese FTAs, refer to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) website of China FTA 
Framework http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/. This table was update in March, 2017.  
FTAs already signed (14) 
FTAs with IP Provisions (eight) 
China-Chile FTA (2005) 
China-New Zealand FTA (2008) 
China-Peru FTA (2009)  
China-Costa Rica FTA (2010) 
China-Iceland FTA (2014)  
China-Switzerland FTA (2013) 
China-South Korea FTA (2014) 
China-Australia FTA (2014) 
 
FTAs without IP Provisions (six) 
China-ASEAN FTA   
China-Pakistan FTA  
China-Singapore FTA (2008) 
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer 
Economic and Partnership 
Arrangement  
Mainland and Macau Closer Economic 
and Partnership Arrangement  
China-ASEAN FTA Upgrade (2015) 
 
FTAs under negotiation (seven) 
China-Georgia FTA 
China-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) FTA 
China-Norway FTA 
China-Japan-South Korea FTA 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
China-Sri Lanka FTA 
China-Maldives FTA 
 
FTAs under consideration  
China-India Regional Trade Arrangement Joint Feasibility Study 
China-Columbia FTA Joint Feasibility Study 
China-Moldova FTA Joint Feasibility Study 
China-Fiji FTA Joint Feasibility Study 
China-Nepal FTA Joint Feasibility Study 
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Chinese FTA partners are not major trading partners for China, but in most cases, China is the 
major trading partner for its FTA partner. Looking at the economic structure, China and these 
countries are complementary rather than competitive. The small size and non-competitor status 
of China’s FTA partners have facilitated the negotiation of these FTAs (Li 2013). 
 China incorporated the acceleration of FTA negotiation and implementation as a national strategy 
in the 17th National Congress of CCP (Xinhua News Agency 2007). The political will to promote 
Chinese FTAs was reinforced in 2015 by the State Council Opinions on Accelerating the 
Implementation of the FTA Strategy (FTA Strategy 2015).2 The FTA strategy (2015) deploys 
objectives to facilitate trade liberalization through FTAs at three levels: neighboring countries, 
countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),3 and a global network of FTAs.  
The short-term objective for Chinese FTAs is to speed up the ongoing FTA 
negotiations, further liberalize the existing FTAs, and promote negotiations with 
neighboring countries and regions. By doing this, China's trading values with FTA 
partners should reach or exceed the level of most developed countries and emerging 
economies. The mid-to-long term objectives are to create a global network of FTAs 
including neighboring countries and regions, countries along the path of the “Belt 
and Road Initiative” and priority countries in all five Continents, to liberalize and 
facilitate transnational trade for Chinese enterprises and bilateral investment (FTA 
Strategy 2015). 
In addition to promoting domestic development as articulated in the FTA Strategy 2015, there is 
a strategic geopolitical interpretation of China’s FTA strategy which is that the Chinese FTAs are 
considered a counter-balancing strategy to the US’ pivot to Asia through the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) (Song and Yuan 2012). Wang (2016b) applied the same logic to the BRI, 
arguing that the seemingly proactive initiative is defensive in nature.  
The recent black swan events, including the Brexit referendum and the US’s withdrawal from the 
TPP, suggest an undercurrent of backlash to globalization. Trump’s success in the US presidential 
election may signal the end of the US model of globalization because of his preference for 
bilateralism (Stokes and Waterman 2017). One viewpoint is that the anti-globalization trend may 
lead the world back to economic nationalism instead of liberalism.  
                                                     
2   State Council 国务院  [Guowuyuan], Several Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Implementation of the Strategies for Free Trade Areas 国务院关于加快实施自由贸易区战略的若干
意见 [Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Shishi Ziyoumaoqiyu Zhanlüe de Ruogan Yijian] 2015 No. 69 国发 
(2015) 69 号 [Guofa (2015) 69 hao]. In this chapter, national laws and regulations refer to Chinese laws 
and regulations if not articulated otherwise. 
3  The Belt and Road Initiative 一带一路 [yidai yilu] (BRI) was initiated in 2013. For a detailed discussion 
of its objectives and measures, see Huang (2016). The IP arrangement in the BRI will be discussed in 
Chapter 7.5.4 
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In response to these changes in the global political economy, many countries have also changed 
their strategy by showing confidence in “China-led trade pacts” as a way of gaining momentum 
for globalization, especially the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). However, Geng Shuang, the Chinese Foreign Affairs 
spokesperson has made it clear that China would not take a leadership role in either trade pact 
(CMFA 2016). President Xi Jinping’s opening address at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
declared China’s position in response to these changes — China will keep its door wide open and 
call for the international community to take steps to fix the current problems affecting free trade 
and economic globalization, rather than backing away from it entirely (Anderlini, Wang, and 
Mitchell 2017). Both speeches suggest China’s position in response to the recent changes has 
begun to consolidate. On the one hand, Mr. Geng’s emphasis on the non-dominance of China in 
both the RCEP and FTAAP indicates its effort to avoid being referred to as “a regional hegemon” 
in trade issues. On the other hand, President Xi’s Davos speech defended free trade and a liberal 
international economic order. In this context, China has defended the WTO as the primary 
multilateral trade forum and accelerated its FTAs negotiation to defend the international order of 
free trade.  
Against the above background, China’s bilateral engagement may not be isolated from its position 
in the multilateral IP regimes (in particular TRIPS). Through the investigation of the intellectual 
property provisions in Chinese FTAs, this chapter will examine China’s bilateral IP engagement 
with a focus on the Chinese FTA and TRIPS relationship.  
Before investigating the FTA-TRIPS relationship in the Chinese context, Section 6.1.2 will 
review how the developed countries have strategically used FTAs as a global intellectual property 
ratchet. Section 6.1.3 will propose hypotheses of possible positions on intellectual property that 
China may take in its FTAs in relation to TRIPS. Section 6.1.4 will introduce the Chinese FTAs. 
Sections 6.2-6.4 test these hypotheses one by one.  
6.1.2 The US style FTAs: Nodes for global IP ratchet and its resistance  
Bilateral agreements including FTAs, bilateral investment agreements, and bilateral intellectual 
property agreements, have long been used as an instrument by developed countries to push for 
more extensive IP protection. The unequal agreements introducing the IP system to China in the 
early 20th Century were all negotiated bilaterally (Wang 2008). The US and EU started 
incorporating IP in their bilateral agreements at the beginning of the 1980s. During TRIPS 
negotiations, the US promised the developing countries that it would end bilateralism in 
intellectual property if they accepted TRIPS (Drahos 2002a). However, the US started a new 
round of the global intellectual property ratchet through FTAs as soon as TRIPS was concluded 
(Drahos 2001a). The high standards for intellectual property gained in the post-TRIPS era, 
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especially data exclusivity and more restrictive enforcement of copyright in cyberspace, have 
been consolidated in ACTA and TPP. Although ACTA and TPP failed respectively after the veto 
by the EU parliament and the result of the recent US presidential election, the final texts of both 
agreements clearly demonstrate how the US has pushed global intellectual property upwards (Sell 
2010a). 
In the post-TRIPS era, FTAs became a more effective instrument for the US to extend the IP 
protection standards because of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle in TRIPS. Before 
TRIPS, the gains in IP for the US bilateral FTAs were confined to the US According to Article 4 
of TRIPS, any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity in intellectual property stipulated in one 
FTA will not be limited bilaterally between the negotiating parties, but available immediately and 
unconditionally to all other WTO Members.4 As a result, FTAs become a critical node in the US 
strategy to push up global intellectual property standards.   
Nonetheless, the global intellectual property ratchet has not been all smooth sailing after TRIPS. 
It has encountered protests from both state and non-state actors. During TRIPS negotiations, the 
asymmetry of power limited the capacity of developing countries to influence the outcomes of 
TRIPS. After TRIPS, developing countries opposed any TRIPS-plus standards because they had 
already made great concessions in the TRIPS negotiations. In addition to firmly adhering to 
TRIPS standards, developing countries actively promoted the Development Agenda at WIPO. 
Developing countries also employed the strategy of forum-shifting, promoting IP standards at the 
CBD and the World Health Organization (WHO) on genetic resources, access to medicine, and 
human rights, thereby contesting the dominance of the ‘traditional’ multilateral IP regimes. These 
practices unfolded a possible alternative framework for standard-setting for valuable intangibles 
not originally included in TRIPS (Kapczynski 2007).  
With the promotion and protestation in international IP rule-making by both developed countries 
and developing countries in fora at various levels, the international IP system presents a high level 
of rule-complexity. The vertical forum-shifting further introduced legal fragmentation and rule 
ambiguity into the international IP system. More uncertainty into the international IP rule-
complexity has been introduced through the political will of great powers and by security 
concerns. The case of TPP being abandoned by the Trump administration exemplifies the 
influence of political will. Security concerns were manifested by the China-South Korea-Japan 
FTA, for which the changing security situation in North-East Asia functions as a check on the 
progress of its negotiation. Specifically, the Diaoyu Island dispute between China and Japan and 
                                                     
4  The MFN principle of TRIPS works in an unequal way because, as opposed to GATT and GATS, there 
is no exception to the TRIPS MFN principle (Drahos 2001a, Frankel 2008).   
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the US deployment of the anti-missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), 
in South Korea significantly disturbed the negotiations. 
The EU has also aimed for TRIPS-plus rules in its FTAs. How the US and the EU used FTAs as 
a node to promote TRIPS-plus IP standards globally provides a base from which to build the 
categorization of a Chinese position in intellectual property in its FTAs.  
6.1.3 Categories of Chinese IP positions in its FTAs 
The starting point for analyzing intellectual property provisions in Chinese FTAs is that China is 
a developing country with rapid growth. Primarily, China is still a developing country. As 
revealed in Chapter 2, the introduction of intellectual property to contemporary China is a result 
of external pressure, especially by the US, that has led to a process of legal transplants. After its 
accession to the WTO, China revised its domestic intellectual property laws to comply with the 
TRIPS standards. Both processes took place when China was still a developing country that had 
just embarked on market-based industrialization and was dependent on technology importation. 
Therefore, the hypothesis for the Chinese intellectual property position in its FTAs – based on the 
fact that China is still a developing country – is that China will try to safeguard the current TRIPS 
standards.  
However, this assumption concerning its preferences is time-bounded, especially considering the 
rapid Chinese economic transition and its increasing innovative capacity. There are two inferences 
from the time-boundedness. First, China may actively promote alternative IP standards in its 
FTAs – different standards compared to those the US has sought to ratchet up. Secondly, China 
may accept some TRIPS-plus standards, using them as a bargaining chip with developed countries 
while expecting these standards to be compatible with its own innovation capacity in the near 
future. Such an argument has justified Chinese acceptance of TRIPS standards in early 2000. 
Professor Wu Handong, a celebrated Chinese IP law professor, has argued that “intellectual 
property is a momentum to boost the national economy and social development for traditional 
developing countries, so that these countries can embark on the avenue of industrialization and 
modernization as well as take initiatives in international competition” (Wu 2009, 56). He further 
emphasized that “strengthening IP protection and effectively using the IP system is a strategic 
choice for China to achieve leapfrog development and a supportive instrument to realize the target 
of building China as an innovative country”. Following the second inference, though defending 
TRIPS in its FTAs reflects Chinese interests at the current stage, China may occasionally accept 
or associate the creation of certain IP standards beyond current development with the expectation 
that it will catch up in future. 
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To test the relationship between Chinese FTAs and TRIPS, this Chapter categorizes the 
relationship between the eight Chinese FTAs with intellectual property provisions (see Table 15 
above)5 and TRIPS into four groups:  
(1) passive defensive — FTAs that do not explicitly mention intellectual property; 
(2) active defensive — FTAs that explicitly refer to TRIPS or repeat specific TRIPS 
provisions in its text;  
(3) TRIPS-plus — FTAs that provide more extensive protection than TRIPS or eliminating 
options available in TRIPS; and  
(4) active promotion — FTAs that regulates issues not mentioned in TRIPS. 
Table 16 divides the specific provisions of Chinese FTAs into the four categories6.  
                                                     
5  Considering that recent Chinese FTAs tend to provide more detailed provisions, some FTAs have 
divergent positions on different issues. On these occasions, the categorization is made by reference to 
the FTA’s rules on a specific issue.     
6  In this table, “AD” represents active defensive, “AP” represents active promotion, “PD” represents 
passive defensive and “TP” represents TRIPS-plus. 
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Among the four categories, both passive defensive and active defensive FTAs are FTAs that try 
to maintain the current IP standards in TRIPS. Further clarification is needed to distinguish 
TRIPS-plus and active promotion. TRIPs-plus standard-setting in FTAs refers to two situations: 
(1) requiring more extensive protection than TRIPs and (2) eliminating an option for a Member 
conferred by TRIPS (Drahos 2001a). A typical example of the latter is that TRIPS offers a 
Member an option to decide whether ‘visually perceptible’ could be used as a requirement for 
trademark registration. The China-South Korea FTA provides that ‘visually perceptible’ cannot 
be used as a requirement for trademark registration. With the reduction of this trademark 
registration requirement, the scope of trademark protection has been extended – distinctive sounds 
and smells can be registered as trademarks. However, if an FTA confirms an IP standard that has 
already been mentioned in multilateral IP treaties other than TRIPS, they are not considered as 
TRIPS-plus for the purpose of this chapter but analyzed separately. For instance, the protection 
of new plant varieties is provided in the China-Switzerland and China-South Korea FTAs. 
Considering China is a Member of the UPOV 1978, these provisions, though conferring more 
extensive protection than TRIPS, are not regarded as TRIPS-plus. In addition, international rule-
making on the overlaps between intellectual property and other issues are not TRIPS-plus. Using 
the classifications such as “TRIPS, TRIPS-minus, and TRIPS-plus” may not always gauge the 
complex relationship between TRIPS and other multilateral IP agreements.  
Active promotion refers to the effort of alternative rule-making– rules that set standards in areas 
that TRIPS has not touched. For instance, the disclosure obligation relating to genetic resources 
in the patent applications in FTAS belongs to the active promotion category. Developing countries 
are major promoters of these rules. Actively promoted rules manifest the true interest of the FTA 
parties promoting them because they are not compelled by some prior treaty obligation to set a 
standard or set it at a particular level. 
The legal effects of the four categories of rules are different. In passive defensive and active 
defensive FTAs, TRIPS will still apply. The TRIPS-plus FTA will invoke the application of the 
MFN principle, which means the advantage, favor, privilege or immunity agreed by both parties 
will be accorded immediately and unconditionally to other WTO Members. within active 
promotion FTAs, the provisions actively promoted will bind both parties signing the FTA. 
Whether the active promotion FTAs will trigger the application of the MFN depends on the 
subject matter—if the active promotion FTAs regulate a subject matter that relates to intellectual 
property as defined in Article 1.2 of TRIPS, MFN will apply.  
TRIPS-plus provisions in Chinese FTAs do not necessarily introduce additional international 
obligations for China. On the issue of additional international obligations, FTA standards are 
compared with Chinese domestic IP laws, not TRIPS. Recently amended Chinese IP laws have 
introduced some TRIPS-plus standards. As long as an FTA does not exceed IP standards to be 
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found in national legislation, it will not introduce an additional obligation via the FTA into its 
domestic legal system. Take, for example, the abolishment of “visually perceptible” as a 
trademark registration requirement. Although the provision itself is TRIPS-plus because it 
eliminates an option otherwise available to WTO Members, it does not introduce an additional 
international obligation for China since the amended Trademark Law (2013) has already 
abolished such a requirement.   
Recent Chinese FTAs tend to refer to provisions of other multilateral treaties as well. TRIPS is 
not the only multilateral forum for IP rule-making. The analysis of the relationship between 
Chinese FTAs and other multilateral IP agreements presents a more nuanced picture of China’s 
position. In the case of anti-circumvention of technological protection measures, it seems China 
has accepted a TRIPS-plus standard in the China-South Korea FTA, but China is obliged by the 
WIPO Internet Treaties to set such TRIPS-plus standards. In other words, TRIPS-plus anti-
circumvention provisions are in place to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties. In this Chapter, 
such active defensive FTAs that relate to other multilateral IP agreements are carved out from the 
TRIPS-plus category.   
The analysis of this chapter is limited in the following aspects. First, this chapter focuses on IP 
provisions/chapters in Chinese FTAs. A comprehensive study of Chinese FTAs and their 
geopolitical impact is beyond the scope of this chapter. Secondly, this chapter uses a text-based 
analysis of Chinese FTAs. An account of the negotiation procedure of these FTAs is beyond its 
scope because the data was not accessible. Therefore, the subject for analysis in this chapter is 
mainly FTA provisions, not the intention of the parties. The position of an FTA party will be 
analyzed when data is available. I recognize that this approach to some extent limits the revealing 
of a clear Chinese IP position in its FTAs.  
6.1.4 Overview of IP provisions in Chinese FTAs 
Intellectual property was not mentioned in the first few Chinese FTAs with Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pakistan and Singapore, or the internal market coordination 
agreements with Hong Kong and Macau. Intellectual property first appeared in the China-Chile 
FTA as one article in the chapter on cooperation. The China-Peru FTA and China-Costa Rica 
FTA are similar to the China-Chile FTA, focusing on the common interests of developing 
countries such as public health, and protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge and 
cooperation, not introducing any TRIPS-plus obligations.7  
                                                     
7  One exception for this general observation is the border measures in the China-Peru FTA. For detail, see 
Section 6.4.4. 
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The China-New Zealand FTA was the first comprehensive FTA that covers trade in goods and 
services and investment, and the first FTA that China signed with a developed country. An 
independent chapter is devoted to intellectual property, with provisions on issues such as 
intellectual property principles, contact points, notification and exchange of information, 
cooperation and capacity building, genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, and 
consultation. Much of the content is procedural. Like the China-Chile FTA, this FTA did not 
create any TRIPS-plus obligations.  
In 2005, Iceland became the first European country recognizing the market economy status of 
China. Both countries started an FTA feasibility study in 2007. However, the negotiations lasted 
for eight years. In its IP chapter, this FTA confirms the principle of adhering to TRIPS and the 
balance of interest. It also lists other multilateral IP agreements that both countries have joined. 
Unlike earlier FTAs with developing countries which actively promote the protection of GIs, 
genetic resources, and traditional knowledge, this FTA does not involve any of these issues. Also 
differing from other FTAs with developed countries, this FTA does not include any substantive 
provisions either confirming TRIPS standards or promoting TRIPS-plus provisions.   
China and Switzerland started an FTA negotiation in 2011 and concluded the negotiation three 
years later. The China-Switzerland FTA sets high standards for intellectual property, especially 
the data exclusivity for biologics. With 22 articles in 12 pages, the IP Chapter in the China-
Switzerland FTA is among the longest in Chinese FTAs. Although the Switzerland FTAs are 
usually negotiated together with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, in the framework of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (SECO 2018), the China-Switzerland FTA is outside 
of the framework.  
China and Australia started FTA negotiations in 2005, and the marathon-like negotiations lasted 
for ten years. Nonetheless, the IP chapter is not the controversial part of this FTA (Weatherall 
2015). Like the China-Switzerland FTA, the IP chapter in the China-Australia FTA tends to go 
into detail by either repeating TRIPS standards or creating TRIPS-plus standards occasionally.  
South Korea, as the 11th largest economy in the world,8 is the largest FTA partner for China. The 
China-South Korea FTA, signed in 2015, includes the most detailed IP chapter among all Chinese 
FTAs. Like the Chinese FTAs with Switzerland and Australia, the China-South Korea FTA 
includes extensive provisions referring to other multilateral intellectual property treaties. It also 
includes the largest number of TRIPS-plus standards among all Chinese FTAs (Section 6.4).  
                                                     
8This is based on the World Bank statistics on GDP in 2016. See 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
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6.2 Chinese FTAs defending TRIPS standards  
6.2.1 Passive defensive Chinese FTAs  
Out of the 14 Chinese FTAs, the six FTAs that do not mention intellectual property at all can be 
categorized as passive defensive FTAs based on the definition in Section 6.1.3. These FTAs 
include the Chinese FTA with ASEAN countries and its upgrade, Pakistan, and Singapore, and 
China’s closer economic arrangement with Hong Kong and Macau. Most of the ASEAN countries 
and Pakistan are developing countries, and the main purpose of these FTAs is to promote exports 
and imports through eliminating tariff barriers. Thus, not including intellectual property makes 
sense in these FTAs. Singapore is a developed country. The reason for excluding intellectual 
property might be that neither party wanted intellectual property to be a deal-breaker. After all, 
the market size of China is much larger than that of Singapore. For Singapore, with the priority 
of entering the Chinese market, the issue of intellectual property was likely to be something on 
which it could compromise. The Hong Kong and Macau FTAs are in essence internal market 
coordination, so the central government of China takes the initiative in these FTAs.  
All the Chinese FTAs passively defending TRIPS were negotiated at the beginning of the 21st 
century (Figure 19), just after China’s accession to the WTO. The amendment of Chinese IP laws 
has been criticised because the amended IP laws set standards higher than China at that stage of 
development needed (Wei 1997). Therefore, adhering to TRIPS standards was the negotiating 
priority for China in its early FTAs. The outcome of these FTAs – not mentioning intellectual 
property at all – clearly reflected such considerations. In addition to these six FTAs, every other 
FTA is passive defensive of TRIPS on specific issues if this issue is provided for in TRIPS, but 
not mentioned in these FTAs.  
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6.2.2 Active defensive Chinese FTAs  
Except for the six passive defensive FTAs already discussed, eight FTAs which include IP 
provisions can be further divided into three categories: active defensive, active promotion, and 
TRIPS-plus. However, this time, it is hard to split an entire FTA into one category because one 
FTA may include provisions that can embody all three categories. For instance, the China-
Switzerland FTA contains provisions reiterating TRIPS on border measures (active defensive), 
on intellectual property and public health, and protection of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge (active promotion), and six-year data exclusivity for biologics (TRIPS-plus). 
Therefore, for these three categories, the subject of analysis is not an entire FTA but a bundle of 
rules within one FTA on a specific issue.  
This section will focus on the active defensive provisions in these FTAs. In general, there is a 
trend that the active defensive provisions dramatically increased in the China-Switzerland, China-
South Korea, and China-Australia FTAs. Specifically, Chinese FTAs have made explicit 
reiterations of the TRIPS standard on the following issues: 
• The principle of adhering to TRIPS standards. It appears as a basic principle in all eight 
Chinese FTAs explicitly mentioning intellectual property.  
• The possible exceptions to National Treatment in TRIPS appears in the China-Australia 
FTA.  
• The requirement for patentability, in which the TRIPS requirement of Article 27 is 
reiterated in the China-Switzerland FTA and China-South Korea FTA.  
• The protection of well-known trademarks in the China-South Korea FTA and China-
Australia FTA. Both provisions further referred to relevant provisions of the Paris 
Convention. Considering the Paris Convention has been incorporated into TRIPS, these 
provisions are still active defensive of TRIPS, not other multilateral IP agreements.  
• Provisional measures and criminal enforcement are both repeated in the China-
Switzerland FTA and China-South Korea FTA.9  
• Protection of prior rights, acquisition of intellectual property and opportunity to submit 
oppositions are reiterated in the China-South Korea FTA, China-Switzerland FTA, and 
China-Australia FTA respectively.  
• As for border measures, the China-Peru FTA, China Costa-Rica FTA, and China-
Australia FTA contain provisions actively defending the TRIPS standards. In the China-
                                                     
9  This conclusion is made on the basis of comparing the border measure provisions in these two FTAs with 
relevant TRIPS provisions. See for instance, the similarity in (1) Article 11.20.1 of the China-
Switzerland FTA and Article 50 of TRIPS, (2) Article 11.20.2 of the China-Switzerland FTA and Article 
44 of TRIPS, and (3) Article 11.21 of the China-Switzerland FTA and Article 61 of TRIPS.  
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Switzerland FTA and China-South Korea FTA, TRIPS-plus standards are provided on 
this issue.  
• In the protection of undisclosed information, TRIPS provisions are reiterated in the 
China-South Korea FTA as well as the China-Australia FTA.  
In addition to reiterating TRIPS provisions, Chinese FTAs also reiterate the outcome of the border 
measures dispute at the WTO.10 For instance, the China-South Korea FTA provides that “simple 
removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, 
to permit the release of goods into the channels of commerce.”11 This provision first appeared in 
Article 46 TRIPS, and Chinese border measures were found inconsistent with this article by the 
WTO DSB. China amended its Regulation on the Customs IP Protection by incorporating this 
sentence to fully comply with the TRIPS standards.12 The same provision was replicated again in 
the China-South Korea FTA. This example shows that active defensive rules extend to the defense 
of even the content of the panel report that clarified TRIPS provisions.  
The specific rules mentioned above will not be elaborated on in this chapter as active defensive 
FTAs only reiterate TRIPS standards. I will focus instead on the effects of the active defensive 
provisions. Although active defensive provisions do not introduce additional international 
obligations for China, their effects vary with the type of rules such provisions defend.    
Some active defensive rules in Chinese FTAs are intended to maintain the minimum standards of 
TRIPS and to prevent derogation from them. Most of the active defensive rules in the three recent 
FTAs with Switzerland, South Korea, and Australia fall into this group. These rules are directly 
actionable, and they are likely to be implemented by state laws. They may further feedback into 
the interpretation of TRIPS and WTO dispute resolution when the DSB investigates state practice 
in interpreting TRIPS.  
Another group of active defensive rules in Chinese FTAs repeat the flexibilities of TRIPS, 
including the basic principles of TRIPS and some specific rules. The principle of balance of 
interest (Article 7 TRIPS) and preventing abuse of intellectual property rights (Article 8 TRIPS) 
appear in all Chinese FTAs that have intellectual property provisions. For the principle of balance 
of interest, Chinese FTAs reiterate the interests at stake, namely that the IP system should 
“achieve a balance between rights of right holders and the legitimate interests of users and the 
                                                     
10  DS362: China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. 
11 Article 15.24.6.3 China-South Korea FTA. 
12 The Decision of the State Council on Amending the Regulation on the Customs Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights 国务院关于修改〈中华人民共和国知识产权海关保护条例〉的决定 [Guowuyaun 
Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishichanquan Haiguan Baohu Tiaoli de Jueding] 
amended Article 27.3 of the Regulation on the Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 中华
人民共和国知识产权海关保护条例 [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishichanquan Haiguan Baohu 
Tiaoli] to make the latter comply with the TRIPS standard on border measures.  
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community with regard to protected subject matter”.13 The reiteration manifests the different 
expectations China has for FTAs in IP regulation, compared with the US and EU’s desire for 
increasing the strength of IP standards (See Section 6.1.2). This principle helps to resist the 
commodification-based or even assetization-based rationale (Dreyfuss and Frankel 2014) 
developed by the recent US and EU FTAs. By emphasizing the function of intellectual property 
to promote innovation and to facilitate technology dissemination, this principle also enables 
Chinese FTAs to actively promote standards concerning the balance between intellectual property 
and public health, and the disclosure obligation of genetic resources in patent applications. In the 
case of the principle of preventing abuse of intellectual property,14 the reiteration has practical 
significance for China. The recent judicial activism emerging from local courts and other anti-
monopoly law agencies indicates the robust implementation of anti-monopoly regulations in 
China to prevent the abuse of intellectual property (chapter 5.2.3). Reiterating the principle of 
preventing IP abuse not only helps to justify the above domestic anti-monopoly practice but also 
sets a foundation for China to further export potential anti-monopoly norms ‘with Chinese 
characteristics’ to its FTA partners in the future. 
Another example of this group of rules are provisions replicating the exception of national 
treatment. For instance, Article 11.5.3 of the China-Australia FTA echoes Article 3.2 TRIPS. This 
article confirms a flexibility that WTO Members have to exempt national treatment in two cases 
– one is requiring a national of the other Party to designate an address for service in its territory, 
and the other is requiring the appointment of an agent in its territory in administrative or judicial 
procedures. This provision is preferable for China because it is a justification for some practices 
in China.15  
Some IP issues in early FTAs were regulated by an active defensive provision but later regulated 
by a TRIPS-plus provision in other FTAs. Regarding border measures, the China-Chile, China-
Peru and China-Costa Rica FTAs include active defensive provisions. The China-South Korea 
FTA includes TRIPS-plus standards, both in the scope of the inspection and the types of 
                                                     
13 See Article 110.1 of the China-Chile FTA, Article 160.2 of the China-New Zealand FTA, Article 144.2 
of the China-Peru FTA, Article 109.2 of the China-Costa Rica FTA, Article 63.1 of the China-Iceland 
FTA, Article 11.1.4 of the China-Switzerland FTA, Article 15.1.2 of the China-South Korea FTA, and 
Article 11.1.4 of the China-Australia FTA.   
14 See Article 110.5 of the China-Chile FTA, Article 144.4 of the China-Peru FTA, Article 110.3 of the 
China-Costa Rica FTA, Article 11.1.5 of the China-Switzerland FTA, Article 15.2.3 of the China-South 
Korea FTA, and Article 11.1.6 of the China-Australia FTA. 
15 For instance, Article 12.1 of the Internet Domain Name Regulations 互联网域名管理办法 [Hulianwang 
Yuming Guanli Banfa] (2004) provides that to register a domain name in China, the applicant should set 
up top-level domain name server (exclude mirror server) within the territory of China. This requirement 
is further specified in the amended Internet Domain Name Regulations 互联网域名管理办法 
[Hulianwang Yuming Guanli Banfa] (2017). 
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intellectual property to be protected (See Section 6.4.4). In these cases, the TRIPS-plus standard 
automatically overturns the active defensive provision because of MFN treatment.  
6.3 Active promotion of intellectual property in Chinese FTAs 
As clarified in the definition, active promotion means both parties are committed to promoting a 
standard not mentioned in TRIPS. Active promotion provisions are often voluntary soft rules, and 
non-compliance does not have legal consequences. Active promotion provisions are a valuable 
lens, enabling one to see the genuine interest of the parties because they are not obliged to include 
these provisions. This section explores active promotion rules in Chinese FTAs on the following 
issues: (1) protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, (2) intellectual property and 
public health, (3) mutual recognition of GIs, (4) limit to ISP liabilities. Active promotions in 
cooperation and procedure will also be discussed.  
6.3.1 Protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge  
The protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is not explicitly mentioned in 
TRIPS. After TRIPS, developing countries argued for the inclusion of the disclosure obligation 
in post-TRIPS negotiations to guarantee that TRIPS provisions are conducive to achieve one of 
the CBD’s objectives – fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of genetic 
resources.16 However, though the Nagoya Protocol has established the access and benefit sharing 
(ABS) mechanism, the disclosure obligation, the necessary complementary mechanism in the 
patent system, was not incorporated in the final text of the Nagoya Protocol (see Chapter 4). 
China, as one of the mega-biodiverse countries in the world, has incorporated the disclosure 
obligation in its patent law.17 In this context, China has endeavored to incorporate the protection 
of genetic resources in its FTAs. 
So far, China has actively promoted the protection of genetic resources in its FTAs with six 
countries, including New Zealand, Peru, Costa Rica, Switzerland, South Korea and Australia. 
Among these six FTA partners, Peru and Costa Rica are developing countries, and both have 
domestic legislation in place on the disclosure obligation.18 Australia, South Korea, and Costa 
Rica have signed the Nagoya Protocol while Peru and Switzerland have already ratified it.19 
These mutual interests constitute the basis upon which to include protection of genetic resources 
in these FTAs. Considering only eight Chinese FTAs address the issue of intellectual property, 
                                                     
16 Article 1 Convention on Biological Diversity.  
17 Article 5.2 and Article 26.5 Patent Law (2008).  
18 In Peru, the disclosure obligation is provided in Article 4 (c), Law No. 27811 of 24 July 2002, Introducing 
a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from Biological 
Resources. In Costa Rica, the disclosure obligation is provided in Article 25, Rules on Access (2003). 
19 From the website of CBD, https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/, last retrieved on Feb 3, 
2017.  
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the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is among the most widely discussed 
intellectual property topics in Chinese FTAs.  
The focus of each of these six FTA provisions on genetic resources is slightly different. The 
China-New Zealand FTA is the first Chinese FTA to mention the protection of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, with no binding requirement for the parties. The China-Peru FTA is 
the first Chinese FTA touching on the disclosure obligation. The China-Costa Rica FTA 
introduces the concept of ABS for the first time. The China-Switzerland FTA is the only Chinese 
FTA addressing the legal consequence of the disclosure obligation. The China-South Korea FTA, 
as the first Chinese FTA signed after the Nagoya Protocol, reiterates certain requirements in the 
Nagoya Protocol.  
Despite these differences, FTA provisions on genetic resources and traditional knowledge share 
some commonalities. First, they all demonstrate China’s approach of soft rule-making. These 
provisions are more declarative as opposed to creating legally binding obligations. Including 
provisions on genetic resources and traditional knowledge in FTAs manifests the Chinese position 
of supporting the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. However, since these 
rules are non-binding, there is no guarantee that their objective will be achieved. For instance, 
while the China-New Zealand FTA confirms the regulatory power of the parties to “establish 
appropriate measures to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore to fulfill its 
international obligations”, they are not obliged to do so.20 Similar provisions can also be found in 
the China-Switzerland and China-Australia FTA.   
The second commonality is that FTA provisions on the protection of genetic sources and 
traditional knowledge are synchronized with the progress of Chinese IP law and the Chinese 
position in multilateral negotiations. For instance, the disclosure obligation first appeared in the 
China-Peru FTA in 2010, following the Chinese patent law amendment in 2008 which 
incorporated the disclosure obligation into patent law for the first time. ABS first appeared in the 
Chinese FTA with Costa Rica in 2011, after China clarified its position in the Nagoya Protocol 
negotiation. Since China was not yet a signatory to the Nagoya Protocol when the China-Costa 
Rica FTA was signed, the China-Costa Rica FTA incorporated provisions on ABS without 
mentioning its commitment to the Nagoya Protocol. The situation changed in the China-South 
Korea FTA when China was determined to sign the Nagoya Protocol. The China-South Korea 
FTA requires both parties to incorporate the achievement of multilateral negotiations of the 
Nagoya Protocol in their FTA, especially emphasizing the principle of prior informed consent 
                                                     
20 Article 165 China-New Zealand FTA provides that “Subject to each Party’s international obligations, the 
Parties may establish appropriate measures to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and 
folklore”. 
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and fair and equitable benefit-sharing. The subtle difference of the wording in the Chinese FTAs 
on the disclosure obligation shows how China cautiously adjusted its positions to keep the FTAs 
consistent with the progress of Chinese legislation and its position in multilateral negotiations. 
Thirdly, China is flexible when negotiating on genetic resources with different partners. This 
flexibility is demonstrated by the case of the TRIPS-CBD relationship and the opt-out of genetic 
resources provisions in some FTAs. The TRIPS-CBD relationship was first negotiated 
multilaterally at the TRIPS Council. Brazil, China, and India along with other developing 
countries hold the position that “there are inherent conflicts between the two instruments, and the 
TRIPS Agreement needs to be amended to remove such conflict.” 21  They further proposed 
amendments to TRIPS to coordinate with Article 16.5 of CBD (access and benefit sharing of 
genetic resources).22 The China Costa-Rica FTA tries to promote the priority of the CBD in the 
TRIPS-CBD relationship. It encourages both parties to establish mechanisms such as ABS “in 
conformity with what is established in the Convention on Biological Diversity”.23 The China-
Costa Rica FTA is consistent with the Chinese position at the TRIPS Council in supporting the 
CBD as a priority in the international regime complexity that governs genetic resources. The 
China-Switzerland FTA and the China-South Korea FTA require parties to be committed to “build 
a mutually supportive system between the TRIPS and CBD”. In these FTAs, the TRIPS-CBD 
relationship is more ambiguous because it is not clear which one will prevail when there is a 
conflict. States may take advantage of the legal fragmentation, in the context of regime 
complexity, by selectively complying with a certain regime that fits with their domestic policy 
objectives.  
China’s flexibility in the FTA genetic resources provisions is also indicated by cases of ‘opt-out’ 
in which genetic resources are not mentioned at all. The protection of genetic resources is not 
reinforced over time. This is different from the IP provisions in US FTAs where a later FTA is 
negotiated based on the model of a previous one, and a chain effect is expected over time (Morin 
2009). The China-Peru FTA first mentioned the disclosure obligation. Although the China-
Australia FTA and the China-South Korea FTA were concluded after the China-Peru FTA, the 
disclosure obligation is not referred to in these FTAs (though China-South Korea FTA does 
actively promote the ABS in the Nagoya Protocol). The China-Switzerland FTA draws China 
away from a more proactive promotion of the disclosure obligation (Chapter 4.5.2). 24 
                                                     
21 IP/CIW/368/Rev.1. See note no. 9 in Chapter 4. 
22 IP/C/W/474 (also circulated as WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 and TN/C/W/41/Rev.2). See note no. 17 in Chapter 
4.  
23 Article 111.3, the China-Costa Rica FTA. 
24 Article 11.9.5, the China-Switzerland FTA. 
205 
There could be various interpretations for this flexibility in Chinese FTAs. First, it may indicate 
the careful calculation of China in different FTA contexts. Secondly, it may indicate the lack of 
structural design of Chinese FTA texts and the lack of coordination among different negotiating 
teams (Liu 2016). Thirdly, as this provision is non-binding, China may use flexibility in the 
language to accommodate the FTA partner in order to conclude the negotiations earlier. 
In sum, the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is a typical case of China’s 
active promotion of IP rules. China has tried to make soft rules in its FTAs, allowed for 
flexibilities, and adjusted its position to track the progress of its domestic law and multilateral 
agreements. However, this soft rule-making approach may be not sufficient to counterbalance the 
trend of actionable and binding TRIPS-plus intellectual property rule-making initiated by the US 
and the EU.  
6.3.2 Intellectual property and public health  
Intellectual property and public health was mentioned in six Chinese FTAs, specifically the 
China-Chile FTA, China-Peru FTA, China-Costa Rica FTA, China-Switzerland FTA, China-
South Korea FTA and China-Australia FTA. The terms and conditions of the six FTAs on this 
issue are almost the same. Intellectual Property and public health have been actively promoted by 
the reiteration of the principle in (1) the Doha Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public 
Health, (2) the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (2003), and 
(3) the Geneva Protocol Amending TRIPS (2005).25  
FTA provisions on intellectual property and public health are consistent with the progress of 
Chinese domestic legislation, like provisions on the protection of genetic resources. The key issue 
addressed by both the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and 
the Geneva Protocol is the mechanism of compulsory license. In the Patent Law (2008), a whole 
chapter (Chapter VI, Article 48 to 58) is devoted to the compulsory license mechanism. Article 
49 Patent Law (2008) authorizes the patent regulator to use compulsory licenses during a national 
emergency or when an extraordinary affair occurs, or the public interest so requires. Article 50 
authorizes the exportation of drugs manufactured under compulsory licenses to other countries 
based on relevant international treaties. All five FTAs were signed after the Patent Law (2008). 
Therefore, the active promotion of public health in Chinese FTAs will not introduce further 
implementation problems for China.  
In addition to the reiteration of the WTO agreements or decisions, the China-Australia FTA adds 
a principle of retaining sovereign regulatory power over public health. Article 11.1 (g) has 
authorized the use of regulatory power by the parties to take appropriate measures to protect 
                                                     
25 The Geneva Protocol was not mentioned in the China-Chile FTA and China-Peru FTA. 
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public health and nutrition as long as the measures are consistent with TRIPS and the intellectual 
property chapter of the China-Australia FTA. This provision was supported by Australia because 
its Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 led to it being sued by Philip Morris Asia using the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement and by Ukraine, Honduras and other Members at the DSB of 
the WTO (Hartmann 2017). 26 
6.3.3 Geographical indications  
GI-related issues are provided for in five Chinese FTAs because China has identified GIs as being 
in its national interest. GI-related provisions in Chinese FTAs were discussed in Chapter 3.4.4. 
The China-Chile, China-Peru and China-Costa Rica FTAs follow the EU model of listing certain 
GIs to be mutually recognized by the other party. The China-Australia FTA repeated the TRIPS 
provision confirming the state regulatory power over GIs: “each Party recognizes that 
geographical indications may be protected by a trademark or sui generis system or other legal 
means”.27  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the China-Switzerland FTA is ambiguous on GIs. It stipulates mutual 
protection of GIs28 with a footnote that parties may require a registration procedure to acquire 
such protection. Different interpretations of this provision are possible (See Chapter 3.4.4).  
Provisions on GIs in Chinese FTAs can be both a case of active promotion and active defensive. 
In most cases, the TRIPS standards concerning GIs are reiterated. Active promotion is on display 
in the provisions on mutual recognition of GIs in Chinese FTAs with Peru, Chile, and Costa Rica. 
There could also be an argument that the list of GIs for mutual recognition may result in a TRIPS-
plus effect. This is because the complex and tedious procedure of examination of GIs originating 
from a foreign country is substantially streamlined in a mutual recognition scheme. Therefore, 
mutual recognition makes it easier for a GI to get protection in the territory of an FTA partner. 
What is unique in the case of mutual recognition of GIs is that such recognition may not trigger 
MFN because of the geographical confinement of GIs. 
Although it seems China is promoting a rival standard through the mutual recognition of GIs, its 
position is still different from the EU which seeks to incorporate TRIPS-plus GIs standards in 
every one of its FTAs. China does not insist that every FTA partner include a list of GIs. An FTA 
partner can opt out if they do not want to include such a list, as in cases of the China-New Zealand, 
China-Iceland, and China-South Korea FTAs. 
                                                     
26 The Attorney-General's Department of the Australian Government. 2017. Tobacco Plain Packaging —
Investor-State Arbitration. https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging. 
27 Article 11.15, the China-Australia FTA. 
28 Article 11.13.3, the China-Switzerland FTA. 
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6.3.4 Limit to ISP liability  
Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability only appears in the China-Australia FTA. ISP liability 
has never been an issue in multilateral negotiations. It is not mentioned in TRIPS or the WIPO 
Internet Treaties. Rule-making concerning ISP liability was first developed in the US courts in 
the form of a judge-made law which tended to pose a direct, vicarious or contributory liability on 
ISPs before the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 (Unni 2001). The DMCA 
provides four types of limitations or “safe harbors” on ISP liability, including (1) transitory digital 
network communications, (2) system caching, (3) information residing on systems at the direction 
of users, and (4) information location tools. Although these safe harbors do not offer more relief 
from liability than has already been stipulated by the courts, it does offer courts grounds in later 
cases not to follow the decisions that have already been rendered (Yen 1999). 
However, the US has recently proposed more restrictive domestic legislation in the form of the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) to reinforce ISP 
liability. ISP liability was an important issue during both ACTA and TPP negotiations. These 
recent domestic and plurilateral laws were all intended to bypass the ‘safe harbor’ provision in 
the DMCA and to impose more restrictive liabilities on ISPs (Carrier 2012). 
Australia issued its Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act in 2000, and one of its main 
purposes is to provide “limited immunity” for telecommunications carriers and ISPs from liability 
for authorizing infringement and contributory negligence (Rimmer 2006). However, after the 
signing of the US-Australia FTA, Australia had to amend its copyright law. The Copyright 
Legislation Amendment Act (2004) limits the scope of the exception for temporary copies made 
as part of a technical process of using an electronic copy of a work.29 
The negotiation of the China-Australia FTA started in 2005, just after the amendment of the 
Australian copyright legislation. During the 10-year negotiation of the FTA, China formulated its 
domestic legislation on ISP liability. The Regulations on the Protection of Information Network 
Transmission Right (2006), the Tort Law (2010) and related judicial interpretations30 all address 
the issue of ISP liability. To counterbalance the pressure of the stricter ISP liability provisions 
provided by both Australian domestic law, as well as plurilateral agreements under negotiation, 
the China-Australia FTA includes the following provision confirming the regulatory power of the 
state to limit ISP liability:  
                                                     
29 Copyright Legislation Amendment Act, 2004, § 3, Schedule 1. See Burrell and Weatherall (2008).  
30  Supreme People’s Court of China, Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving Infringement of the Right 
of Dissemination on Information Networks 最高人民法院关于审理侵害信息网络传播权民事纠纷案
件适用法律若干问题的规定 [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinhai Xinxi Wangluo 
Chuanboquan Minshi Jiufen Anjian Shiyong]. 
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Each Party may take appropriate measures to limit the liability of, or remedies 
available against, Internet service providers for copyright infringement by the users 
of their online services or facilities, where the internet service providers take action 
to prevent access to the materials infringing copyright in accordance with the laws 
and regulations of the Party.  
This provision is an example of active promotion because it resists the diffusion of more 
restrictive provisions on ISP liabilities from the US and keeps the door open for further regulation 
on ISP liability, an issue that is not regulated by TRIPS and other multilateral agreements.  
6.3.5 Active promotion on other issues  
In addition to the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, implementation of 
the Doha Declaration, the protection of GIs, and regulatory power to limit ISP liability, Chinese 
FTAs also actively promote IP rule-making on the following issues: 
• Cooperation – including the exchange of information, capacity building, and established 
contact point or intellectual property committee; and 
• Pre-WTO dispute settlement procedure.  
IP cooperation is mentioned in most Chinese FTAs that have an IP provision or IP chapter. 
Provisions on IP cooperation is the starting point for Chinese FTAs to include intellectual property 
provisions. The China-Chile FTA, the first Chinese FTA directly mentioning intellectual property 
in its text, puts IP provisions under the chapter of cooperation.  
Different Chinese FTAs focus on different aspects of IP cooperation. The China-Peru FTA 
requires the exchange of information on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, actions 
to prevent illegal access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and domestic procedures 
concerning the practice of ABS.31 Such exchange of information between the parties will not only 
facilitate the learning of best practices from each other but also serve to provide evidence to 
support their respective positions in multilateral negotiations. A similar provision also appears in 
the China-Costa Rica FTA.32 In Chinese FTAs with developed countries such as Switzerland and 
South Korea, the key issue for cooperation is how to reinforce IP enforcement and exchange 
enforcement information. In the China-Switzerland FTA, the use of genetic resources is not 
mentioned in the exchange of information.  
Chinese FTAs also enhance cooperation on specific IP issues where there is a common interest. 
For instance, the China-South Korea FTA not only mentions general cooperation but also 
specifically emphasizes cooperation on the issue of utility models. It provides the following: 
                                                     
31 Article 148.3 (a), the China-Peru FTA. 
32 Article 117.1 (c), the China-Costa Rica FTA. 
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Considering that both Parties have established utility model system, in order to 
facilitate the understanding and utilizing of utility model system by right holders and 
the public from both Parties and keep the balance of interests between right holders 
and the public, the Parties agree to enhance the cooperation on utility model legal 
framework of the Parties by exchanging information and experience on laws and 
regulations concerning utility model. 33 
This provision reflects the common interest of China and South Korea in the utility model system. 
The utility model is a type of intellectual property conducive to innovation and growth in 
developing economies (Kim et al. 2012). It is considered an integral and important part of the 
Chinese patent system (SIPO 2013). South Korea has also relied on the utility model system to 
promote innovation (Suthersanen 2006). Thus, both countries have a mutual interest to agree to 
further cooperation in this area in their FTA. This provision indicates the use of the “win-win” 
principle in Chinese FTAs, the idea being to maximize the common interests of both parties. It 
also indicates how China sees FTAs as a flexible tool. China did not require other FTA partners 
such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru to reinforce the utility model through FTAs. This practice is 
thus different from the US FTAs. 
The China-New Zealand FTA and China-Iceland FTA both introduce consultation as a prior-
WTO dispute settlement procedure.34 Both articles provide that consultation is a prerequisite for 
any IP dispute before a party pursues dispute resolution using the FTA or the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. With this consultation procedure, possible IP disputes between the parties 
could be solved in a more informal way. This provision will benefit China, considering it is more 
likely to be sued by developed countries. 
 In summary, some issues that China has actively promoted have been areas that the US has 
opposed. The protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and Intellectual Property 
and public health belong to this category. China gradually linked its position in FTAs to 
developments in its domestic laws. Chinese FTAs promoted these two issues by means of soft 
laws, so these provisions are more declarative of China’s position. In the case of GIs, the mutual 
recognition of GIs has appeared in a couple of Chinese FTAs. The protection of GIs is consistent 
with China’s national interest, but China does not require every FTA partner to have a mutual 
recognition mechanism. The limit to ISP liability was a case where China and Australia resisted 
the more restrictive standards in the US-Australia FTA. What was proposed was not a specific 
standard, but rather a reinforcement of state power to regulate ISP liability.    
                                                     
33 Article 15.16.1, the China-South Korea FTA. 
34 Article 166 of the China-New Zealand FTA and Article 66.1 of the China-Iceland FTA. 
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6.4 TRIPS-plus standards in Chinese FTAs 
TRIPS-plus standards refer to more extensive protection than that conferred by TRIPS or the 
closure of an option that is open in TRIPS. In the post-TRIPS era, these standards have been a 
battlefield for international intellectual property rule-making because these standards have 
encroached on flexibilities and policy space left open under TRIPS (Kur and Grosse Ruse-Khan 
2011). TRIPS-plus IP provisions appear in recent Chinese FTAs with Switzerland, South Korea, 
and Australia. All these FTAs are signed with developed countries and include high IP protection 
standards. South Korea and Australia both have signed FTAs in which TRIPS-plus IP standards 
are incorporated.   
 Since TRIPS-plus standards do not necessarily result in new domestic obligations for China this 
section will evaluate the impact of TRIPs-plus standards through the comparison of those 
standards with relevant domestic Chinese laws. Specifically, TRIPS-plus standards have been  
introduced into China concerning the following issues: 
(1) Data exclusivity for biologics;  
(2) Protection of designs;  
(3) Abolish “visually perceptible” as a trademark registration requirement;  
(4) Border protection; and  
(5) Strict transparency obligation; and 
(6)  Accepting more extensive protection as a principle. 
6.4.1 Data exclusivity for biologics  
Test data are data generated in the development of drugs, including data relating to a drug’s 
quality, safety, and efficacy, as well as to its physical and chemical characteristics (Correa 2002b). 
Test data and other data are required by national authorities for the purpose of registering 
pharmaceutical products. The central issue concerning test data protection is a third party’s use 
of the data for subsequent registration of similar products. There are two models for data 
protection concerning its use by a third party. First is trade secret protection. TRIPS adopted this 
approach and protected test data and other data as undisclosed information in Article 39.3. The 
other approach is data exclusivity, which treats test data as a type of intellectual property bearing 
a right of exclusivity. Before TRIPS, the US and the EU introduced data exclusivity as part of 
their domestic/regional legislation. The US successfully incorporated data exclusivity into North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but failed to incorporate data exclusivity into TRIPS. 
Nonetheless, data exclusivity reappeared in post-TRIPS US FTAs (Lopert and Gleeson 2013), 
including the TPP (Luo and Kesselheim 2015).  
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China has accepted data exclusivity during its accession to the WTO,35 where six-year data 
exclusivity was granted for test data. After its accession to the WTO, China formulated a national 
regulation to implement a six-year data exclusivity period for the first applicant concerning 
subsequent submissions for market approval.36 However, this national regulation is ambiguous as 
to whether biologics could be considered as “chemical entities” and to which data exclusivity 
could be granted.  
In the China-Switzerland FTA, the parties agreed to provide six-year data exclusivity for biologics. 
Switzerland is the home to three of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies; Ciba-Geigy, 
Hoffmann-La Roche, and Sandoz. Switzerland joined the US and EC proposal for data exclusivity 
in the TRIPS negotiation (Shaikh 2016, 70-72). Extensive data protection for biologics is an 
essential part of its interest.  
The six-year data exclusivity period for biologics is not only a TRIPs-plus standard but also 
introduces an additional obligation for China. It has created a new obligation for China because 
test data for biologics have not been explicitly protected by domestic Chinese laws. Considering 
the competitive advantage of the Swiss pharmaceutical industry, it seemed that China made a big 
concession to provide data exclusivity for biologics. However, the China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) proposed a ten-year data exclusivity for biologics, original orphan drugs 
or original drugs for children in 2017. 37 This proposal suggested that some in China saw long-
term data exclusivity for biologics as being consistent with China’s interest long term.  
6.4.2 Protection for designs  
Both the China-Switzerland FTA and China-South Korea FTA include TRIPS-plus standards for 
industrial designs. However, the standards introduced by the two FTAs are different. The China-
Switzerland FTA provides double protection–patent and copyright protection–to industrial 
designs. The China-South Korea FTA includes a new right in the form of a “right of offer to sell” 
to design right holders.  
Article 11.12.1 of the China-Switzerland FTA first confirms ten-year patent protection for 
industrial designs as provided in TRIPS. In addition, it provides twenty-five-year copyright 
                                                     
35 Para 284, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 23 November 2001, WT/L432.  
36 Article 35.2 of Regulations on Drug Administration 药品管理法实施条例 [Yaopin Guanlifa Shishi 
Tiaoli]. 
37  CFDA Notice on Calling for Comments on “Policies Related to Encouraging Innovations in 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Equipment and Protecting Interests and Rights of Innovators (Draft for 
Comments)” 总局关于征求《关于鼓励药品医疗器械创新保护创新者权益的相关政策（征求意见
稿）》意见的公告 [Zongju Guanyu Zhengqiu Guanyu Guli Yaopin Yiliao Qixie Chuangxin Baohu 
Chuangxinzhe Quanyi de Xiangguan Zhengce (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) ]. 
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protection for industrial designs that could be “considered as works of applied art and fulfill the 
general condition required for copyright protection by the respective domestic legislation”. 
China started to protect industrial designs in its Patent Law (1984), which granted five-year 
protection to designs with a possible renewal of another three years.38 Copyright Law (1990) did 
not include copyright protection for applied art. After China joined the Berne Convention in 1992, 
the State Council issued Provisions on the Implementation of the International Copyright Treaties, 
which granted 25-year copyright protection for foreign works.39 This is super-national treatment 
since the same level protection is not available to Chinese right holders. The term for patent 
protection of industrial designs increased to ten years after China’ accession to the WTO. 
Meanwhile, the super-national treatment of copyright protection for applied arts continues to be 
effective for foreigners. In the Copyright Law Proposal (2014), 40 25-year copyright protection 
for applied arts was to be made equally available to domestic and foreign right holders. If this 
proposal is approved, double protection (ten-year patent rights for designs and 25-year copyright 
protection for applied arts) will be available in China for any right holder.  
Considering the domestic legislative progress, the China-Switzerland FTA on copyright 
protection for designs will not introduce additional obligations for China. Nonetheless, such 
protection itself forms a TRIPS-plus standard in the sense that the double protection may derogate 
from the flexibility for Members to decide the specific system to protect designs otherwise 
available in TRIPS. 
Article 15.20.2 of the China-South Korea FTA provides that right holders of industrial designs 
can prevent unauthorized “making, offering for sale, selling, importing” articles bearing or 
embodying the protected design. The offering for sale of such articles is a TRIPS-plus standard 
because it grants a right for designs not mentioned in Article 26.1 of TRIPS. Again, this TRIPS-
plus standard will not introduce a new obligation for China because the same level protection has 
already been provided in Article 11 of Patent Law (2008).  
                                                     
38 Article 45.2 Patent Law (1984). 
39 The definition of “foreign works” conforms to the national treatment principle of the Berne Convention. 
Specifically, Article 4 of the Provisions on the Implementation of the International Copyright Treaties 
defines the scope of foreign works as “(1)works of which the author or one of the co-authors or the other 
owner of copyright or one of the co-owners of copyright is a national or a permanent resident of a country 
party to the international copyright treaties; (2) works of which the author is not a national or a permanent 
resident of a country party to international copyright treaties but which have been first published or 
published simultaneously in a country party of the international copyright treaties; or (3) works created 
by others by commission from a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture, a Chinese-foreign contractual joint 
venture or a foreign-capital enterprise which, by virtue of a contract, is the owner of copyright or one of 
the co-owners of copyright of the work.”  
40 Article 29.3. Copyright Law (Amendment for Deliberation) 著作权法 （修订草案送审稿） 
[Zhuzuoquanfa (Xiuding Caoan Songshengao)] http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-
06/10/content_2697701.htm. 
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6.4.3 Abolition of “visually perceptible” as a trademark registration requirement 
Article 15.1 TRIPS provides that “Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs 
be visually perceptible”. The China-Switzerland FTA actively defends this requirement in its 
Article 11.7.1. However, the China-South Korea FTA closes this option in TRIPS by stipulating 
that “neither Party may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible, 
nor may either Party deny registration of a trademark solely because the sign of which it is 
composed is a sound”.41 This is a TRIPS-plus standard because it enlarged the scope of trademark 
protection by lowering the registration requirement.  
Like TRIPS-plus standards for designs, the abolition of the ‘visually perceptible’ requirement for 
trademark registration does not introduce an additional obligation for China. This is because in 
the amended Trademark Law (2013), ‘visually perceptible’ is no longer a condition for trademark 
registration.42  
6.4.4 Border measures   
Provisions on border measures are included in the Chinese FTAs with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, 
Switzerland, South Korea and Australia. In these FTAs, the China-Chile FTA (Article 11), China-
Peru FTA (Article 147) and China-Costa Rica FTA (Article 114) mainly confirmed the provisions 
existing in TRIPS in terms of suspension of release, application, requirement for security or 
equivalent assurance to protect defendants and prevent abuse, right of inspection and information 
and ex-officio action (Article 51-53, 57, and 58 TRIPS). In addition to these active defensive 
provisions, the China-Switzerland and China-South Korea FTAs also introduced TRIPS-plus 
standards in border measures (Table 17). 
  
                                                     
41 Article 15.11.2, the China-South Korea FTA. 
42 Article 8 of the Trademark Law (2013) stipulates that “any signs, including words, graphs, letters, 
numbers, three-dimensional symbols, colour combinations, sound or any combination thereof, that are 
capable of distinguishing the goods of a natural person, legal person or other organization from those of 
others may be applied for registration as trademarks”. English version of the law is available at the WIPO 
website: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=341321.  
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Table 17 Border Measures in Chinese FTAs 
Content Scope of protection Intellectual property under 
protection 
TRIPS Importation  suspected counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods 
Regulation on the 
Customs Protection 
of Intellectual 
Property Rights of 
China (2010) 
Importation and exportation 
(Article 3) 
patents, trademarks or copyright 
protected by the present 
legislation of China (Article 2); 
special signs for Olympics and 
special signs for World Expo  
China-Chile FTA Importation and exportation suspected counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods 
China-Peru FTA Importation, exportation, and 
goods in transit 
suspected counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods 
China-Costa Rica 
FTA 
Importation and exportation suspected counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods 
China-Switzerland 
FTA 
Importation and exportation  goods infringing patents, industrial 
designs, trademarks or copyright 
China-South Korea 
FTA 
importation, exportation, in 
transition, placement under a 
free zone and placement 
under a bonded warehouse 
Trademarks and copyright, and 
goods which, according to the 
legislation of the Party in which the 
application for customs action is 
made, infringe a patent, a plant 
variety right, a registered design, 
or a geographical indication. 
China-Australia FTA Importation and exportation suspected counterfeit trademark 
or pirated copyright goods 
 
China accepted TRIPS-plus standards concerning border measures before TRIPS. TRIPS only 
requires Members to implement border measures for trademarks and copyright in the process of 
importation. Protection of other types of intellectual property and inspection in the process of 
exportation are optional according to Article 51 TRIPS. Nonetheless, China accepted high 
standards on customs protection of intellectual property during its bilateral negotiations with the 
US in the early 1990s. After the US-China Intellectual Property MOU (1992), China formulated 
Regulation on the Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (1995) which protects 
copyright, trademarks, and patents in both importation and exportation of goods.43 Although this 
standard turned out to be higher than that in the final text of TRIPS, China may not derogate from 
this standard in its domestic legislation because of the treaty obligation contained in the 1992 
MOU. Therefore, FTA provisions concerning (1) border measures for the export of goods and (2) 
border measures for patents (special signs for Olympics and World Expos) are TRIPS-plus 
                                                     
43 Article 3, 5, 14, 17, 19, 28, 29 and 31 of the Regulation on the Customs Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights (1995) 海关知识产权保护条例 [Haiguan Zhishichanquan Baohu Tiaoli] (1995). 
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standards that do not introduce additional obligations for China. In practice, the China-Chile, 
China-Costa Rica, China-Australia and China-Switzerland FTAs include such standards.  
The China-Peru FTA and China-South Korea FTA also include provisions on border measures 
for goods-in-transit. Border measures for goods-in-transit is a controversial issue, especially in 
the case of Netherlands’ seizure of generic drugs on their way from India to Brazil. 44  The 
amendment of the EU regulation suggested that the international standard is tilting towards no 
border measures for goods-in-transit. This issue has not yet been negotiated at multilateral fora, 
but the outcomes in ACTA indicate the efforts to push plurilateral rule-making on border 
measures for goods-in-transit have been in vain. Border measures for goods-in-transit have not 
been part of domestic Chinese law. However, the above FTA provisions on border measures for 
goods-in-transit have locked China into the adoption of more restrictive border measures.    
The China-South Korea FTA further extended the types of intellectual property protected by 
border measures to “goods which, according to the legislation of the Party in which the application 
for customs action is made, infringe a patent, a plant variety right, a registered design, or a 
geographical indication.”45 Current Chinese regulations only explicitly confer customs protection 
on copyright, trademarks, and patents.  The border measures for plant variety rights and GIs have 
already exceeded the level of protection to be found in China’s domestic IP laws, and therefore 
introduce additional obligations for China. This provision in the China-South Korea FTA reflects 
the shadow of border measures growing to cover more types of intellectual property than TRIPS, 
a shadow that is being cast by ACTA and other US and EU-led FTAs. For instance, border 
measures in ACTA cover patents, GIs, and new plant variety rights.46 The EU-South Korea FTA 
provides border measures for all types of intellectual property. Moreover, the China-South Korea 
FTA extends border measures to goods “in transition, placement under a free zone and placement 
under a bonded warehouse”. Just as with goods-in-transit, border measures for goods under a free 
zone and bonded warehouse are TRIPS-plus standards in the sense that these goods are not yet 
“imported” into the territory of a state. Both the extension of IP protection to more types of 
intellectual property and to other processes beyond importation of goods are TRIPS-plus 
standards requiring China to bring its domestic laws into compliance. In addition, through the 
TRIPS MFN principle, these protections will be extended to other WTO members.  
                                                     
44 The seizure was made merely on the basis of alleged patent infringement in the transit country 
(Netherlands), although such drugs did not infringe any patents in both the country of origin (India) 
and country of destination (Brazil). India and Brazil requested a consultation with the EU at the WTO 
(DS 408 and DS409). The WTO cases were settled later when EU and India reached an agreement to 
amend the EU Measure 1383/2003. 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=research  
45 Foot note 11, the China-South Korea FTA. 
46 Article 5 (h) and Article 13 of ACTA.  
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6.4.5 Additional transparency obligation 
Article 63 TRIPS provides a transparency obligation concerning intellectual property. It requires 
a WTO Member to publish IP legislation, judicial decisions and administrative rulings in a 
national language. The China-South Korea FTA requires parties to publish such information in 
the national language of each party.47 The China-Australia FTA requires parties to publish the 
database of invention patents, industrial designs, utility models, plant variety rights, geographical 
indications, and trademarks via the Internet.48 Requiring publication in other languages or through 
a certain media (Internet) are not specifically required by TRIPS, so the transparency 
requirements in these two FTAs impose extra duties on China. They are considered as a TRIPS-
plus standard because they limit China choice in selecting instruments to implement the TRIPS 
transparency requirement. The specified approach, especially publishing in other languages poses 
extra duties for China.  
6.4.6 Calculation of damages 
Although provisions on civil procedure in the China-Switzerland and China-South Korea FTAs 
are generally active defensive, the specified rules on the calculation of damages constitute a 
TRIPS-plus standard. The calculation of damages is one of the ‘constructed ambiguities’ in 
TRIPS. No matter how the ambiguous rules are specified, the specification per se limits freedom 
of Members to “determine the appropriate method of implementing TRIPS provisions within their 
own legal system and practice” (Article 1.1 TRIPS).  
The China-Switzerland FTA requires judicial authorities to consider the actual damage or to 
establish a fair license fee in determining the amount of damages.49 The China-South Korea FTA 
further specifies that the calculation of damages should consider “the value of the infringed goods 
or services, measured by the market price, the suggested retail price, or other legitimate measures 
of value submitted by the right holder”.50 TRIPS is silent on specific ways to calculate damages, 
so it is open to its Members to decide for themselves. The two FTA provisions mentioned above 
limit the discretion of judges in making decisions concerning the calculation of damages, thus 
constituting a TRIPS-plus standard.  
The above two FTA provisions concerning the calculation of damages do not introduce further 
obligations for China. They are compatible with Chinese domestic IP legislation. Before signing 
the China-Switzerland FTA and China-South Korea FTA, the actual losses of right holders and 
reasonable royalties have already been mentioned in domestic Chinese intellectual property laws. 
                                                     
47 Article 15.22.1, the China-South Korea FTA 
48 Article 11.6.2, the China-Australia FTA.  
49 Article 11.19 (b), China-Switzerland FTA.  
50 Article 15.24. 2 (b), China-South Korea FTA.  
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For instance, actual loss, benefit acquired from infringement, and reasonable royalty are stipulated 
in Trademark Law (2013) and Patent Law (2008).51  Chinese IP laws also provide statutory 
compensation as a fourth way to calculate damages.52 Nonetheless, with the specific requirements 
in the FTAs, a party is constrained by its treaty obligation to calculate damages in certain ways; 
in particular, it loses its freedom to amend its domestic laws in a way that takes a different 
approach.  
6.4.7 Principle of minimum standards  
The China-South Korea FTA allows parties to provide more extensive protection for IP. Article 
15.4 stipulates “each Party may, but shall not be obliged to, provide more extensive protection 
for, and enforcement of, intellectual property rights under its law than this Chapter requires, 
provided that the more extensive protection does not contravene this Chapter.” Article 11.3 of the 
China-Australia FTA includes a similar provision entitled “Obligations are Minimum 
Obligations.”  
This principle itself may not directly be TRIPS-plus, but it is an enabling provision. It enables the 
FTA to confer more extensive protection on intellectual property. It opens the door to a bilateral 
or plurilateral ratcheting up of TRIPS standards. This provision models Article 1.1 TRIPS and 
has a lock-in effect on the TRIPS-plus commitment made in any subsequent FTA. With this 
provision, states may not compromise any TRIPS-plus commitment they made in these FTAs. 
Together with the MFN principle in TRIPS, these provisions of minimum standards in FTAs 
become a stepping stone to more extensive protection.  
6.5 Compliance with other multilateral intellectual property treaties  
In addition to TRIPS, China has also entered into 14 WIPO-administered treaties, ratified the 
convention administered by the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), CBD and its protocols, and become a member of three UNESCO treaties. 53  As 
mentioned, treaty obligations arising from implementing these multilateral intellectual property 
treaties are not TRIPS-plus. This section will analyze them separately.  
Following the analytical framework of Chinese FTAs and TRIPS, the relationship between 
Chinese FTAs and other multilateral intellectual property treaties could be passive defensive (as 
long as both parties are members of a treaty), active defensive or active promotion of a rival 
standard. The China-Iceland FTA, China-Switzerland FTA, and China-South Korea FTA all 
                                                     
51 Article 63.1, Trademark Law (2013) and Article 65.1, Patent Law (2008) 
52 Article 63.3, Trademark Law (2013); Article 65.2, Patent Law (2008); and Article 49.2, Copyright Law 
(2010).  
53 See Appendix I for a list of international treaties that China is a member.   
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include an active defensive provision which lists multilateral treaties as part of the FTA.54 The 
China-South Korea FTA not only lists the names of treaties that both parties have concluded but 
also reiterates the specific provisions on preventing circumvention through technological 
measures and protection of rights management information in the WTO Internet treaties.55  
The focus of this section is on the more extensive protection that China agrees to in its FTAs than 
the current domestic legislation in China because these provisions will introduce additional 
obligations for China in the process of compliance. Specifically, protection of plant variety rights 
in the China-South Korea FTA is discussed as an example. The UPOV administers the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention). Two 
texts of the Convention–UPOV 1978 and UPOV 1991 – are relevant here. The major difference 
is that the UPOV 1978 is more generous, including farmers’ exemption (or privilege),56 but 
UPOV 1991 tends to favor the right holders. China is a Member of UPOV 1978, and the farmers’ 
exemption is permitted in China.  
The China-Switzerland FTA is generally consistent with the text of UPOV 1978. That means its 
provisions are active defensive of UPOV 1978 and do not create new obligations for China. A 
comparison of Article 15.18 of the China-South Korea FTA, the Chinese Regulation on the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (2013), UPOV 1978, and UPOV 1991 shows that the China-
South Korea FTA is more similar to UPOV 1991. In particular, it mentions the right of exporting 
and importing, something that does not exist in either Chinese domestic regulations or the UPOV 
1978. Therefore, the China-South Korea FTA has introduced new obligations for China. However, 
since the farmers’ exemption (the most important provision in UPOV 1978 for the public) still 
exists in the China-South Korea FTA, this FTA will not put Chinese farmers in a more 
disadvantageous situation as the UPOV 1991 may have done. In summary, though China made a 
concession in the form of right of exporting and importing, it did not compromise the farmers’ 
exemption. Considering China is a major exporter of vegetables and fruit to Korea, such an 
arrangement shows careful calculation by China concerning what is acceptable to it in FTAs and 
what is not.    
                                                     
54 See Article 64 of the China-Iceland FTA, Article 15.3 of the China-South Korea FTA, and Article 11.3.1 
of the China-Switzerland FTA. 
55 Article 15.8 and Article 15.9 China-South Korea FTA. 
56 Farmer’s exemption refers to a right of farmers to save their seeds for next year's sowing on their own 
holdings. For instance, UPOV 1978 provides that “breeder, restrict the breeder’s right to permit farmers 
to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have 
obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety.” Such provision is abolished in UPOV 
1991.  
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6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examined Chinese FTAs through their comparison with TRIPS and domestic 
Chinese IP legislation. The key message from the examination of IP provisions in Chinese FTAs 
is that these provisions are basically consistent with the TRIPS provisions, because of the 
overwhelming amount of TRIPS-defensive provisions, either passive or active. This message is 
emphasized here because, in the process of analysis, the focus was given to active promotion 
standards and TRIPS-plus standards in Chinese FTAs simply because they are new, different and 
under-researched. Nonetheless, the basic pro-TRIPS position in Chinese FTAs, either through 
their explicit reiteration or quiet acknowledgment through defensive provisions, should not be 
obscured. Basically, Chinese FTAs defend TRIPS as the dominant multilateral IP agreement and 
defend the WTO, the major multilateral forum for IP rule-making. The majority of defensive IP 
provisions in Chinese FTAs further support a higher-level conclusion that China basically takes 
a pro-development, developing country position in its bilateral engagement. These defensive 
provisions, to some extent, counterbalance the trend of the global IP ratchet.  
The active promotion provisions and TRIPS-plus provisions are important to detect the ‘novelty’ 
of IP provisions in Chinese FTAs. The active promotion provisions in Chinese FTAs reflect an 
interest of China that is not adequately promoted by TRIPS. China’s promotion of the disclosure 
obligation, GIs, public health and the limit of ISP liability, though sometimes through non-binding 
soft laws, shows how China supports rival standards proposed by developing countries. However, 
it is not clear at the current stage to what extent China is willing to be a regulatory innovator by 
leading alternative rule-making on these issues.  
For every TRIPS-plus standard in Chinese FTAs, two questions were raised and answered. First, 
how does the standard exceed TRIPS protection or eliminate an option otherwise open in TRIPS, 
and secondly whether it creates a new obligation for China? Among seven issues that have been 
identified as TRIPS-plus standards, the additional obligations that are imposed on China include 
the six-year data exclusivity for biologics and more restrictive border measures. The other five 
TRIPS-plus standards are essentially a reiteration of the TRIPS-plus standards that already existed 
in Chinese IP law. Nonetheless, a reiteration of domestic IP rules that exceed TRIPS standards in 
FTAs will lock in China, because these TRIPS-plus standards become international obligations. 
Strategically, China’s acceptance of TRIPS-plus standards reveals an inconsistent practice when 
compared with its general TRIPS-defensive position. This inconsistency will be discussed in the 
section on its strategy of dissembling (Chapter 10.3.1). 
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Chapter 7 China’s IP Engagement in 
Multilateral and Plurilateral Fora 
7.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I analyzed intellectual property provisions in Chinese FTAs with a focus 
on comparing them with TRIPS standards. This chapter will focus on China’s multilateral and 
plurilateral IP engagement. At the multilateral level, WIPO and WTO are the key fora to analyze. 
When considering plurilateral fora, I will differentiate between two types of engagement: China’s 
response to the vertical forum-shifting initiative of the US and its supporters; and China’s 
initiatives to promote its own plurilateral/regional IP agenda.  
China has developed a level of trust in WIPO since the 1970s, and its engagement with WIPO 
has increased in recent years. The Diplomatic Conference for WIPO Audio-visual Performance 
Treaty was hosted in Beijing, and the treaty was named after Beijing. The WIPO Beijing Office 
opened in 2014. Reciprocity has been enhanced in recent China-WIPO engagement. While WIPO 
supported China’s regional Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China defended WIPO’s role as the 
major forum for multilateral IP engagement. Section 7.2 will analyze the above issues in further 
detail.    
China’s engagement with WTO on IP issues has been discussed at various places in this thesis. 
China has used TRIPS to resist the U.S TRIPS-plus IP requirements in the US-China IP 
negotiations. China amended its IP laws to comply with TRIPS after its WTO accession, and 
another amendment was made to comply with the WTO dispute settlement resolution (Chapter 
2.4). China cosponsored developing countries and the EU’s proposals on GIs and the disclosure 
obligation (Chapter 3 and 4). China condemned the US for its forum-shifting to ACTA. China 
has defended the WTO firmly in the face of US bilateralism. This engagement shows China’s 
position at the WTO is a classic pro-development position shared by developing countries. 
Building on this basic point of view, Section 7.3 will focus on China’s IP proposal at the WTO, 
which was most closely related to the research question of whether China is an international IP 
rule-maker. 
In recent years, the US has initiated vertical forum-shifting through a couple of plurilateral IP 
agreements, in particular, ACTA and TPP, to enhance global IP standards beyond TRIPS (Sell 
2010b). Vertical forum shifting refers to the strategy of shifting IP negotiations from the 
multilateral level to the plurilateral level where it may be easier to reach an agreement with fewer 
members. Section 7.4 will analyze China’s position by comparing Chinese IP law and IP 
standards in ACTA and TPP. ACTA is already a proved failure. The TPP has gone ahead in the 
form of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
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(CPTPP), but without the participation of the US.1 These two agreements are natural experiments 
to test China’s position on TRIPS-plus standards. In the case of the TPP, the discussion in this 
chapter will be in the process of standard setting as it existed with US participation.  China 
opposed ACTA and TPP actively at the TRIPS Council meetings, despite there being no pressure 
for China to accept ACTA and TPP standards. 
Along with the domestic demand that China should increase its discursive power in international 
IP rule-making, intellectual property has been incorporated as an issue in China-participated or 
China-led plurilateral/regional initiatives. Section 7.5 will analyze China’s IP engagement in the 
RCEP, BRI, and the BRICS (including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). China 
keeps a low profile in negotiating IP rules at RCEP and does not attempt to take on a leadership 
role. In BRI and BRICS, China has developed into a model exporter, focusing on IP capacity 
building in these countries.  
Section 7.6 will explore the SIPO’s role in international patent regulation. SIPO, as the national 
patent regulator, has developed extensive transnational networks. An examination of its 
transnational engagement will demonstrate how multichannel communications have taken place 
among sub-state actors in a globalized world. It is through such engagement that SIPO has 
developed into an independent node in international IP regulation. 
7.2 China and WIPO: a tale of reciprocal engagement   
WIPO has been considered as something of an abandoned forum for IP rule-making after the US 
created a trade agenda on intellectual property in the GATT negotiations in the 1980s (Braithwaite 
and Drahos 2000, Sell 2003). However, the shift does not mean that WIPO is no longer important. 
Abbott (2000) has pointed out that the inter-institutional relationship between WTO and WIPO 
enabled the co-evolution of the two fora. Also, leaving enforcement to the WTO enabled the 
recent resurgence of WIPO as a more focused agency concentrating on socialization and norm-
building (May 2006, 35).  
WIPO is able to be a self-sufficient international organization because 90% of its operating budget 
comes from its administration of the PCT. Such budgetary facts may “compromise its image as a 
technocratic, objective civil servant” (Sell and Prakash 2004). Indeed, WIPO has long played the 
role of a missionary to spread the ideology of intellectual property (Drahos 2010). WIPO has 
actively engaged developing countries in intellectual property capacity building by providing 
technical assistance. It also creates TRIPS-plus obligations for its members. For instance, the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
                                                     
1  The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was signed 
in March 2018, in Chile. 
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include higher standards than TRIPS in online copyright protection (Chapter 6.5). The US is still 
a powerful actor in ongoing WIPO negotiations. For instance, the WIPO IGC negotiation was 
suspended in the year 2015 because the US opposed its working agenda (Chapter 4.2.2).  
The China-WIPO engagement started with WIPO’s technical assistance to China. As Chinese 
applicants became the largest community to use various WIPO treaties, and as China’s 
international influence increases in recent years, one can find the spirit of reciprocity in the China-
WIPO engagement.  
7.2.1 History of trust built on technical assistance 
The relationship between China and WIPO can be seen as early as 1973, one year after the UN 
recognized the PRC as the representative of “China”2 at the UN. WIPO, as one of the 16 special 
organizations of the UN, began to send invitations to China to attend its meetings. China, 
dispatched the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)3 to attend the 
WIPO meeting in November 1973 as an observer. The first contact was fruitful: after the meeting, 
the CCPIT assessed the feasibility for China to join WIPO and recommended China to establish 
a patent system. Though its proposal was shelved due to the Cultural Revolution, the seed for a 
patent system had been planted (Zhao 2008). 
Dr. Árpád Bogsch (the then Director General of WIPO) indirectly influenced the domestic debate 
on whether China should retain the inventor’s certificate during the preparation for China’s Patent 
Law (1984) and provided comments on one of its early drafts of this law. Patent law in China was 
censured because it was believed as a bourgeois right 资产阶级法权 [zichan jieji faquan].  To 
achieve a compromise, an early draft of the Patent Law designed a “dual track” system where 
invention patents and inventor’s certificates4 could coexist. China sent a delegation to participate 
in the Diplomatic Conference for the Amendment of the Paris Convention in 1980. During the 
breaks in this conference, Bogsch devoted hours of private discussions with Chinese patent law 
drafters to detailed technical questions in Chinese patent law. According to Zhao Yuanguo, one 
of the drafters of Chinese Patent Law (1984), the discussion with WIPO was important for China 
to formulate a “better, modern and advanced patent law” (Zhao 2008). WIPO’s comments helped 
Chinese patent law to gear towards international standards 和世界接轨 [he shijie jiegui]. In 
addition to patent law, WIPO also provided technical assistance on the early draft of copyright 
law in 1986 (Liu 2009). 
                                                     
2  From 1945 to 1972, the position was assumed by the Nationalist Government based in Taiwan.   
3  The CCPIT is a civil society responsible for international communication at that time. The identity of the 
CCPIT indicated China wanted the contact to remain informal. 
4  A legacy of the USSR where only honorary titles were granted to the inventers without remuneration. 
See Chapter 2.3.   
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In parallel with the legislative progress in intellectual property, China became a contracting 
member of WIPO on June 3, 1980, and joined the Paris Convention on March 19, 1985. To date, 
China has ratified 14 and signed three WIPO-administered IP treaties (Appendix I). Participating 
in WIPO IP treaties has aligned the Chinese IP system to world standards. Meanwhile, China 
cooperates with WIPO in joint research projects as well as personnel training and information 
exchange. Cooperation has also been enhanced in specific technical fields, for instance in 
trademark classification (SAIC 2016) and patent classification (See Section 7.6.1). Such 
cooperation has smoothed multi-channel communications between technocrats in China and 
WIPO.    
While China was frequently criticised by the US for ineffective and inadequate IP protection in 
the early 1990s, WIPO recognized the progress China made in intellectual property. When the 
US put China on the Special 301 watch list and occasionally threatened China with unilateral 
trade retaliation, Bogsch observed that “China’s IP development in the last two decades was 
unprecedented in the history of intellectual property”.5 Bogsch’s comment was quoted by China 
Intellectual Property White Paper (1994) to demonstrate the progress made by China with its IP 
system (State Council Information Office 1994). The endorsement by WIPO helped China to 
respond to the US criticism and further consolidated the China-WIPO friendship. 
In recent years, the number of IP filings from China has increased dramatically. The Chinese 
trademark office has received the largest number of annual trademark registrations since 2001. 
Since the recent global financial crisis, China has been the major contributor to the global increase 
in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications. In 2016, SIPO received 1.3 million patent 
applications, more than the sum of the applications received by USPTO, JPO, and KIPO (WIPO 
2017a). WIPO has enhanced its liaison with China in recent years as a response to the pivotal role 
played by China in the WIPO-administered treaties. China also supported WIPO to remain the 
major platform for international IP rule-making. This sub-section will discuss the strategic 
reciprocal relationship that China and WIPO have developed in recent years, specifically: (1) the 
opening of the WIPO Beijing Office, (2) the naming of the WIPO audio-visual performance treaty 
after Beijing, (3) WIPO’s support for the BRI and (4) China’s support for WIPO to become the 
major forum for IP rule-making. 
7.2.2 WIPO Beijing office: a response to surging Chinese IP applications  
China became a contracting member of the PCT in 1994 and simultaneously became one of the 
receiving offices for PCT applications. China was also the first developing country recognized as 
                                                     
5 This was from a speech Bogsch gave in China, in 1993, when reflecting on the 20-year WIPO-China 
cooperation from 1973.  
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an International Searching Authority (ISA) as well as an International Preliminary Examination 
Authority (IPEA) for PCT applications. China has become the third largest user of the PCT system 
since 2013. In 2016, the number of PCT applications from China underwent an annual increase 
of 44.7%. As reported by WIPO, “if this current trend continues, China will overtake the US 
within two years as the largest user of the PCT System”(WIPO 2017b).  
In the field of trademark, the Madrid System, on the basis of several WIPO-administered treaties,6 
provides streamlined services for the international registration of trademarks. China became a 
contracting member of the Madrid Agreement in 1989 and Madrid Protocol in 1995. It has been 
the sixth largest user of the Madrid System for the international registration of trademarks since 
2013. SAIC representing China signed an MOU with WIPO on May 11, 2016, to enhance their 
cooperation in international trademark registration (SAIC 2016).  
WIPO opened its Beijing Office in October 2014 as a response to the increasing use of WIPO-
administered treaties by Chinese applicants. The Beijing office is the fifth regional office of WIPO 
outside of its headquarters in Geneva. Through the Beijing Office, WIPO developed a deeper 
liaison with Chinese ministries in charge of intellectual property (WIPO 2016c). The Beijing 
Office also enabled WIPO to collect and timely update information about the Chinese economy 
and politics. When WIPO perceived opportunities in China’s grand regional agenda of BRI, it 
actively encouraged the IP element in the BRI, by encouraging closer cooperation with SIPO (See 
Section 7.2.3.3). 
7.2.3 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances  
The Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performance  (Beijing Treaty)7 is a WIPO-administered treaty 
to enhance protection of performers’ rights. Though China did not make a meaningful 
contribution to the negotiation of the text of this treaty, holding a diplomatic meeting in Beijing 
and naming the treaty after Beijing did have foreign policy significance. The well-documented 
interaction between NCAC and WIPO also shows how WIPO and Chinese IP regulators engage 
with each other. 
The issue of performers’ protection originated from controversial provisions in the Rome 
Convention.8 Basically, the protection of performers’ rights in the Rome Convention is only 
extended to live performance and recording and reproduction through phonogram. The Rome 
                                                     
6 The Madrid System is governed by the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks (Madrid Agreement) and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol). 
7  WIPO, Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances, Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Protection of Audiovisual Performances in Beijing, on June 24, 2012. 
8   WIPO, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention (1961)). 
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Convention provides “once a performer has consented to the incorporation of his performance in 
a visual or audiovisual fixation, performers are not entitled to the rights granted by the 
Convention”.9  When the Rome Convention was adopted, film-making was the only way to 
produce audio-visual works. But with the development of digital technology and channels for 
dissemination, the Rome Convention was not enough to protect performers’ rights. Although the 
issue of performers’ protection was mentioned in TRIPS and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WTTP), these treaties continue the logic of the Rome Convention.  
The EU-US disagreement has slowed down the progress of a harmonized global governance 
around performers’ rights. The EU has been active in developing regional rules to further protect 
performers, 10  but the US opposed international negotiations to extend performers’ rights to 
audiovisual works for fear that such an extension would adversely affect the development of the 
US film industry. International negotiation on a new treaty on performers’ rights in audio-visual 
works finally started in the year 2000 under the auspices of WIPO. A consensus was reached in 
2011. Although the treaty was later named after Beijing and China did participate in the 
negotiations, China did not make a substantive contribution to the outcome of the treaty. It was 
again a deal between the EU and the US (Drezner 2008, 71-87).  
Yan Xiaohong, Vice Minister of the National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC), 
documented the history of the Beijing Treaty in a memoir. He mentioned it was Wang Bingyin, 
Deputy Director-General of WIPO, who first contacted the NCAC, “she will endeavor to facilitate 
Beijing to be the venue for the diplomatic conference if China would like to consider it”(Yan 
2014a, 6-7). The proposal was later approved by the Chinese government after a deliberation 
involving experts and representatives from the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA), 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), 
SIPO, Legislative Affair Office of the State Council (LAO), and Legislative Affairs Committee 
of the NPC (LAC).  
Hosting the diplomatic conference on an IP issue was of symbolic significance for China, because 
it enabled China to display its achievements in intellectual property. As pointed out by Yan (2014a, 
7): “though China has made remarkable progress in recent years, there are still critics from the 
US, EU, and Japan. Hosting the conference in Beijing will introduce representatives from various 
countries to China to feel the development of China and acknowledge its development in 
intellectual property.” 
                                                     
9  Article 19 of the Rome Convention.  
10 For instance, the European Economic Community (EEC) promulgated the Council Directive 92/100/EEC 
of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property. 
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7.2.4 WIPO’s support for the Belt and Road Initiative 
China started its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)11 in 2013. Geopolitically, the BRI is important 
because it is extending China’s outreach to Central Asia, Europe, South East Asia and Africa. It 
is perceived by the US as a counter-initiative to jeopardize the US pivot to Asia (Overholt 2015), 
in particular, a challenge to the US thinking about world trade.12 The BRI treats Asia and Europe 
as a single space, in which China is its focal point. The grand initiative inspired cooperation 
between China and over 60 countries along the Belt and Road (BRI Countries) on many issues 
related to trade, in particular, infrastructures such as express railways, ports, and pipelines. As 
China becomes a technology exporter in these deals, it is imperative that IP systems are 
established in these counties. China began to develop IP cooperation with the BRI countries, and 
WIPO aided such cooperation in various ways.  
In 2016, WIPO initiated and co-organized with SIPO, the High-Level Conference on IP for BRI 
countries (BRI IP Conference). Francis Gurry, the Director General of WIPO, articulated the 
position of WIPO to support the BRI. Gurry noted the significance of the close relationship 
between WIPO and the BRI. He emphasized, “this would ensure coherence in the architecture for 
the implementation of intellectual property worldwide” (WIPO 2016b). He also encouraged the 
BRI countries to leverage WIPO tools, including WIPO’s global IP services, databases, and 
participation in IP treaties administered by WIPO (WIPO 2016b).  
The “coherence” argument partly revealed a deep concern that WIPO has regarding the 
geopolitical change in the international IP system. As China is rising as one of the great powers 
in intellectual property, WIPO must cultivate customer stickiness with China and the BRI 
countries.  
7.2.5 China supported WIPO as a major multilateral IP forum 
Maintaining multilateralism in intellectual property has been important for China, in particular 
when the US played the game of vertical forum-shifting using FTAs, ACTA, and TPP (Sell 
2010b). As demonstrated in Chapter 6, China has actively defended TRIPS standards in its FTAs. 
China diligently implemented the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations in the 
                                                     
11 一带一路 in Chinese, also translated as “One Belt One Road”. There are two major components of the 
initiative. “One belt” refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and “one road” refers to the 21st century 
Maritime Silk Road. Swaine (2015) provides a detailed introduction to the BRI in English.  
12 The US geopolitical thinking consists of two trading blocs — trans-Atlantic bloc with Europe, and trans-
Pacific bloc with Asia. The US, as the focal point of both trading blocs, negotiated regional trade 
agreements TTP and TTIP separately with trading partners in each bloc. 
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US-China WTO dispute13 to bring disputed measures into conformity with TRIPS (Scott and 
Wilkinson 2013).   
Multilateralism is also important for WIPO because WIPO’s influence was compromised by the 
US in the 1980s (Sell 2003, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Thereafter, the influence of WIPO as 
a forum for international IP rule-making began to fade. Although China has not yet developed 
into an international IP rule-maker, the rising market power does provide China with leverage and 
opportunities in IP regulation (See WAPI case in Chapter 5.3). With the prospect that China will 
further engage global governance (Chan, Lee, and Chan 2008, Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008, 
Chin and Thakur 2010), China’s support is crucial for WIPO to remain an important multilateral 
IP forum.  
China can be seen as having enrolled WIPO into its strategy of gaining more international 
influence on global IP standards. Shen Changyu, the Commissioner of SIPO, clearly articulated 
the Chinese position at the WIPO 56th General Assembly: “WIPO should fully play the role as a 
major platform for international IP rule-making” (SIPO 2016c). Shen’s speech signaled China’s 
support for the rejuvenation of WIPO. 
7.2.6 Implications 
WIPO’s support for China’s BRI and China’s support for WIPO as a major multilateral IP forum 
can be interpreted as reciprocal coordination (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000), although it is 
happening not between two states, but between an international organization and a state. A close 
relationship with China potentially gives WIPO more security as a major forum for IP rule-
making and makes it less vulnerable to forum-shifting strategies by other powerful players. WIPO 
may also expand its reach to the BRI countries by supporting the BRI. For China, WIPO is a 
forum that China is familiar with. In addition, as the biggest user of PCT and other WIPO-
administered treaties, China gains more leverage in WIPO.  
7.3 China engages the WTO: first IP proposal and its setback 
China’s engagement with the WTO has been discussed in the historical review and in every 
thematic case study in this thesis. Although China was not active in the TRIPS negotiations, the 
Draft Final Act (1991) was China’s baseline to defend US’ requirement for higher protection 
standards (Chapter 2.4.1) In the case of GIs and disclosure obligation, China’s proposals at the 
WTO manifested its classic, pro-development, developing country position. Another well-
documented area is China’s compliance with the TRIPS dispute settlement procedure (Thomas 
                                                     
13 WTO, China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362.  
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2017, Gervais 2009a, Yu 2011c, Guan 2014). This section will analyze an under-investigated 
issue: China’s first IP proposal at the WTO.   
China submitted its first intellectual property related proposal to the WTO Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee), proposing the TBT Committee to adopt fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, or reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(RAND) terms, as a principle in the licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs) to prevent 
patent hold-up.14 Although FRAND/RAND have been adopted by various international standard 
setting organizations (SSOs) and recognized by case law in some jurisdictions, there is no 
universal interpretation of these terms.  
The FRAND/RAND principle benefits licensees, the weaker party in the negotiation of a licensing 
agreement. Since US companies are mostly technology exporters and licensors in the international 
market, the US prefers letting the interpretation of FRAND/RAND emerge ex post in a dispute. 
Consequently, a clear meaning for the term is unlikely to emerge in a world of many litigation 
fora. By contrast, the FRAND/RAND principle is essential for China as a technology importer. 
After the Chinese DVD industry shrank through the imposition of unreasonably high licensing 
fees (Chapter 5.2), the Chinese government promoted standardization as a national strategy and 
began to promote anti-monopoly regulation on the licensing of SEPs, both nationally and 
internationally. Promoting FRAND/RAND as an international standard at the WTO is part of this 
agenda.  
 7.3.1 Process of the WTO IP in standardization proposal 
Dr. An Baisheng, the key negotiator for the IP in the standardization proposal has pointed out that 
developing countries have been the victim of a unilateral standardization process dominated by 
the US and the EU: 
Developed countries tend to be indifferent to the SSOs' behavior that may undermine 
the productive efficiency of developing countries or require developing countries to 
accept the international standards they have formulated unilaterally or compel the 
international society to accept increasingly higher intellectual property standards 
without mentioning how to restrict the abuse of these intellectual property rights (Liu 
2007, 10). 
These remarks indicate China’s intention to frame IP in standardization as a development related 
issue and gain support from other developing countries.  
                                                     
14 Generally, three categories of rules are developed: (1) disclosure rules, requiring certain disclosures of 
patents or patent applications; (2) negotiation rules, regarding the timing and focus of license 
negotiations; and (3) licensing rules, governing the level and structure of royalties, most often requiring 
participants to license essential patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms or 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms (Farrell et al. 2007). 
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In the fourth triennial review of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)15 
in May 2005, China suggested to the TBT Committee that it include intellectual property in 
standardization in the Triennial TBT Review among seven other issues.16 China was the sole 
proposer of this issue. The Chinese representative emphasized the development element of this 
proposal, “to strike the right balance between the needs of international standards development 
and the implementation of adequate and fair protection of intellectual property rights”.17 He 
further supported his argument by the fact that the issue of disclosure was not properly addressed 
by some SSOs and there are no sanctions for IP right holders when they refuse to trade. However, 
this proposal was questioned by other WTO Members. For instance, Mexico asked for 
clarification of the proposal because intellectual property was not within the remit of the TBT 
agreement.18  
China further clarified its position in its submission G/TBT/W/251 to the TBT Committee 
following the meeting. This submission focused on how the lack of disclosure and the different 
interpretations of the RAND principle, as prominent problems in the relationship between 
intellectual property and standardization, have been obstacles to international trade. China 
recommended that the interpretation of RAND be included in the TBT Triennial Review. By 
framing intellectual property and standardization as an important development issue, China was 
trying to shift the forum for interpreting the RAND principle from international SSOs to the WTO 
TBT Committee. 
This submission was supported by Brazil on the basis that patent rights should not constitute an 
obstacle to development objectives. Mexico again questioned the appropriateness of the TBT 
Committee as a forum to discuss the issue. Canada and South Korea19 further questioned how 
intellectual property in standardization had become an obstacle for Members to adopt 
international standards and facilitate international trade.20 The US refused to discuss the Chinese 
proposal at the TBT Triennial Review (Interview No. 29). Without a unanimous consensus on 
this issue, the Chinese proposal was not included in the TBT triennial review.  
                                                     
15 Article 15.4 mandates the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) to review 
the operation and implementation of the TBT Agreement on a triennial basis. 
16 The other seven issues submitted for the Fourth Triennial Review include: (1) Implementation and 
administration of the Agreement (proposed by the US); (2)  Good regulatory practice (proposed by the 
EC and US); (3) Transparency (proposed by China and the EC); (4) Conformity assessment procedures 
(proposed by the EC and the US); (5) Technical assistance (Proposed by China and the EC); (6) Special 
and Differential Treatment (proposed by China); and, (7) Labelling (proposed by the EC). See WTO 
TBT Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of 22-23 March 2005, G/TBT/M/35, May 24, 2005, Para. 74-
76.  
17 Ibid, Para. 74, G/TBT/M/35. See also An (2005). 
18 See supra note no. 16, Para, 78, G/TBT/M/35. 
19 WTO TBT Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of 2 November 2005, G/TBT/M/37, Para. 120.  
20 WTO TBT Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of 4 August 2005, G/TBT/M/36, Para. 102-104.  
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7.3.2 Forum shifting to APEC 
After the triennial review, China tried the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as its next 
venue. The proposal was not further pursued by China because of logistic issues. China could not 
find a place and time for a meeting that everyone would agree on (interview No. 24). 
The logistic issues might have been an excuse when there was no point in pursuing it further. The 
position of the US was already clear when the Chinese proposal was refused at the WTO. It was 
not easy for China to gain support from the developing countries in the Asia and Pacific region 
for this proposal either. Notwithstanding China’s framing of IP and standardization as a 
development issue, it was more a unique problem for China as an emerging economy than a 
common development problem shared by all developing APEC members. Moreover, APEC was 
not a key forum for international IP rule-making.  
7.3.3 Implications 
Though China’s efforts at promoting a universal interpretation of the RAND principle did not 
bear fruit, the proposal indicated China’s awareness of active engagement in the multilateral trade 
system. The trajectory of the proposal showed how China had learned to use the strategy of forum-
shifting. The outcome of the proposal revealed the strong veto power of the US and its allies to 
block a rival standard. In addition, some Chinese government officials were not confident in 
China’s role to promote the proposal even without the US’ block. They argued that RAND was a 
principle initially developed from judicial practices mainly in the US and the EU. China, as an 
importer of intellectual property, was not equipped with the capacity to explain and justify 
RAND’s judicial steering in a way that could convince the US and the EU that China could 
responsibly manage the evolution of the proposal.  
7.4 China’s response to the US-led plurilateral IP agreements  
Two US-led agreements, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the intellectual 
property chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) provide opportunities to examine China’s 
response to the process of plurilateralism.  This section will first briefly introduce the trend of 
plurilateral IP treaties as part of the international IP ratchet (Section 7.4.1). It will proceed to 
compare IP standards in ACTA and TPP with IP standards in Chinese law (Section 7.4.2). Based 
on findings of the comparison, the Chinese position (official and academic) towards ACTA and 
TPP will be analyzed in section 7.4.3.  
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7.4.1 The trend of plurilateralism in international IP rule-making  
IP plurilateralism (manifested by ACTA and TPP) started in 2007 as a counteraction to the WIPO 
Development Agenda adopted by WIPO. The negotiation of both treaties was secret.21 This 
secrecy has been criticised because without proper and timely information it is hard for a third 
party to influence the negotiation process (Levine 2011, Yu 2011a).  
Plurilateral fora often create club standards. Plurilateral IP rule-making only involves a small 
number of states, which are different from multilateral fora with a larger membership. The small 
membership makes it easier for great powers to overcome opposition and impose standards 
(Drahos 2002b). Plurilateral IP agreements are also different from bilateral FTAs that are 
negotiated individually. Once a plurilateral club is established, other states can be persuaded or 
pressured to join.  With the expansion of membership, these agreements gain more legitimacy. 
However, for the new members that did not participate in the original negotiations, the text of 
agreements is set.  Because of the secrecy in negotiations and the nature of the club standards, 
plurilateral agreements have been opposed by developing countries and global civil society. 
Both ACTA and TPP have encountered a backlash. The EU Parliament rejected ACTA because 
of opposition from global civil society and unprecedented public concern (Matthews and 
Žikovská 2013, Dür and Mateo 2014, Losey 2014). Specifically, Powell (2012) argues the online 
activism — including suspended access to websites, notably Wikipedia, blackouts of some 
website content, as well as mobilization efforts (contacting elected representatives) — contributed 
to the failure of the domestic US copyright legislation draft22 and eventually defeated ACTA. 
Soon after his presidency, Trump signed an executive order removing the US from the TPP. After 
the US’ withdrawal from the TPP, most of the IP provisions in the TPP were suspended.23 
Plurilateral agreements or regional agreements form part of the international IP ratchet to increase 
protection standards (Drahos 2002a). Stopping negotiations on IP protection standards is difficult 
precisely because powerful countries have lots of choices as to forum. The end of ACTA and the 
withdrawal of the US from the TPP does not mean the game of forum-shifting has ended. 
However, tracing the life cycle of IP plurilateralism and China’s protracted reaction is beyond the 
scope of this section. Instead, I will only look at China’s response, in particular in the 2010 round 
when there was an expectation that both ACTA and TPP would come into force.    
                                                     
21 For details of the negotiations of the ACTA and TPP and the TRIPS-plus standards they were intended 
to establish, see Ayoob (2010), Weatherall (2010), (Yu 2011a), Kaminski (2011), Bitton (2012), 
Cossiavelou (2017). 
22 Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and related Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).  
23  Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement, 11 November 2017, available at: 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/tpp-11/news/Documents/ministerial-statement.pdf.    
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7.4.2 Comparing Chinese IP law with ACTA and TPP 
During the ACTA negotiations, Chinese IP scholars started to compare ACTA and domestic 
Chinese legislation based on the leaked text accessible through WikiLeaks. 24  After detailed 
comparison in areas of civil remedies, border measures, criminal liability, and international 
cooperation, these Chinese researchers concluded that the IP standards set in ACTA did not 
deviate much from the current domestic Chinese law; although there were still gaps between 
ACTA and Chinese IP law, they did not amount to insurmountable barriers (Cheng 2011, Cui 
2011).   
Border measures is a case in point. ACTA extended border measures to processes of export and 
in-transit (Ruse-Khan 2011). China started to enforce border measures for exported goods in 1995. 
In the China-Peru FTA, border measures are extended to goods-in-transit. In the China-South 
Korea FTA, the parties agreed to implement border measures for IP protection in “importation, 
exportation, in transition, placement under a free zone and placement under a bonded warehouse”. 
This provision provides even higher standards than ACTA (See Chapter 6.4.4 for a detailed 
discussion).  
The TPP set higher IP standards than ACTA. It increased terms for copyright protection to 70 
years, extended the subject matter of trademark to include smell marks, and introduced patent 
linkage and eight years of data exclusivity for biologics. Data exclusivity for biologics not only 
poses undue obligations on developing members of the TPP but also threatens the general public’s 
access to medicine (Rimmer 2017, Artecona and Plank-Brumback 2016). Nonetheless, China has 
agreed to provide a six-year data exclusivity for biologics in its FTA with Switzerland in 2013. 
Under the MFN principle, such six-year data exclusivity for biologics is now available to all WTO 
Members (See Chapter 6.4.1). This example shows that there is not a wide gap between TPP 
standards and China’s IP law.25 
It is thirty years since the first IP legislation was promulgated in the PRC, and Chinese legislation 
and regulations have now reached a high level of IP protection. There are still gaps between the 
TPP and Chinese legislation, but as Zhang (2016a) has pointed out, China has already or is about 
to implement the TRIPS-plus standards in the TPP. It is based on the same mindset that led China 
to accept various TRIPS-plus standards in its FTAs (Chapter 6.4).    
ACTA and TPP did create a certain “pressure to join” the club (Drezner 2008), but this pressure 
was not an international obligation. Clearly, China still had the freedom not to join these 
                                                     
24 The website including ACTA related documents is https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Category:ACTA.  
25 At the time of writing the US has withdrawn from the TPP. However, it is still worth comparing the TPP 
standards with China’s existing standards, because China’s existing standards reveal China’s own 
preferences in intellectual property.  
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agreements. Should these agreements come into force, they will not threaten China too much 
because there are only small gaps between these two agreements and Chinese IP law.   
7.4.3 Chinese position towards the ACTA and TPP 
The above comparisons provide a basis to understand Chinese response to the high IP standards 
in recent plurilateral agreements. SIPO did a survey on the possible position of China in response 
to the high IP standards led by the US and the EU. The results of the survey showed China was 
ready for higher protection standards in some IP issues considering the progress and prospect of 
Chinese enterprises in these areas (Figure 20). Based on this result, Li and Cui (2015) provide 
two suggestions. First, China could make a reasonable compromise on some IP issues so as to 
grasp the opportunity to participate in international negotiations. Secondly, China is still a 
developing country and so needs to evaluate standards from that perspective.  
Figure 20 Attitudes to the High IP Standards Led by the US and the EU (ACTA, 
TPP, TTIP, etc.)26 
The Chinese government emphasizes the compatibility of the IP system with its stage of 
development when formulating IP law and regulations. The functions of the IP system are to 
                                                     
26 This table is translated from Li and Cui (2015). Both authors of the paper are affiliated to MOFCOM. It 
is worth noticing that this is a second-hand source and the original source of the data is an internal report 
entitled, Research on Enhancing International Impact of Intellectual Property by SIPO. Some details 
about the survey, for instance, how many samples were collected and whether they were representative 
are unknown. However, it is still valuable data because it was prepared by SIPO and would be used to 
advise decision-making.  
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A. China should not accept the high 
standards, because high-standard IP 
protection will impair China’s 
economic development.  
B. China should accept the high 
standards because they are consistent 
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C. Though the protection and 
enforcement standards in these 
agreements are stricter than domestic 
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some of the high standards.  
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will be the trend in the future. 
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promote innovation and economic development.27 This basic position, combined with the rapid 
economic development in China in recent years, underpins the overwhelming responses (C and 
D in Figure 20) towards the recent US-led plurilateral IP agreements.  
Notwithstanding the attitudes from domestic IP experts to take an open and inclusive attitude 
towards the ACTA and TPP, China officially opposed ACTA at the TRIPS Council, as a 
developing Member of the WTO. At the TRIPS Council meeting in 2010, China and India, 
supported by a number of developing countries, firmly resisted ACTA and other plurilateral IP 
agreements. Both countries argued that ACTA would not only conflict with TRIPS and other 
WTO agreements and cause legal uncertainty but also undermine the balance of rights, obligations, 
and flexibilities that were negotiated in the various WTO agreements. ACTA, they argued, would 
distort trade or create trade barriers and disrupt goods in transit or transshipment (WTO 2010).  
The divergent opinions towards ACTA and TPP among Chinese IP experts and the Chinese 
government implied a certain inconsistency in China’s position towards TRIPS-plus standards. 
This inconsistency was caused by conflicting principles — intellectual property as a tool to 
stimulate innovation versus intellectual property as an integral part of foreign policy. This 
inconsistency will be analyzed in the strategy of dissembling (Chapter 10.3.2).  
7.5 Intellectual property in China-led regional/plurilateral agendas 
In recent years, China has begun to initiate its own plurilateral and regional IP arrangement. These 
initiatives were made to echo the domestic call for increasing China’s “discursive power 话语权 
[huayuquan]” in international IP rule-making. This section will first introduce this background of 
a call for increasing discursive power and then examine examples of China’s IP arrangement in 
RCEP, BRICS, and BRI. Despite the domestic demand for increasing China’s discursive power 
being clear and strong, its specific positions in these China-led IP arrangements tend to be obscure.  
7.5.1 The demand for China to increase its discursive power in IP rule-making 
As China moved to become the second largest economy in the world, there were increasing 
domestic demands for China to deeply participate in global governance. President Xi articulated 
this demand when he proposed to disseminate the successful experience of the free trade zones: 
The global trade system has undergone a biggest restructure after the Uruguay 
round in 1994. China is not only an active participant and firm supporter for 
economic globalization but also an important builder of and a major beneficiary 
                                                     
27 For instance, the 12th Five-year Guideline for Intellectual Property 国家知识产权事业发展“十二五”
规划 [Guogjia Zhishichanquan Shiye Fazhan Shierwu Guihua] identified the following two principles 
to promote intellectual property development: “(1) keep promoting the integration of intellectual 
property and the economy, (2) keep serving the change of economic development mode as the starting 
point for and the purpose of making intellectual property policies.” 
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from globalization. We cannot be bystanders and followers; instead, we have to be 
participants and leaders. We will have China’s voice heard in the setting of 
international standards, have the Chinese characters injected so that we can 
safeguard and expand Chinese interest in development (Xinhuanet 2014, underlined 
by the author). 
President Xi’s call for China to be “participants and leaders” was disseminated to and 
implemented by government officials at various levels in many areas, including intellectual 
property. In 2015, China issued the policy aiming to build China as a leading IP power in the 
world.28 The policy is aimed at enhancing China’s engagement in international IP rule-making: 
“(China should) push forward construction of more fair and reasonable international intellectual 
rules…and steer international IP rules to a direction that is more generous, inclusive balanced and 
effective”.29  
The roadmap to enhance China’s role as an international IP rule-maker was further articulated by 
IP epistemic communities. Li and Cui (2015, 10) 30  suggested that “China should actively 
participate in the new round of restructuring of international IP rule-making, actively export IP 
values with Chinese characteristics and continuously increase China’s discursive power in 
international IP negotiations”. To realize this goal, specific measures were proposed, including: 
(1) continue to use multilateralism to decide international IP issues; (2) ensure that the plurilateral 
negotiations remain open and transparent while trying to build alliances; and (3) seek leadership 
as well as seek a “win-win” situation in FTA negotiations (Li and Cui 2015, 15-16).  
In addition, Chen (2016b) proposed that China adopt a defensive posture in response to the current 
ratcheting up of international IP standards. Chen (2016) also argued that China should represent 
developing countries in international negotiations. By contrast, Government officials consider 
discursive power as spreading the best practices of IP protection with Chinese characteristics. For 
example, Zhou Yong, who works at the Office of National Leading Group on the Fight Against 
Intellectual Property rights Infringement and Counterfeit (the Anti-counterfeiting Leading Group), 
commented that the increasing creation, utilisation, and protection of intellectual property in 
China, recently has produced a deeper understanding and wider recognition of IP protection from 
international society. China should disseminate its successful experience in its anti-counterfeiting 
campaign as a “Chinese paradigm for IP protection” (Zhou 2017).  
                                                     
28  State Council issued Several Opinions on Accelerating Building China as an IP Power under New 
Conditions, (Opinions on IP Power Building (2015)), see note no. 4 in Chapter 1.  
29 Para. 25, Opinions on IP Power Building (2015). Participation in international intellectual property rule-
making is also mentioned in Para. 18 and Para. 28 of Opinions on IP Power Building (2015).  
30 Both authors of this article are researchers from a research institute affiliated with the MOFCOM. Among 
various publications in Chinese on this topic, Li and Cui (2015) provide the most specific and feasible 
recommendations.  
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Although the demand for China to increase its discursive power in international IP rule-making 
has emerged after the Opinions on IP Power Building (2015), the variegated views presented 
above shows China has not yet had a clear roadmap pertaining how to exert its discursive power. 
The next section will investigate China’s actual IP engagement with RCEP, BRI, and BRICS and 
the difficulties that it has encountered in promoting these initiatives.  
7.5.2 China’s engagement in RCEP  
RCEP was first initiated by the ASEAN in 2012. The negotiating parties include the ten ASEAN 
members, and China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Before the US’ 
withdrawal from TPP, it was considered as China’s counterstrategy to the TPP. China was 
excluded from the TPP negotiations, and the US is excluded from RCEP negotiations. Exclusion 
of rival states is essential for the major powers included to assume leadership (Azis 2013, 
Hamanaka 2014). However, TPP and RCEP have seven members in common (See Figure 21). 
The overlapping membership to a certain extent eased the exclusion pressure, in particular for 
China.   
 
Figure 21 Mapping of ASEAN, TPP and RCEP Membership  
After the US withdrew from the TPP, some of the negotiators from both the TPP and RCEP, 
specifically, Australia and South Korea, advocated for Chinese leadership and deeper 
commitments to RCEP. RCEP is a mega-regional agreement with 16 states representing some 46% 
of the world’s population and 30% of global GDP in 2016 (Ashton 2017). However, China has 
not been keen to be seen as a dominant leader in RCEP and has emphasized it is an ASEAN-led 
agreement. Geng Shuang, the spokesperson for the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA), 
replied to such a proposition as follows:  
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Neither RCEP nor FTAAP is dominated by China. RCEP is an ASEAN-led regional 
economic integration and cooperation, and China fully respects the ASEAN's core 
position and leading role. On this basis, China has cooperated with the parties to 
negotiate, and actively promoted the negotiation process, to conclude negotiations 
as soon as possible (CMFA 2016). 
After the US withdrawal from the TPP, Japan and South Korea pushed for stronger IP standards31 
in the 18th round of RCEP negotiations, in May 2017, including extending patent terms and data 
exclusivity (Geyter 2017). These standards are not acceptable to India and other developing 
countries involved in the RCEP negotiations. In addition, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) called 
for removing the IP clause from RCEP because almost two-thirds of all the drugs MSF purchases 
to treat HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria across the world are generic medicines from India. If data 
exclusivity is introduced into RCEP, the entry of generic medicines will be delayed (The Hindu 
2016).  
It is difficult to accommodate demands on IP standards in RCEP negotiations. On one end of the 
spectrum, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia requested a high level of IP protection, 
some of which are TRIPS-plus protection; on the other end of the spectrum, India proposed 
adhering strictly to the TRIPS standards. When it comes to the level of IP protection, China falls 
in the middle of the spectrum (Section 7.3.2). With the introduction of higher standards of 
intellectual property in the RCEP negotiations, China will have to come to a decision as to whether 
to support those standards or whether to side with India’s pro-TRIPS standards.  
There is a visible tension between China’s ambition to be a world leading IP power and the degree 
to which it actually engages in the RCEP IP negotiations. How China will respond to the draft 
high standards in RCEP will reveal much about how it sees its IP future. 
7.5.3 China and BRICS IP arrangements  
After the global financial crisis, the BRICS began to emerge as a new coalition in global 
governance (Armijo and Roberts 2014). In particular, the BRICS have been active in global 
financial governance by establishing the BRICS Development Bank (Stuenkel 2013, Cooper and 
Farooq 2015). The BRICS also began to engage in global energy governance (Downie 2015). Yet 
in other areas like health, the BRICS are unlikely to be a unified political bloc that will transform 
global health governance (Tediosi et al. 2016).  
Two IP cooperation mechanisms among BRICS have been established:  the Heads of Intellectual 
Property Offices (HIPO) since 2011, and the BRICS IPR Cooperation Mechanism (IPRCM) since 
                                                     
31 For a closer review of the intellectual property standards in RCEP, See Yu (2017). 
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2016. HIPO focuses on technical and substantive cooperation among the patent offices, while 
IPRCM focuses more on the general coordination of trade-related aspects of IPRs.   
According to the BRICS Intellectual Property Offices Cooperation Roadmap, 32  HIPO will 
cooperate in examiner training and exchange, patent procedures, promoting public awareness on 
intellectual property, information exchange, national IP strategy, and position coordination at 
multilateral fora (SIPO 2018). These areas (except for the last one) are not so different from the 
agenda for North-South IP cooperation (for instance EU-China IP Cooperation).  
China proposed IPRCM in 2011, which was finally established at the eighth BRICS Summit at 
Goa in October 2016. According to an interview with Zhang Shaogang, the head of the 
International Department of MOFCOM, “China seeks to use this cooperation mechanism to 
coordinate IP cooperation with other BRICS countries at both multilateral and plurilateral levels, 
increase the discursive power and influences of the emerging economies in international IP rule-
making, and promote a more balanced, fair and reasonable international IP system” (Zhang and 
Hu 2016).  
So far, it seems that the BRICS countries have had a consensus in making defensive coalitions, 
but they have not yet had a clear roadmap as to how to undertake active initiatives to reform 
international IP regulation. The BRICS appear to have a common interest in defending the current 
multilateral IP regulation through WTO as a response to the US vertical forum-shifting. For 
example, China, India, and Brazil have stood together at the TRIPS Council to oppose ACTA 
(See Section 7.3.3).  
They face more obstacles in actively promoting an IP standard. Whether BRICS members will 
actively promote, as a coalition, IP rules that are different from EU or US standards depends on 
the solidarity of their interests. One possibility is that interests among the BRICS on intellectual 
property are somewhat fractured due to the different stages of development of these countries. 
The BRICS have different domestic IP standards and therefore different expectations concerning 
IP cooperation amongst themselves. For instance, China has already achieved high-level 
standards of IP protection (See Section 7.3.2), and it has fewer incentives than other BRICS 
members to promote TRIPS-minus standards at the multilateral level, such as proposing the 
amendment of Article 27.3 (b) TRIPS to exclude life forms from patenting. Without a unified 
internal position on intellectual property, cooperation among the BRICS is likely to take a thin 
form such as information exchange and technical cooperation. The current IPRCM is an example 
of this thin cooperation.  
                                                     
32 BRICS Heads of IP Offices, BRICS Intellectual Property Offices Cooperation Roadmap, Magaliesburg 
May 2013, available at: https://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SIGNED-
BRICS-IP-OFFICES-COOPERATION-ROADMAP.pdf.  
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7.5.4 Intellectual property in the Belt and Road Initiative  
From 2013, the BRI has been China’s grand strategy to enhance engagement between China and 
the BRI countries. 65 countries are identified as BRI countries, and they account for 62% of the 
world’s population and 31% of the world’s GDP (Emerging Markets Institute 2017). As discussed 
in Section 7.2.2, WIPO supported China’s BRI to consolidate its role as a major multilateral IP 
forum. This sub-section will look at another aspect of intellectual property in the BRI — 
cooperation between China and the BRI countries.  
Intellectual property was put on the agenda of the BRI because China is the technology exporter 
in this initiative. Unlike 30 years ago when China imported technologies from the US, Japan, and 
Germany, Chinese cooperation with the BRI countries is mainly in the area of infrastructure 
building (transportation, telecommunications, construction, energy and environment) which 
involves dissemination of Chinese technologies to the BRI countries. From 2014 to 2016, the 
trading volume between China and the BRI countries topped USD 3 trillion, and cumulative 
investment from China to the BRI countries exceeded USD 50 billion (Xi 2017). It is in China’s 
interest that these countries have basic institutions for intellectual property so that China’s 
exported technologies can be properly protected. This demand motivates China to focus on IP 
related capacity building in these countries.  
China has not imposed IP standards on these countries.  At the High-Level Conference on IP for 
BRI Countries in 2016, a Common Initiative33  was reached by IP authorities from the BRI 
countries who participated in the conference. The areas of cooperation areas include the following:  
(1) exchange of experience on IP laws and regulations, policies and strategies; 
(2) enhancement in capacity building; 
(3) cooperation in specific issue areas; 
(4) raise public awareness about intellectual property; 
(5) develop human resources in intellectual property; 
(6) intellectual property information sharing and utilization. 
This Common Initiative highlights cooperation and capacity building, without any substantive 
requirements regarding IP standards. It indicates that China may rely on webs of dialogue, 
focusing on capacity building to enhance IP protection and awareness in the BRI countries.   
China has also signed bilateral IP agreements with the BRI countries. For instance, Uzbekistan 
and China signed a bilateral agreement on IP protection and cooperation in June 2016 (SIPO 
                                                     
33 High-Level Conference on Intellectual Property for Countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Common Initiatives for Strengthening Cooperation between 
Countries along the "Belt and Road" in the Field of Intellectual Property, July 27, 2016, available at: 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar/headlines/201607/t20160727_1282731.html. 
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2016b). In this bilateral agreement, both parties are committed to providing mutual and effective 
IP protection in accordance with the international treaties in which they jointly participate. They 
also agreed to extend cooperation to areas like personnel training and information exchange.  
With the progress of the BRI, some specific proposals for IP cooperation among BRI countries 
have emerged. For instance, China initiated a three-year special anti-counterfeiting campaign the 
“Breeze Action 清风行动 [qingfeng xingdong]” in 2015 to maintain the good reputation of “Made 
in China” overseas through border measures on exported goods. This campaign has focused on 
cracking down on counterfeiting and piracy of products to be exported to Africa, Arabic countries, 
Latin America and BRI countries.34  
These initiatives on technical coordination or cooperation are small steps for China to enhance its 
IP engagement with the BRI countries. At this stage, a deepening of cooperation around existing 
standards is all that might be expected. Most of the BRI countries are WTO Members, which 
means their domestic legislation already complies with the “minimum standards” established by 
TRIPS. Considering that China advocates “adhering to the TRIPS standards”, it would be 
inconsistent for China to propose a TRIPS-plus IP standard among the BRI countries. China may 
think of rule experiment in areas that it has actively promoted in its FTAs, such as the disclosure 
obligation, geographical indications and the protection of traditional knowledge (see Chapter 6). 
However, the case studies on the disclosure obligation (Chapter 4) and GIs (Chapter 3) indicate 
that there is no strong political will in China to push forward with rule-making in these areas.  
China has enhanced its IP cooperation with the BRI countries and sought to be a regulatory 
exporter through capacity building. Nonetheless, it is difficult for China to propose rule-making 
initiatives with the BRI countries at the WTO.  
7.5.5 China in global patent governance— SIPO as an important node 
As a result of the surge in patent applications from Chinese residents, since 2011, SIPO has 
become the biggest patent office in the world (WIPO 2012). It has come to play an increasingly 
important role in global patent regulation. In addition to representing the Chinese government, 
SIPO has developed its own transnational networks with its counterparts (patent offices of other 
states) and international organizations (WIPO and WTO). For instance, SIPO has been one of the 
                                                     
34 General Office of the State Council. Circular of the State Council on Issuing the Main Tasks of the 
National Work on Combating Infringement upon Intellectual Property and Manufacture and Sale of 
Fake or Substandard Commodities 国务院办公厅关于印发 2015 年全国打击侵犯知识产权和制售
假冒伪劣商品工作要点的通知 [Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa 2015 Nian Quanguo Daji 
Qinfan Zhishichanquan he Zhishou Jiamao Weilie Shangpin Gongzuo Yaodian de Tongzhi] No. 17 
(2015).  
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IP5 (the five largest patent offices) and ID5 (the five largest offices for designs).35 SIPO has also 
established a patent prosecution highway (PPH) with 19 patent offices in the world.36 The pilot 
PPH pilot program for IP5 was launched in September 2013 (EPO 2016).  
In addition to cooperation in the patent examination with other major patent offices in the world, 
SIPO began to contribute to discussions around international patent classification (IPC).37 China 
is a country with distinctive traditional knowledge, in particular in plant pesticides. At the 35th 
IPC Union Committee of Experts meeting in October 2004, SIPO proposed a detailed 
classification of botanical pesticides. To persuade others to accept this classification, SIPO 
skillfully framed its demand as a specific issue in relation to one of the agendas of the meeting: 
consideration of the need for further development of the IPC in relation to biodiversity. At the 
meeting, Chinese representatives proposed that technologies in the area of botanical pesticides 
cover the relevant subject matter relating to “developing new pesticides with biocompatibility”.38 
Chinese representatives requested a more detailed patent classification in IPC A01N65/00 in 
relation to botanical pesticides, in order to facilitate patent document searches in this area. One 
month later, at the 12th Meeting of the IPC Revision Working Group, SIPO submitted its proposal 
concerning the detailed classification of IPC “A01N65/00” in relation to plant pesticides, as a 
solution to the search problem. It took SIPO more than two years to undertake intensive 
negotiations with patents offices in Germany, Britain, the US, Japan, Europe, Sweden, and WIPO. 
The proposal, finally adopted by WIPO in 2007, was the first Chinese proposal on IPC (The New 
Century of Agrochem 2007).  
After its first IPC proposal, China participated in six IPC revision projects. For instance, China 
volunteered as rapporteurs for the WIPO Five-Year Plan for the Revision of the IPC in 2013.39 
Among these six revision projects, SIPO played the role of rapporteurs in two projects — C462 
(in relation to IPC revision in the field of transmission in electronic communication technique) 
and C464 (in relation to IPC revision in the field of food or foodstuffs and their preparation or 
                                                     
35 “ID5 is an Industrial design framework comprised of the European Union Intellectual Property Office 
(EUIPO), the Japan Patent Office(JPO), the Korean Intellectual property office(KIPO), the State 
Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China(SIPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office(USPTO),” described in the Official website of ID5 http://id-five.org/. 
36 These include patent offices from Japan, the US, Germany, Russia, Finland, Denmark, Mexico, Austria, 
South Korea, Poland, Canada, Singapore. Portugal, Spain, UK, Switzerland, Iceland, Israel, Hungary. 
Data from SIPO website for PPH http://english.sipo.gov.cn/specialtopic/pph/.   
37  Strasbourg Agreement establishes the International Patent Classification (IPC) is the international 
agreement to harmonized international patent classification. It is one of the WIPO-administered treaties. 
China joined the Strasbourg Agreement in 1997.  
38 WIPO Special Union for the International Patent Classification Committee of Experts, Thirty-Fifth 
Session, Classification Tools Relating to Traditional Knowledge and Biodiversity, IPC/CE/35/7, 
September 21, 2004.  
39 WIPO International Bureau, Project CE 453, Five-Year Plan for the Revision of the IPC, February 7, 
2013. See Para. 5 for the issue areas to be revised and Para. 11 for the responsibilities of the rapporteurs.   
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treatment).40 Both projects have been completed, and SIPO proposals have been adopted by 
WIPO (Wu 2016).  
These Chinese proposals, however, are not comparable to India’s Traditional Knowledge Digital 
Library (TKDL), a database designed to protect India’s centuries-old traditional knowledge.41 
The TKDL played a role in defensive protection within the existing IP protection system by 
preventing misappropriation of traditional knowledge. From 2009 to 2011, the European Patent 
Office (EPO) identified 36 patents making use of Indian traditional knowledge by searching this 
database (WIPO 2011a). The Chinese proposals are complementary to the existing IPC and do 
not initiate rival standards.  
From a nodal governance perspective (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing 2005), SIPO has emerged as 
a nodal center for global patent governance. Its engagement as a sub-state actor of China will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8.2.2.  
The above-mentioned initiatives, whether or not led by China, show that China is socializing itself 
in the use of IP rules. It is quietly experimenting with international IP regulation by providing 
technical assistance, training and exchange programs to the BRICS and BRI countries. Though 
there have been suggestions that China should enhance its rule-making power, it does not take the 
leadership in the RCEP negotiations. Technical assistance and exchanges in various forms are the 
most frequently used measures for China to strengthen its IP engagement with these countries. 
China is treading softly rather than assertively on intellectual property. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined China’s IP engagement with WIPO and WTO, its role as a veto power 
over the US-led plurilateral agreements, and its own regional/plurilateral engagement. Quite a 
few issues discussed in this chapter have emerged only recently, indicating that China’s 
multilateral and plurilateral IP engagement have intensified in recent years. These ongoing 
processes also add uncertainty and difficulty to any conclusion on the prospect of China’s 
international IP engagement. This section will summarize the general observations from this 
chapter and their implications for future discussion.  
The most obvious observation is the inconsistency of China’s position on the same issue at 
different fora. China-WIPO engagement aims to cater for the surging Chinese IP applications and 
to better serve the interest of Chinese IP right holders. China’s position at the WTO is the classic 
                                                     
40 WIPO Special Union for the International Patent Classification Committee of Experts, Thirty-Fifth 
Session, Report, IPC/CE/45/2, March 22, 2013. See Para. 20 for the list of the projects.  
41 SIPO has developed the Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database (TCMPD). See (Liu and Sun 
2004). However, the TCMPD is fundamentally different from the TKDL because it is a patent database 
of the patented traditional Chinese medicine by SIPO, not a database of traditional knowledge itself.  
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pro-development, developing country position. However, it included TRIPS-plus standards in its 
FTAs (Chapter 6.4). At the plurilateral level, China quietly exported IP standards (and probably 
a set of China-specific IP standards) to the BRICS and BRI countries through providing technical 
assistance. This issue will be further discussed in the dissembling strategy (Chapter 10.3.1) 
The second observation relates to the Chinese way of navigating international IP regime 
complexity. Unlike the US strategy of forum-shifting and new forum creation, China tends to play 
a multi-fora game, which is more nuanced and refined than either a one-way assimilation to the 
US-centered liberal order or a collision course with this order. While China advocates its own 
regional or plurilateral IP arrangements, it simultaneously supports the WIPO and WTO as pillars 
for IP multilateralism. This is consistent with observations from international financial regulation 
where “China is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations and 
multilateral regimes. Instead, it is constructing supplementary — in part complementary, in part 
competitive — channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership” 
(Heilmann et al. 2014).   
The third observation concerns the diversity of attitude among IP regulators and IP experts.  Even 
though the Chinese government opposed ACTA and TPP officially at the TRIPS Council, 
domestic IP experts took an open and embracing attitude towards the ACTA and TPP. The recent 
proposal by the CFDA on data exclusivity indicates the embracing attitude towards the tool of 
exclusivity among Chinese ministries. The stagnation of the EU-China cooperation on GI mutual 
recognition, however, suggests that MOFCOM has more balls to juggle than intellectual property. 
The general fragmentation of domestic IP regulation in China has become a web that provides 
opportunities for individual actors to have influence.  
Fourthly, China’s IP arrangement in its own plurilateral initiatives (RCEP, BRICS, and BRI) 
varies. In RCEP, China does not take on the role of leader, showing little political will to 
accommodate or deal with polarised opinions among different negotiators. In the BRICS IP 
arrangements, the BRICS seems to have reached a consensus on making defensive coalitions, but 
they have not yet collectively proposed any IP rules in the name of the BRICS IPR Cooperation 
Mechanism. The BRI IP arrangement is basically a network for information exchange and 
capacity building in the BRI countries.  At this stage, it is still too early to predict its impact in 
international IP regulation.   
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Summary of Key Findings from Case Studies 
Table 18 below illustrates the key findings from the case studies. There are two dimensions of 
this matrix:  
(1) whether the US and the EU agree with each other on the international rules of certain 
issues; and  
(2) the extent to which China has a preference to promote a rival standard.   
The first dimension is selected because the US and the EU are the most powerful actors in global 
intellectual property regulation. When they agree on which direction global intellectual property 
regulation should take, that is usually the direction it does take. This dimension shows the basic 
power relations of global regulation on a specific issue. The second dimension explains why 
China behaves differently in different cases. The behavior of China in different cases is based on 
the strength of its preference to promote a rival standard. As discussed in Chapter 1, engagement 
is the concept to operationalize the investigation into whether China is a rule-taker or rule-maker 
in the international IP system. For China, as a latecomer to the international IP system, the 
ultimate goal for its international engagement is to promote a rival standard required to achieve 
its domestic policy objectives.  
Table 18 Summary of China’s International IP Engagement in Case Studies 
 
Two general observations can be made from the case studies: first, when the US and EU agree (in 
cases of TRIPS and standardization), there is no space for China to exert influence; secondly, 
when the US and the EU disagree (in cases of GIs and the disclosure obligation), there is a chance 
for China to advance various strategies to promote certain principles. TRIPS, by and large, 
resulted from the compromises between these powerful initiators, in particular, the US and the 
EU. China was not willing to promote any rival standard, and it was a rule-importer of the TRIPS 
rules (Chapter 2.4). In the case of the standardization, China attempted to promote a rival WLAN 
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standard and the US blocked it at every level, inside and outside of China. China ultimately failed 
in its standardization initiative. Both cases demonstrate that when the hegemonic power of the US 
is met with support or acquiescence from the EU, China cannot exert influence in the international 
IP system, even when promoting a rival standard is pivotal to China’s national interest. In the case 
of GIs and the disclosure obligation where the US and the EU held divergent positions on their 
global governance, China did take advantage of the broader policy space caused by the 
disagreement to maximize its national interest through various strategies (to be discussed in 
Chapter 10).  
In addition to the cases mentioned in this matrix, I also discussed broader issues where China has 
interacted with other states and international organizations at the multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral level. These issues include data exclusivity, intellectual property and public health, 
China’s intellectual property cooperation with other BRICS countries and countries along the Belt 
and Road Initiative, and China’s hosting of the diplomatic conference for the WIPO Treaty for 
Audio-visual Works (also known as Beijing Treaty), etc. These cases will also be discussed in the 
following sections as they add to the nuances and complexity of China’s international IP 
engagement.  
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Part Three: Discussion 
Chapters 8-10 form the discussion chapters of this thesis, using an analytical framework that has 
been adapted from Braithwaite and Drahos’ work Global Business Regulation (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000) (See Chapter 1.6). In this framework, actors, principles, and strategies are the three 
key elements of analysis. Chapter 8 will focus on the actors involved in China’s international IP 
engagement, with the Chinese state as the focus. The analysis of the state actor is complemented 
by that of the various sub-state actors involved in determining policy (ministries affiliated with 
the State Council) and non-state actors (epistemic communities and private actors). Drawing on 
the case studies, Chapter 9 will identify principles for China’s international IP engagement. 
Chapter 10 will discuss the strategies that China uses to follow the principle of IP instrumentalism, 
as well as how it manages contestation between different principles. The analysis in these chapters 
provides the basis for the conclusion of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 Who Governs? Actors in China’s 
International IP Engagement 
8.1 Introduction 
One of the basic assumptions of realist international relations theory is that states are the major 
actors in international society. Obviously, China is the major actor for the purpose of this thesis. 
However, focusing on China as a unitary actor is not enough. Looking only at “China” will not 
reveal what was going on internally, for instance, who represented China in negotiations at 
various fora, or who built the transnational networks with sub-state actors of other states. Further, 
an analysis of domestic politics, which may influence China’s international IP engagement, is not 
possible if China is considered only as a unified actor. Based on the case studies in this thesis, 
this chapter will focus on producing a more detailed analysis of the actors actually involved 
China’s international engagement. This level of analysis is needed in order to explain, at least 
partly, the different outcomes of China’s engagement in different cases and the different strategies 
that China has used. Section 8.2 will focus on the role of sub-state actors involved in China’s 
international engagement, and 8.3 on non-state actors including the epistemic communities and 
private actors. Section 8.4 concludes.  
8.2 Sub-state actors 
In this thesis, “sub-state actors” refers to ministries affiliated with the central government of China 
that have a mandate to regulate specific IP issues and can represent China in its international 
engagement. Table 19 provides a summary of sub-state actors involved in multilateral, plurilateral 
and bilateral IP engagement in the cases examined in Chapter 3-7. Domestic fora are also included 
when mentioned in the cases.  
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Table 19 Sub-state Actors as Representatives for China in International Engagement 
                                                     
1  Joint Technical Committee, Subcommittee 6, of the International Organization for Standardization and 
the International Electrochemical Commission. This the forum where China proposed its WAPI standard 
(Chapter 5.3) 
Issue area  Fora  Sub-state actors 
Geographical indication WTO TRIPS Council MOFCOM 
WIPO IGC SAIC 
Bilateral FTAs MOFCOM 
EU-China Mutual 
recognition of GIs 
MOFCOM, AQSIQ  
National fora SAIC, AQSIQ, MOA  
Disclosure obligation  CBD and Nagoya 
Protocol  
Ministry of Environmental 
protection (MEP), MOA, SIPO 
WTO TRIPS Council   MOFCOM 
WIPO IGC SIPO  
National fora SIPO 
Intellectual Property and 
Standardization (the WAPI 
case) 
National standard-setting MIIT, SAC, AQSIQ 
ISO/IEC JCT1 SC61 SAC 
Bilateral: JCCT Vice premier of China, 
MOFCOM 
Domestic implementation  Local Chinese courts and NDRC 
IP provisions or chapters in 
FTAs 
Bilateral  MOFCOM 
 
FRAND Proposal WTO TBT, APEC MOFCOM, SIPO 
Beijing Treaty on Audio-
visual Performance 
WIPO NCAC, CMFA, MOFCOM, SAIC, 
SIPO, LAO, and LAC  
Resist ACTA TRIPS Council  MOFCOM 
RCEP IP negotiation RCEP MOFCOM 
BRICS IP cooperation  Heads of Intellectual 
Property Offices (HIPO) 
and BRICS IPR 
Cooperation Mechanism 
(IPRCM) 
SIPO 
Belt and Road IP cooperation  High-Level Conference on 
Intellectual Property for 
BRI Countries 
SIPO 
Patent examination highway  Bilateral  SIPO 
International patent 
classification (IPC) Proposal  
WIPO SIPO 
Hague agreement  WIPO SIPO 
Beijing Treaty for audio-
visual product  
WIPO  NCAC 
Patent-related cooperation 
among powerful patent 
offices  
IP5 SIPO  
Intellectual property and 
public health & Data 
exclusivity and patent linkage  
US-China IP Cooperation 
Dialogue 
CFDA 
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MOFCOM, as the trade negotiator for China, has been the ministry most extensively involved in 
many IP negotiations and other forms of engagement among the 31 IP regulators in China at the 
central level (see Appendix II).2 A number of ministries that regulate a specific IP issue (ministries 
in charge)3 are also mandated to represent China in international engagement/cooperation on that 
issue. 4  Over time, these ministries have developed their own transnational networks. Most 
prominently, SIPO has already developed into a new node in international patent regulation 
(Chapter 7.5.5). This section will analyze MOFCOM, SIPO, and rule-implementing actors 
respectively. The last sub-section will also discuss some missing actors in international IP 
engagement.  
8.2.1 MOFCOM: the checkpoint for China’s engagement  
MOFCOM functions as the checkpoint for China’s international IP engagement. The “checkpoint” 
metaphor has two meanings: first, China’s international engagement, implemented by ministries 
in charge, is coordinated by MOFCOM; and secondly, if an issue is agreed to by MOFCOM in 
negotiation, it goes to implementation without a further check. 
MOFCOM is the key negotiator on IP issues on almost every front indicated in Table 19. 
MOFCOM has the resources and capacity to make trade-offs and coordinate with transnational 
and international actors as the trade negotiator. Intellectual property is one of the many issues that 
it can juggle with many ministries in charge of developing their international/transnational 
networks, it is important for China to have MOFCOM to coordinate positions on various fora to 
best represent China’s interests. The GI case shows the importance of this coordination.  
Regulated by SAIC, AQSIQ, and MOA in parallel (Chapter 3.3.2), GI regulation in China is a 
typical example of regulatory competition. All three ministries regulating GIs have developed 
their own international networks with international IP organizations, or transnational networks 
with their counterparts from other states (Table 19). In this scenario, where more than one ministry 
                                                     
2  In this chapter, I distinguish IP regulators and ministries in charge of IP. The list of members of the State 
Council Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for the Implementation of the National IP Strategy is the 
authoritative source to identify IP regulators in China (Appendix II). Though IP regulators are primarily 
ministries in charge of IP, they also include judicial agencies (the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate), as well as a department of the Central Military Commission (Central 
Military Commission Equipment Development Department), and one representative of the civil society 
(China Council for the Promotion of International Trade).  
3  For conciseness, “ministry in charge (of IP)” will be used in this chapter to refers to ministries affiliated 
with the State Council that have the mandate to regulate a specific IP issue.  
4  The mandates of every ministry affiliated with the State Council in China are provided by their Provisions 
on the Main Mandates, Setup of Internal Bodies and Staffing 主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定 
[zhuyao zhizhe neishe jigou he renyuan bianzhi guiding]. These provisions are amended regularly during 
institutional reshuffles 机构改革 [jigou gaige] and can be found at the website of each ministry. 
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can represent China, a trading partner can choose the most convenient ministry to undertake the 
negotiation. This forum-shopping can undermine China’s bargaining capacity.  
In the EU-China bilateral cooperation on GIs, the EU insightfully selected AQSIQ to negotiate 
the mutual recognition of GIs. As early as October 2006, the EC Directorate-General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development and the Directorate-General for Trade and AQSIQ agreed on 
the mutual recognition of GIs, and the two parties nominated ten GIs from each side “10+10” two 
months later (AQSIQ 2007). In 2007, the EU-China IPR2 project launched, in which MOFCOM 
began to represent China in the EU-China bilateral GI negotiations. The negotiations with 
MOFCOM became slower and more complicated for the EU than its previous negotiations with 
AQSIQ. The “10 +10” program took another five years to finalize. Its upgraded version “100+100” 
ended in stagnancy in the second half of 2017 (Chapter 3.4.3).  
The GI case shows that it is easier for a trade partner to make a deal with the ministry in charge 
than with MOFCOM. By negotiating with AQSIQ, which tended to focus only on GIs, the EU 
paid nothing. However, MOFCOM negotiates everything related to trade, and intellectual 
property is only one of these many issues. Simultaneously negotiating many issues with one trade 
partner enabled MOFCOM to arrange reciprocal coordination (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
Thus, the EU would have had to have made a concession on another issue in order to make a deal 
on GIs.  
In addition to having a limited capacity when it comes to reciprocal coordination, a ministry in 
charge tends to made decisions on the basis of technocratic trust built by some of its counterparts 
(Drahos 2010). The EU and the US have focused on IP related capacity building in China for 
years. Through exchange and training programs, study tours, and seminars since the 1990s, 
Chinese IP regulators and IP epistemic communities have been convinced that the EU and US IP 
systems are “more advanced”. As well as technical training, they absorb the norms and values of 
the training agency, such as the European Patent Office. When the EU and China undertake 
negotiations on the mutual recognition of GIs, AQSIQ, the Chinese negotiator, genuinely believes 
that such mutual recognition will benefit Chinese agriculture and export. This trust leads 
negotiators into detailed discussions regarding the technical issues of implementation, rather than 
impartially calculating where China’s national interest truly lies. 
The second dimension of the checkpoint essentially means that the IP compliance game in China 
is guaranteed — there is no further check once MOFCOM agrees. For example, it took only one 
year for China to amend its IP legislation to comply with TRIPS (Chapter 2.4.2); after the 2004 
JCCT, the implementation of WAPI as a national compulsory standard was indefinitely 
suspended (Chapter 5.3.1). MOFCOM’s assent was fundamental in both these cases. 
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The checkpoint role of MOFCOM makes it possible for China to implement systematic strategies 
in its international IP engagement, in particular dissembling (Chapter 10.3.1) and the foreign 
policy chessboard (Chapter 10.3.3). 
8.2.2 SIPO: a new node for international patent regulation 
SIPO has been one of the ministries that involved in China’s international IP engagement most 
extensively First, as China’s IP coordinator domestically, it has developed solid networks with 
WIPO (Chapter 7.2); secondly, it has already developed into a vibrant actor in international patent 
regulation as a member of IP5, ID5, and through extensive patent prosecution highway (PPH) 
agreements (Chapter 7.5.5). Thirdly, it is also the key actor in the export of Chinese model IP 
rules to BRICS and BRI countries (Chapter 7.5.3 and 7.5.4).  
As revealed by the case studies, SIPO assumes various important roles, but its capacity is limited, 
as a ministry in charge, to coordinate issues relating to China’s international IP engagement. The 
bigger coordination role in these issues belongs to MOFCOM. Some of SIPO’s initial actions 
show that SIPO has come closer to the center of the stage in international patent regulation. Its 
IPC proposal on botanical pesticides reflected China’s interest in facilitating relevant patent 
examinations among WIPO members. Nonetheless, there is potentially an “agent problem” in 
SIPO’s transitional/international IP engagement. With its integration into the international IP 
(particularly patent) system, SIPO began to identify itself as a somewhat independent actor to 
promote international IP regulation. Table 19 indicates that SIPO generally takes a pro-IP 
protection position in its international IP engagement, except in the case of the disclosure 
obligation. Even in the case of disclosure obligation, SIPO could have taken a more pro-
development position like other megadiverse countries (Chapter 4.5).  
The recent development of SIPO’s IP engagement in fora like BRICS, the BRI and various 
programs on IP capacity-building in south-eastern Asian countries, signals that SIPO has 
developed into a regulatory exporter in terms of intellectual property rather than an importer. IP 
capacity building is necessary because Chinese companies have begun to invest extensively 
overseas and export their own patented technologies as well. Since this type of engagement has 
only emerged in the last couple of years, it is still too early to assess its effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
it is obvious that China does not engage with the BRI countries in the same way that the US 
engaged China (Chapter 2.4).  
From a nodal governance perspective (Burris, Drahos, and Shearing 2005), SIPO has become an 
important node of global patent governance. However, the global patent governance network is, 
in essence, a private insider governance network (Drahos 2010, 327). If we examine the role that 
SIPO has played in the above-mentioned projects, all its efforts have been made to expedite the 
number of patent applications or to benefit potential right holders as clients of the patent system. 
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This may help SIPO’s position as an influential patent actor in international IP regulation but may 
not converge with China’s national interest as a developing country, nor promote the effective 
dissemination of technology. 
Though recent literature suggests the emerging markets, in particular, China, Brazil, and India, 
might be a potential force to change world patent order (Abbott, Correa, and Drahos 2013), 
perhaps by introducing hybrid patent systems (Sell 2013), SIPO has been deeply integrated into 
the private insider governance network with other big patent offices. It thinks within rather than 
outside of the international patent paradigm. This level of normative integration will make it 
harder for China to become a patent regulatory innovator.  
8.2.3 Rule-implementing actors: their switching role in the implementation game 
Table 19 shows that rule-implementing actors (mainly the courts)5 only appeared in the case of 
standardization, the only arena where China attempted to promote a rival standard. This is not a 
coincidence. Rule-implementing actors play the role of a switcher in the implementation game, 
in the sense that they may be able to reverse an outcome through their interpretation of the law. 
For example, in the standardization case, the owner of WAPI can sue a licensee for patent royalties, 
and Chinese companies as licensees can sue the licensor for the breach of FRAND.  Courts are 
brought into the game. 
There are two preconditions for rule-implementing actors to get involved in international IP 
engagement. First of all, relevant domestic laws should be in place. The DVD case (Chapter 5.2) 
showed that without an anti-monopoly law, Chinese courts are likely to end up enforcing the 
rights of foreign right holders, in the DVD case to collect unreasonably high royalties from 
Chinese companies. Secondly, a domestic court or other rule-implementing actor needs 
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional requirement is usually satisfied when civil IP litigation involves 
“foreign-related civil relations”,6 in particular when one of the parties is a foreign citizen or a 
foreign legal person. However, getting involved does not necessarily mean active engagement. 
                                                     
5  China has an unusual “administrative enforcement” mechanism for intellectual property which, together 
with judicial enforcement, is called “double track” 双轨制 [shuangguizhi] enforcement (Li 2015b). In 
this enforcement mechanism, local regulators in charge of intellectual property are also law 
implementers. Therefore, Chinese rule-implementing actors are not limited to levels of court; they also 
include IP departments, affiliated with levels of local government, responsible for administrative 
enforcement.  
6  “Foreign-related civil relations” are regulated by Law on the Application of Laws to Foreign-Related 
Civil Relations of China 涉外民事关系法律适用法 [Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falü Shiyong Fa] (2010). 
The specific circumstances that may constitute “foreign-related civil relations” are further defined in 
Article 1, SPC Interpretations on  Several Issues Concerning Application of the Law of Law on the 
Application of Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) 最高人民法院关于适用《涉外民事关
系法律适用法》若干问题的解释（一）[Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Shewai Minshi 
Guanxi Falü Shiyong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (yi)].  
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To reveal the role of rule-implementing actors in China’s international IP engagement, this section 
will focus on cases of “judicial activism”.7 
Chinese courts and other rule-implementers began to engage the international IP system from the 
1980s. Chinese courts and local IP regulators began to enforce intellectual property rights on the 
basis of international treaties before IP laws were in place. For instance, the GIs for Danisa and 
Champagne were first protected in China by local branches of SAIC on the basis of the Paris 
Convention before any GI legislation was promulgated (Chapter 3.3.1). Another example is 
Disney vs Beijing Publishing House (the Disney case) in 1994.8 The court applied the US-China 
1992 MOU to adjudicate this case when the grounds for such application were not clear in Chinese 
law. These early cases of judicial activism aimed at proving that China had an effective system 
for the protection of (foreign) intellectual property (Jiang 2009). 
In the case of standardization, Chinese rule-implementing actors no longer provide favorable 
super-national treatment on a foreign party. Instead, they tend to look to the goal of stimulating 
indigenous innovation and assisting Chinese companies to gain technology independence. In the 
case of IWNComm vs Sony, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court ordered Sony to pay treble 
damages to the IWNComm for the licensing of the SEPs before treble damages were enacted in 
patent law (Chapter 5.3.4). In the case of Huawei vs InterDigital Technology Corporation 
(InterDigital) 9  (Zhang and Zhang 2015, Lee 2016), Shenzhen Intermedium People’s Court 
creatively decided on the principle of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). At the 
time the decision was made, this principle has not yet been incorporated explicitly into Chinese 
law.  
                                                     
7  It means courts and local IP regulators creatively interpret laws, and (1) apply rules when they are not yet 
codified as laws, or (2) decide differently from what the law stipulates. 
8  In this case, Disney had licenced its copyright in Chinese publications to Maxwell, and Maxwell agreed 
not to license the right to a third party. When Maxwell breached the agreement with Disney and licenced 
the copyright to a third-party Beijing Publishing House, Disney only sued Beijing Publishing House for 
copyright infringement. The licensing agreement between Maxwell and Beijing Publishing House was 
signed before the US-China bilateral MOU (1992) which included a clause on reciprocal protection of 
copyright. That meant at the time that infringement happened, China was not yet committed to protect 
copyright of US residents. The court nonetheless applied the US-China bilateral MOU (1992) directly, 
and confirmed the existence of copyright infringement and ordered Beijing Publishing House to pay 
damages to Disney. See The Walt Disney Company, US v. Beijing Publishing House etc. (Copyright 
Infringement Dispute) 美国沃尔特·迪斯尼公司诉北京出版社等侵犯著作权纠纷案  [Meiguo 
Woerte Disini Gongsi Su Beijing Chubanshe Deng Qinfan Zhuzuoquan Jiufen An], Beijing Intermediate 
People’s Court Decision No.141, 中经知初字第 141 号[Zhongjing Chuzi 141 Hao] (1994), available at 
SPC Gazette 最高人民法院公报 [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao] 1996 (4).  
9  Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei v. IDC) 华为技术有限公司诉交互数
字通信有限公司 [Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi], Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court, No 858 深中法知民初字第 858 号 [Shen Zhongfa Zhi Min Chuzi 858] 
(2011). For decision of the second instance, see Guangdong High People’s Court No. 305 粤高法民三
终字 305 号 [Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi 305 Hao] (2013).  
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Standard essential patents (SEPs) and FRAND have been areas in which judicial activism has 
frequently appeared (Wang 2017b). Considering some of the standards involved have a global 
scope, these decisions have significant impacts. Nonetheless, the leverage of the market should 
not be ignored. Though domestic courts in every state can have long-arm jurisdiction over foreign-
related cases, only powerful players can use it effectively. Currently, China had 772 million 
netizens by the end of 2017; 97.5% Chinese netizens access the internet by mobile phones (China 
Internet Network Information Center 2018). No company in the telecommunication industry can 
afford to ignore domestic regulation or a court decision and remain in the Chinese market: Apple 
had WAPI installed one year after China’s tie-in policy in 2009 and Qualcomm paid a USD 975 
million fine to the NDRC (Chapter 5.2.3).  
The function of rule-implementation actors and instances of judicial activism should not be 
confined to a specific case and isolated from the bigger picture of competitiveness among 
companies and nation states. Instead, they should be considered as part of China’s national 
strategy of technology catch-up, specifically cultivating indigenous innovation and improving the 
core competitiveness of Chinese companies. This orientation has been clearly articulated by a 
SPC opinion in 2009, which mandated the various levels of domestic courts in China to “raise the 
sense of crisis, hardship, big thinking and overall thinking, and pay more attention to expanding 
the space for innovation, promoting the cultivation of indigenous intellectual property, local 
brands and new economic growth areas, and enhancing the market competitiveness of enterprises 
and raising the core competitiveness of China.”10 
Through judicial activism, rule-implementing actors have reinterpreted the rules and occasionally 
created rules concerning standardization in the telecommunications industry. Chinese rule-
implementing actors intend to switch the effects of rules to positive outcomes in the 
implementation game. This “switching” role, however, should not be interpreted as arbitrary and 
capricious, nor as an embodiment of nationalism. Instead, this switching role manifests the 
resistance of China at the implementation stage to the US’ blocking China’s attempts to define 
standards that better suit its own companies. 
8.2.4 The missing actors in developing potential engagement 
Chinese sub-state actors represent China in the international IP system when they are mandated 
to do so. 11  In cases of domestic regulatory competition, the ministries in charge are often 
                                                     
10 SPC Opinion on Several Issues Concerning (Using) Intellectual Property Trials to Serve the Overall 
Objective under the Current Economic Situation 最高人民法院关于当前经济形势下知识产权审判
服 务 大 局 若 干 问 题 的 意 见 [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Dangqian Jingji Xingshixia 
Zhishichanquan Shenpan Fuwu Daju Ruogan Wenti de Yijian], No. 23 (2009) 法发 (2009) 23 号 [Fafa 
(2009) 23 Hao].    
11 See supra note 4.  
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motivated in their international engagement by a desire to consolidate their regulatory legitimacy 
(e.g. AQSIQ in regulating GIs). However, in other cases, one can observe a phenomenon of 
regulatory neglect where sub-state actors (which one might have expected to be involved) are 
missing from potential engagement.  
Regulatory neglect refers to the situation where a ministry in charge could engage as a 
representative for China concerning an IP issue, but it does not do so because formally (1) other 
ministry/ministries share the regulatory power or (2) the international engagement on that issue 
is not clearly mandated. The deeper reason for cases of regulatory neglect, however, lies in a 
reticence to be involved in an issue of tangled interests (Chapter 10.3.2). Since regulatory neglect 
presents as inaction, it is difficult to assess as a case.  
China’s international engagement in the area of disclosure obligation may be considered as a case 
of regulatory neglect, in particular, China’s role in the Nagoya Protocol negotiation. Xue Dayuan, 
one of the experts advising on China’s negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol,12 pointed out that the 
lack of coordination, communication and mutual support among various ministries in China is a 
crucial problem in genetic resources regulation (Xue and Cai 2009b, Xue 2015). This is a case of 
regulatory neglect because of shared regulatory power — the Chinese delegation on the Nagoya 
Protocol was led by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. SIPO as a member of the 
delegation was not active in promoting the issue of the disclosure obligation.13 The Patent Law 
(2008) on the protection of genetic resources incorporates a “linkage” (Chapter 4.4.1), which 
authorizes other laws and regulations to define circumstances of violation relating to the 
protection of genetic resources. This can be considered as an instance of regulatory neglect — 
SIPO, as the patent regulator nominated by the patent law, has shirked its regulatory power, 
leaving this complex matter to other relevant ministries.  
Regulatory neglect could provide a plausible explanation for China’s comparative lack of active 
engagement on intellectual property and human rights (in particular public health and access to 
medicine) and the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. This lack of 
engagement is essentially an outcome of domestic politics. It not only happens at the stage of 
rule-making but also rule-implementation — no compulsory license has been issued in China 
since the relevant law was promulgated in 2003 as an implementation of the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health. Regulatory neglect among sub-state actors is related to the strategy 
of reticence. Together, they make China a state that fails to act as much as it could on intellectual 
property given its economic power. 
                                                     
12 Professor Xue has participated in the whole process of the Nagoya Protocol negotiations as advisors for 
the Chinese negotiators, see http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=18655.  
13 This information was from a refusal to my interview invite.  
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8.2.5 Discussion 
Among the sub-state actors involved in China’s international IP engagement, this section has 
highlighted MOFCOM, SIPO, rule-implementing actors and some missing actors. The 
coordination (and the lack of coordination) among these sub-state actors, as well as regulatory 
competition and regulatory neglect, directly impact on their international IP engagement and 
contribute to China’s international IP engagement. Externally, the technocratic trust built through 
participation in transitional networks also influences the positions of ministries in charge.  
In summary, the checkpoint role of MOFCOM emphasizes its capacity to arrange reciprocal 
coordination. The nodal governance analysis of SIPO focuses on the risk that when sub-state 
actors identify themselves as an independent node in the global governance of an issue for which 
they have official carriage, they may focus on their own nodal power and status rather than 
representing the best interests of China. Rule-implementing actors in China have begun, where 
necessary, to switch outcomes in the implementation game, assisted by China’s increasing 
economic power. Some sub-state actors do not engage as much as they could on IP issues, a case 
of regulatory neglect.  
8.3 Non-state actors 
Two types of non-state actors have been involved in China’s international IP engagement — IP 
epistemic communities and Chinese companies. Different from the sub-state actors, their 
engagement does not represent the position of the Chinese government.  
8.3.1 Chinese IP epistemic communities  
The epistemic community concept refers to networks of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area (Haas 1992). Though the IP system has been a recent 
phenomenon in China, there has been a dramatic growth in epistemic communities in the area of 
intellectual property. Chinese IP epistemic communities (mainly trained by IP lawyers) have been 
building networks and endeavoring to disseminate a view of intellectual property that places the 
emphasis on the exclusivity of rights, rather than public interest. 
IP epistemic communities play a critical role in the strategy of modeling (Chapter 10.2) which is 
the key strategy for diffusing intellectual property in China. The study and absorption of models 
rely on epistemic communities made up of technical experts of various kinds who study, adapt 
and finally adopt models presented by foreign experts. For instance, WIPO and the EU have 
regularly seconded expert advisors to help with the amendment of IP legislation in China (Chapter 
7.2 and Chapter 2.4.2). Chinese patent examiners, IP judges, and other technocrats, as well as 
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university professors, have also been dispatched to study the IP systems of other states. The 
destinations for these exchange programs are mainly the US and the EU.  
Because the composition of the IP epistemic communities is heterogeneous and the function of 
different communities varies, these communities are divided into two layers: (1) IP elites and (2) 
IP practitioners. Their relationship can be thought of as a “ripple,” where IP elites are located in 
the center as opinion leaders and IP practitioners on the periphery. This section will focus on their 
role in transnational networks and how such transnational networks influence their position and 
further Chinese policymaking.   
8.3.1.1 Intellectual property elites 
The term “IP elites” in China refers to celebrated IP academics and retired high-level government 
officials. Among all IP epistemic communities, they are one of the few that can influence law and 
policy making. For instance, Professor Liu Chuntian, the Dean of Intellectual Property Academy 
Renmin University (IPARU) was named one of the World’s 50 Most Influential People in IP in 
2014 in the category of policymakers. As stated by the official website of the Renmin University, 
“Professor Liu is the only academic who is listed in the category of policymakers. This… reflected 
the recognition of international society of the special role played by Chinese academics in the 
development of China” (RUC News 2014). Professor Liu Chuntian is also the Chinese 
coordinator of the US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue. Co-organized by the Renmin University 
Intellectual Property Academy of China (under Liu’s lead) and the US Chamber of Commerce, 
the dialogue is composed of ten IP experts (Sun 2016a).14 The US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue 
has developed into an important informal forum for the US to influence Chinese thinking 
concerning IP issues and this can be more successful than formal fora. The US’s influence on 
particular issues, such as patent linkage, can be found in the periodic publication, the US-China 
IP Cooperation Dialogue (US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue 2013, 2014-2015, 2016). 
Patent linkage and data exclusivity are two examples of US influence. The US-China IP 
Cooperation Dialogue (2014-2015) first claims that China’s potential for innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry was hampered by its current IP protection regimes and recommended 
that China “improve the patent linkage system and provide effective protection for clinical data 
of new chemical entities by using the ongoing effort to amend the Patent Law and the Drug 
Administration Law.”15 In the conference to launch the US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue 
(2016), the US and Chinese experts who drafted the report again advocated for a patent linkage 
                                                     
14 The team of experts includes five experts from each country. They consist of government officials, 
business experts, judges, lawyers and academics. Profiles of the experts are available at: 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/dialogue/.  
15 US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue Report (2014-2015), p. 2. 
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scheme in China (Zhang 2017c).16 Cheng Yongshun, former judge of the Beijing People’s High 
Court and one of the Chinese experts in the US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue, held symposiums 
to promote patent linkage in China,17 arguing that patent linkage mechanism would be a win-win 
system for China (Cheng and Wu 2018). In 2017, China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) 
proposed a patent linkage mechanism18 similar to the US Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984. In addition, CFDA also proposed up to ten years data exclusivity 
for biologics, orphan drugs, and original drugs for children (Cheng 2017).  
Though the causal links between the US-China IP Cooperation Dialogue Report and the CFDA 
call for comments are hard to verify, several issues are clear. First, the US is motivated to 
influence China through this forum. Increasingly the US resorts to webs of dialogue to influence 
China (Chapter 2.4.2) and the US Chamber of Commerce has been an important part of these 
webs (McGregor 2010). Secondly, these reports were submitted to high-level officials in the 
Chinese government. Thirdly, IP elites as opinion leaders have produced academic publications, 
the policy recommendations from which may further influence decision making. Last but not least, 
IP elites can have access to policymakers through the revolving door or through their academic 
reputation.  
8.3.1.2 Intellectual property practitioners  
IP practitioners form a rising IP epistemic community, which includes mainly technocrats, IP 
lawyers, and patent agents. The recent patenting surge in China, as well as a series of policies to 
develop the IP service industry in China, has also stimulated the expansion of IP intermediaries. 
According to Liu Jufang, the Deputy Director of Planning and Development Department of SIPO, 
China had over 31,000 IP agencies with over 600,000 employees by 2014 (Liu 2015a). Statistics 
from the All-China Patent Attorneys Association indicates there were 1442 registered patent 
                                                     
16 This report launching conference was simulcasted live and attracted a real time audience of 30,000 and 
total audience of 60,000. Though the simulcast has finished, the number of the accumulative audience 
is still indicated at the webpage 
http://i.ifeng.com/ifenglive?liveId=106004&vt=5&from=singlemessage&isappinstalled=0. 
17 Beijing Intellectual Property Institute 北京务实知识产权发展中心 [Beijing Wushi Zhishichanquan 
Fazhan Zhongxin] 2016, Pharmaceutical Patent Link System Salon “药品专利链接制度沙龙”简报 
[yaopin zhuanli lianjie zhidu shalong], http://www.bipi.org/index.php/2014-04-01-06-02-54/93-2014-
04-01-06-38-14/644-news2016070501.  
18 China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) 中国食品药品监管总局 [Shipin Yaopin Jianguan 
Zongju], Notice of Calling for Comments on “Policies Related to Encouraging Innovations in 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Equipment and Protecting Interests and rights of innovators (Draft for 
Comments) 关于鼓励药品医疗器械创新保护创新者权益的相关政策（征求意见稿）[Guanyu 
Guli Yaopin Yiliao Qixie Chuangxin Baohu Chuangxinzhe Quanyi de Xiangguan zzhengce (Zhengqiu 
Yijiangao)], No. 55, May 12, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-05/12/content_5193269.htm.  
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agents and 15,660 qualified patent attorneys in China as of May 2017.19 The IP service industry, 
as its name suggests, provides services to IP right holders.  
The IP practitioners are located on the periphery of the “ripple” of the Chinese IP epistemic 
communities. Messages from IP elites are disseminated to them so that a uniform 
acknowledgment of the importance of intellectual property is shared among them. This 
dissemination is exemplified by the 30,000 people who watched the simulcast of the US-China 
Intellectual Property Cooperation Dialogue (2016) in real time.  
Various transnational networks have also been established directly between IP practitioners and 
their counterparts in the US or the EU. For instance, starting in 1994, SIPO began to select and 
send its employees as visiting scholars to John Marshall Law School in the US. After 20 years, 
over 400 individuals from SIPO have participated in this program (Zhang 2013b). As pointed out 
by Tian Lipu, the then Commissioner of SIPO, at the 20th anniversary of the SIPO-John Marshall 
cooperation: “those who once attended the John Marshall program now become departmental 
leaders and backbones of SIPO. Such programs help develop technical ties across time and culture. 
When problems arise those trained in the US will likely look to how the US has addressed the 
problem.”   
In addition to the official channels, Chinese lawyers are also keen to enhance their status by 
having an LL.M. degree from US law schools with a New York Bar admission. After they return 
to China, they can bill their clients as US lawyers and raise their incomes dramatically or assume 
pivotal positions in Chinese start-up companies. IP lawyers are part of this trend. When they go 
back to China, they spread not only IP norms, but US specific IP norms into the Chinese IP system. 
Though the number of IP practitioners is large, this community is narrowly constituted, being 
mainly made up of those legally trained in IP law and dedicated to maximizing the interests of IP 
right holders. They rarely critically question whether the extension of IP rights really does 
promote innovation that is in the public interest.  
As one effect of the modeling strategy, Chinese IP epistemic communities have established their 
own transnational networks with their counterparts exclusively from developed countries. 
Through such transnational networks, the innovation stimulation theory (Chapter 9.2.1) has been 
rooted in Chinese IP epistemic communities and accepted as factually correct.  
                                                     
19 Statistics from All China Patent Attorneys Association, see http://www.acpaa.cn/, accessed on May 18, 
2017. 
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8.3.2 Private actors 
Private actors, in particular the multinational corporations (MNCs), have already developed into 
important nodes in international IP regulation (Tusikov 2016). In the case of standardization 
(Chapter 5.2), Intel developed sophisticated strategies to launch Wi-Fi-enabled personal 
computers into the Chinese market, formed strategies of coalition building, threatened embargos, 
lobbied the US government, and manipulated the IEEE. Other less powerful MNCs have also 
attempted to pressure the Chinese government through their national or regional industrial 
associations. For instance, AmCham China represented high-tech MNCs doing business in China. 
It questioned China’s indigenous innovation policies (Chapter 2.4.3), helped to place those 
policies on the negotiating table of the JCCT, and played a role in stalling the implementation of 
these policies.20   
Most Chinese companies are still located in the middle of global value chains and they are 
dependent on MNCs (Chapter 5.2.2). Nonetheless, some Chinese companies have begun to 
establish themselves at the summit of the patent world. For instance, ZTE and Huawei have 
become two of the top PCT patent applicants worldwide. They have developed exponentially in 
the past few years, benefiting from the huge size of the domestic market in China.  
In the case of IP and standardization, one can see there are two paths for Chinese companies to 
obtain supportive regulation. First is through the ministries in charge. For instance, the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) supported the tie-in strategy of the WAPI alliance 
by requiring every mobile phone to be WAPI-installed in order to enter the Chinese market 
(Chapter 5.3.3). However, such reliance on the Chinese government has been criticised as a black-
box operation. A fatal flaw for WAPI was the lack of transparency concerning its algorithm, 
implying that it was considered a state secret. This close connection to the state turned WAPI into 
an example of the supposed technological nationalism of China (Suttmeier and Yao 2004, 
Suttmeier, Yao, and Tan 2006). The Chinese government and Chinese companies learned from 
the WAPI case. Later, China did not exclude foreign companies from getting involved in 
developing the 4G standard. MNCs like Qualcomm came on board and the standard development 
process became more transparent. In this way, China further integrated into the global ecosystem 
of developing telecommunication standards (Higgins 2015).  
The second path for supportive regulation is initiating litigation or anti-monopoly investigations 
against MNCs. This means that Chinese companies have to resort to courts as rule-implementing 
actors, in particular when the MNCs breach the FRAND principle in the Chinese market. Large 
Chinese companies are also more active in initiating legal action in other jurisdictions. As the 
                                                     
20 China suspended the implementation of its indigenous innovation policy in 2011.  
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various markets in China mature both in size and in the sophistication of the Chinese players, the 
role of rule-implementing actors becomes greater. The telecommunications sector in China is an 
obvious case of this maturing process. 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter analyzed various sub-state actors and non-state actors which appeared in the case 
studies. Regulatory competition and regulatory neglect are useful concepts to understand the 
dynamics among sub-state actors and China’s international IP engagement in general.  
The discussion of actors cannot be isolated from principles and strategies. Most ministries in 
charge of intellectual property and IP epistemic communities have developed transnational 
networks with their counterparts in the US and EU, absorbing various legal approaches and ideas 
about intellectual property, especially the innovation stimulation theory. As IP regulators, they 
have developed policies favoring IP right holders. On the other hand, while China’s trading 
partners (EU in the case of GIs) have selected the most accommodating ministry to negotiate a 
deal concerning intellectual property, MOFCOM functions as the checkpoint through reciprocal 
coordination of a much broader range of issues than just intellectual property. In addition, Chinese 
rule-implementing actors have also become increasingly involved in IP issues, meaning that high 
technology markets like telecoms are full of complex contestation. A degree of judicial activism 
has produced benefits for Chinese companies in the market.  
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Chapter 9 Principles for China’s 
International IP Engagement 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the principles that guide and sometimes constrain China’s international 
IP engagement. Generally, two sets of principles are identified in this chapter — one concerning 
the logic of intellectual property, and the other concerning the logic of China’s international 
engagement. Both sets of principles are drawn from the data examining China’s behavior as 
outlined in the case studies (Chapters 3-7). The foreign policy principles to be discussed in this 
chapter have been officially identified by the Chinese government as guiding principles, but some 
of the IP principles are more implicit behavioral guides shared by the sub-state actors and IP 
epistemic communities. In this chapter, I will use the word “China” when a principle is generally 
agreed to by all the sub-state actors. Otherwise, I will refer to names of the sub-state actors (often 
ministries in charge of a specific IP issue) when they directly follow a principle.  
This chapter will identify specific lower-level principles guiding China’s international IP 
engagement. Principles of an international IP system per se have already been established and 
embedded by IP treaties over the last one and half centuries. Some issues relating to specific 
principles have also been discussed in the case studies in this thesis, an example being the case of 
the disclosure obligation, where the principle of considering genetic resources as the “common 
heritage of mankind” was contrasted with the principle that these resources are governed by “state 
sovereignty”. In addition, higher-level principles commonly exist in China’s foreign policy 
agenda like “pragmatism” or “rationalism”. These general principles will not be discussed in this 
chapter for two reasons. First, these principles have already been sufficiently discussed in the 
literature and are neither special to China nor special to intellectual property. Secondly, if the 
principles are not sufficiently specific, it will be difficult to identify interactions and tensions 
among different principles and the discussion on strategies in the next chapter will be groundless.  
Section 9.2 will examine IP instrumentalism as the logic of intellectual property. Section 9.3 will 
focus on the foreign policy agenda as the logic of China’s international engagement. Section 9.4 
will follow up the evolution of the principles, in particular, their development in recent years. 
Section 9.4 summarizes the chapter.   
9.2 The logic of intellectual property: IP instrumentalism 
China established a proprietary system for knowledge that recognizes certain intellectual 
outcomes as a type of property, similar to the western IP system. However, China’s configuration 
of intellectual property is mainly instrumental, which means the value of intellectual property lies 
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not in the system itself, but in its complementary function to other goals of China. Intellectual 
property is not grounded in a tradition of private property, or property rights, or the rule of law. 
In China, intellectual property is dominated by a “means-to-ends” way of thinking.  
There are two primary reasons for the emphasis on the instrumental value of intellectual property 
in China. First, instrumentalism is the primary justification for establishing and maintaining the 
Chinese IP system. Intellectual property was first introduced to contemporary China because of 
the US’ trade coercion. Initially, the feasibility of the IP system in China was not justified on the 
basis of property rights and individual entitlement. The proprietorial nature of intellectual 
property was fiercely criticized by the Ministry of Machinery Industry in the early 1980s because 
it was incompatible with socialist institutions (Chapter 2.3.2). The IP system survived in China 
because of its instrumental value. Establishing an IP system was a prerequisite for reciprocal 
coordination with the US and other developed countries, the payoff being that these countries 
would release restrictions on their exports of high-technology to China or increase their foreign 
direct investments (FDI) in China. In the post-TRIPS era, the instrumental value of intellectual 
property in China has changed to serve domestic goals, including to stimulate innovation and 
promote economic growth.  
Secondly, the theories of IP instrumentalism were imported from the West to China. In the US-
China bilateral IP negotiations, US negotiators framed China as a born pirate (Chapter 2.5) and 
threatened China with unilateral trade retaliation. This antagonistic approach which imposed IP 
rules on China met with a counter-retaliation from China (Chapter 2.4.1). Gradually, the model 
missionaries and model mercenaries (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) relied more on webs of 
dialogue, intentionally framing intellectual property as the means to promote innovation. This re-
framing emphasized the instrumental value of intellectual property, which matched China’s 
enthusiasm for developing science and technology and achieve technology catch-up. 
In general, under IP instrumentalism the purpose of intellectual property should be to serve the 
“big picture”.1 One excerpt of Deng Xiaoping’s speech shows that there are predominantly two 
                                                     
1  There are several interpretations for Chinese characters “大局”. Literally, it can be translated into the 
“grand chessboard” because the word “局” is often related to the chess game. More implicitly, the term 
can also be translated into “overall view” because the current use of the term emphasizes the strategic 
vision derived from the chess game. I translated this term as big picture in this thesis, in order to grasp 
both its explicit and implicit meaning. 
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big pictures for China, one domestic and the other international. 2  Xi Jinping, the Chinese 
President, has interpreted the big picture as follows: 
 Colleagues from different departments should command a sense of the big picture. 
Before proposing an important reformative agenda, one should first consider 
whether this agenda will serve the big picture and whether it is conducive to the long-
term development of the Party and the State. One should sincerely look forward, 
think ahead and plan ahead (Xi 2013). 
This extract provides two dimensions of the big picture: the long-term interest and overall interest 
of the Party and the Chinese State.  
The requirement that intellectual property should serve China’s big picture constitutes a unique 
characteristic of the Chinese IP system in an authoritarian state compared with a democratic one. 
To a certain extent, it does not matter what constitutes the big picture as who can decide its 
elements. From this perspective, enhancing the sense of the big picture is a way to reinforce 
centralization. Therefore, serving and sometimes sacrificing for the big picture as drawn by the 
Chinese government is the ultimate goal for IP instrumentalism.  
Specifically, there are three dimensions as to how IP instrumentalism works in China. The three 
specific goals for the Chinese IP system at the current stage of development are as follows: 
(1) The IP system should stimulate innovation; 
(2) The IP system should serve Chinese economic transformation; and  
(3) The IP system should be consistent with the overall foreign policy agenda.  
9.2.1 The innovation stimulation theory 
As analyzed by (Drahos 1995), there are four different philosophical foundations for thinking 
about intellectual property. Innovation stimulation is one of them. Though it is widely recognized 
as a justification for the IP system, it has drawbacks in its operationalization. First, it does not 
provide a detailed correlation between intellectual property and innovation: is it a linear relation 
that stronger intellectual property will inevitably stimulate more innovation? If not, what is the 
optimal level of intellectual property protection (Gangopadhyay and Mondal 2012, Chu, Cozzi, 
and Galli 2014)? What are the factors that could determine this optimal level? Secondly, the 
innovation stimulation theory does not differentiate between types of intellectual property in 
terms of their contribution to innovation.  Thirdly, this theory does not consider the differences 
                                                     
2  Deng’s discussion on the two big pictures was first proposed in 1985. The objective for the international 
big picture is to maintain a peaceful world, and the objective for the domestic big picture is to achieve 
China’s development. Deng argues that the two big pictures are mutually conducive to each other. The 
two big pictures have been considered as the essence of his diplomatic thinking, see Zhang and Liu 
(2006). After four decades, this diplomatic thinking is still being used as a basis for China to participate 
in global governance (Zhang 2016b).   
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among the industries in which the IP system functions. In addition to the operationalization 
problem, the innovation stimulation theory does not provide a solution to patent hold-up created 
by exclusive rights for the diffusion of knowledge. Practically, the innovation stimulation theory 
tends to benefit the right holders but ignore the public interest (Drahos 2010). Once adopted as a 
principle for policy making the innovation stimulation theory tends to favor right holders. 
This innovation stimulation theory was disseminated in China in parallel with its regulatory 
importation of the IP system (Chapter 2), taking root and becoming the fundamental theory of 
intellectual property. Ultimately, China assimilated the innovation stimulation theory 
notwithstanding its theoretical and practical problems. The innovation stimulation theory further 
developed in China along two dimensions: 
(1) The IP system provides incentives for innovation; 
(2) The IP system is indirectly instrumental to China’s grand strategy of technology catch-
up. 
The first dimension is consistent with the original explanation of the innovation stimulation theory 
in the western world, while the second dimension is a further derivative of the theory to fit into 
the Chinese context. The basic thesis of the innovation stimulation theory is that intellectual 
property promotes innovation by incentivizing investment in knowledge-based assets. Since a 
proprietary right is granted to the creator of knowledge, the process of investing in innovation can 
be made profitable for individuals using the IP system. In this way, intellectual property will add 
the fuel of interest to the fire of genius. 
The innovation stimulation theory has been the foundation for the recent national IP agenda in 
China. The National IP Strategy in 2008 was a milestone, showing how the innovation stimulation 
theory had taken hold in China (Chapter 2.4.3).3 The National IP Strategy, first initiated by SIPO, 
clarified the priority of the IP system. The prioritized position of intellectual property on the 
national agenda further generates pressure on various levels of local government in China for 
compliance with the goals of the national strategy (Cheng and Drahos 2018).    
                                                     
3  Before 2008, the balancing theory has also been influential. For instance, in 2003, Professor Xu Xuan 
published a paper Justification of intellectual property: the consideration and equity in intellectual 
property law 知识产权的正当性: 论知识产权法中的对价与衡平 [Zhishichanquan de Zhengdangxing: 
Lun Zhishichanquan Fa Zhong de Duijia yu Hengping] in China Social Science (Xu 2003). This paper 
argues that “an expansion of intellectual property against the principle of equity may violate fundamental 
human rights.” However, the discussion on the justification of intellectual property was gradually 
marginalized.  
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Intellectual property has been incorporated into two other higher-level national agendas because 
of its function to stimulate innovation — one is innovation-driven development,4 and the other is 
Made in China 2025.5 In the National Outline of the Innovation-driven Development Strategy, 
intellectual property is juxtaposed with the strategies of standardization, quality, and brand as 
forces to enhance further innovation. Made in China 2025 is the first step towards building China 
into an innovative power by 2045, and intellectual property is a key approach to guarantee the 
achievement of this goal. Both agendas demonstrate the instrumentalism of employing intellectual 
property to stimulate innovation. These two agendas also manifest an increasing recognition of 
the significance of intellectual property among Chinese regulators because they were formulated 
based on consensus among various regulators in charge of development, intellectual property, and 
industrial policies.  
Intellectual property has gained wider recognition from various regulators mainly because of the 
second dimension of the “innovation stimulation” theory, which links the IP system to one of the 
grand agendas of China’s big picture — achieving technology catch-up. This catch-up discourse 
was then integrated into a bigger narrative about the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation after its 
century-long humiliation in modern history. The second component, though seemingly obscure, 
provides further justification for promoting the priority of intellectual property on the national 
agenda.  
These two dimensions, taken together, can explain in most cases why China has accepted higher 
IP protection standards than it initially wanted in the US-China bilateral IP negotiations (Chapter 
2.4.1). China’s pragmatic acceptance of high IP standards can be explained as reciprocal 
coordination — intellectual property could be sacrificed in exchange for another interest (Chapter 
5.3.1). It was the principle of innovation stimulation that suggested that the sacrifice of intellectual 
property would be worthwhile for China, since it came with the promise that, with the support of 
                                                     
4  In the keynote report at the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012, the concept of “innovation-driven 
development” was first proposed. See note no. 2 in Chapter 1. Innovation-driven development was 
further specified as an operational concept in two recent policies: (1) Central Committee of the CCP 
and the State Council, Several Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Systems and Mechanisms and 
Accelerating the Implementation of the Innovation-driven Development Strategy 中共中央 国务院关
于深化体制机制改革加快实施创新驱动发展战略的若干意见 [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowutyuan 
Guanyu Shenhua Tizhi Jizhi Gaige Jiakuai Shishi Chuangxin Qudong Fazhan Zhanlüe de Ruogan 
Yijian], March 13, 2015, available at 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/pressroom/201211/t20121119_98014.htm; and (2) Central Committee of 
the CCP and the State Council, Outline of Innovation-driven Development Strategy 国家创新驱动发
展战略纲要[Guojia Chuangxin Qudong Fazhan Zhanlüe Gangyao], May 20, 2016, see 
http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/zhuanti/ch-xinwen/2016-05/23/content_38515829.htm for a 
background brief in English. 
5  State Council, Notice of the State Council on Issuing Made in China 2025. See note no. 56 in Chapter 2.  
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the IP system, China would catch up in the future and at that time the IP standards entrenched by 
earlier generations of negotiators and regulators would fit China’s economy.  
9.2.2 The economic contribution theory 
The function of intellectual property has also been associated with broader goals of China’s 
economic development. In particular, China has been committed to transforming its 
manufacturing industry from mass quantity to high quality, changing the production model from 
labor-intensive to technology-intensive, and balancing economic development with 
environmental sustainability. The economic contribution theory explains such functions of 
intellectual property — intellectual property should contribute to the economic transformation in 
China. Though economic growth and job creation have been central goals, recently the role of 
intellectual property in promoting innovation that meets environmental goals and sustainable 
development has also come into focus.  
Numerous econometric studies have addressed the economic contribution of intellectual property 
(Yang and Maskus 2001, Thompson and Rushing 1996, Park and Ginarte 1997, Chu, Cozzi, and 
Galli 2014, Gould and Gruben 1996). However, the links between intellectual property and 
economic growth remain uncertain. For example, the effect of intellectual property differs across 
industries and across the type of intellectual property. More importantly, it is not a direct causal 
relationship. The function of intellectual property in economic growth is mainly based on its effect 
in stimulating innovation.  
Nonetheless, this instrumental narrative about the contribution of intellectual property to 
economic development has been adopted as an independent principle in China. In the 1990’s, the 
economic contribution theory focused more on how an IP system could contribute to foreign 
investment in China. The belief was that only a relatively comprehensive IP system could 
convince multinational companies to transfer technology to China. In the absence of technology 
transfer, China would still be trapped by the vicious circle of “equipment importation→equipment 
aging →equipment re-importation” (Chapter 2.3.3). Empirically, it has been proven that the 
strengthening of IPR protection in China has had a positive and significant effect on FDI 
(Awokuse and Yin 2010).  
Over time, China began to address the role of intellectual property in China’s domestic economic 
development. The National Intellectual Property Strategy states that the goal of intellectual 
property is to serve the economic and social development. SIPO has been active in developing 
the economic contribution theory to incorporate intellectual property into the broad agenda of 
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economic transition. For instance, after Chinese economic growth went into the “new normal”,6 
Dr. Shen Chagyu, the Commissioner of SIPO, stated in the 2015 Conference of Directors of Local 
IP Offices: “intellectual property is a very important factor to support economic new normal. In 
order to better support the new normal, intellectual property should be deeply mixed with (other 
aspects of) social and economic development” (Shen 2015). In the Several Opinions in 
Accelerating Building China as an IP Power under New Conditions (2015)7, the function of 
intellectual property to be able to directly contribute to an increase in the GDP was emphasized. 
Since 2016, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has incorporated IP products 知识产权产品 
[zhishichanquan chanpin] into the calculation of the System of National Account (SNA) (NBS 
2017). When the central government committed to reviving the manufacturing industry through 
Made in China 2025, Dr. Shen further stated that intellectual property should serve the 
development of China’s real economy (Zhang 2017a).8 The National Copyright Administration 
of China (NCAC), the primary regulator of copyright in China, also strived to consolidate the 
direct contribution of the copyright industry to economic growth. From 2007, the NCAC has been 
investigating the contribution of the copyright industry to economic growth. It is reported that the 
Chinese copyright industry contributed 7.3% to China’s overall GDP in 2015 (Hou 2017). In 
addition, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the trademark regulator 
of China, has emphasized the contribution of the trademark system to China’s economic 
development, specifically through its function to adapt to supply-side reform, enhance product 
quality, and promote the increase of consumption (Cui 2017). In addition, SAIC and the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) have also addressed 
the pivotal role of GIs in solving the problem of agriculture, rural areas and farmers (Chapter 
3.3.3). 
Recognizing the function of intellectual property, China has also incorporated intellectual 
property into various industrial policies in recent years. SIPO and other ministries often issue 
complementary policies to further comply with national economic agendas. For instance, after the 
State Council Decision on the Development of the Strategic Emerging Industries, 9  several 
ministries jointly issued the Opinions for Strengthening Intellectual Property in the Strategic 
                                                     
6  In recent years, China has experienced a slower economic growth rate, which has fallen from the historic 
double-digit rate to 6–7%. The Chinese government coined the term “new normal 新常态 [xin changtai]” 
to refer to this rebalance of economic growth to achieve slower but more sustainable economic 
development. For more discussion about the term, see Zhang and Chen (2017). 
7  See note no. 1 in Chapter 1. 
8  At the 8th China Patent Annual Conference, Dr Shen made a speech: “(we) should reinforce the creation 
and utilization of intellectual property, enhance the level of contribution of technology to real economy, 
and continuously inject new momentums to the real economy” (Zhang 2017a). 
9  Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Cultivation and Development of Strategic Emerging 
Industries, No. 32 (2010), see note no. 39 in Chapter 4. 
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Emerging Industries, 10  which further specifies that an IP assessment mechanism should be 
established in order to facilitate the development of strategic emerging industries. Also, 
intellectual property has become one of the indexes in Made in China 2025. It means that when a 
policy is implemented by local governments in a top-down manner, intellectual property is a key 
element in any performance evaluation for this policy. Such policy implementation, therefore, not 
only helps China to realize the goal of Made in China 2025 but also to strengthen intellectual 
property activities.  
Innovation stimulation theory focuses on intellectual property as a property right that can 
individually function as a driving force for innovation. The economic contribution theory focuses 
on intellectual property as a policy instrument to promote China’s economic development through 
the promotion of its own high technology industries. To this end, it is often incorporated or 
embedded into a bigger agenda, such as innovation-driven development or Made in China 2025. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 10, the strategies to manage IP principles often focus on the 
innovation stimulation principle, which calls for a more extensive protection of intellectual 
property. 
9.3 The logic of international engagement: foreign policy agenda 
Intellectual property has been one of the central issues in China’s bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations. China’s international IP engagement follows the basic principles of its foreign 
policy agenda — “keeping a low profile and getting things done” (Chapter 1.3.4.2). Specifically, 
foreign policy principles related to China’s international IP engagement include the following: 
(1) Non-alignment under the independent foreign policy of peace; 
(2) Adhere to the position that China is a developing country; and 
(3) Safeguard the multilateral trade system. 
9.3.1 Non-alignment under the independent foreign policy of peace 
China’s foreign policy agenda changed dramatically in its first three decades: from “leaning to 
one side to the USSR 一边倒 [yibiandao]” (1949-1958), to “anti-two hegemons 反两霸 [fan 
liang ba]” in the 1960s, to the “big triangle strategy 大三角 [da sanjiao]” in the 1970’s (Zheng 
1991, Zhang 2000, Liu 1999, Ding 2003, Deng 2005). China has developed a relatively stable 
                                                     
10 The General Office of the State Council, Notice on Forwarding Several Opinions of the State Intellectual 
Property Office and Other Departments on Strengthening the Work of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Strategic Emerging Industries (No. 28 [2012] of the General Office of the State Council) 国务院办公
厅转发知识产权局等部门关于加强战略性新兴产业知识产权工作若干意见的通知  （国办发
〔2012〕28 号）[Guowuyuan Bangongting Zhuanfa Zhishichanquanju Deng Bumen Guanyu Jiaqiang 
Zhanlüexing Xinxing Chanye Zhishichanquan Gongzuo Yijian de tongzhi (Guobanfa [2012] 28 Hao)]. 
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foreign policy agenda since the 1980s — “the independent foreign policy of peace”. 11 The theme 
of this foreign policy is that “China may not form an alliance with any superpowers, and China 
will not join one superpower to oppose the other. In dealing with foreign affairs, China will decide 
its own position on the basis of the merits of the issue, the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
people and the people of the world” (Zhang 1997, 48-49). The independent foreign policy of 
peace has been China’s major foreign policy agenda to deal with bilateral relations with other 
states. As pointed out by Zhang (1997), the core of this policy is non-alignment.  
The independent foreign policy of peace has developed with the changing situation globally since 
the end of the Cold War. The non-alignment position has evolved into partnerships with other 
countries. Wang Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, has pointed out that the core idea of 
partnership that China has established is “partnership without alliance”.12 This partnership differs 
from a conventional alliance in two ways. First, it does not emphasize security as the alliance 
system does; second, it does not target any third party as a potential enemy, and it does not exclude 
or coerce a third party (Sun 2012). In summary, non-alignment is still the important feature of the 
primary independent foreign policy of peace.   
9.3.2 China as a developing country 
China’s status in the world has been a controversial issue due to the dual identity of China. It has 
become the world’s second-largest economy while still a lower-middle-income country (Nolan 
2012). From this dual identity, one can infer that either China is a leading economy in the world 
or China is still a developing country. China has given full play to its dual identity to best serve 
its national interests. In terms of international IP engagement, China’s self-identification as a 
developing country has been consistently maintained. For instance, in the case of the disclosure 
obligation, the Chinese representative at the WTO TRIPS Council stated the following to support 
the disclosure obligation (Chapter 4): 
Many developing countries possessed plenty of genetic resources and related 
traditional knowledge but, due to some constraints on their technological capacities, 
most of them were unable to make full use of these resources and knowledge for 
patented innovation…The TRIPS Agreement did not extend protection to genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, thus encouraging biopiracy and damaging the 
interests of many developing countries. The proposal for the amendment of the TRIPS 
                                                     
11  The 12th CCP national congress held in 1982 established China’s new foreign policy agenda of 
“independent foreign policy of peace 独立自主的和平外交政策  [duli zizhu de heping waijiao 
zhengce]”. 
12 This term is translated from “结伴而不结盟 [jieban er bu jiemeng].” Wang Yi made this argument at 
the Press Conference of the 2015 “Two Sessions” (annual plenary sessions of the National People's 
Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). Wang 
Yi pointed out at this press conference that “this foreign policy focuses on constructing new foreign 
relations based on cooperation and win-win. China has established a partnership of various forms with 
over 70 countries in the world” (Wang 2015). 
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Agreement made by some developing Members was meant to enhance the mutual 
supportiveness of the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD…China, together with many 
developing Members, believed that the work under the TRIPS Council should be 
intensified…ensuring that the source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
obtained from developing countries was disclosed in patent applications. He agreed 
with Brazil that this item be included in the final single undertaking.13 [Underline 
mine] 
This speech vividly shows how China allied itself with other developing Members in post-TRIPS 
IP negotiations at the WTO to promote an agenda consistent with its domestic policy objectives.  
China’s developing country identity requires that its position on specific issues stays aligned with 
such an identification. Specific to intellectual property, it means China should consistently 
support the following developing-country positions:   
(1) Oppose TRIPS-plus standards in multilateral negotiations (substantively), and 
procedurally support multilateralism and oppose the new trend of plurilateralism (such 
as ACTA and TPP);  
(2) Support developing countries’ proposals on traditional IP issues at multilateral and 
bilateral fora; and 
(3) Support the WIPO development agenda and promote the dissemination of knowledge 
for the purpose of promoting access. 
These three dimensions have emerged from the case studies in the thesis. In the case of position 
1, China opposed the US and other developed countries’ initiatives of vertical forum-shifting, 
including ACTA and the IP chapter in the TPP (Chapter 7.4.3). Position 2 can be seen in China’s 
stance at the WTO TRIPS Council in the cases of GIs (Chapter 3.4.1) and the disclosure obligation 
(Chapter 4.5.1). In addition, the active promotion provisions14 in Chinese FTAs (Chapter 6.3) also 
show China’s standpoint of supporting the developing countries’ positions. Position 3, though not 
examined through specific cases, is also evident in China’s position on the issues of access to 
medicine15 and technical assistance on technologies conducive to adapt to and mitigate climate 
change.16 
                                                     
13 WTO TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 13 February 2007， 
IP/C/M/53, March 22, 2007.  
14 In Chapter 7, active promotion provisions refer to IP provisions in Chinese FTAs where both parties are 
committed to promoting a standard not mentioned in TRIPS. Active promotion provisions are often 
voluntary soft rules, but they represent the preference and prospect for different rule-making in 
intellectual property initiated by China.  
15 WTO TRIPS Council, Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, Communication from Brazil, China, 
Fiji, India and South Africa Communication, IP/C/W/630, June 6, 2017.   
16 Implementation of the Bali Roadmap-China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 
中国关于哥本哈根气候变化会议落实巴厘路线图立场  [Zhongguo Guanyu Gebenhagen Qihou 
Bianhua Huiyi Luoshi Bali Luxiantu Lichang], May 2009, available at: http://www.china-
un.ch/eng/bjzl/t564324.htm.  
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9.3.3 China as a pillar in the multilateral trade system  
China has been safeguarding the WTO, the world’s multilateral trade system, mainly through its 
compliance with WTO rules. As mentioned, China amended its IP laws comprehensively to 
comply with the WTO rules in 2000, and again to comply with the panel’s decision on the US-
China WTO IP dispute (DS362) (Chapter 2.4.2). While the US tends to embrace bilateralism 
under the Trump administration (Gertz 2017), China is slowly building itself into a pillar of the 
multilateral trade system. China’s position in firmly supporting multilateralism can be seen in the 
position statement by Gao Hucheng, the Chinese Minister of Commerce: 
China also participated in, protected and contributed to the multilateral trade system 
by observing WTO rules and fulfilling its promises and responsibilities. After the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, China continued its efforts on multilateral 
trade rules. When the Doha Round met with impasse, China, at both ministerial 
meetings in Bali and Nairobi, played a leading role as a responsible major trading 
country, in a bid to help the WTO move forward, bolster global prosperity and boost 
multilateral trade system (Gao 2016). 
Gao also highlighted that the WTO is a rule-based multilateral trading system, and compliance 
with its rules plays a key role in the prosperity that international trade and investment can bring. 
But the compliance mechanism is not designed only for China. He urged other WTO Members to 
recognize China’s market economy status 15 years after China’s accession to the WTO.17 When 
the EU and the US refused to do so, China requested consultations with the EU18 and the US19 at 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), one day after the 15-year expiry date. China began to 
adopt the same discourse the US used when it was trying to establish the WTO, the “rule-based” 
discourse about the importance of the multilateral trade system and urged the EU and the US to 
comply with the system (Zhang 2017d). The above two consultations show how China is using 
WTO rules to safeguard its own interests. In summary, the non-alignment principle deals with the 
basic position as to whether China should make an alliance in IP negotiations. Its adoption of a 
developing country identity mainly defines China’s IP position substantively. One can often see 
that China has a clear position in opposing the proposals of developed countries, but its position 
on the proposals of developing countries is sometimes more obscure. Clearly, China does not 
oppose developing countries’ proposals. However, it has been cautious in joining coalitions.  
                                                     
17 Provisions concerning recognising China’s market economy status are stipulated in Article 15 of the 
Protocol of China’s Accession to the WTO. Zhang Interprets this provision as that by the end of the 15 
years, other WTO Members should end of the practice that trading partners use a “substitute nation 
method,” a special formula and prices in third countries to calculate punitive tariffs for non-market 
economies in anti-dumping cases. Instead, the real prices should be used as a basis for such calculation.  
18 WT/DS516, European Union–Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies.  
19 WT/DS515, United States–Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies. 
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9.4 The variations of principles 
The rapid development of intellectual property and other issues in China over the last four decades 
has seen variations in the principles of decision-making. Some sub-state actors and private actors 
have come to recognize the value of intellectual property itself and are cultivating an IP culture. 
For example, in foreign policy, one can detect a temporal change from keeping a low profile to 
getting things done.  
9.4.1 From IP instrumentalism to cultivating an IP culture 
 Though IP instrumentalism has been the dominant principle justifying the importation of IP rules 
in China, there has been a bifurcation in the recognition of IP instrumentalism in recent years. On 
the one hand, IP instrumentalism is reinforced. The belief in intellectual property gradually 
developed among epistemic communities and technocrats through the medium of transnational 
networks formed between Chinese technocrats and their counterparts from the US, the EU, and 
WIPO in the form of capacity building. These transnational networks often take the form of 
technical assistance, training and exchange programs (Chapter 8.2). Wyzycka and Hasmath (2016, 
8-9)) concluded from their investigation of EU-China projects on intellectual property that 
“probably the greatest achievement of the EU’s norms transfer to China is that there seems to be 
an increasingly positive attitude at the central level of Chinese administration, in particular, 
MOFCOM, towards IP.” WIPO has been another important missionary promoting the IP system 
in China (Chapter 7.2). In November 2016, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and 
WIPO co-organized an international conference with the support of SIPO. The theme of the 
conference was Building Respect for Intellectual Property: Stimulating Innovation and Creativity 
(Gurry 2016).  This title suggests that a cultural change in relation to intellectual property is 
happening: from IP instrumentalism to respecting the value of intellectual property itself. 
Domestic right holders who have benefited from the IP system have also begun to support more 
effective IP enforcement. For instance, Zheng Yuanjie, one of the most famous authors of 
children's books in China has spoken about the importance of intellectual property for authors 
(Wang 2017a). In parallel with the surge in trademark registration and patent applications, IP 
litigation has also surged in recent years. For right holders, IP protection is the end, not a means. 
IP enforcement has been emphasized in various places, and special campaigns against 
counterfeiting have been launched by different ministries and implemented by local IP authorities, 
in response to the calls from right holders.  
On the other hand, some domestic regulators have begun to recognize other aspects of intellectual 
property. The anti-monopoly regulators, for instance, have noticed that IP monopolies can stifle 
innovation. They keep an eye on the negative effects and have formulated anti-monopoly 
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guidelines on the abuse of intellectual property.20 In addition to anti-monopoly law implementers, 
the general public, by and large, took a defiant position when the alien IP system was introduced 
in a top-down format in the early 1980s. The repetitive, large-scale and sometimes organized IP 
infringement that took place also revealed that although the IP institution had been formally 
established, the general public was a long way from respecting intellectual property as a property 
right. Such defiance21 underpinned various forms of IP infringement and caused the high cost and 
low effectiveness of IP enforcement.  
IP regulators and IP right holders as rights beneficiaries are eager to address the motivations 
underpinning this defiant attitude from the public. They have made efforts to cultivate an IP 
culture. In 2013, Several Opinions on Reinforcing the Construction of Intellectual Property 
Culture were jointly issued by six IP regulators.22 These Opinions set medium and long-term 
goals for the cultivation of IP culture.  
By 2015, the social identity of the core values of intellectual property and the sense 
of honor and shame related to intellectual property will have been significantly 
improved, public awareness of intellectual property will have been further enhanced. 
By 2020, the core values of intellectual property will have been an important part of 
a universal recognition by the public. 
Among various strategies to implement these Opinions, IP education has been emphasized. In 
university education, there is a call for promoting intellectual property as an independent 
discipline (Chen 2017). As a further step to cultivate IP culture, IP education has been extended 
to primary and secondary schools. SIPO and the Ministry of Education initiated a campaign to 
“cultivate awareness of intellectual property in kids”.23 Statements on the goals for IP education 
include:  
                                                     
20 SAIC Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property and Restrictions on Competition in 
2015. See note no. 22 in Chapter 5. 
21 In the process of importing intellectual property rules, China failed to respect traditional social values 
and challenged the stress and coping capabilities of individuals (See chapter 2.2). Instead of condemning 
the defiance as a theft of intellectual property, I argue this lack of consideration of local conditions is 
also responsible for generating defiant attitude. See Braithwaite (2009) for the role of defiance in 
regulation.  
22 State Intellectual Property Office, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce, State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television 
(SAPPRFT), and National Copyright Administration of China jointly issued Several Opinions on 
Reinforcing the Construction of Intellectual Property Culture 关于加强知识产权文化建设的若干意
见[Guanyu Jiaqiang Zhishichanquan Wenhua Jianshe de Ruogan Yijian], No. 22 (2013).  
23  This is the slogan of the campaign, which is translated from Chinese “知识产权从娃娃抓起 
[zhishichanquan cong wawa zhuaqi]”. 
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Young people can develop their respect for knowledge, advocating innovation and 
protecting intellectual property. Such education for young students can have a 
spillover effect on the whole society. It is desirable that a situation of “educating a 
student, influencing a family, and driving the whole society (to respect intellectual 
property)” can be formed.24  
To achieve these goals, it is expected that in 2020, around 100 primary and secondary schools in 
China will have IP programs. Special public funds have been allocated by SIPO to reach this 
target. These goals for education, if successfully achieved, will gradually transform IP 
instrumentalism into a belief in the inherent value of intellectual property among the next 
generation.  
9.4.2 The transition from “keeping a low profile” to “getting things done” 
China’s second-generation leader Deng Xiaoping first proposed the principle of “keeping a low 
profile, while getting things done”25 in the early 1990’s as China’s strategy to respond to the end 
of the Cold War. This guideline set the basic tone for China’s position at multilateral fora. China 
hid its capabilities, bided its time, avoided confrontation, and took advantage of the peaceful and 
stable international environment to facilitate domestic development. China expanded its trade and 
became a Member of the WTO, focused on economic development, and enhanced its military 
strength, technological competence, and diplomatic influence. Though keeping a low profile was 
only the first part of Deng’s idea, this part had been disproportionately emphasized in the first 
two decades after it was proposed.  
This guideline endured throughout changing circumstances. Gradually, the second half of the 
guideline, “getting things done” became the priority. In the first decade of the 21st century, China 
adopted a foreign policy agenda of “peaceful rise” under the Hu Jintao Administration, which 
was later replaced by the “peaceful development of China in a harmonious world” (Glaser and 
Medeiros 2007, Huang 2015). Since the Xi Jinping administration started in 2012, China has 
emphasized “getting things done”. Evidence for this changing focus can be seen mainly in the 
recent BRI which has involved IP engagement. Intellectual property has been influenced by the 
transition from being conservative and cautious “keeping a low profile” to being more active and 
“getting things done”. Specifically, China proposed the goal of becoming a leading IP power in 
                                                     
24 The State Intellectual Property Office and Ministry of Education issued Work Plan for Implementing the 
National Pilot and Demonstration Program of Intellectual Property Education at Primary Schools and 
Secondary Schools (Trial) 全国中小学知识产权教育试点示范工作方案 [Quanguo Zhongxiaoxue 
Zhishichanquan Jiaoyu Shidian Shifan Gongzuo Fang’an (Shixing)], 2015.  
25  This is a translation for the eight Chinese characters “韬光养晦，有所作为  [taoguangyanhui 
yousuozuowei] which were extracted from Deng’s talks in the 1990s. It has been China’s foreign policy 
guideline ever since.  
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the world and building “fairer and more reasonable international IP rules”.26 China has actively 
promoted IP capacity-building in the BRI countries, as well as the BRICS countries (Chapter 
7.5.3 and 7.5.4). 
9.5 Summary 
In summary, the logic of intellectual property in China is essentially IP instrumentalism, which 
means the value of an IP system lies in its function to achieve technology catch-up and economic 
development, along with China’s other goals. The foreign policy agenda of keeping a low profile 
to some extent constrained China’s international IP engagement. Over time, one can see changes 
in principles. Some ministries in charge began to focus on the value of intellectual property itself 
and have become devoted to cultivating an IP culture. Chinese foreign policy has also begun to 
focus more on getting things done, as shown by the recent BRI. The recent changes make the 
relationship between different principles more complicated. The next chapter will discuss the 
strategies by which China manages contesting principles.  
                                                     
26  See Para. 25 of the Several Opinions in Accelerating Building China as an IP Power under New 
Conditions (2015). 
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Chapter 10 Strategies to Manage 
Contesting Principles 
10.1 Introduction  
Strategies refer to specific methods that China has utilized either to achieve one of the principles 
or to reconcile two contesting principles (Chapter 9). Two basic strategies will be discussed in 
this chapter: modeling and balancing. China modeled the advanced IP systems in the first four 
decades of the PRC. Section 10.2 will discuss the variation of the modeling strategy in different 
contexts. Section 10.3 will discuss three specific strategies of balancing (dissembling, reticence, 
and the foreign policy chessboard).  
10.2 Modelling  
Modeling refers to a process of undertaking active learning, working with the models from 
international organizations, studying the experience from other industrialized countries, and 
sometimes refining these to fit with local conditions. As pointed out by Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000), modeling is more than mere imitation. In this thesis, modeling is different from rule-
taking because the actor who models can take the initiative in the process of modeling.  
 Modeling is the primary strategy that China has adopted to establish the domestic IP system. The 
intellectual property system was introduced to China through regulatory importation, which was 
part of the modeling strategy. Foreign IP laws were translated into Chinese, and their differences 
were studied carefully. IP experts from the EU and the US were invited to China to provide 
technical assistance, and Chinese officials and IP scholars took study tours, training, and 
exchanges to learn more about foreign IP systems. Chinese IP scholars actively followed and 
analyzed the latest developments in the international IP system and IP legislation of other 
countries.  
Modeling adds nuances to the rule-maker/rule-taker narrative by clarifying the grey area between 
a rule-taker and a rule-maker. One can understand, through modeling, the concerns China had 
over intellectual property, the choices China has made and the principles that underpinned these 
choices. Generally, the foreign policy chessboard was the underpinning principle for modeling 
before China’s accession to the WTO, and the innovation stimulation principle and the economic 
transformation principle have guided modeling afterward.  
China re-embraced the international IP system in the late 1970s, following its bilateral agreements 
with the US on trade and science and technology cooperation. China modeled IP systems from 
the US and the EU following the principle of the foreign policy chessboard. After China’s 
accession to the WTO, Chinese IP laws modeled provisions in TRIPS to meet the requirement for 
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compliance. GIs are a case in point. After TRIPS, China extended the range of targets it would 
model from existing international IP rules to rules that were beyond TRIPS standards. In the case 
of the disclosure obligation, China modeled rival rules — rules that the US opposed. A more 
recent trend has been manifested in the case of standardization, where China attempted a transition 
from “modeling the rules” to “modeling the strategies” for winning markets.  
10.2.1 Modelling as a strategy for foreign policy chessboard 
The historical review and case studies discussed in this thesis show that modeling was employed 
extensively in every area of intellectual property, throughout China’s modern history. Until 
China’s accession to the WTO, China modeled IP rules simply for TRIPS compliance. 
Compliance itself was the result of the foreign policy chessboard. In the bilateral IP negotiations 
between China and the US, the threat of trade retaliation by the US brought counter-threats from 
China. Despite this cycle of threats, a reciprocal coordination between the parties occurred — the 
US agreed on MFN treatment for China and to the release of restrictions on technology transfer, 
while China agreed to establish an IP system and to continually increase its domestic IP protection 
standards. This reciprocal coordination required China to put intellectual property as a piece on 
the foreign policy chessboard and this, in turn, became the trigger for China to take the modeling 
strategy before TRIPS.  
A different scope of analysis may lead to different conclusions on China’s IP engagement during 
this period. If the subject of analysis is limited to intellectual property, one would see China’s 
importation of intellectual property law before TRIPS as a result of coercion from the US and 
refer to China as an IP rule-taker. However, from the perspective of the foreign policy chessboard, 
having a domestic IP system in place was a cost that China had to pay to integrate itself into 
market globalization (getting MFN treatment from the US) and achieve its technology catch-up. 
Following the foreign policy chessboard principle, modeling at this stage was aimed at appeasing 
the US. Within a decade, China promulgated Trademark Law (1982), Patent Law (1984), and 
Copyright Law (1990), which fulfilled its commitment made in the US-China negotiations. 
China’s symbolic compliance further raised the issue of enforcement.   
Adherence to the foreign policy chessboard principle does not mean China lost its autonomy in 
deciding what to model. From the 1980s when the formulation of patent laws was put on the 
agenda, China invested a lot of time and personnel in studying and comparing IP systems in 
different jurisdictions. China did not always model the US. For instance, when the State Patent 
Office of China (SPO) began accepting patent applications in 1985, it signed an agreement with 
the EPO which agreed to provide technical assistance to the Chinese patent examination system. 
For over 30 years, the two patent offices cooperated with each other extensively in areas of policy 
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and rule-making, personnel training, patent examination, machine translation, Cooperative Patent 
Classification (CPC) and patent archives (Tuo and Tang 2015).  
10.2.2 Modelling for compliance and resistance 
Following China’s accession to the WTO, the Chinese IP laws underwent a substantial 
amendment to comply with the TRIPS standards. The amended intellectual laws in 2001 adopted 
the exact language of TRIPS to avoid any potential inconsistency. Thereafter, there was no 
international obligation for China to further increase IP protection. In this sense, China also 
modeled TRIPS as a baseline to resist any ratcheting-up of IP standards. GIs are a case in point.  
In the 1990s, as GIs were not clearly mandated to a specific ministry, SAIC and the AQSIQ both 
acquired regulatory power over GIs. With transnational bureaucratic networks, SAIC modeled 
the US trademark system while AQSIQ and MOA modeled the EU sui generis system that 
provides more extensive protection than TRIPS. The outcomes of this modeling were three 
independent parallel systems for GIs in China. Although following different logics (trademarks 
versus sui generis protection), the three systems in China actually provide protection equivalent 
to TRIPS. In the case of modeling the US trademark system, this meant increasing protection for 
wines and spirits to comply with TRIPS. In the case of modeling the EU sui generis system, China 
essentially resisted the higher standards that the EU sui generis system conferred by defending 
TRIPS standards (Chapter 3.3.2).  
In the US-China bilateral negotiations, China also resisted the higher requirements set by the US 
by defending the IP standards of Draft Final Act (1991) (Chapter 2.4.1). China has used modeling 
to develop patterns of compliance and resistance to help it navigate a world of rule-complexity, 
defending the lowest possible standards to minimize the impacts resulted from the foreign policy 
chessboard.  
10.2.3 Modelling a rival standard  
 China does not always model the US. In the case of the disclosure obligation, Chinese 
representatives undertook active learning at the TRIPS Council and WIPO IGC. Consequently, 
China supported a rival standard, similar to the EU/Norway proposals for weak disclosure model. 
Although China did not follow the megadiverse countries’ strong disclosure model that requires 
disclosure as a substantive requirement for the grant of a patent, Patent Law (2008) introduced a 
complementary “linkage” arrangement to protect genetic resources inspired by the megadiverse 
countries’ position (Chapter 4.4.2). Arguably the outcome of China’s creative modeling may still 
not be sufficient to protect genetic resources because the linkage has not been comprehensively 
established. Nonetheless, modeling a rival standard itself indicates the unique learning curve of 
China in the post-TRIPS era. China’s position on disclosure also brought closer coordination with 
other megadiverse countries on this issue at the TRIPS Council.  
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10.2.4 Modelling the strategy of standardization 
The Chinese government and Chinese companies learned, at great cost to their DVD industry, 
that intellectual property alone is not enough if Chinese companies want to be competitive and 
profitable in the global market. Modeling occurred across three dimensions in this case:  First, the 
Chinese government enacted its own anti-monopoly law, which was a combination of modeling 
(from the US anti-trust law and EU competition law) and adapting it to its local conditions. 
Secondly, the Chinese government carefully studied the US and EU strategy of standardization 
and set up its own national standardization strategy (Zhang and An 2005). Thirdly, Chinese 
companies began to model multinational corporations in order to obtain or maintain their 
competitiveness through standardization. What was modeled in the second and third dimensions 
was not the content of a standard, but the strategy of using standard-setting to maintain 
competitiveness. Although Chinese companies failed in their attempt to promote WAPI as an 
international standard, the recent development of 4G and 5G standards has seen deeper 
involvement by Chinese companies. The case of standardization, spanning almost two decades, 
also shows how modeling in the form of learning took hold and began to accelerate. 
10.2.5 China to be a model exporter  
Since China’s National IP Strategy in 2008, modeling has been used more to follow the 
innovation stimulation principle rather than the foreign policy chessboard. Chinese decision 
makers, as well as the epistemic communities, have been convinced by the innovation stimulation 
principle. Under this principle, China has actively modeled more “advanced IP systems” in the 
world. TRIPS-plus standards adopted by domestic laws and accepted in bilateral FTAs 
demonstrate this emerging trend. Typical cases include data exclusivity and patent linkage; in 
both cases, the advocacy of IP epistemic communities started the modeling process. 
China began to transform itself into an IP model exporter in the fora of BRICS and the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). It also enhanced its IP engagement with developing countries in other fora. 
Through webs of dialogues, China provides technical assistance to enhance IP capacity building 
in these countries and it disseminates its successful experience and best practice in intellectual 
property to these countries (Chapter 7.5.3 and 7.5.4). This transformation conforms to both the 
principle of innovation stimulation and the recent foreign policy agenda of striving to get things 
done. Such a transformation is necessary for China to protect its own intellectual property in these 
countries when it exports its own technologies, in particular to the BRI countries.   
10.2.6 Discussion: modeling and regulatory sovereignty 
When the US, Switzerland and other industrialized countries were in their early stage of 
industrialization, they played a game of defiance in intellectual property. The US entered the 
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Berne Convention in 1988, a century after the Berne Convention came into force. In the 19th 
century, the Netherlands opted to eliminate its patent law. Switzerland took advantage of the 
absence of the patent protection in certain subject matters to help its industrial development, 
especially in industries like dye, chemical, and electro-technical (Machlup and Penrose 1950, 
Schiff 1971).  
China cannot afford defiance in intellectual property. China entered the international intellectual 
system after TRIPS, which meant it had little influence on the emergence of the TRIPS paradigm. 
Its choice was basically to accept or reject it. Rejection meant that China would be excluded from 
the WTO, which was not really an option for a nation developing on the basis of export growth. 
In the post-TRIPS era, China did not have the flexibility to determine its own domestic IP 
standards, like the US and Switzerland once had. Instead, China had to comply fully with the 
international standards established by TRIPS. In this situation, China’s regulatory sovereignty 
was limited, compared with the US and other industrialized countries. The modeling strategy 
indicates how China has exercised its limited sovereign discretion over intellectual property.   
Modeling has two important effects: compliance and institutional isomorphism. Compliance with 
international IP standards is necessary for China to integrate itself into the international IP system. 
Institutional isomorphism, as indicated by its name, is an institutional effect. Institutional 
isomorphism refers to the process that organizations become similar or homogeneous with each 
other (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).1 After extensive learning in the form of personal training, 
study tours and numerous roundtables and seminars and symposiums, the Chinese IP regulators 
came to hold views very similar to their counterparts in the EU and the US 
10.3 Balancing  
As Braithwaite and Drahos pointed out in Global Business Regulation, one prominent 
characteristic of principles is that they are not mutually exclusive. Different principles can coexist 
and contest (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). China appears to juggle, balance, and manipulate 
principles, with a view to steering itself to fulfill its big-picture vision. This section will focus on 
the strategy of balancing that China employs to reconcile contestation of principles.  
There is potential contestation between the innovation stimulation theory and some of the foreign 
policy positions held by China. One is with China’s self-identification as a developing country, 
and the other is China’s foreign policy agenda. Specific strategies to balance the contestation will 
be discussed in the following sections.  
                                                     
1  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three sources for the institutional isomorphism: mimetic, 
normative, and coercive pressures. 
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(1) Innovation stimulation versus maintaining developing country status 
There is a contestation between the innovation stimulation principle and China’s position in 
maintaining its developing country status. On the one hand, the innovation stimulation principle 
encourages China to promote more extensive IP protection. On the other, its claim to developing 
country status requires China to act as a developing country by, for example, supporting 
developing country positions at various international fora. Specifically, by adopting a developing 
country status, it has to oppose TRIPS-plus standards and plurilateralism and support developing 
countries’ proposals (Section 9.2.4.2).  
(2) Innovation stimulation versus keeping a low profile 
When there is potential contestation between the innovation stimulation principle and China’s 
general foreign policy agenda, the foreign policy agenda will always prevail.  As pointed out by 
Yang Jiechi, State Counsellor and Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office: 
 We have to emphasize that foreign affairs must take care of both domestic and 
international respects, plan comprehensively, deployed uniformly, and implement 
under coordination; this requires central and local governments, civil society and 
other foreign-related departments firmly to establish a sense of “foreign policy 
chessboard”, perform their duties, and make a concerted effort (Yang 2013, 10). 
Following this guideline, intellectual property should serve China’s overall interests in foreign 
affairs. This means that when there is an internal conflict between different opinions surrounding 
intellectual property, the one that serves China’s foreign policy interest prevails.   
It is not unique for China to have a potential contestation between (1) the desire for higher IP 
protection standards because of enhanced innovative capacity that such standards might bring and 
(2) the foreign policy demand to defend a developing country position. It perplexes other 
emerging powers. For instance, Okediji (2004b) pointed out that the developing-country 
coalitions on intellectual property are fracturing as some emerging powers within the coalition 
(India and Brazil) have developed their technology, which propels these countries to subtly 
change their positions in IP negotiations. Benoliel and Salama (2010) further highlighted the 
tension between innovation and international IP negotiation. They refer to this phenomenon as 
the “innovation dilemma” in which innovation weakens the negotiating power of the emerging 
countries. As they enhance their innovative capacity, developing countries tend to adopt similar 
IP standards to developed countries; in turn, this position of developing countries weakens their 
bargaining power.  
China has adopted the following specific balancing strategies to address the clashes flowing from 
the need to stimulate innovation while adhering to the foreign policy agenda: dissembling, 
reticence, and moves on the foreign policy agenda.  
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10.3.1 Dissembling 
Dissembling refers to an approach in which an actor backs different, sometimes inconsistent 
principles, making it hard to understand its true position. Specifically, it refers to a situation where 
a state takes a clear position at one international forum at one time, but its positions at different 
fora on the same issue are inconsistent with each other. This measure is used by China to allow it 
to keep moving to higher IP standards to promote further innovation while projecting an apparent 
desire to maintain IP multilateralism as a developing country.  
 Dissembling is not used in the thematic cases examined in this thesis. It is deployed 
systematically and evidenced by data on China’s engagement at different levels (Chapter 6-7). At 
the national level, China reinforces IP protection to stimulate innovation, and to achieve 
technological catch-up. The innovation stimulation principle has prevailed at the domestic level:  
some Chinese domestic IP laws and regulations have already adopted TRIPS-plus standards 
(Chapter 6.4). At the multilateral level, China supports IP multilateralism at the TRIPS Council 
and opposes forum-shifts led by the US  
At the bilateral level, China’s positions are more variegated. Most of the IP provisions in Chinese 
FTAs defend TRIPS standards, either implicitly or explicitly (Chapter 6.2) indicating support for 
multilateralism. On certain issues, China has adopted TRIPS-plus IP standards in its recent FTAs 
with Switzerland, Australia and South Korea (Chapter 6.4). These provisions, though not many 
in number, lend support to the innovation stimulation theory. There are also active promotion 
provisions in Chinese FTAs where China promotes issues with an element of development, such 
as the protection of genetic resources, and intellectual property and public health. 
The nuanced positions of China at the different levels can be explained by dissembling. First, with 
regard to TRIPS-plus provisions, any standards beyond TRIPS are apparently unacceptable to 
China at the multilateral level because China has a clear principle of aligning its position with 
developing countries. However, China’s domestic IP protection level is high and so it is no longer 
a concession for China to accept TRIPS-plus standards. Still, FTA partners aiming for higher IP 
standards (Switzerland, Australia and South Korea, Chapter 6.4) had to go to the bilateral level to 
negotiate TRIPS-plus provision with China. By opening a bilateral FTA door to TRIPS-plus 
provisions, China turns intellectual property into a bargaining chip for itself. Secondly, most of 
the active promotion provisions in Chinese FTAs are vague, open-ended, and with no treaty 
obligation attached. They showcase China’s attitude to align itself with other developing countries. 
With dissembling, China managed to align with developing country positions at the multilateral 
level, strategize IP as a bargaining chip in its FTAs negotiations, and enhance domestic IP 
protection to stimulate innovation.     
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10.3.2 Reticence  
Reticence refers to an approach in which an actor tries to keep a low profile while participating 
in the international negotiation of an issue — it refuses to join any alliances, abstains from 
expressing a clear substantive position, and keeps implementation to a minimum when it has to. 
While dissembling is used by China to mask its support for some higher IP standards held by 
developed countries, reticence is used to deal with proposals by developing countries, often 
related to access.  
Through the practice of reticence, China aimed to reconcile the tension between the innovation 
stimulation theory and China’s foreign policy position of non-alignment and keeping a low profile. 
This tension is compounded by the contestation between the innovation stimulation theory and 
the social contract theory of intellectual property that underpins developing country proposals. 
Following social contract theory, the developing country proposals have not only strived to 
balance the proprietary interest and the public interest but also to prioritize the public interest 
(manifested by access interests). They prioritize it by framing the access to medicine, food, and 
books as basic human rights to life, to health and to knowledge. At the same time, they have 
framed intellectual property as a constructed monopoly that has stifled these human rights (Sell 
and Prakash 2004). In addition to developing countries, international civil society has also actively 
participated in these campaigns. Since it is not possible to support both proprietary and access 
interests, there is no space for dissembling. China has had to take sides. Domestically, China has 
moved to create large IP administrations and to protect IP right holders to promote innovation. 
Internationally, it has used reticence to mitigate the tension and maintain its developing country 
status.  
At the international level, China’s reticence mainly takes the form of inaction or abstention from 
participation. For instance, China has not made any meaningful contribution to the international 
discussion on access to medicine at various multilateral fora, only observing the progress of the 
international debate without trying to steer its progress or expressing a clear position.  
At the national level, China’s reticence takes the form of minimum implementation. As mentioned 
in Section 9.3.1, China has complied with international IP standards. Although China has not been 
actively supporting the access campaign at the international level, it did not hesitate to comply 
with any substantive international norms that the access campaign has achieved. A case in point 
is the compulsory license of patents. In Patent Law (2000), China adopted the same wording in 
the provision of compulsory license to comply with the WTO standard — a typical example of 
modeling. On November 29, 2005, SIPO issued Measures for Compulsory License of Patents 
concerning Public Health, as its implementation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
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Agreement and Public Health. 2  Since then, civil societies and domestic pharmaceutical 
companies have tried to initiate the procedure. One reported case was that the Chinese hepatitis 
community and AIDS community had submitted the Petition to Grant Compulsory License to the 
Drug Lamivudine to MOFCOM, Ministry of Health, SIPO, the National Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) (Fang and Zou 
2012). However, there has been no official reply to this petition. To date, no single compulsory 
license has been granted by the Chinese government in the 12 years after the 2015 Measures (Xie 
2017). 
The innovation stimulation theory and economic contribution theory are the underpinning 
rationales for China to undertake the strategy of reticence to address developing countries’ 
proposals. The influence of the innovation stimulation theory makes the Chinese government 
hesitant to advocate for developing countries’ proposals on access-related issues. The economic 
contribution theory also keeps China silent at multinational fora on access-related issues. China 
does not want to disturb FDI from multinational pharmaceutical firms and so has not issued a 
compulsory license to generic firms in China. In addition, according to the analysis of sub-state 
actors, regulatory neglect provides a regulatory explanation for China’s reticence in access-related 
issues (Chapter 8.2.4). Access-related issues have never been central to the implementation of the 
National IP strategy. In the Major Expected Targets for the Implementation of the National IP 
Strategy (2014—2020) 3 (Appendix III),  no single target is related to access. Promoting access 
has not been one of the major targets for ministerial IP regulators and it has not been designated 
to a specific ministry to implement, therefore, no ministry is explicitly responsible for its 
implementation. In this case, even if a government official in charge of access-related IP issues 
acknowledges the significance of access interests and is motivated to promote such interests, 
his/her effort may be impeded by the lack of a clear mandate. 
10.3.3 Foreign policy chessboard 
When there is a contestation between intellectual property and the foreign policy agenda, the rule 
of thumb is that the foreign policy prevails. Intellectual property becomes a pawn on the “big 
chessboard of foreign policy”. As mentioned in the modeling strategy, the initial momentum for 
China to draft IP laws in the early 1980s was to fulfill its treaty obligations under US-China 
bilateral treaties on high energy physics and trade relations (Chapter 2.4.1). Again, China 
comprehensively amended its IP laws in 2000 to fulfill the commitments it undertook as part of 
                                                     
2   These measures were replaced by Measures for Compulsory Licence of Patent Implementation, 
promulgated by Order No. 64 of SIPO on March 15, 2012.  
3  State Council, Notice on the Action Plan for Further Implementing the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy (2014-2020). See note no. 50 in Chapter 2.  
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WTO accession. These domestic law-making processes were not out of genuine domestic 
demands for these laws, but to keep foreign policy promises.  
The foreign policy chessboard also means that when an issue is considered as a priority in foreign 
policy, it will be resolved efficiently, in a way that is favorable to the foreign party. Foreign 
companies doing business in China have long been aware of such practices. As early as the 1980s, 
EU and US companies or industrial associations began to lobby their governments to 
coerce/persuade China to enhance IP protection standards. European GI owners of Danisa and 
Champagne managed to pressure the Chinese government to protect their GIs through case-
specific administrative decrees (Chapter 3.3.1.2). These decrees offered super-national treatment 
because Chinese geographical names were not protected at all at that time. In the standardization 
case, the plan to adopt the home-grown standard WAPI as a compulsory national standard for 
WLAN was highlighted in the US-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and 
suspended indefinitely (Chapter 5.3.1).      
The foreign policy chessboard is also the rule of thumb when China actively engages the 
international IP system. In this case, the foreign policy chessboard means a deliberation process 
open to all relevant ministries to make a concerted decision on a foreign policy-related IP issue. 
This strategy aims to safeguard the implementation of “keeping a low profile while getting things 
done” through cautious consideration of all relevant aspects of an issue by all relevant parties. It 
also guarantees that the ministries representing China internationally have a coherent voice on the 
same issue. They may disagree internally in discussions or deliberations, but they must speak in 
one voice once a decision is made.  
An example of this is the deliberation process of hosting the diplomatic conference of the WIPO 
Treaty for Audio-visual Works (Chapter 7.2.3). It was not a big issue in the sense of IP rule-
making because China was not contributing substantively to the negotiating process of the treaty. 
However, the organization of such an event in China was a significant foreign policy issue. During 
the deliberation of whether to hold this event in a Chinese city, National Copyright Administration 
of China (NCAC), the copyright regulator in China, was part of a larger group decision-making 
process, which included CMFA, MOFCOM, SAIC and SIPO, even Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council (LAO) and Legislative Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(LAC). After careful consideration, it was decided that Beijing would host the diplomatic 
conference and the treaty could bear the name of Beijing. The issue at stake was whether it would 
be a correct and reasonable decision to raise China’s IP profile by hosting the conference under 
the general principle of keeping a low profile. 
This foreign policy chessboard also works in implementation. When explaining why China has 
not issued a single compulsory license for any patent, Mr. Yin Xintian, the then Director of Legal 
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Department of SIPO said “since it [compulsory license] is an issue that can have a significant 
impact, so it is a cautious decision to make. SIPO cannot make the decision alone — a request 
should be made by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries” (He 2010). 
One of the greatest concerns about issuing a compulsory license is its impact on multinational 
pharmaceutical companies, which have been active in foreign investment in China. The procedure 
to issue a compulsory license, therefore, involves more than the patent office. However, the 
sophisticated deliberation procedure and foreign affairs concerns act as a fetter on issuing a 
compulsory license. 
10.3.5 Effects of balancing 
There are two major effects of China’s balancing strategy: one is constructed inconsistency, and 
the other is the invisibility of China on many IP issues at the international level. Constructed 
inconsistency refers to the variegated positions of China at the bilateral level and multilateral level 
on the same issue. The inconsistency is enabled by international regime complexity in the area of 
intellectual property. For instance, on the issue of TRIPS-plus provisions, China is an active tester 
at the national level, an active blocker at the multilateral level, and keeps opportunities open at 
the bilateral level.  
The foreign policy chessboard and reticence lead to the same effect; they make China less visible 
in the international policy debates on intellectual property. China’s uniform foreign policy 
consideration hinders bottom-up initiatives. At the foreign policy chessboard, intellectual 
property may sometimes be sacrificed for reciprocal purposes. Reticence, on the other hand, 
impedes China from joining developing country proposals to promote access at the international 
level. By taking this measure, China is gradually separating itself from its developing country 
allies on IP issues, a result that is inevitable as long as China keeps embracing the innovation 
stimulation theory. In summary, these two measures keep China cautious and inactive in 
international IP engagement.   
10.4 Summary 
China has used the strategy of modeling to fulfill its foreign policy commitment and/or achieving 
its innovation stimulation goals. Balancing is another strategy China uses to manage contestation 
of principles. The outcomes of modeling are compliance with international standards and 
institutional isomorphism, while the effects of balancing are constructed inconsistency and the 
perceived low-profile of China in its international IP engagement.  
With regard to the question of whether China will become an international IP rule-maker, the 
strategies of modeling and balancing provide an insider’s view. Institutional isomorphism, as an 
effect of modeling, means that the Chinese IP system will become similar to the western (in 
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particular the US and EU) IP systems it modeled. Through modeling, Chinese IP regulators (and 
epistemic communities) established and consolidated transnational networks. Innovation 
stimulation theory took root in China and has spread through these transnational networks. 
Consequently, China tends to take similar positions to those who have forged the link between 
innovation stimulation theory and the models that now form the basis of international IP 
regulation. However, this clear tendency is obscured by the balancing strategy. As a result of 
foreign policy concerns, China dissembles on its positions in fora at different levels. For example, 
it is reticent to support developing countries’ access-related proposals and calculates its foreign 
policy risk whenever it intends to make its own proposal. Balancing illustrates how China 
struggles to accommodate changing principles in a period of rapid transition.   
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Chapter 11 Conclusion 
Three questions were set up at the beginning of this thesis: (1) how does China engage with the 
international IP system? (2) has China become an IP rule-maker? and (3) what underpins China’s 
international IP engagement? These three questions have been analyzed through cases where 
China has had opportunities to become a rule-maker (GIs, the disclosure obligation and IP and 
standardization) and cases that capture China’s extensive engagement bilaterally and 
multilaterally. The discussion chapters analyzed actors involved in China’s international IP 
engagement, identified the principles that the actors follow, and the strategies that actors use to 
pursue one principle or manage contestation of different principles. This chapter, based on the 
previous analysis, draws together the conclusions to the three questions initially raised. 
11.1 Strategies behind China’s engagement and their consequences 
China engages with the international IP system through strategies of modeling and balancing to 
manage the contestation of principles that China has chosen to observe simultaneously. 
Specifically, the Chinese government (and its ministries) uses the strategy of modeling to 
operationalize the principle of IP instrumentalism; it uses the strategy of balancing (including 
dissembling, reticence and foreign policy chessboard) to address the contestation between the 
principles of IP instrumentalism and its foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless, the effects of the 
strategies have gone beyond achieving these expected goals.  
It is clear that the Chinese IP system has moved closer to the US or EU IP systems than might 
have been expected on the basis of mere modeling alone. This is because the strategy of modeling 
has introduced institutional isomorphism and a similar mindset among IP regulators. Four-
decades of modeling makes China similar to rather than different from developed countries in the 
recognition of intellectual property and in its positions concerning international IP regulation, 
even on the issue of the export of IP rules. China has quietly emerged as an IP model exporter in 
its engagement with the BRICS countries and in the BRI IP arrangement. China will continue to 
use these strategies in the foreseeable future because the contestation of principles (IP 
instrumentalism versus foreign policy agenda) will continue. 
 China has used the strategy of balancing to manage contestations between different principles. 
Three specific balancing strategies (dissembling, reticence and the foreign policy chessboard) 
were discussed in this thesis. Dissembling leads China into constructed inconsistent positions at 
the various different levels of international engagement and rule-making. Reticence is used by 
China to keep a low profile in its international IP engagement.  
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11.2 Tipping point for China to be a rule-maker? 
The case studies basically indicate that China has some way to go before it can claim a regulatory 
agenda-setting influence to match its status as the world’s second largest economy. Even where 
China looks to promote a rival standard, as in the WAPI case, its attempts have been resisted by 
the US and ultimately defeated. Nonetheless, China’s recent IP engagement with the BRICS and 
BRI reveal that China is adjusting its principles and strategies to produce more active engagement. 
Is this a sign that China is moving from reticence to assertiveness in its international IP 
engagement? This would be consistent with its emphasis on enhancing its innovative capacity and 
its belief in the function of intellectual property to stimulate innovation. However, given the 
contestations between the IP principles and foreign policy principles, the answer to the question 
also depends on what happens in China’s foreign policy sphere, in particular, China’s self-
identification as a developing country. It is a question that can only be answered through the 
passing of time.  
Even if China becomes more active in international IP regulation, it is very unlikely to be able to 
exercise the kind of dominance that the US demonstrated during the making of TRIPS. In fact, 
because of legal fragmentation, rule ambiguity created by international regime complexity and 
the rise of the international civil societies, no state, the US included, can dominate the IP rule-
making game in the way that the US and EU once did. International regime complexity provides 
powerful states with more opportunities to play cross-regime games or create an entirely new 
regime, but it also means that no single state can be the rule-maker for all regimes. The 
variegations of China’s role in specific cases (see Table 18) shows that it is not possible to capture 
China’s role with a simple binary of rule-taker v rule-maker.  China has entered a game of great 
networked complexity in which IP is one key global issue, but only one. Where China will end 
up on intellectual property is hard to say, not just because of China’s speed of development, but 
because there are many others players in the game also responding and affecting this networked 
complexity. 
11.3 Motivations for China’s international IP engagement 
This thesis set out two propositions for China’s international IP engagement: either China is 
trapped by IP rules set by the US (the China trapped proposition) or China engages with the 
international IP system to achieve its own grand strategy (the grand strategy proposition).  
Though seemingly exclusive, these two propositions are not contradictory from a longitudinal 
perspective. After a review of IP history in modern and contemporary China (Chapter 2) and case 
studies on China’s international IP engagement in specific areas, I find that the data indicates that 
the two propositions can be reconciled if they are seen as part of a historical process. China had 
to comply with US demands on intellectual property in order to continue its science and 
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technology cooperation with the US and to gain membership of the WTO. From 1978, a process 
started in which Chinese IP regulators (ministries in charge of intellectual property) began to 
consolidate and a strong domestic IP epistemic community began to grow. The influence of the 
US and the EU on intellectual property in China was exerted through the transnational networks 
they established with various domestic institutions in China.  
Over time, China began to use intellectual property as a fulcrum to leverage its trade and export 
capabilities and to attract FDI in the early days of its Reform and Open-up policy. Once advanced 
technologies were introduced to China, they took root in China — first absorbed by local partners, 
then integrated with existing technologies, and further adapted to fit local conditions. At this point, 
China began to calculate what it could win using intellectual property as the rules of the game for 
its economy. China is implementing its grand strategy of innovation-driven development to 
achieve technology catch-up. It is a grand strategy in which intellectual property is seen as being 
critical to its development. Plurilaterally, China emphasizes IP cooperation and is ready to export 
its best practice in IP regulation to other BRICS countries and to cooperate on IP with the BRI 
countries (Chapter 7.5.3 and 7.5.4). 
In the end, however, there is no uniform answer to the questions of “who is trapped” or “whose 
grand strategy”.  The evidence from the perspective of the dynamic of sub-state actors in China 
(Chapter 8) is cloudy. For instance, in late May 2017, while the Chinese Food and Drug 
Administration was collecting comments on its proposal for a patent linkage mechanism and 
longer-term data exclusivity in China, MOFCOM proposed to the WTO TRIPS Council to allow 
more flexibility in intellectual property to promote public interest (IP/C/W/630) (Section 9.3.2).  
In the end, China’s vast internal bureaucratic networks on IP have added yet another layer of 
network complexity to the globalization processes of intellectual property. 
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Appendix I Multilateral Treaties Effective in China1
Administer/ 
Forum of 
negotiation 
Name of the Treaty Date effective to 
China  
WIPO-
administered 
Treaty (14 
ratified, 3 
signed but 
not ratified) 
The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organization 
June 3, 1980 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(1967) (the Paris Convention) 
March 19, 1985 
The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks (1989) (the Madrid Agreement) 
October 4, 1989 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (1971) (the Berne Convention); 
October 15, 1992 
the Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms against Unauthorised Duplication of their 
Phonograms (1971) 
April 30, 1993 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970), as amended in 1979, 
and modified in 1984 and 2001 
January 1, 1994 
the Nice Agreement Concerning the International 
Classification of Goods and Services for the Registration of 
Marks (1957), as amended in 1979 (the Nice Agreement) 
August 9, 1995 
the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the 
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent 
Procedure (1977), as amended in 1980 (the Budapest 
Treaty) 
July 1, 1995 
The Madrid Protocol September 1, 
1995 
The Locarno Agreement Establishing an International 
Classification for Industrial Design (1968), as amended in 
1957 (the Locarno Agreement) 
September 19, 
1996 
The Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International 
Patent Classification (1971), as amended in 1979 
June 19, 1997 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) June 9, 2007 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
(1996) 
June 9, 2007 
Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances (2012), (Beijing 
Treaty, not yet in force) 
July 9, 2014 
1  Data collected on February 10, 2017, referring to the WIPO and CBD websites: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp, and https://www.cbd.int/.  
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Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits (1989) (the Washington Treaty, not yet in 
force) 
Signed in 1989 
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks Signed on Jan 
29, 2007 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for 
Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print 
Disabled (2013), (Marrakesh Treaty) 
Signed on June 
28, 2013 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (1994) (TRIPS)  
December 11, 
2001 
UNESCO the Universal Copyright Convention (1971) October 30, 1992 
The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (2003) 
April 21, 2006 
The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) 
December 29, 
2006 
UPOV The International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (1978) 
April 23. 1999 
COP of the 
Convention 
of Biological 
Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) January， 1993 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (2000) 
April 27, 2005 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2014) 
September 6, 
2016 
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Appendix II Intellectual Property Regulators in China 
The following table contains the names of all 31 members to the State Council Inter-Ministerial Joint 
Meeting for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy both in Chinese and in 
English.2 
中共中央宣传部  (国务院新闻
办) 
Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
最高人民法院  Supreme People's Court 
最高人民检察院 Supreme People's Procuratorate 
外交部  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
国家发展改革委员会 National Development and Reform Commission 
教育部  Ministry of Education 
科技部 Ministry of S&T 
工业和信息化部  Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
公安部  Ministry of Public Security 
司法部  Ministry of Justice 
财政部  Ministry of Finance 
人力资源和社会保障部 Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
环境保护部  Ministry of Environmental Protection 
农业部  Ministry of Agriculture 
                                                     
2  Source of the list: website of the General Office of the State Council Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting for the 
Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlssbgs/#, last 
retrieved on January 24, 2018.   
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商务部  Ministry of Commerce 
文化部  Ministry of Culture 
卫生和计划生育委员会 National Health and Family Planning Commission 
人民银行 People’s Bank  
国务院国有资产监督和管理委
员会 
State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council 
海关总署  General Administration of Customs 
工商行政管理总局 State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
质量监督检验检疫总局 General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine 
新闻出版广电总局 (版权局) State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television (National Copyright 
Administration) 
国家林业局  State Forestry Administration 
国家知识产权局  State IP Office 
国务院法制办公室  Legislative Affairs Office of State Council 
中国科学院  Chinese Academy of Sciences 
国防科技工业局  State Administration of Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defence 
中央军委装备发展部 Central Military Commission Equipment 
Development Department 
中国国际贸易促进委员会 China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade 
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Appendix III IP targets in the Action Plan for Further Implementing the 
National IP Strategy (2014-2020) 
Target 2013  2015 2020 
Invention patents by residents (unit: patent numbers/ 10, 
000 people) 
4 6 14 
Patent applications filed via the "Patent Cooperation 
Treaty" (unit: 10, 000) 
2.2 3.0 7.5 
Average years of maintenance of an invention patent 
applied for by a resident 
5.8 6.4 9.0 
Number of copyright registrations (unit: 10, 000) 84.5 90 100 
Copyright registrations for computer software (unit: 
10,000) 
16.4 17.2 20 
Total amount of trading in technology contracts 
registered at technology exchange market nationally 
(unit: 100 billion) 
0.8 1.0 2.0 
Annual amount of IPR pledge financing (unit: 100 million) 687.5 750 1800 
Royalties and license fees from export of exclusive rights 
(unit: USD 100 million) 
13.6 20 80 
Annual increase in the revenue of intellectual property 
services (%) 
18 20 20 
Social satisfaction with intellectual property protection 
(score) 
65 70 80 
Average period for substantive examination of an 
invention patent (months) 
22.3 21.7 20.2 
Average period for registered trademarks (months) 10 9 9 
 
